


Southern Africa REPORT

Vol. 4 No. 4

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Apartheid Economics

CHASING A CURE:
Capitalist Dilemmas
in South Africa

THE 50%
SOLUTION:
Unemployment and
the Working Class

STACKING THE
DECK IN NAMIBIA
by Victoria Brittain


ADJUSTING THE
SPORTS BOYCOTT
by Bruce Kidd

price: \$3.00

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Contents

Editorial	
The Bottom Line	1
Chasing a Cure:	
Capitalist Dilemmas in South Africa	3
The 50% Solution:	
Unemployment and the Working Class	9
Stacking the Deck in Namibia	12
Adjusting the Sports Boycott	16
Prime Time History:	
Appropriating Shaka Zulu	21
"Apartheid is the State of Emergency!"	
UDF Leaders in Toronto	24
Bonn Trabalho: Supporting Angola and Mozambique	
I: The Conference	26
II: Two Workshops	27
Review:	
Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths	29
Letters	30

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
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The Bottom Line

South Africa's Emergency has indeed inflicted a set-back on the popular movement in that country. But the apartheid state has only bought itself time, not shifted the balance of political forces decisively in its favour. This is not the Emergency of the 1960s. Psychologically, the culture of resistance brought into focus over the past fifteen years survives. Moreover, enough of the accomplishments in the sphere of political organization witnessed during that period also remain in place to promise a revival – slow but certain – of ever more effective resistance.

Equally important, however, is the fact that mere state repression has not solved South Africa's deep-seated economic problems. These problems – signalled by slow growth, chronic unemployment and on-going balance of payment difficulties – have, since the early 1970s, served to fuel resistance as much as has the black population's smoldering resentment of prejudicial treatment and political inequality. But what are these "deep-seated economic problems" that have moved economists to speak of a continuing economic crisis in South Africa? How subject are they to redress from within the existing system of apartheid politics and a racially structured capitalism? And what implications do such problems – and attempts by the white power structure to redress them – have for both the democratic opposition inside South Africa and the anti-apartheid movement abroad? These are some of the questions the current issue of *SAR* seeks to address.

In doing so we are fortunate to be able to draw on the work of a group of progressive economists working within South Africa itself. Under the auspices of the Labour and Economic Research Centre (LERC) and linked to the most important trade



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union centres in South Africa, this group has been preparing studies (and, shortly, a book) precisely on the theme of "The Economic Crisis: Recent Economic Trends in South Africa." Access to the draft manuscript of this book provides the material that the *SAR* collective has sought to synthesize in the lead articles of the current issue. We are

grateful for such willing cooperation on the part of our South African colleagues, though, needless to say, we must bear full responsibility for the use – and/or misuse! – we have made of their work.

As seen in the first of our articles on the South African economy, the key to the LERC group's analysis lies in identifying accurately

the nature of that country's economic difficulties which first began to show themselves in the 1970s. It was then that the existing structure of the economy - of South Africa's heretofore phenomenally successful "model of accumulation" - began to come unstuck. It became increasingly evident to economists, to business people and to state planners that significant restructuring - in effect, the bringing into existence of a new model of accumulation - would be necessary to get back on the road of sustained economic growth. For South Africa's ruling class, the need to so restructure the economy has come to have as great a significance as the more familiar problem of how best to ensure the political quiescence of the black population.

As we will see, this is no easy task for such a ruling class, even when posed in narrowly economic terms. This fact must give further stimulus to the resistance movement inside South Africa, but its implications for the anti-apartheid movement also bear emphasizing here. For it serves to underscore a crucial point: that the South African economy remains extremely vulnerable to economic actions directed against it from abroad. We must not allow either the slight lull in the level of resistance inside South Africa nor the growing indifference of many of our erstwhile establishment allies to the sanctions cause to blur this fact. ("Growing indifference"? The damning revelations regarding current figures for Canadian trade with South Africa that, as we go to press, are surfacing at the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' meeting in Harare give added poignancy to this phrase.) As has been noted in these pages before, we must keep our understanding of developments within the South African economy at a high level - the better to identify key pressure points for our actions, now and in the future.

Of course, economic developments inside South Africa have additional implications for the demo-

cratic movement. As one of our lead articles ("Unemployment and the Working Class") reminds us, the class structure of the black population is by no means static. It has been altered over time by the impact both of structural changes in the economy and of self-conscious attempts at dividing and ruling on the part of South Africa's rulers. There is a challenge here for the movement: that of holding together a somewhat more diversified constituency around a common programme (the COSATU "Living Wage" campaign is mentioned as a promising example in this regard). Needless to say, this is a challenge we must be fully aware of and sympathetic towards.

The apartheid regime remains, in the end, unyielding in its defence of the essentials of the racial status quo in South Africa. This makes the task of building unity there rather easier than might otherwise be the case. In such a context broadly democratic demands have resonance for a vast percentage of the black population. But it is well for us to be aware of potential faultlines in the movement, faultlines that could become even more important as the momentum for fundamental change in South Africa begins to pick up once again and diverse perspectives about the precise nature of post-apartheid society express themselves.

Our analysis of South Africa's economy also underscores the fact that economic problems will not simply disappear with the coming of majority rule. Certainly a democratic South Africa will provide the setting within which such problems can be more meaningfully addressed. But an extreme vulnerability to the vagaries of the international capitalist economy and a cruel structure of endemic unemployment will be amongst the chief legacies passed on to the victorious popular movement by the protagonists of racial capitalism.

Unfortunately, we are all too far, at present, from the post-apartheid moment in South Africa. But we must assume that South Africans

will need our solidarity then as much as they need it now.

* * *

Complexity in southern Africa is not confined to the economic sphere. Take Namibia, for example. Even as we celebrate, correctly, the prospect of Namibian independence - earned the hard way, in large part by the defeat of the South Africans on the western flank of the sub-continent - Victoria Brittain reminds us of just how qualified, by virtue of on-going South African and Great Power manipulation, that victory may prove to be. Bruce Kidd celebrates the advances of genuinely non-racial sporting initiatives that have made possible a rethink of the precise terms of the sports boycott in anti-apartheid circles. And he also underscores some of the very real dilemmas that now flow from a more complex politics in that sphere. Finally, Carolyn Hamilton documents some of the ambiguities of struggle on the terrain of culture where diverse forces are seen to be battling for control over the symbolic power and resonance that attaches to the historic figure of Shaka Zulu!

At one level, then, the terms of the struggle in southern Africa are painfully clear, unrelievedly stark. The sides are capable of being cleanly, crisply and militantly presented in a way that does little disservice to the essential truth of the situation. Yet merely to leave matters there is not likely to prove quite good enough, given the complexities we have mentioned and the complexities that attach to the many other issues that demand discussion regarding developments in southern Africa. Elsewhere in these pages, and in reply to a letter from Joe Hanlon criticizing our agonized reappraisal of developments in Mozambique in a previous issue of *SAR*, we argue that there are "no profane questions ... only more or less convincing answers." We continue to invite concerned and committed readers both to help pose those questions and to debate with us the answers.

Chasing a Cure: Capitalist Dilemmas in South Africa

"Economic crisis!" – the phrase resounds in everything we read about contemporary South Africa. There is no doubt that since the 1970s, severe economic problems in that country have helped fuel the growing political opposition to apartheid (and to capitalism itself). But how serious and intractable is the crisis? What are its dimensions? Is it something that can be resolved if only, as the state protests, "political stability" is reasserted and a modicum of international investment confidence is regained?

Consider a few facts. Between 1946 and 1974 South Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 4.9% per annum. In the next decade, this rate dropped to only 1.9%, while during the last five years (1982-1987) annual GDP growth rate has averaged a mere 0.6%.

This decline in the growth rate is, of course, part of a broader pic-

ture of parallel and related changes since 1974. The following facts reveal some of the picture:

- inflation has remained stubbornly at over 10% since 1974
- 200,000 manufacturing workers lost their jobs between 1981 and 1985 (even as an additional 300,000 enter the labour market each year)
- real fixed investment in manufacturing dropped by 58% between 1981 and 1986
- the investment coefficient dropped from 29% to 19% between 1972-4 and 1986-7 (the coefficient being the ratio of gross fixed domestic investment to GDP)
- personal savings have dropped from 11% to 3% between 1975 and 1987

It is evident, then, that 1974 was a turning point, when fundamental, structural problems in the economy began to affect South Africa's growth path. This reality has been acknowledged by government offi-


cialists who have been groping towards suitably structural solutions, even if, in the end, they have so often settled for mere tinkering: freeing up "the market," "getting the prices right," and the like.

Unfortunately for such officials, the problems are indeed profound, reflecting difficulties that are rooted in basic socio-economic relations and in the existing model of accumulation. It is in this sense that the period since 1974 is not simply a "slowdown," but a period of economic crisis. We have been witnessing the death of the "old" model of accumulation. The challenge facing the powers-that-be in South Africa is the necessity of constructing a new model in order to restore former levels of growth and accumulation. This is proving to be no easy task.

Disintegration – and reconstruction?

To grasp the dimensions of the current crisis, two steps are necessary. One is to identify both the economic structure that permitted South Africa's dramatic growth in the post World War II period and the reasons for the disintegration of that "model of accumulation" in the 1970s. The other is to make sense of the responses of the state and the capitalist class to the resulting crisis. What are the strengths, weaknesses and implications of their various attempts to overcome the crisis and reactivate growth by constructing a new economic model?

The post-war growth model that proved so successful in western capitalist countries linked production and consumption in an unprecedented way: expanding mass production and mass consumption drove each other forward in a



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Buyers enticed by bargain prices at OK Bazaars the day after a bombing

dizzying upward spiral. South Africa's post-war boom paralleled this model, with a significant twist: the model was racially cast. Expanding industrial production was linked to expanding *white* consumption; ironically, the very cheap black labour that ensured large profits in industry and mining has eventually shown up as a market constraint on further economic expansion.

In short, the inflexibility of this racist structure would come to contribute to South Africa's economic problems. But certain "external" aspects of the economy bear attention as well. Even though South Africa has become more industrialized, it still has many of the features of a Third World economy. Its strategy of industrializing through import substitution in consumer and intermediate goods depended crucially on exporting primary products, like minerals (most significantly, gold) and on importing machine goods. This pattern left South Africa particularly vulnerable as the international economy itself moved into crisis from the late 1960s. Such global developments disturbed the key relationship within the economy, the link between mining and manufacturing sectors that had seen high export earnings from mining paying for the (then relatively inexpensive) importation of machine goods.

In the global crisis of the 1970s, productivity slowed down in the advanced capitalist countries, thereby raising the unit value of their output. For South Africa this meant a rise in the costs of its major import, machinery, thus reducing profits from investment projects and helping bring on South Africa's own crisis. In addition, however, South Africa now faced uncertain export earnings from primary products destined for the increasingly unstable advanced economies. Gold, its price previously high and fixed, led the way. The growing problems of the international financial system finally led to the 1973 collapse of the Bret-

ton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Accordingly, the price of gold began to fluctuate freely (and wildly).

The results for South Africa were drastic. Import costs for key inputs were rising, export earnings were unpredictable, and the benign link between manufacturing and mining had been broken. South Africa then experienced a serious problem in balance of payments and foreign exchange, along with rising domestic inflation.

At this point the bill for the racial structuring of South Africa's economic model began to come due. Two decades of industrialization had created a substantial black working-class, increasingly concentrated in large-scale production. This emerging, grossly underpaid class inevitably began to react to rising inflation. The 1973 wage strikes in Durban and elsewhere signalled that the "racially despotic" labour relations system was approaching its limits. Black wages began to rise in both mining and manufacturing. But within the established "model of accumulation," such rising labour costs meant a further cut-back on profits, fueled "stagflation" and deepened the crisis - something that even occasional moments of boom in the gold price have never quite been able to offset.

A new "Model of Accumulation"

True, such high earnings from gold during the first period of crisis (1974-1981) did suggest to the capitalist class that mineral exports might continue to offer a way out. In line with prevailing global capitalist orthodoxy, it seemed a promising direction to further liberalize South Africa's links to the international economy (for example, the "realistic" adjustment of South Africa's overvalued exchange rates in the late 1970s). However, there was an even more fundamental rethinking of the economic structure in the wind. It

was aimed at countering the market constraints of South Africa's racial economics.

Supporting certain black wage demands, Harry Oppenheimer said in 1976, that the "increase in black wages reflects the beginning of a process, still actively continuing, of a changeover from a labour-intensive, low wage, low productivity economic system - typical of industrial development in its earliest stage - to the capital-intensive, high wage, high productivity system which characterizes the advanced industrial countries." From one "model of accumulation" to another, allowing at least the upper echelons of the black work-force into the high consumption end of the economy?

State policies began to reflect something of this emphasis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Riekert Commission proposed to further advantage black urban "insiders." The Wiehahn Commission aimed to seduce the best organized workers into a "normalized" industrial relations system. New training possibilities for a more skilled cadre of black workers were put on the cards and new consumption possibilities were proposed in such spheres as housing.

Yet such policies proved, almost inevitably, to be half-baked in terms of installing even partially a high wage system. Of course, even under the most propitious political conditions, this project could be no simple exercise. Even if a high wage system could be seen to make sense for the capitalist class as a whole, coordinating the actions in that direction, of individual capitalists who might stand to lose out competitively from premature *independent* steps towards higher wages, would be difficult. Nor does the realization of higher levels of productivity (the *sine qua non* of profitability) follow unproblematically from higher wages in an economy characterized by limited investment capital and massive unemployment. And

apartheid economics

no combination of economic policies and political containment has been able to cut very deeply into the problem of unemployment, an issue that became all the more pressing as the economy entered a second phase of crisis, which began in 1981 and continues as the decade draws to a close.

Again, the international economy reinforced crisis conditions domestically.

Developments in the US were particularly important: first, the adoption of "monetarist" policies of high interest rates, and hence a rising dollar from 1981; and, later, the

fall of the dollar after 1985. As a result gold prices fluctuated wildly, creating even more severe balance of payments problems for South Africa. The focus of economic policy would have to be on the restoration of the external balance. The rand was allowed to fall and interest rates rose.



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... and What About Gold?

The South African gold mining industry, which has done more than any other to shape the character of the economy and the society, is undergoing profound changes. In 1975 South Africa produced 75 per cent of the gold mined in the "free world." Ten years later this had fallen to 56 per cent.

By the mid-eighties major uprisings by the black majority had rocked the complacency of South Africa's white rulers. In 1986 the president of South Africa's Chamber of Mines, C.G. Knobbs, reflected the worries of many corporate grandees. The country had an apparent "inability to get to grips with its fundamental political and economic problems."

But as Knobbs spoke, the state had just attempted to take care of the political end of things with the national state of emergency. And despite its problems, the gold mining industry was doing its bit for the economy. The falling rand had boosted the country's export position. "Fortunately, the mining industry's earnings, aided by a depreciating, image-battered rand, increased by 36 per cent to a total of R2,620,000 million," concluded Knobbs optimistically.

But the optimism masked a different reality. Even though more ore was being drilled and blasted out of the ground than ever before and there was a 40 per cent rise in ore mined between 1970 and 1985, the actual volume of pure gold produced *declined*. The mining companies are badly in need of new reserves and new mines if they want merely to maintain their present position.

There have been no big new finds. Abandoned mines are being reopened and existing shafts pushed deeper and deeper. Miners at Western Deep Levels work the deepest mine shaft in the world, where rock temperatures at the 3500 metre level reach 55 degrees celsius.

In contrast, the fabulously rich Hemlo deposit on the Trans-Canada highway near Marathon in northwestern Ontario is close to the surface, cheap and easy to get at. Capital likes stability and in mining, with its high levels of investment in fixed assets, is particularly skittish about political volatility. Only 28.5 per cent of South African mining shares are now foreign-owned. New gold mines are being opened in Canada, the U.S. and Australia. According to London financial analyst Michael Coulson of Kitkat & Aitken, South African political leverage in the world declines as its competitor gold producers do well.

But gold is crucial to the country's economy. And during the turbulent mid-eighties, local mining firms continued to make big, long-term investments at home. The mining executives apparently assume that the state - any South African state - will inevitably have to consider their interests as a top priority.

Firms like Anglo-American are apparently in for the long haul. Operations are becoming more capital intensive, with increased investments in technological change. Hydraulic drills are replacing pneumatic drills. Firms are turning their backs on steel rails underground. Increasingly, the ore is moved by scoop trams which can negotiate the new inclined ramps. Canadian mineworkers are familiar with the impact of such changes. At Sudbury, Ontario, INCO has reduced

its labour needs from 18,000 to around 6,000 workers in the past fifteen years.

Mining companies in South Africa are also eager to cut costs by reducing their labour needs. In 1972 white workers received about two-thirds of the wages in the mines even though they comprised but ten per cent of the workforce. By 1985 black workers were receiving two-thirds of the wages, a share that has risen since then. The real earnings of black miners, while lower than those in secondary industry, rose in the seventies. While unionists feel wages have gone up little if at all since the late seventies, there has been a clear shift here.

There has also been a shift in the sources of labour. No longer do the same number of African miners migrate for short periods from Malawi and Mozambique. Nine out of ten miners come from the "homelands" (as well as Lesotho and to a lesser extent Swaziland and Botswana). Attempts at recruiting workers from urban areas have failed, as management has found urban labour too sophisticated, undisciplined and unprepared to accept the harsh conditions of work several kilometers underground.

Given authoritarian workplace control and cheap labour, there was formerly no need to pay close attention to productivity. But in the future, the black workforce will be increasingly divided according to skill level. More training is tying mineworkers into the new technologies. Companies are eager to divide and restructure the workforce in new ways which will intensify differentiation along less racial or non-racial lines, expand skilled labour (perhaps not paid as such) and change the despotic character of workplace control.

The mining companies are also being forced to deal with a more organized and militant workforce. According to the National Union of Mineworkers, the three-week strike of 1987 brought out 340,000 workers. The employers won in the sense that they kept to their initial wage offer. However, it was a costly victory, marked by violence and destruction. There were significant production losses and profits fell.

The Freegold mine in the Orange Free State is the largest gold mine in the world, employing over 100,000 workers. Here, and at other mines (especially those of Anglo-American), managers are trying to move towards a more highly skilled workforce, the most skilled tied into management control through the carrot as much as the stick. Capital would like to aid in the social reproduction of a new, relatively well-paid workforce, stabilized by the offer of housing and other incentives. Freegold management optimistically estimates that 15 per cent of its workers will take advantage of its brand new housing scheme.

Workers are not about to be bought off by this strategy. During the 1987 labour unrest, two white managers at Freegold died during an attack on their offices. Seven black miners were killed by security forces and four black team leaders were "executed" before a crowd of 3,000 workers following a "workers' trial." Obviously, mining companies have a long way to go before they can impose an orderly industrial relations regime.



In effect, the policy choice was to favour mining – the export sector – over manufacturing. Expansion and productivity growth in the latter were impossible as rising import costs and diminishing working capital further undercut industrial profitability. Business floundered, financial fragility increased. There were more bankruptcies and growing debt in the private sector.

Moreover, since 1980, the combination of recession, poor profitability and lack of confidence in the medium to long-term prospect has led to a massive drop in private sector investment in new productive capacity. The effects of recession have also fired political unrest, which, in turn, has served to undermine the very stabilization of the labour market (and of industrial relations) that appeared to be central to the new growth model. Slower growth and retrenchments have not only helped spark township resistance. These have also made unemployment and urbanization essential issues to deal with in constructing the model.

Finally, domestic resistance has led to increased political and economic pressure from abroad. The insurrection of 1984-6, for instance, had a strong impact on overseas governments and international banks. The banks' growing misgivings about South Africa's stability helped deepen the country's debt crisis in 1985. Small wonder that the Botha government was tempted to sideline the subtleties of "reform" and merely move to *suppress* the contradictions created by so intractable an economic mess.

A new "New Growth Model"?

Yet the contradictions will not go away. The ruling class realizes that something must be done to revitalize the economy even though opinions differ widely as to what, beyond repression, this might involve. Some argue that it may have been a big mistake to try to build a typical western economy by relying on the

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export of primary products in order to fund import substitution industrialization. In their view, it would have been better to take the path of Asia's NICs (the "Newly Industrialized Countries," like Taiwan and South Korea), adopting an "outward looking strategy" of *export* substitution. Nor is it too late for this, they claim. They advocate aggressively promoting exports from new manufacturing industries, liberalizing exchange rates and trade policy, and setting internationally competitive wages by forcing wage rates further down.

"If you're going to industrialize for local consumption you can forget it," says Evert Groeneweg, Group Finance Director of Barlow Rand and recently elected President of the Transvaal Chamber of Industries. "Inward industrialization is another myth. The strategy has to be strongly export oriented. You need to look at world markets and drive costs down ... Because of our unique knowledge of Third World countries we should be designing products for the Third World ... (Other business strategists) do not concentrate enough on the need to compete successfully in the international economy. Without this you are a dead duck. Inward industrialization and making half-crock products, forget it."

Yet there are still strong advocates of the more racially inclusive "inward looking" industrialization strategy, despite the difficulties of implementing it. The aim is to develop local industry through import substitution, township upgrading, and trade and exchange policies that are suitably protective. Some of these moves are seen to promise increasing black employment and an expanded market among blacks.

In addition there are some, like Clem Sunter of Anglo-American, who support a "dual logic" approach that favours both internal and external accumulation strategies. Whatever its feasibility this approach does at least go to the heart of the mat-

ter, attempting to address simultaneously the problems of growth and international competitiveness on the one hand and unemployment and poverty on the other.

In Sunter's words, South Africa does need to develop a "substantial manufacturing and service export industry ... alongside the current exporters." These sectors would indeed use "state of the art technology and capital intensive processes

productive and less profitable, certainly ill-suited to the needs of big capital.

The heart of the "second logic" economy would have to be the small business and "informal" sector where the bulk of the new workseekers would have to find jobs. Here the hope is that the momentum and dynamism arising out of the process of (black) urbanization - as well as legislation that has freed up space for the activities of black entrepreneurs - will so galvanize productive and service activities as to provide the needed employment! Yet how easy is it to combine the two logics, to combine the "First World" and "Third World" aspects of South Africa, as some business theorists have put it?

There is a good chance that the two aspects are, in fact, incompatible, especially within the broadly "free market" framework of privatization and deregulation that remains dominant. Furthermore, there are still the real obstacles posed by the international economy: in particular, an economy overwhelmingly dependent on mineral exports will take a long time to attain the exchange rate stability essential to long-term growth.

Terrain of struggle

The crisis of the South African economy provides no easy way forward for the country's dominant classes, even when that crisis is conceived in narrowly economic terms. Moreover, it has proven politically difficult for capitalists both to coordinate their concerns and to bring them to bear effectively upon the state. And the state, in any case, remains as preoccupied with short-term security concerns - in the face of a black population it has stymied but by no means quashed - as with long-term strategies. But, nonetheless, a debate about broad strategic options is taking place. It warrants close monitoring - not least because the economic options chosen will affect the terrain upon which the popular classes must organize.

Alberto Mourato



ALBERTO FOR S.A.R.

to compete in the world game." It would be necessary to strengthen capital's profits in these sectors by means of higher productivity and/or lower costs. It is understood, of course, that such sectors could not be expected to do very much to absorb the labour surplus, a particularly important concern at a time when the growing army of the unemployed is increasingly piling into the cities. To absorb the unemployed would require a shift to more labour-using methods; yet these are less



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The 50% Solution: Unemployment and the Working Class

There is a growing consensus that the exceptionally high level of unemployment is the most dramatic evidence of the parlous state of the South African economy. More importantly, it is chiefly through growing unemployment that the working class, its dependents and its organizations experience the economic crisis.

There are no reliable statistics measuring unemployment. Esti-

mates vary widely from 1,000,000 to as much as 5,000,000. The President's Council (which has no particular interest in exaggerating the extent of unemployment) estimates that in 1982, 3.6 million people - 31.7% of the workforce - were unemployed. Overall figures disguise the impact on particular regions and sectors. Hence, it is estimated that 56% of the economically active African population of Port Elizabeth is unemployed and

that, predictably, the rural areas are particularly blighted by unemployment. Nor do the overall statistics reveal the particularly severe impact on women and the youth. More than 50% of unemployed 'coloureds' and Asians, and 40% of unemployed Africans are below the age of 24. Even the hopelessly inadequate official statistics estimate that the proportion of unemployed African women is three times greater than that of the male workforce. Nor do

aggregate statistics reveal that those jobs lost in the current economic crisis are principally at the unskilled end of the job ladder – in agriculture, in construction, and in manufacturing. Indeed, in certain sectors of manufacturing there is clear evidence of a rise in the number of semi-skilled, technical, white collar and professional workers offset by a simultaneous decline in the number of unskilled workers.

Response of the state and capital

Welfare benefits available to the unemployed are hopelessly inadequate. The Unemployment Insurance Fund is only available to cover short periods of unemployment – it is never available for longer than six months – and it is only available to contributors. This latter restriction excludes all agricultural workers, all those employed in the public sector, domestic workers and, crucially, those who have never been employed at all.

What about government economic policy with respect to unemployment? There are two key aspects of the state's response. Its first tack is to suggest that South African unemployment is 'natural' at a particular stage of development, an affliction that South Africa shares with the rest of the Third World. It is a problem, the state says, rooted in high birth rates, low levels of education, illegal workers from neighbouring countries, and the characteristic litany of 'natural' causes.

The second pillar of the state's response is, effectively, to absolve itself of responsibility for job creation. Indeed, a White Paper on the question states baldly that in an economy based on 'private initiative and effective competition' the state's role is limited to 'an elimination of measures that inhibit the satisfactory operation of a market-oriented system'. The argument is that employment will be provided in the substantive export orientated sector of the economy, as well as in the small business and informal sectors, if reg-

ulations that inhibit the growth and competitiveness of these sectors are eliminated. Examples of these regulations are minimum wage laws, factory health and safety requirements, contributions by employers to unemployment insurance and workers' compensation. It is little wonder then that a major President's Council investigation of employment creation includes as its chief recommendation, that the state investigate the activities of the trade union movement. The unions are responsible for raising minimum wages, and, in general, for securing improved working conditions. But the trade union movement and its members are also thus responsible for unemployment, a perception shared by capital and its political representatives the world over!

What of the state's encouragement to the small business and 'informal' sectors of the economy as some kind of answer to the unemployment question? In South Africa the small business sector employs a tiny proportion of the national workforce, and, accordingly, even a doubling of the size of this sector – a considerable feat – would make little impact on the massive levels of unemployment. Nonetheless, the needs of the small business sector are the major excuse for deregulation. It is small business that, the state argues, is least capable of paying minimum wages and of providing its workforce with a safe environment.

Moreover, there are other, sinister motives behind the current preoccupation of South Africa's economic planners with the 'informal sector.' Increasingly the unemployed in South Africa are referred to in official jargon as those 'without formal sector employment', implying that they are somehow employed elsewhere, in the 'informal sector'. So the state then has a problem of classification and accounting, not a problem of joblessness and poverty. Increasingly, Johannesburg's 'Black Taxis' and ubiquitous street vendors are offered as evidence of this burgeoning informal sector.

The notional existence of the 'informal sector' and the encouragement that the state provides it forms the basis for an economic and social policy that implicitly accepts the permanent marginalization of a large proportion of the population. This is not to say that the 'informal sector' is sheer myth, or that its future development is without significance. Indeed, the exceptionally high cost of living in South Africa (certainly relative to the Asian NICs) acts as a brake upon capital's attempts to cut wages drastically. It is hoped that a large, low earning and unregulated transport and distribution sector may more easily enable capital to depress wages in the formal sector. But working in the informal sector of the economy is not a substitute for formal employment.

Above all, those in the informal sector will only be able to survive on the extremely meagre pickings if their own reproduction costs are exceptionally low – that is, if they live in squatter camps ('informal settlements' in state jargon), if they do not send their children to school, if they do not use transport. This is, in short, a recipe for turning South Africa into a '50% society', whereby half of the population will have access to employment, housing and welfare with the working class firmly at the bottom of this first league; the other half will be permanently outside 'formal sector employment', housing and welfare.

Political and organizational implications

The economic implications of unemployment are obvious. Its political and organizational implications are no less serious. Most obviously, trade union organizing under conditions of massive unemployment is extremely difficult and the winning of economic gains severely hampered.

But unemployment has important medium-term implications that need to be urgently addressed. In-



Unemployed in Dimbaza, Ciskei

creasingly, the unions and the central townships may come to represent a relatively privileged sector of the oppressed. The 'privilege' will be highly relative to be sure, but a job is a significant 'privilege' in a society where at least a third of the population is unemployed – and all the more so when access to housing, education and health care is tied to employment. There is clear evidence of a rapid degree of privatization of housing and health care, with access to medical aid being provided through employment related schemes and access to mortgages contingent upon employment-related housing subsidies.

If the distance between the employed and unemployed is principally accounted for by the permanent marginalization of the latter, then it is exacerbated by the relative upward mobility of the former. As already noted, there were three major developments in the structure of the labour market in the '70s and '80s. Firstly, a massive increase in unemployment; secondly, a significant decline in unskilled work; and thirdly, a marked increase in semi-skilled technical and non-

manual work. Increasingly, the significant distance is not that between the unemployed on the one hand and low paid construction workers on the other. Rather, it is the distance between the unemployed and, say, the relatively skilled workers in the chemical sector or in clerical employment.

This is not to suggest that the South African working class is about to be 'bought off'. It is, however, to suggest that the social composition of South Africa's working class is becoming increasingly complex. Add to this a significant stratum of teachers, nurses and other state employees, as well as an important middle class that is to be found in traditional petty bourgeois occupations (e.g. shop-keeping) and junior managerial positions, and we see a far more complicated 'class map' than previously. This demands a far more sophisticated approach to questions regarding the interplay between the factors of class and race within the popular movement. Unity will continue to be built and alliances forged but this must be done with eyes open to the new range of complexities.

Fortunately, even as we acknowledge such complexities, we are drawn back to the fact that clear grounds for unity do exist, even in specifically economic terms. For underlying the developments we have been tracing is an economic structure and a set of economic policies that must be challenged. Perhaps, at the moment, it is COSATU's 'Living Wage Campaign' that provides the clearest way forward in this regard. It is a campaign that challenges not only low wages in general but also race and gender-defined wage differentials, urban-rural splits and the gap between skilled and unskilled wages. A 'Living Wage' in this perception is not a privilege for the benefit of union members. It is rather the seed of a different economic structure and policy, one that rests on high wages and high consumption, on safe working conditions and job security.

There can be no illusion that these will be secured under apartheid rule. But it would be equally short sighted to hold fire on these critical demands until liberation day.

Stacking the Deck in Namibia

BY VICTORIA BRITAIN

Victoria Britain is editor of the Third World page of the Guardian [UK] and is a regular contributor to SAR.

South Africa was forced into negotiations over Namibia last year from a position of unparalleled weakness. It had suffered a serious military defeat on the ground and in the air in Angola. At home, the regime was faced with a economic and social crisis: the outflow of capital was increasing, white youth were in revolt against conscription, soldiers had mutinied in Namibia, black workers had staged a successful three-day stay-away in June and October's municipal elections had been a humiliating failure for the white regime.

The fact that South Africa was even brought to the negotiating table was a victory, not only for the forces that champion Namibian independence, but also for Angola and for the South African liberation movement along with their allies who are fighting to end the apartheid regime.


But this positive picture is being clouded and darkened now by more negative indications that South Africa may be emerging from these negotiations with enough of a fresh breathing space to recover from the defeats of 1988. Pretoria is being helped to regain its footing by the adroit diplomacy of the United States administration and the Soviet Union's new priorities, which appear to place the super-power relationship above all other considerations. The Frontline States, bludgeoned by a decade of South African destabilization, are proving too weak to offset western machinations.

Taking advantage

It's been ten years since Resolution 435 was drawn up by the Contact

Group of five western powers anxious to coax South Africa into a sensible deal which could remove international pressure for sanctions. That decade, eight years of which included the Reagan administration running U.S. policy, was ample opportunity for South Africa to manoeuvre things to their advantage.

The entire negotiations were based on an acceptance of 'linkage', i.e., linking Namibian inde-



pendence to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. When the Americans first proposed this as part of Chester Crocker's elaborate 'constructive engagement' formula, it was rejected by most of the international community, even Britain, as audacious U.S. interference in two distinct issues - South Africa's defiance of international law and the U.N. over Namibia, and Angola's right to support from a friendly government for its self-defence against South African aggression. In 1988, however - in order to bring the regional military stalemate to an end - Angola and Cuba both accepted that *force majeure*, just as they accepted the extraordinary proposition that the U.S. was a 'mediator' in the conflict, rather than an active participant on the South African side.

Resolution 435 then and now

Unfortunately, the provisions of Resolution 435 were, by 1988, poorly adapted to the dramatically changed situation on the ground inside Namibia. During the past decade of its occupation, South Africa had vastly increased its military infrastructure with a string of bases along Namibia's northern border. It had created the 35,000-strong South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) of Namibian conscripts, increased its own SADF presence to 65,000 and had integrated UNITA units into the SADF both inside Angola and along the Caprivi strip from where they launched operations. The two forces were often indistinguishable.

Well before agreement was closed in 1988, the U.S. had floated the idea that the cost of the originally proposed 7,500 military and 2,000 civilian personnel from the U.S. was too high and Congress would not agree to fund the U.S. share.

Even after the December 1988 signing of the agreement, and while the fine print of Resolution 435 was still being finalized, the South Africans called up another 3,000 young Namibians into the SWATF. At the same time, SWAPO representatives were underestimating the U.N. monitoring forces that would be necessary.

"We should really have a much bigger U.N. force than originally proposed, but we weren't asking for it," said Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO's Foreign Secretary in New York in January, as lobbying over the precise shape and size of the U.N. monitoring group was underway.

"We smelled a rat as soon as the U.S. started focussing on scaling down the military numbers. It was so clearly a political point," Ben



Afrapix

SADF withdrawal from Angola, 30 August 1988

Gurirab said. The Frontline States were sufficiently worried about the U.S. reaction to hold a special Frontline summit in late December and to dispatch no less than two of their foreign ministers (from Zimbabwe and Zambia) to the U.N. to lobby against the cuts being pushed by the U.S.

The strongest objection to the cutback came from Cuba which pointed out that not only had the population in Namibia grown by 3.5 per cent a year since 1977 (when it was 1.25 million), but tens of thousands of the refugees that were expected to return would need the confidence-building presence of a large international contingent.

"The forces of the U.N. should receive and investigate complaints of coercion by police and para-military forces, claims of fraud and contestation relating to the electoral process, and rigorously monitor discrimina-

tory or restrictive laws and administrative measures that could undermine or thwart the holding of free and fair elections," a Cuban Foreign Ministry statement said. Cuba also warned of the threat that South Africa might unleash a 'contra' operation "organized with former members of the Namibian territorial troops and the police" in the huge territory. SWAPO's Secretary-General, Toivo Ja Toivo, made a similar warning at the same time.

No room for the Frontline States

But then the Soviet Union joined the other permanent members of the Security Council in the cost-cutting proposal. It seemed clear that whatever compromise was reached on numbers within the Secretary-General's office, the seeds of what one minister called "another Congo"

had been sown. The same ingredients of a very high level of western interest and a vulnerable African party (SWAPO) appeared set to embroil the U.N. in an operation which it could only nominally control.

Some behind the scenes attempts to place senior Frontline States officials in the U.N. team ran into resistance from western governments. The result was that some African sources expressed extreme disquiet that the international administrative team being put in place was not experienced enough in dealing with South African disinformation and destabilization.

"The South Africans have months of lee-way. They can use the demobilized SWATF and Ko-evoet as any kind of shadowy violent pressure groups. They have made it clear they're keeping South



Afrapix

Refugees cross border into Angola from Namibia

African sovereignty over Walvis Bay, without any discussion. Meanwhile, SWAPO's ability to organize for the election is desperately curtailed by their lack of cadres," said one southern African source. "The only guarantee of a fair transition would be a massive U.N. presence with a very tough leadership prepared to rock the boat every time the South Africans try something on. Otherwise, they'll have got Namibian independence on their own terms. Although it is unthinkable that SWAPO could lose a fair election, the South Africans are organizing this election under 435 and when have they ever organized a fair election?"

South Africa's hidden agenda

There are two more items on South Africa's hidden agenda that are related to Namibia's political future and its relationship to Pretoria - the removal of ANC bases from Angola and the incorporation of Savimbi and UNITA into the Angola government on the same favourable terms as the old leadership of FNLA and FLEC received during 1988.

The South Africans raised the issue of ANC bases through intermediaries, at least as early as June 1988. SWAPO was on record as saying there would not be ANC bases in an independent Namibia, and bases in Angola have been used for training, not for infiltration into South Africa. Nevertheless, Pretoria wanted the guerrillas ousted from all the Frontline States (excluding Tanzania which has never been a viable target for such pressure).

The symbolic importance for the South Africans of getting the ANC out of the Frontline States outweighs any practical importance. Ousting the ANC in what could be presented as a re-run of the 1984 Nkomati agreement with Mozambique, or the possible foundering of the entire regional peace process on an Angolan refusal to get rid of the ANC, was a major propaganda opportunity in their civil war against the ANC in South African townships. In the first case, the move could be interpreted as a defeat for the military option that the ANC embodies, and an additional pressure towards compromise in negoti-

ation. In the second case, Pretoria can show international critics, such as those in Congress, that an intransigent ANC is preparing for a more violent future.

It was in light of these perspectives that the ANC leadership prepared to close the Angolan camps and move their several thousand guerrillas undergoing training to Tanzania and Ethiopia. Tanzania had previously training ANC military cadres and is the home of a large ANC educational facility. It is also the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee, which immediately offered practical assistance in the move. Ethiopia had offered military training facilities two years before. Algeria and Uganda were also mooted as medium-term possibilities. Unlike the humiliation of the ANC departure from Mozambique at the time of Nkomati, this time the ANC held the initiative in deciding how and when to go.

In an important political speech January 8th on the ANC's 77th anniversary, Oliver Tambo outlined a new emphasis in the organization's military strategy. He called for the strengthening of the underground structures of the ANC, and other senior ANC officials said that the self-defence capacity of the underground was receiving new attention. Several hundred young ANC cadres were to be infiltrated from Angola back into the townships, rather than to go further north to new training camps, ANC sources said.

The Delmas trial sentencing in December effectively signalled the regime's determination to criminalize all forms of non-violent anti-apartheid organization. That event prompted leaders of the remaining mass democratic structures within the country to warn that the pressures of repression had become so acute that there was an unprecedented upsurge of youth opting for military training by the ANC either inside or outside the country because they now felt every other avenue was blocked.



Afrapix

Namibian conscripts report for National Service

It was the protocol signed in New York in August which dictated the end of the Angolan bases, although the deliberately ambiguous diplomatic language meant that neither the ANC nor UNITA were mentioned by name. The pattern of scrupulous adherence by Angola and Cuba to the procedures of negotiation – including the secrecy of the content of the meetings which was repeatedly breached by the South Africans – meant an immediate start to the move by the ANC.

A little something for Savimbi

South Africa's approach to the question of Savimbi's future was much less direct. Throughout the autumn, the South Africans and the U.S. had redoubled previous efforts to get the Angolan government into negotiations. All the important channels of U.S. influence in Africa –

through Morocco, Zaire, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Kenya – were used to put pressure for concession on Luanda. Only after December's signing in New York did South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha state that aid to Savimbi would cease. However, even then UNITA remained in possession of a 300-kilometre border strip between Angola and Namibia, closed to the outside world by the SADF and entirely open for re-supply of UNITA.

To compound the Angolan government's future military problems, as the Cubans withdrew the first 3,000 troops ahead of schedule, president-elect George Bush made the significant political gesture of sending a warm letter to Savimbi assuring him of future support. This was consistent with the fact that U.S. access to UNITA base areas in Zaire was enhanced during joint

manoeuvres with Zairean troops in May 1988, even as the quadri-partite peace negotiations were underway in London.

The long negotiations with Angola and Cuba, like the renewed top level contacts with Mozambique in late 1988 culminating in a head of state summit and South African military supplies being given to Frelimo, undoubtedly enhanced Pretoria's prestige internationally. By the beginning of the Namibian independence process, the South African government had managed to emerge somewhat from its pariah status and had clawed back a few fig leaves of respectability. For the western countries trying to defuse pressure for sanctions in 1989, Resolution 435 was serving the same convenient purpose – demonstrating Pretoria's new 'moderation' – as it was meant to do in 1978.

Adjusting the Sports Boycott

BY BRUCE KIDD

Bruce Kidd teaches physical education at the University of Toronto.

In recent months, an historic 'adjustment' has begun to take place in the international anti-apartheid sports boycott. For more than a decade, the target of the campaign has been the whole system of apartheid itself, under the slogan "No normal sport in an abnormal society." But increasingly, the liberation movement and leaders of the international campaign such as the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee's Sam Ramsamy, have been shifting the focus of the boycott, under the new slogan "No relaxation in the campaign against apartheid sport." This subtle change makes it possible for representatives of non-racial, anti-apartheid sport within South Africa to benefit from international competition and legitimation.

The blanket boycott

The international campaign to isolate South Africa in sport began in the early 1960s as a protest against racism in sport. The shift to a blanket sports boycott against apartheid as a whole was made in the mid-1970s when - in a desperate attempt to end their sporting isolation - the Vorster Government, in collusion with the leaders of white South African sport, began to allow integrated competition within the framework of apartheid. They permitted clubs and schools to engage in 'multi-national' or 'multi-racial' competition and removed sport from the discriminatory provisions of the Liquor Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Blacks Urban Consolidation Acts. They hoped that these changes - and the resulting photos of blacks and whites playing together on the same fields - would be enough to get them back into international competition.

The changes touched off a difficult strategic debate among anti-apartheid sportspersons within South Africa, because the abolition of petty apartheid did open up new opportunities for some black athletes and administrators. But the majority of them were not deceived. The 'liberalization' did not change the legal fiction of 'separate development': under 'multi-racial' sport, athletes were still required to compete as members of legally distinct races rather than as equal citizens, as the 'non-racial', anti-apartheid sports movement wanted. Nor did the Vorster government's new policy soften the savagery of apartheid in other aspects of sportspersons' lives.

It soon became clear that few events were actually integrated - less than one percent, it has turned out. Most clubs, schools, and municipalities continued to bar non-whites, protected by legislation which allows them the 'autonomy' to 'differentiate' on the basis of race. Moreover, nothing has been done to reduce the gross inequality between white and non-white opportunities. A 1988 study reports that the 212,000 whites living in Durban share 146 soccer fields and 15 swimming pools, while the 330,000 blacks in the adjoining townships of Umlazi and Lamontville share six soccer fields and two pools.

Buoyed by the post-Soweto militancy of the late 1970s, the non-racial, anti-apartheid sports movement, led by the South African Council on Sport (SACOS), refused to play with the newly-created 'multi-national' sports bodies. (They also refused to have anything to do with the various bantustan sports bodies.)

The non-racial sports movement also asked their allies in SANROC (the London-based group of sportspersons-in-exile which leads

the international campaign), the African sports community, and the United Nations to make all of apartheid their target. They conducted the boycott against all South African sportspersons, even those non-whites who excelled under the 'multi-racial' policy. Gradually, more and more sports bodies and governments added their support.

The blanket boycott has become tremendously successful, shutting South Africa out of international competition in most of the major sports. That's why apartheid propaganda like the full-page ads taken out at the time of the Calgary Olympics whines that "while our sport has now been integrated, the politicians have changed the goalposts."

The new strategy

But the terrain of struggle is continually shifting. The gains and setbacks of the last decade has necessitated a second look at how the sports boycott can be used to undermine apartheid. The primary impetus for international recognition of non-racial sport inside South Africa has come from the liberation movement itself, which has thrown some of its considerable energy into sport. Their goal is to create new sports opportunities in the townships and rural areas where they are particularly underdeveloped. At the same time, the liberation movement is making virtue out of necessity: in the face of the draconian repression, it uses the space created by the regime's cosmetic liberalization to agitate publicly against apartheid's contradictions. (We can see a parallel a century ago: when many European countries declared socialist parties illegal, the parties continued as sport and recreation clubs. This was not simply a matter of tactics - many of these organizations became the basis of the successful workers' sports movement.)



David Hartman

Cape Town fans go wild as the S. A. Springboks score in 1986 sanctions busting rugby tour by New Zealand Allblacks

The effort to turn South Africa's 'multi-racial' sports policy to advantage has been spearheaded by the banned United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) through a new organization, the National Sports Council (NSC). The creation of the NSC was necessitated by the sectarian reluctance of SACOS, the federation which led the movement for so many years, to join with the UDF and COSATU in this undertaking. The NSC leadership has close ties to the London-based SANROC and the African sports community. It continues to press for the total isolation of 'apartheid sport', i.e., those white, 'multi-racial', and bantustan organizations which collaborate with the regime. But it has begun to look ahead to the day when a much stronger non-racial sports movement might wish to enjoy international exchanges.

Just a few years ago, it might have been the 'multi-racial' sub-

terfuge - not the anti-apartheid sports movement - which would have benefitted from any return to a sport-specific boycott. But today, although the international sports federations continue to be dominated by western interests, they have become deeply committed to the anti-apartheid campaign. Under its president, Juan Samaranch, the powerful International Olympic Committee has actively sought to eliminate the few remaining South African contacts in Olympic sports and has given the African leadership an effective veto on any IOC policy change. Although there are significant risks involved in this two-thrust strategy, the blanket boycott's success has brought the advantage of high ground.

The advantages

The non-racial movement is expected to benefit significantly from the practical support and symbolic recognition international exchange

brings. Strengthening communications has been a prime justification for the turn to selective targets in the cultural and academic boycotts (see "The Academic Boycott," *SAR* Sept. 1988). SANROC helps coaches and teachers in the non-racial sports movement study abroad, but that is done on a limited basis. It wants to expand these efforts to enable many more in the non-racial sports associations - including athletes - to benefit from international opportunities.

International competition would also increase the visibility and legitimacy of the anti-apartheid movement as a whole. Sports usually reinforce the dominance of the powerful who control them, but they can also dramatize the worthiness and humanity of the powerless, as recent Olympic performances by female and third world athletes well attest. Imagine the effect of an anti-apartheid team in the Olympic Games, organized by the liberation movement under the banner of



International solidarity against apartheid sport has been a basic condition of African Olympic participation. Is an anti-apartheid team the next step?

the liberation movement! Wouldn't that demonstrate the isolation of the apartheid regime!

International recognition for non-racial sport would also help reduce tensions in the black community. In 'multi-racial' track and field, rugby, soccer and boxing, where the mining companies, the police, black sports entrepreneurs, and international sports firms like Adidas aggressively promote black stars, the number of accomplished non-whites is growing. Many of these, such as those who work in the mines, have no choice but to play within these collaborationist organizations. Careers are short, so it is not only the apartheid propagandists, but a segment in the black community which has bitterly criticized the international campaign's hard-line. Last spring, for example, SANROC persuaded the international soccer federation to prevent professional star Jomo Sono from playing in an international fund-raising exhibition in Harare. Soccer is the most popular black South African sport (at least for males) and the widely-followed National Soccer League where Sono plays has never aligned itself totally with the anti-apartheid struggle. The intervention unleashed a

fury of criticism against SANROC and the blanket boycott.

If non-racial teams were to compete internationally, they might draw some of these 'multi-racial' clubs and associations into the anti-apartheid camp. In fact, this has already begun to happen. Last October in Lusaka, at a meeting arranged by the African National Congress, the National Soccer League agreed to resolve its differences with the non-racial movement and to make a greater effort to support the anti-apartheid struggle. The carrot the ANC held out was the prospect of an amalgamated non-racial soccer body sending teams into international tournaments.

The Harare meeting

The new strategy was signalled most dramatically by another October meeting called by the ANC, this time in Harare. There Dr. Danie Craven, the patriarch of Afrikaner rugby, agreed to the amalgamation of the white and non-racial rugby bodies and to their top-to-bottom integration. It was a tremendous victory for the ANC, reinforcing its claim to a major role in the construction of post-apartheid society. "Before we get to where we want

to be, we are all going to have to talk to the ANC," Progressive Federal Party leader Zach de Beer said at the time.

The Harare meeting also demonstrated the very real pressure for change the boycott has created. Just 12 years ago, Craven stood in adamant opposition to even the cosmetic experiment in 'multi-racial sport', vowing that no black would ever wear the Springbok colours in rugby. He was also won over by the promise of an eventual return to international competition for South African rugby - non-racial, anti-apartheid rugby, that is. The prospects have been front-page news within South Africa ever since.

While the new direction has been mapped out, it may take several years to implement. Strengthening the non-racial sports bodies by grass-roots organization and negotiated amalgamation has only begun. Certainly, there are no plans for an immediate non-racial international tour in any sport. In soccer, the NSL has said that "we don't deserve to be part of the world right now." In rugby, the ANC and SANROC have made it clear that the creation of a new, completely non-racial body is "only the first step towards South Africa taking its rightful place in world rugby."

There is a stench of opportunism in the acquiescence of the white rugby body to amalgamation. They want an international tour to mark their centenary this year. While they negotiate amalgamation with their non-racial counterparts, they continue to flood the international community with 'multi-racial' propaganda. In the unlikely event that the white body actually began to push for and help finance the full and uncategorical integration of sport, the government would probably intervene. There's no doubt that a powerful non-racial body could become a telling new source of ideological opposition. Craven has already been bitterly attacked by sports minister F.W. de Klerk and

many rugby colleagues because of his Harare visit and has been unceremoniously removed from future talks.

Of course, the new boycott strategy must contend with the determined opposition of the apartheid state. Despite the space available for 'multi-racial' sport, the non-racial movement has always faced intractable opposition and its leaders have been repeatedly harassed. NSC organizing has to proceed cautiously because the sponsoring bodies have been severely weakened by repression and forced underground. International travel will also be problematic. In the past, when international federations recognized or sought meetings with them, they have been denied passports and even arrested.

The risks

The liberation movement and the leaders of the international campaign will face other difficulties as well.

It will not be easy to convince all international sports federations and governments to recognize and support the anti-apartheid sports movement, while maintaining sanctions against 'apartheid sport'. The ideology of sport is much more liberal and meritocratic than democratic. It is a widespread belief that 'excellence' – defined by measurable performance – should be the main determinant of opportunity. If the present ban is lifted for the non-racial organizations, there will be fierce objections to the continuing isolation of 'apartheid sport', especially when it, too, claims to be integrated. Given the unequivocal support of the IOC, and the third world and socialist associations for the anti-apartheid movement, there should be enough votes for the recognition of only the non-racial bodies in most of the international federations. But there will almost certainly be a well-financed counter-attempt, couched in the vocabulary of equal opportunity, to admit all South African athletes and end the boycott alto-

gether. If successful, that would be a tragic defeat: white athletes, who have rarely supported the struggle and enjoy far greater access to resources, would benefit disproportionately. So would the apartheid propagandists.

The sports community is much less suited to the tactical flexibility required by the new strategy than are culture or organized scholarship. Nevertheless, monopoly and hierarchy ensure that decisions made at the top can be effectively enforced. If the IOC decides that henceforth no athlete who competes in South Africa will compete in the Olympic Games, as it did in December, it can enforce that through its control over eligibility. Because the desire to compete in the Games is so strong, national Olympic committees and national federations throughout the world will bend to its bidding. That is why the sports boycott has been more successful than its cultural and academic counterparts: artists and academics are more independent and autonomous than athletes. But to get agreement at the top of the vast sports hierarchy is tortuously slow – it has taken more than 25 years of patient lobbying to reach this point. If the blanket campaign is abandoned prematurely, it would be extremely difficult to persuade the international federations to take it up again.

I am even more concerned about the response of the already reluctant western governments. It is difficult to imagine the Mulroney Cabinet, for example, readily approving visas for a largely black anti-apartheid soccer team while maintaining the ban against the white tennis pros. Many small-l liberals would join the right wing in opposing such 'discrimination'. Much would depend upon the pressure of the Frontline States and the anti-apartheid movement in Canada and the Commonwealth. The ideological vulnerability of the new strategy should not be minimized. It will take considerable political skill to ensure that only genuine anti-apartheid athletes and teams are welcomed by the international community.

Great care will also be needed to ensure that the hoped-for gains from international recognition are fully realized. Athletes are much less able than artists and academics to express oppositional or emancipatory ideas in the course of their performances – the rules require a high degree of conformity and there's not much opportunity for social comment. Even when athletes are in the spotlight, the dominant agencies of communication obliterate all but instrumental meanings (i.e., who won and who scored). The didactic effect of a Matthews Temane (the un-



New Zealand breaks sanctions with rugby tour, Cape Town, 1986.

official world record holder in the half marathon) running in Toronto would be much less than would a performance of "Woza Albert!" by a Soweto theatre company. Moreover, we cannot rule out the grotesque possibility that such an appearance, after the long and well-publicized blanket boycott, would be interpreted as a return to 'normalcy' in apartheid society. Obviously, any non-racial tour must be accompanied by a careful educational campaign.

Links to the overall struggle

In the face of the expected counter-agitation, it is paramount that the 'adjusted' boycott be fought in conjunction with the overall struggle. The blanket boycott has been predicated on the premise that sports

are inextricably imbedded in social structure. While the slogan "No normal sport in an abnormal society" is inappropriate to the developing two-thrust strategy, we should not forget that it provided a far more accurate message than the popular fantasy that sport is a world apart and "sport and politics should not mix." The genius of the blanket boycott was that it was easily linked to other critiques of apartheid society and drew support from and reinforced economic sanctions and other campaigns. That emphasis should continue.

The new strategy is only unfolding, and it will take the liberation movement some time - perhaps several years - to develop the most favourable tactics and conditions. There is a much greater range of options available than I have been able

to consider here. *SAR* will follow the emerging campaign with great interest. It's an exciting prospect, for despite the risks, it promises another advance in the struggle.

Those of us in Canada can help by maintaining the pressure for the total isolation of apartheid sport. The arguments are as compelling as ever. As the Australian Embassy in Pretoria argued in a recent report: *As long as black South Africans do not have rough equality of opportunity in all aspects of life - health, education, housing, employment, welfare, access to leisure time and facilities - including equitable per capita expenditures by the government in all these areas, and underpinned by non-discriminatory laws, it will never be possible for them to participate in sport on a fair and equal basis.*

Another Stall

When Joe Clark finally announced an end to the practice of granting visas to professional South African athletes last July, after more than a year of 'policy review' (see "Apartheid's Racquet: Extending the Sports Boycott," *SAR*, Oct. 1988), he also promised that further steps against Canadian-South African sporting relations would be initiated in a new comprehensive policy statement to be released at the end of August.

The promised new policy has yet to materialize.

At issue is the government treatment of South African athletes resident in the United States on 'green cards' and student visas, and Canadian-South African sporting contacts in third countries. Without clear direction to immigration officers in airports and along the Canada-US border, South African athletes resident in the US - especially golfers and tennis players who continue to be welcome in Canadian tournaments - could enter the country and circumvent the boycott. Sports bodies receiving federal assistance are prohibited from engaging in third-country contacts with South Africa, but under the "Mulroney loophole" created in 1985 and still in effect, the policy does not cover professionals who claim to compete as 'individuals'. As a result, Canadian tennis players continue to compete against South Africans all over the world and Tennis Canada continues to get federal aid.

The source of the delay is External Affairs. Fitness and Amateur Sport (FAS) wants all South African athletes barred from Canada. The Immigration Department

has said that it would enforce a prohibition against those in the US on 'green cards' and student visas - if called upon to do so. FAS would also like to see the third-country policy extended to tennis and to require Tennis Canada and Canadian professional players, as a condition of continued financial assistance, to push publicly for the expulsion of South Africa from international events. As an alternative, FAS has proposed that Canada deny entry to all foreign athletes who have played in South Africa (i.e., those reported on the UN Blacklist) as the Scandinavian countries do.

But External Affairs won't agree to any of this, on the grounds that an extension of the third-country policy would impose "too great a burden" on Canadian tennis and Canada shouldn't move too far in front of the other white Commonwealth nations. Apparently, the three ministries had an agreement by early September, only to have it suddenly called off by External on the eve of the Olympic Games in Seoul.

The timing seems to confirm the widespread speculation that stopping the visas and promising a tougher new overall policy was only designed to deflect criticism of Canadian footdragging on economic sanctions at the August meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Toronto and to win votes for Victoria's application for the 1994 Commonwealth Games. The Commonwealth Games Federation awarded Victoria the 1994 Games a week before the Seoul Olympics opened. That's when External suddenly lost heart.

Prime Time History: Appropriating Shaka Zulu

BY CAROLYN HAMILTON

The South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) television mini-series *Shaka Zulu* was released in November 1986. Within a year, remarkably, it had been seen by up to a million viewers in South Africa and even more abroad. The story of Shaka Zulu, outcast son of an insignificant chief, who rose in power to establish the mighty Zulu kingdom in the 1820s and died by the hand of an assassin, leaving his kingdom in flames and chaos, was hailed by some as a rare instance of African history from an African point of view.

Close review of the series reveals, however, that it is based largely on the diaries of the early white traders and visitors to the Zulu court, and very little on Zulu views of Shaka. Indeed, the series is framed through the narrative of one of the white traders, Henry Francis Fynn. Moreover, with its focus on, for example, Shaka's disturbed psyche and on the Zulu "customs" of live burials and execution by anal impalement, it repeats many of the stereotypes of Shaka and of precolonial African societies created and nurtured by white historians over a period of a hundred and fifty years.

If *Shaka Zulu* did not differ materially in content from earlier productions of the story, it certainly outstripped them in cost. It seems that the director, Bill Faure, initially planned to make the series independently, but as work on the script proceeded, it became clear that *Shaka Zulu* was destined to become a media extravaganza. By 1981, the SABC had taken over production and financing. In late 1983, or early 1984, the scale of the production suddenly expanded dra-



Shaka Zulu

"Shaka is prepared for his coronation as king after proving himself the Zulu's greatest warrior"

matically and American distributors were drawn in. The final cost admitted to by the SABC was \$24 million.

The vastly extended scale of the production began to have an impact on its form and content. Script adjustments were demanded by both the SABC and the American backers. Faure was obliged to abandon Africanist interpretations of Shaka and to favour a script more complimentary to whites. When his backers insisted that the big name white stars appear early on in the series, Faure exchanged a chronological unfolding of the story of Shaka's life for a flashback sequence which commenced with the arrival of the traders in the Zulu kingdom, thus allowing the traders' view of the Zulu kingdom to frame the narra-

tive. Other changes to the script were required to further enhance the image of the traders and to iron out ambiguities in what was to become the central message of the series, the vision of future co-operation between whites and blacks, proposed by the leader of the traders party, Lieutenant Francis Farewell, to the Zulu king.

The use and abuse of history
To explain these script changes and why the SABC embarked on such an expensive project at the time that it did, it is necessary to look at the wider political context which prevailed when the series was in production. 1984 was a traumatic year for South Africa. The United Democratic Front (UDF), formed in 1983, called for a boycott of the tri-

cameral parliamentary elections (the first step in the Government's so-called "reform" strategy), and an explosive backlash against this "reform" swept the country. One of the ways that the state responded to this crisis was with the increased use of its coercive powers. Troops poured into the townships and thousands of people were detained.

It was widely recognised that the nightly scenes of violence were disastrous for South Africa's image abroad. Television drama was one way in which the SABC could place another view of South Africa on the screens. Faure's *Shaka Zulu* offered the SABC an occasion for presenting black and white viewers in South Africa with a drama advocating inter-racial collaboration and portraying the dangers of its failure. The series presented an opportunity of giving another view of South Africa to overseas audiences; one which could be seen to advocate peaceful co-existence and respect for the African heritage. It also provided, by way of analogy, a more complex picture of the issues at stake and the struggles going on in contemporary South Africa, as well as of the government's vision of reform. A script which promised all this constituted a powerful motivation for the SABC to sink millions into historical drama.

Shaka Zulu was extensively promoted outside South Africa. Faure and the two leading Zulu stars of the show did a promotional tour of the United States that was timed to coincide with the screenings, and with Black History Month. On tour, Faure and Henry Cele (who plays Shaka) made the series' propaganda purposes explicit: "We believe that it is time to shed light on South Africa, correct misconceptions and change the system." They made it clear that they saw the series as an analogy with the present. Echoing the words of Farewell and Shaka ("Nothing is impossible if two kingdoms truly want to live in harmony"), Faure remarked, "There is

a large core of white and black people who want to come together in harmony."

The force of analogy

In the turbulent political climate which prevailed when the series was screened at the end of 1986, *Shaka Zulu* offered an easily recognizable analogy for modern South Africa. The series vividly conjures



Shaka Zulu

up the numbers ratio which is obsessively debated by white South Africans. Farewell's party consists of only eight men. The crowd scenes at Shaka's capital show masses of thronging black humanity. "There's an awful lot of them, isn't there?" comments one of Farewell's men on their first sight of the capital.

The "violence" of African society is explored at length. It is the problem to which a solution must be found. White society at the nearby Cape Colony is represented as being under threat of attack by the Zulu king. Farewell is charged by the Colonial Office in London with the task of deflecting that onslaught. Shaka himself is shown to be a ruthless leader, dominated by the imperatives of power and revenge; the Zulu as an irresistible warrior tide. But this militancy is not simply censured. Rather, the visitors seek to control it and divert it from attack on white society.

The representatives of British imperialism serve as a symbol for the far right wing in contemporary South Africa. King George IV, who considers the Zulus to be nothing more than "a tribe of savages running around in their birthday suits," is an object of ridicule. The Colonial Office's understanding of how to deal with the Zulus is also shown to be way off the mark, as are their ready assumptions of the superiority of "civilization" and the potential efficacy of a "solitary Caucasian" (Farewell) in dealing with Shaka. "If we cannot soothe the savage beast, we can at least confuse him whilst we mount an effective military defensive." The series makes it clear that Shaka confuses as much as he is confused. The white traders realise that their position in south-east Africa is most precarious, and that only the most careful strategy will see them through.

The strong rejection of the racist attitudes of the Colonial Office strikes a recognizably "reformist" note. Farewell's final plea to Shaka to refrain from attacking the Cape, is perhaps the most direct call of the series. "That yearning which has brought about everything that has happened was as much your fault as it is mine, but hating my people is not the solution. We must search for another, together." Shaka is portrayed as the one Zulu with vision who can see the importance of the whites and their "magic" for the Zulu people. Despite the warnings of his advisors, Shaka is determined to appropriate the power of western knowledge. His complete control over his people means that he can enforce a vision of interaction if he chooses.

Shaka is the type of black leader with whom the proponents of reform in South Africa would ideally like to negotiate. Enlightened and authoritarian, his closest contemporary parallel is, of course, the leader of the kwaZulu homeland and Inkatha boss, Gatsha Buthelezi. Like the Shaka of the series, Buthelezi seeks

to embody Zulu politics. During the 1980s, moreover, Buthelezi has enjoyed a media prominence that exceeds that of any other black leader in southern Africa. The analogy between Shaka and Buthelezi is a common one in South African discourse. It is a comparison often drawn by Buthelezi himself, by journalists and by ordinary South Africans.

The South African government's reform strategy is centred around the idea of political confederation. Buthelezi's mobilization of Zulu ethnic nationalism is highly compatible with this reformist vision. In the face of widespread opposition to the government's new constitutional proposals, the cooperation of Buthelezi in "reform" became essential.

The Limits of Comparison

Contrary to the view of some observers, it is not sufficient to see Buthelezi and the SABC simply as acting in concert in *Shaka Zulu* to further the aim of presenting the leaders of kwaZulu as the authentic representatives of African people in Natal/kwaZulu. By the end of 1986, when the series was first screened, the South African state was certainly more squarely behind Buthelezi than ever before. However, the series is characterized by far greater ambiguities than this simple interpretation allows.

The series ends with a picture of chaos when interaction with the whites is rejected by Shaka. It offers a strong warning to independent black politicians like Buthelezi not to try and go it alone. This is not surprising, for the 1980s saw Buthelezi seize the constitutional initiative from the government through the establishment of the Buthelezi Commission. Though its own democratic vision remains severely compromised, the Commission rejected as a "sop" the state's attempt to cater to black political aspirations through the establishment of a Black Advisory Council to the President's Council; in-

stead it set out to explore constitutional alternatives. In 1986, Buthelezi's most ambitious venture, the kwaZulu/Natal Indaba began to prepare the way for a multiracial, multi-cultural legislature for the Natal region. The state, which rejected all of these initiatives, was alarmed at the support which Buthelezi was garnering at the expense of the state's own more fraught "reform" plans. An analogous warning note is sounded in the very first scene of the series. Queen Victoria listens closely to an account of the life of Shaka by a subsequent Zulu king, Cetshwayo, and then remarks, "We are a practical woman, your Highness. We will not make an alliance with a legend."

Shaka Zulu offers more than just a caution to Buthelezi and others of his ilk. It neatly twists the veiled threats that Buthelezi directs at the South African state when it seems intransigent. It suggests by way of analogy that the chaos which Buthelezi threatens may erupt if whites continue to ignore him, will be as threatening to the Zulu leadership as to the whites. In the series, Shaka's decision to launch an attack on the Cape Colony is the beginning of his own undoing. The lesson is there for Buthelezi, and any other black leaders, that a successful outcome for *either party* is predicated on close cooperation with the other. The alternative portrayed in *Shaka Zulu* is that everything will go up in flames and chaos will reign. "Out of ashes will come more poverty," commented Bill Faure, "and children will be denied opportunities to be educated. It will pave the way for Marxism and set the country back."

More than any of the other South African "ethnicities," the Zulu identity is founded on "traditionalism," within which Shaka is the key symbol. In *Shaka Zulu*, the SABC had, for a moment, vividly and powerfully appropriated the linchpin of Inkatha ideology. Its screening provided a valuable chance for Buthelezi to make connections between himself and his illustrious pre-

decessor. The price was to concede the point about white narration and other objectionable features of the series. Indeed, this compromise reflects the essential compromise with continuing white hegemony of Buthelezi's broader political vision.

But in spite of itself, the series shows that the whites are themselves dependent in a similarly ambiguous fashion. Their options are limited. As Farewell acknowledges, they have nowhere else to go. In the series, the whites cannot shape the course of events in terms of their interests alone. Shaka falls short of the demands made on him by the presence of the traders, and Fynn and Farewell suffer in the process as much as Shaka's own subjects. The South African state is, in turn, itself equally dependent on the co-operation of a Buthelezi in the "reform" scenario. As Farewell comments, after an attempt on the king's life, "We need Shaka alive. If we can control Shaka's soul, we can control the whole of southern Africa."

Shaka Zulu is no mere "racist propaganda"; on the contrary, it apparently advocates inter-racial interaction and mutual dependency. However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, it is not a simple rendition of the most coherent "reform" line coming out of Pretoria. Instead, it simultaneously reveals both the promotion of the "reform" vision and its limitation, and its confusions as well as its subversion. The contradictions and ambiguities of the series reflect its production over a period when the political landscape of South Africa was altering rapidly and when the nature of domination itself was in ferment. No simple reflection of a dominant ideology then, *Shaka Zulu* is actually about the process of a struggle for a new hegemony in South Africa, one which is not fully worked out by any of the parties involved.

An extended version of this article will appear in the Radical History Review.

“Apartheid is the State of Emergency!” UDF Leaders in Toronto

A clear call to the Canadian solidarity community to intensify pressure on the South African government in 1989 came from United Democratic Front (UDF) leaders Mohammed Valli and Murphy Morobe, speaking at a hastily convened meeting of solidarity groups in Toronto last month. According to local news reports, the two made similar forthright appeals to the Canadian government when they met with External Affairs, expressing the frustration of South Africa's democratic movement at Canada's vacillation on sanctions.

Valli and Morobe's presence in our midst was in itself a statement about the value of interna-

tional pressure. The two, along with Vusi Khanyile, escaped from detention while at Johannesburg Hospital last September and took refuge in the US Consulate for over a month. They departed from their highly publicized asylum once they had won government assurances that they would not be redetained. They attribute their continued “freedom” – for how can we talk of freedom under the emergency regulations, they reminded us – to the international attention their plight received and South Africa's present susceptibility to international pressure.

Effects of media restrictions

A central objective of Valli and Morobe's extended trip – through a

number of European countries and Canada en route to the US – was to assess the effect of South Africa's comprehensive and ever-increasing media restrictions on the way the internal situation is being reflected internationally, and how this is influencing the kind of support being (or not being) given to the anti-apartheid forces. The effect of the news clampdown has been severe, they have found. In the absence of an information flow, governments have been tending to accept the South African regime's depiction of the situation as quiescent and resolved, and of popular opposition as abated. There has been a backing away from former positions on sanc-



Murphy Morobe greets wellwishers after leaving the US consulate in Johannesburg

Afrapix

tions and an ebbing of support for the democratic opposition. Particularly in light of the Namibia settlement, governments are trying to find other ways out.

The UDF leaders wanted to work out with NGOs how to ensure that the international community be kept informed and pressure on the apartheid government be maintained. Valli and Morobe shared with us their assessment of the internal situation and the most fruitful directions for international solidarity in the present phase.

Firstly, they stressed that state repression, far from easing, is as severe as ever. All political activity is heavily restricted and thousands remain in detention. (In the Eastern Cape in particular, conditions of incarceration are appalling.) Yes, there had been releases from detention recently, they said, but the conditions of those releases were hardly liberating ones. And of course, the state of emergency persists.

When considering only restrictions and detentions, the picture of the democratic movement is gloomy. But the visitors had another, more heartening picture to convey, one gleaned during a country-wide tour of South Africa taken after they "released themselves" from their 14 months of detention. They found that, despite the detentions and extreme constraints on national coordination, local organization had in many cases remained relatively intact. Unfortunately, the state had also recognized this and is now banning specific organizations - such as the Western Cape Teachers' Union, the National Detainees' Forum and the Black Students' Society at Witwatersrand University.

Broadening the democratic movement

The democratic movement, they contend, "is in a new stage of development" and "is actually experiencing unprecedented growth." As they see it, there have been spin-

off effects from the UDF's intense organizing thrust in the 1984 period. These are manifesting themselves now in the breadth of opposition to the apartheid state, the range of political figures and organizations of whites and other groups who are talking to the ANC, COSATU, and the UDF. It was important, Morobe maintained, to see the democratic movement as much broader than the UDF. He gave the example of the Anti-Apartheid Conference which was banned just before it was due to take place in Cape Town last September. The objective of that conference was precisely to broaden the coalition of oppositional forces, and take stock of the implications of that widening base. Much of this was achieved during the important process of consultation and discussion leading up to the planned event. The people who agreed to participate in the conference - including such figures as Enos Mabuza of Kangwane Bantustan and Wynand Malan, leader of the liberal Afrikaners' National Democratic Movement in the Transvaal - are an indication of the range of forces now prepared to oppose the Botha government, people who not so long ago would have rejected any association with the UDF or COSATU.

Morobe noted other significant developments in the democratic movement: the important move towards unity amongst teachers, a formerly divided constituency that included quite conservative elements, and the increasingly important role of some of the churches in posing fundamental challenges to apartheid.

Other social forces

Responding to a question about the role of the business community in South Africa, Valli didn't see that community's discussions with the ANC as representing a major shift in its position. "Apartheid and capitalism remain two sides of the same bloody coin," he said. The business community spoke with the ANC at

the point where an imminent uprising was feared, but it refused to condemn the reimposition of the emergency in 1986. Now, once again, Valli suggested, when the emergency is apparently not working and when there is clearly no real solution under the present government, business is beginning to look elsewhere. Certainly, the business community is not cutting links to the government, but it is making contact with the UDF, while hoping for some initiative for settlement from the Big Powers, particularly Thatcher's government. Having lost confidence in the present regime, business is looking for a solution from above, one that won't have the ANC at its centre.

The Afrikaner right wing is getting a lot of international press. The UDF representatives cautioned us not to see the Conservative Party and even the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) as an independent phenomenon, thus falsely placing the ruling Nationalist party in a moderate light. The Nationalist party is still protecting the apartheid laws that Treurnicht's Conservatives are reasserting in municipalities like Boksburg. In Pretoria, a Nationalist stronghold, these laws have never been challenged.

Directions for solidarity work

Discussion took us back to the role of sanctions and international support: What should solidarity organizations be doing?

"We are convinced that sanctions are working and that campaigns to increase sanctions must continue!" Valli assured us. Supporting this position, he noted that the South African government has taken a number of steps in recent years to improve its image abroad, a change from its previous position of defiant disregard. The regime has clearly begun to feel the bite of sanctions, or at least to realize the possibility of real sanctions being imposed. It has felt forced to respond to those issues that have received a

continued on page 33

Bonn Trabalho: Supporting Angola & Mozambique

BY LINDA GUEBERT AND
JUDITH MARSHALL

I: The Conference

The large banner at the front of the hall had been created by the Mozambican painter Malangatana Ngwenya for the Nelson Mandela Concert at Wembley Stadium a few months before. Now it hung behind the speakers' table at another large solidarity event: a conference to launch the European Campaign Against South African Aggression on Mozambique and Angola (ECASAAMA), held in Bonn, West Germany, December 8 to 10. And before the conference was over, Malangatana, himself part of the Mozambican delegation, had unveiled a new painting and offered it as a contribution to a proposed ECASAAMA fund, in what he termed "solidarity with solidarity."

The sweeping lines and vibrant energy displayed in Malangatana's banner seemed to symbolize the very nature of the conference: the coming together of many diverse groups and their active commitment to support for two of southern Africa's most besieged countries. Four hundred delegates came from all the countries of Western Europe, with a few, like ourselves, from as far away as North America. They represented solidarity organizations, church and community groups, trade unions and non-governmental aid agencies, and they included parliamentarians and politicians, academics, writers, journalists and activists. Many came from groups which have had a long history of support for Mozambique and Angola, predating their now predominant anti-apartheid concerns. A member of the Holland Committee urged a renewal of this support:

"Now is the time to bring Angola and Mozambique to the forefront of our activities again."

The choice of Bonn as the conference site was part of a deliberate strategy on the part of organizers to focus attention on the official support coming from Germany for the Mozambique National Resistance, or Renamo. Western support for both Renamo and Unita in Angola was an area of intense interest to the conference participants, not least ourselves, who must confront the fact that our government allows Renamo information officer Francisco Nota Moises to remain in Canada as a legitimate "refugee" (see Chris Collier's letter elsewhere in this issue). Mozambique Support Network consultant Prexy Nesbitt's detailed re-

port of Western involvement, particularly U.S. support for Unita, fueled the resolve of the conference to monitor more closely and share information more quickly about forms of Western backing for these surrogate forces. Indeed, the fact that a phony document on ECASAAMA letterhead was distributed during the conference seemed to indicate that the event had been duly noted by Renamo supporters in Bonn. Written in German, the document nonetheless gave its English version of the ECASAAMA acronym: "The European Campaign Against Stability and Acceptable Morality in Africa"!

Three packed days of presentations, workshops and reminiscences with old friends in smoke-filled corridors (Did we ever smoke that much in Canada?) were not nearly long



José Luís Cabaço speaking before a backdrop of Malangatana's banner

Santana Afonso/Mozambique file

enough to consider the many issues which were raised. Both Mozambique and Angola sent high-level delegations to the conference. The opening paper given by the head of the Mozambican delegation, José Luís Cabaço, was especially impressive in its clear and well-structured analysis of South African strategy toward Mozambique. The Angolan presentation included the contribution of Maj. José João Manuel of the Angolan armed forces, FAPLA, who reported on military activity on the Namibian border. Salome Moiane of the Mozambican Women's Organization (OMM) offered poignant accounts of the effects of war on Mozambican children, while her Angolan counterpart, Maria Luísa Gaspar of the OMA, spoke on the effects of aggression on women.

There were many, perhaps too many, speakers. Some with significant information to offer had to face imposed time limits of fifteen or twenty minutes. Carlos Cardoso of the Mozambique News Agency (AIM) condemned Western governments for using some notion of Western democracy and "freedom of expression" to allow right-wing groups to support Renamo when they would not allow such

"The MNR [Renamo] is not 'supported' by the South African army – it is part of the South African army. One does not speak of an army 'supporting' its tenth division."

*Carlos Cardoso,
Mozambique News Agency*

terrorist organizations in their own countries. Evidence of violations of the arms embargo and sanctions presented by Abdul Minty demonstrated the extent of Western accommodation with apartheid South

Africa. And South African war resister Mark Patrick, in one of the shortest but most moving presentations of the conference, told the story of his brother, who, having volunteered to serve in northern Namibia, had been found dead 300 km inside Angola, painted black and wearing a Unita uniform, carrying a Portuguese Bible and a Portuguese passport.

Many of the predominant themes were taken up in workshops (see below), which provided the opportunity to discuss in more detail the consequences of South African aggression in the two countries. The impact of policies of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and the role of NGO's and aid agencies emerged as two particularly troubling issues. (They are described in more detail in the section following.)

The painter Malangatana's presentation provided a high point at the close of the conference. But after the final, rousing "Viva!"s and "Aluta continuas!" what comes next?

For the core groups organizing the conference, the Bonn event was but the starting point for a major European action programme in support of Mozambique and Angola, one that will complement Namibia support campaigns and the anti-apartheid movement. Four broad priorities have been adopted by ECASAAMA for 1989:

- 1 – Much increased investigation and collation of information on the presence of, and support for, Unita and Renamo activities in EEC countries;
- 2 – The organization of European fact-finding missions to Angola and Mozambique during 1989, made up of prominent individuals from key sectors;
- 3 – Aid for self-defence for people at local levels in Mozambique and Angola;
- 4 – Material aid for women and children in the front lines, channeling this support to existing programmes of the respective govern-

ments in Angola and Mozambique and to their women's organization, OMA and OMM.

"There has been a more effective arms embargo against the Frontline States than against South Africa. More U.S. assistance has gone to Unita than to all the Frontline States combined."

Abdul Minty

More detailed proposals from the workshops about actions in specific areas are still to be circulated. In general, however, the conference was deemed highly successful in focussing energies and defining new priorities for ongoing solidarity with Mozambique and Angola.

II: Two Workshops

The ECASAAMA conference included workshops on a variety of topics. Our correspondents report on two of them which focussed on international intervention in Mozambique.

A workshop on the International Monetary Fund gave delegates an opportunity to think through what the dramatic shifts in economic policy under the aegis of the IMF signify in relation to the long-standing commitments of the Frelimo Party and MPLA Workers Party to socialism. Marc Wuyts, just back from a study of the IMF programme in Mozambique, was one of the resource people. He pointed out that although economic reform in Mozambique dates from well before the IMF entry, its pace increased greatly with the full-scale structural adjustments programme worked out with the IMF in early 1987. (The U.S. is still blocking Angola's en-

try into the IMF; the appropriateness of solidarity groups' pressuring their governments to support Angola's application came up for debate in another workshop.)


There seems to be no doubt that Mozambican access to foreign aid after 1984 became contingent upon acceptance of the IMF package. Expectations that the basic IMF recipe for Africa will produce sustainable economic growth in Mozambique are very suspect, according to Wuyts. Depressing urban incomes and channeling resources to rural producers, the classic IMF formula, is being carried out in the context of widespread abandonment of rural areas as peasants flee to the cities from Renamo's systematic terrorism. Also, expectations of rapid improvements in the balance of payments through exports are questionable. Mine labour and services to South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe have always accounted for about half of Mozambique's foreign exchange revenue. Both depend totally on the security situation.

Pinning hopes on a jump start in rural production by "getting the prices right" is also a myth, taking no account of the war, the drought and the historic marginalization of peasant producers in Mozambique. The initial increases in industrial production have already levelled off, largely due to demand constraints. Present wage and price policies give no buying power to urban consumers, despite their desperate need for the goods in the suddenly overflowing shops.

Wuyts felt that the social cost of structural adjustments had been grossly underestimated. The IMF has insisted on deregulation and an end to price controls. Urban families on the minimum wage do not have enough even to purchase the monthly "food basket," now that price subsidies have been removed. Clinic attendance figures show 60 to 80 per cent decreases from 1987 to 1988 and school attendance is be-

ginning to drop, now that subsidies have been taken off prescriptions and school supplies.

The gravest consequence reported by Wuyts was the fundamental shift in control of the process, with the donor community now playing a preponderant role. Management of the economy in Mozambique is increasingly in the hands of the IMF. UNICEF begins to play an increasingly significant role in social policy. The emergency situation has resulted in a large amount of control passing into the hands of a multiplicity of NGO's and bilateral donors. The creation of a state coordinating body for the emergency, CENE, was seen as one mechanism for resisting these trends.



Margie Bruun-Meyer/ICCAF

A workshop on the role of NGO's and aid organizations in Mozambique and Angola raised the same troubling questions. Joe Hanlon, literally straight from the airport after a period of research for his forthcoming book on aid agencies in Mozambique, presented a shocking picture of Mozambique's vulnerability to the foreign donor community.

Hanlon argued strongly that the current policies of the NGO's have the effect of undermining and discrediting Mozambican state structures. Hanlon cited examples of the negative impact of food aid on local grain marketing structures. He pointed to the anomalies of rigid dis-

tinctions between "relief" and "development." These make funding available for expensive airlifts of food and materials (relief). Once the area is secure, however, no assistance is forthcoming to rebuild roads and bridges (development). He described situations where locally produced hand tools and clothing items lack markets because aid agencies offer the same items, imported duty free, at cheaper prices. One of the most alarming trends cited by Hanlon was the exodus of Mozambican officials from government service to work for the higher pay and benefits which even low-level NGO employees receive.

In informal conversation, Hanlon also cited cases of NGO activity which can only be seen as sabotage. He mentioned examples of NGO insistence on delivering relief supplies against the express requests of local Mozambican officials who wanted to delay delivery because of Renamo presence in the area - only to have the relief supplies raided within hours of delivery. For whom were they intended?

The second resource person in the workshop, long-time Swedish Africa Group cooperant Gunilla Akesson stressed that there were also solidarity groups and NGO's genuinely committed to strengthening Mozambican structures. Other workshop participants, many of them former cooperants, stressed the importance of clearer distinctions between the practices of different aid agencies.

Angola and Mozambique are facing a difficult moment with continued aggression and high level manoeuvres from the Pretoria regime, its surrogate forces and its Western backers. The IMF and Western aid agencies have their part to play in this scenario. For the solidarity movement to find ways to expose not only the crude, but also the more subtle, machinations of these aggressive forces, and at the same time find effective forms of support, will take enormous hard work and creativity.


Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths

BY LOIS BROWNE

Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths: South Africa's Crippling of a Continent by Victoria Brittain, published by Faber and Faber, London, 1988. £9.95, 182 pp.

Victoria Brittain's book moves back and forth between fact-filled analysis of political developments and on-the-spot reporting of events. She recounts U.S. nurturing of a conspiracy that overthrew Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah who was fostering a new nationalism throughout the continent that would have undermined western influence in many African nations. She also describes a recent visit to a Mozambican village where Frelimo has settled hundreds of former 'guerrillas' of the anti-government MNR who can never return to their own homes because "they have spent weeks, months or years in passionless killings aimed at the soul of Frelimo, the peasants of Mozambique."

Brittain points out some of the ways in which the West has divided Africa in order to rule it - CIA funding of the military regime in Ethiopia that had overthrown U.S.-backed Haile Selassie; the development of 'constructive engagement' by the U.S. to end international isolation of the white regime in Pretoria. Much of this needs some background in recent southern African history to be fully appreciated. *Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths* is strongest when Brittain makes us feel how the daily violence that western interference has brought to Africa traumatizes a family or a community. In the chapter entitled "Women, Children and Armies of Cunene," about the 1981 South African destruction of the Angolan



town of Ngiva, Brittain recreates the aftermath of that attack. She talks of Angelina, and other MPLA cadres of the women's organization who "had to deal with case after case of shock and trauma. So many women had been repeatedly raped and sexually tortured that they had appalling internal injuries. One small group of foreign nuns provided the only outside resource of emotional strength and modest medical facilities ... There are mental scars and ineradicable hatreds across Cunene. The men did not much want to hear about these things then or now, but the women have never stopped talking among themselves of the nightmares which were only too real then and today are still not far from their thoughts."

The only means they have of reclaiming these women from the edge

of mental breakdown is to try to get them working again to rebuild their homes and their families.

And this was no isolated case, Brittain points out. Many communities in Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have been laid to waste, food crops destroyed, homes razed, people kidnapped, mutilated, murdered. Not because vengeful enemies in a civil war are so maddened by grief and horror that they strike back at those who have attacked them. In southern Africa, such attacks are waged by South Africans, or their surrogates, for a precise objective. The purpose is to make the people - the greatest resource any of these countries have - physically and emotionally incapable of moving their countries forward.

If you still doubt, read "Firepower," the chapter in which Brittain talks about the many legless people of Huambo, in central Angola, where "On every street as people go about their business, ... trouser legs flap in the wind and the click of crutches on the pavement mingles with footfalls." These amputees are testimony to South Africa's war on civilians. UNITA's reaction to this policy? Brittain points out that they have often fire-bombed the centre in Huambo where artificial limbs are produced.

Brittain has obviously been a frequent witness, not only to the brutality that apartheid must exercise to survive, but also to the courage of the people who have withstood South Africa's might. After years of covering the region, she speaks eloquently of the persistence of southern Africans in continuing to fight for their autonomy. Despite her respect for these people, she hasn't much hope to offer for a better understanding or more help from Western nations. Whatever brightness there may be in southern Africa's future, its fate seems to lie where it always has - in the courage the people have and their faith that it is worth fighting and dying for.

Readers' Forum . . .

The Salman Rushdie Affair

February 10, 1989

It is obvious from the article by Charlotte Bauer ("The Rushdie Controversy," *SAR* vol. 4 no. 3, Dec. 88) that she and perhaps the *Weekly Mail*, have not yet milked the last drops of martyrdom achieved from the sorry 'Salman Rushdie Affair'.

Nadine Gordimer will set right herself the blatant misuse of her name by Bauer. The Congress of South African Writers (COSAW), however, also needs to describe from its point of view the events as we saw them:

1. COSAW had to intervene to salvage the *Weekly Mail's* bungled invitation to Salman Rushdie. Though this intervention brought COSAW into direct conflict with the anti-apartheid movement and with radicals inside the country, we nevertheless persevered. Apart from the courageous individual in the form of Gail Behrman (organiser of the *Weekly Mail* Book Week) the rest of the *Weekly Mail* staff remained curiously detached.

2. When the *Satanic Verses* controversy first arose, and right-wing Muslim organisations began to make violent threats, it was the *Weekly Mail* and its editors who were willing to negotiate and compromise with the 'fanatics'.

This 'reasonable' attitude continued right up to the moment Minister Stoffel Botha announced the suspension of the *Weekly Mail* (for a period of a month). Now that martyrdom was conferred on it by Botha, the *Weekly Mail* perhaps decided to widen that hallowed state by accepting 'victimisation' by the left as well.

3. In spite of the fact that the *Weekly Mail* had invited Rushdie, it was left to COSAW to make

the odious choice of asking for South African police protection for Rushdie or 'withdrawing' the invitation. Despite the fact that the *Weekly Mail's* editors knew of the very serious nature of the threats to Rushdie's life, they refused to make any decision, perhaps knowing that COSAW would have to.

4. COSAW made its decision because:

- a. it could not guarantee Rushdie's safety; and
- b. it could not ensure he would come thousands of miles to fulfil his intended purpose.

Rushdie, himself, in telephonic conversations with COSAW stated clearly that he was not prepared to come to South Africa at the risk of his life, to be prevented from doing what he had come here to do.

5. COSAW learned many bitter lessons from the 'Rushdie saga'. Not only did it, as an organisation, face the irrational wrath of right-wing Muslims, but it had to contend with a ludicrous display of self-righteousness from the so-called 'liberal left'.

People who rarely utter any opposition to daily acts of censorship (including the lengthy detention in solitary confinement of COSAW members such as Mzwaki Mbuli) now criticized COSAW. Included in the wine-wagon were academics and even an activist relic from the fifties turned millionaire arm-chair critic.

Predictably, all of them have lapsed into a damnable silence, while censorship continues to be enacted every day. Or perhaps the fight against censorship is to become an annual, grand-stand affair, replete with wounded international celebrities, wine and glamorous settings. This attitude is perhaps best exemplified by the ridiculous suggestion



by a once universally known academic, that Salman Rushdie should have been urged 'to come and be a martyr in our cause!' More wine, anyone?

Throughout the negotiations surrounding Rushdie's visit, COSAW remained true to its stated opposition to all acts of censorship. We will keep on defending that position. It is with deep regret that we had to experience that the power of word, of discussion and argument, was denied by people who resorted to another kind of power which we know only too well in the country, the power of physical violence. That denial is extremely worrying to us in our attempt to help create a non-racial, united and democratic South Africa.

Junaid Ahmed
National Coordinator
Congress of South African Writers
Johannesburg

February 10, 1989

In an article published in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Charlotte Bauer cites me as one who has been 'deeply upset by [COSAW's] back-to-the-wall decision to give up' the Rushdie visit to South Africa. I was, indeed, deeply upset, but not by COSAW's decision with the *Weekly Mail* that Rushdie should not come. I was a

member of the COSAW delegation that participated in the decision. I was party to it and entirely in accord with it. I have never expressed, to Charlotte Bauer or anyone else, any other opinion. What I was deeply upset about was the violent threat to a writer's life, the bringing about of a ban on his work, and the attack on freedom of speech, by religious extremists.

Charlotte Bauer was not present at the meeting between representatives of COSAW, the *Weekly Mail*, and a large delegation from a wide spectrum of the Muslim community. I was. After four hours of talks, it was made adamantly clear by the Muslim representatives that they would give no assurances whatever that Salman Rushdie's personal safety, let alone that of crowds coming to hear him, would be respected. South Africa is a violent country; threats of death are not empty here: only a few weeks later a man with his particular sense of mission, just as the Muslim extremists had theirs,

gunned down and killed seven people in the streets of Pretoria. One can only put down to innocent ignorance – if not treat with contempt – suggestions from after-the-event commentators that police protection could have been requested or private security men could have been relied upon to protect Rushdie and the public. Can one imagine him wishing to be surrounded by a body-guard of agents of the very government whose oppressive laws he had come to challenge? Or surrounded by hired thugs, thus giving the police an opportunity to arrive with their dogs and teargas in evidence that the *Weekly Mail* and COSAW were engaged in acts provoking public violence?

It would have required a misplaced sense of values, to say the least, to have risked making Salman Rushdie a martyr to our principles of freedom of expression, however dearly the *Weekly Mail* and COSAW hold these. We in South African have plenty of opportunities to risk

our own skins for our convictions, and both the *Weekly Mail* and COSAW have not failed to do this; but we have no right piously to make a sacrifice of someone else.

I do not know why the *Weekly Mail* has not chosen to distance itself completely from what was the only decision possible, in view of the ugly facts. One of the co-editors, Irwin Manoim, expressed the opinion early on in negotiations with the Muslims that the visit should be cancelled because of the circumstances that had arisen, including the banning of the *Weekly Mail* that same day. At the meeting at which the final decision was made the representatives of the *Weekly Mail* (which did not include the co-editors) did not inform COSAW representatives that they would dissociate themselves from the decision.

Yours faithfully,
Nadine Gordimer
Transvaal Regional Representative
COSAW
Johannesburg

Onto the Next Revolution?

January 1989

Is it time for the radical tourists to move on? Should those who have followed the winding trail from Tanzania to Nicaragua and Burkina Faso now leave Mozambique, ever in search of the perfect revolution?

Initially the True Believers avert their gaze and are caustic about those who dare to criticize. When they can no longer maintain the myth, they call for "critical solidarity." Finally, like a spurned lover, they say their former idol has lost its way and fallen into sin. And they search for a new revolution that has yet to lose its virginity.

SAR (Oct. 88) seems to suggest that because destabilization has been so successful, this process has begun in Mozambique, and it is time to give up on Frelimo.

The editorial "States of Siege"

talks about ending the "conspiracy of silence with respect to abuses of state power and class contradictions within the Mozambican state." It points with apparent approval to the view that "some organizations may even begin to think it preferable to increase the political and material support going directly to more autonomous non-governmental organizations ... whose leadership might be thought to be more accountable to their constituents than state bureaucrats and party officials are to theirs." And it concludes with the need "to stand firmly beside Mozambicans" rather than beside Mozambique.

A central goal of destabilization – and of South African, US, and IMF policy in Mozambique – has been to destroy the prestige and viability of state and party. Private enterprises, non-government organiza-

tions, churches, and donor agencies are to be seen as providers of food and resources, and as agents of development, bypassing an ever weaker state.

The reports of John Loxley and Otto Roesch are true. Inefficiency, corruption and class formation within the state apparatus are increasing; this is hardly surprising as this is one way many so-called "donor" agencies try to weaken the state. Indeed, one of the biggest changes in the struggle for Mozambique has been the development of an open assault on the credibility of the government itself.

Working in Mozambique has never been easy, except perhaps for those who averted their eyes from the complexities and maintained the "conspiracy of silence." Unquestioning support of government was never sensible; the success of destabilization has made such support even less possible. But it is essential – espe-

cially now – to support progressive sectors and individuals within government.

Solidarity means choosing sides. When the fight is over the government itself, if we choose to support “autonomous organizations” instead of the government, we are siding with apartheid and the IMF.

In critical solidarity,
Joseph Hanlon
London

SAR REPLIES TO HANLON

As often stated in these pages SAR welcomes critical discussion, and we are pleased that Joe Hanlon has felt moved to write us concerning our recent Mozambique-focussed issue. Underlying his letter are some very real questions about the premises of solidarity with the beleaguered Front-line States of southern Africa, questions that we do intend to explore further in our next issue. Then we intend to focus more systematically on the broad range of challenges, strategic and tactical, that currently face the global anti-apartheid movement. However, there are two aspects of Hanlon's letter that seem to demand more immediate comment.

The reader not familiar with the original editorial might not gather from Hanlon's citations just how tentatively – as one possible hypothesis for further discussion – the quotation he chiefly objects to was put forward. Even more important is the astonishing way in which Hanlon edits that quotation: “Some organizations may even begin to think it preferable to increase the political and material support going directly to more autonomous

non-governmental organizations ... whose leadership might be thought to be more accountable to their constituents than state bureaucrats and party officials are to theirs.” What do those dots (...), signalling, as they do, an omission by Hanlon from the original, represent? The reader, moving on to Hanlon's next paragraph, could be forgiven for thinking that the “non-governmental organizations” referred to are, in Hanlon's words, “private enterprises, non-governmental organizations [?], churches and donor agencies.” But such is not the case. In the original the dots actually read: “cooperatives and unions, for example”!

In other words, the suggestion was not, as Hanlon implies, to strengthen organizations either external to Mozambique or outside the thrust of popular assertions, but rather to consider ways of helping further to empower the grassroots organizations of Mozambican peasants and workers. Might such organizations, in turn, be expected to reinforce domestic pressures from below on a Mozambican state that is being pulled in so many ways towards conformity with the dictates of international capitalism, thereby strengthening the hand of those Mozambican politicians who are struggling to retain as much as possible of the positive thrust of Frelimo's original radical project? We might have expected a more welcome response to such a notion from the Joseph Hanlon who earned his reputation by critically (but supportively) asking hard questions of the Mozambican experiment in his book *Mozambique: The Revolution*

Under Fire. In that book Hanlon worried aloud that “Frelimo has largely failed to build peasant and worker power” (p. 183). All the more startling, then, that SAR's concern about the same issue should be seen as “siding with apartheid and the IMF.” Really, Joe!

We repeat: There are real and important questions here. Why, then, the rhetorical overkill? “Radical tourists”, “True Believers”, “the perfect revolution”, not to mention “siding with apartheid and the IMF.” (Why, we might also ask, the laboured overinterpretation of our use of the word “Mozambicans” – as in “to stand firmly beside Mozambicans” – when the editorial also clearly states at another point that “we must continue to support Mozambique”?) What kind of dialogue is possible when contributions to the discussion of serious issues are caricatured in such terms? It is precisely this kind of “dialogue of the deaf” that SAR has attempted to transcend and we will continue to do so. In the meantime, readers may wish to note that SAR's parent committee, TCLSAC – a committee that serves within the COCAMO coalition, that played a major role in helping put together the recent resource kit *Mozambique: Apartheid's Second Front*, that numbers among its members people who have spent, literally, decades working on behalf of the Mozambican revolution – need hardly apologize for its record of support for Frelimo's project. Forgive us, then, if we think there are no profane questions, even about Mozambique, only more and less convincing answers.

More on Nota Moises

February 6, 1989

On June 17 of last year the *Globe and Mail* reported that the Canadian government had granted political asylum to Francisco Nota Moises, an official of the Mozambican terrorist organization Renamo, now

living in Victoria, B.C. (see *SAR*, vol. 4 no. 2). After being criticized in the House of Commons by opposition MPs, the government referred the issue to the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission. The Commission recently reported that it has found nothing wrong with Moises' admission, and that unless

any new information came to light, his case would be considered closed.

This decision to allow Moises to continue to live and work in our country must not be allowed to stand. His organization has committed unspeakable atrocities in its effort to destabilize the Frelimo gov-

ernment. Last April, the U.S. State Department released a report on Renamo activities in which Mozambican refugees described many instances of the murder of civilians, their enslavement to carry Renamo supplies, their forced relocation and confinement, the destruction and looting of their villages, rape, beatings, torture, mutilation and food and water deprivation. Moises' implication in these acts remove any internationally accepted obligations to grant him political asylum.

Canada's Immigration Act requires that any immigrant found to be "engaged in or instigating subversion by force of any government" be deported. This is exactly what Moises has been doing. By his own admission, he has continued to play an important role as a Renamo information officer since moving to Canada. According to a recent article in the periodical *Africa Confi-*

dential, Moises attended a meeting of Renamo leaders in Bonn, West Germany, last September.



Francisco Nota Moises

Readers are urged to contact the Minister of Employment and Immigration, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and their own Member of Parliament to protest the continued presence of Francisco Nota Moises in our country. Your effort can really make a difference.

Please write or call:
The Hon. Barbara McDougall, P.C., M.P., Minister of Employment and Immigration, 231 West Block, House of Commons, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6. Telephone (613) 957-3744;
and

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Secretary of State for External Affairs, Room 165, East Block, House of Commons, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6. Telephone (613) 995-1851.

Christopher Collier
Toronto

UDF Leaders

continued from page 25

lot of attention in the international community, particularly when that attention includes threats of sanctions by foreign governments. The reprieve of the Sharpeville Six is an example. The detainees that have been "released" are those who are well known internationally - Zwellahke Sisulu, Raymond Suttner, Eric Molobi. There are many, many more inside whose release should be the object of international campaigning.

Campaigns should be broader in the focus of their demands, we were advised. The focus on Mandela had been very effective, but is perhaps now too narrow. The South African government is still struggling to respond to that particular demand, hoping to appease international opinion. But when he is released, then what? Unless there are other demands in place, the regime will be let off the hook. Constant campaigning to lift the state of emergency is necessary, it was ar-

gued. If Mandela is released into a state of emergency, he will have very little freedom at all.

Massive international opposition should make it as costly as possible for the state to proceed with further trials against UDF and other anti-apartheid activists, as was being threatened for Eastern Cape UDF leaders. The recent judgement at the Delmas trial of the UDF leadership had very serious implications for the anti-apartheid struggle, Morobe pointed out. The judge had ruled that all non-violent political opposition was potentially illegal and could be regarded as treasonous. This extreme narrowing of the space for political action had to be vigorously challenged.

And what about diplomatic sanctions, the two UDF representatives were asked. How should NGOs here respond to the Canadian government's argument that the embassy is an important conduit of information about anti-apartheid developments and witness to trial procedures? "Having put diplomatic

sanctuary to good use," quipped Morobe, "how can I turn around and argue for the closure of all embassies?" It is true, they said, that some embassy people have their hearts in the right places, and have been supportive of democratic organizations, placing pressure of the South African government. But the overall policy of the democratic opposition remains to isolate the apartheid regime diplomatically. In reality, however, there are complex evaluations to be made of actual situations that arise. The solidarity movement, it was proposed, should "call for the optimum," that is diplomatic isolation, but evaluate pragmatically what each embassy is doing.

"Apartheid is the state of emergency!", the current slogan of the Five Freedoms Forum in South Africa, was quoted by Morobe as particularly apposite. He and Valli made a strong case for intensifying pressure on the apartheid regime. How is the Canadian solidarity movement to respond?

In solidarity with the
women of Southern Africa on
the occasion of International Women's Day

