

SPECIAL NUMBER

English Edition.

Unpublished Manuscripts - Please reprint

- INTERNATIONAL -

Vol 9. No. 44

PRESS

30th August 1929

CORRESPONDENCE

Editorial Offices and Central Despatching Department: Berggasse 31, Vienna IX. — Postal Address, to which all remittances should be sent by registered mail: Postamt 66, Schliessfach 213, Vienna IX. Telegraphic Address: Inprekorr, Vienna.

Tenth Plenum of the E. C. C. I.

Full Report.

Continuation of the Discussion on the Reports of Comrades Kuusinen and Manuilsky.

Seventh Session.

6th July, 1929 (morning).

Comrade PIATNITSKY (E. C. C. I.):

Comrades, I will probably bring a discordant note into the discussion. The comrades who have hitherto spoken here dealt with theoretical questions about the nature of Fascism, or with other great political questions — capitalist rationalisation, Left orientation of the masses, — and if they spoke at all about the Communist Parties, they only mentioned the Central Committees. I want to go down a little lower and to show what the basis of our Parties looks like, and how C. P. organisations of the capitalist countries are working, because I hold the view that political questions cannot be separated from organisational ones. It is only by combining correct policy with good organisation that the C. I. sections will be able to do justice to the tasks imposed on them.

How can the growing influence of the Parties be consolidated? By good work on the part of the Party organisations, by close contact with the masses. What is the best way of establishing this contact? By communist work in the workers and peasants mass organisations (factory committees, trade unions, workers co-operatives and sport organisations, I. R. A., Free Thinkers organisations, W. I. R., provisional organisations, mainly strike committees, anti lock-out committees), by the work of Party nuclei in enterprises.

Then I want to show here how the Communist Parties have worked hitherto in the enterprises. I must remind you briefly that prior to 1924 — in spite of the Third Congress of the C. I. passing a detailed resolution on the organisational question in which the necessity of re-organising the Parties on a factory nucleus basis was pointed out — these directions were not put into practice. It was only in 1924 that the orga-

nisation of nuclei in enterprises was taken in hand in some countries where the Party is legal. Till then, the organisations were constructed according to the territorial principle, according to the residential district of the Party members. Owing to this fact, the C. P. organisations did not differ from the organisations of the Social Democratic Party. I will give you official statistical data of the Communist Parties. According to the statistics of the C. C. of the Communist Party of Germany, we had in 1925, 1,384 factory nuclei and 110 street nuclei; in 1926 — 2243 factory nuclei and 1928 street nuclei; in 1927 — 2107 factory nuclei and 2597 street nuclei; in 1928 — 1556 factory nuclei and 2461 street nuclei. What do we see? Street nuclei which started their existence in 1925 with 110, reached 2461 in 1928. In 1925, the C. P. of Germany had 1384 factory nuclei, whereas in 1928 this number increased just a little (1556), although in 1926, the C. P. of Germany had already 2243 factory nuclei. The number of factory nuclei was reduced during this period, whereas the number of street nuclei increased in the C. P. of Germany.

In 1927, there were in Germany 549 local Party organisations with nuclei, and 480 in 1928. Thus, the number of local organisations based on factory nuclei was reduced. In 1927, there were 1963 local organisations without factory nuclei, and 2358 in 1928. Instead of the number of local organisations based on factory nuclei increasing, we witness a reduction.

The organisations of the C. P. of Germany in big industrial centres, such as the Ruhr, Halle-Merseburg, the Lower Rhine, instead of strengthening their position in the enterprises and organising more Party nuclei, retrogressed, the number of factory nuclei in 1928 going down in the Ruhr to 123, in Halle-Merseburg to 63 and in the Lower Rhine to

60. Out of 27 districts of the C.P. of Germany, in 22 the number of Party nuclei in enterprises was reduced.

It is interesting that what we witness in the German Communist Party, is repeated also in the other Parties.

In America, there were 166 factory nuclei and 452 street nuclei in 1927. In 1928, the number was 111 and 468 respectively. Here too the number of factory nuclei decreased, whereas the number of street nuclei increased.

In Czechoslovakia, there were 1301 factory nuclei in 1926, and 1013 in 1927; in 1928 — 954. The number of street nuclei in 1926 (street and so-called village nuclei together) was 2500; in 1927 the number of street nuclei only was 663; in 1928 669; as to so-called village nuclei (they give them this name because it sounds important, they are just ordinary Party organisations in villages) their number was 3187 in 1927, and 3083 in 1928. These so-called village nuclei embrace mainly workers employed in urban factories and works, but resident in the adjoining villages. These communist workers are not members of Party nuclei in the factories.

What about membership in these nuclei? what is the percentage of Party members co-ordinated in factory nuclei? In this respect, comrades, the state of affairs is very unsatisfactory. I will give you the statistics of 19 districts of the C.P. of Germany for 1927 and 1928. The percentage of industrial workers in the C.P. of Germany is considerable, members employed in factories and works constitute, I am sure, not less than 60% of the membership. How are these members represented in factory nuclei; (Remmele: How did you arrive at 60%? The percentage is much bigger).

Comrade Remmele, if you think that the percentage of Party members employed in factories and works is even higher than 60%, as stated by me, the figures which I will give here, will seem even more insignificant.

In 1927, 15% of the Party membership belonged to factory nuclei. In 1928 — 12% (I take round figures). In 1927, 47% of the Party membership belonged to street nuclei, and 42% in 1928. Local organisations, which had no nuclei, had in their ranks 31% of the Party membership in 1927, and 43% in 1928. Thus, the number of Party members belonging to street nuclei was reduced from 47% in 1927 to 42% in 1928, i. e. by 5%, because part of the Party members went over from street and factory nuclei to Party organisations where nuclei do not as yet exist. These figures apply to 19 out of the 27 districts of the C.P. of Germany. If we take the older districts of the C.P. of Germany, the percentage of Party members belonging at present to factory nuclei will be 18, and in some districts, as for instance in the Ruhr, it is 38%, in Upper Silesia it is 34%, in the Saar Basin 33%, in Erzgebirge Vogtland 24%, in Berlin-Brandenburg 25%. I must also point out that in the Berlin-Brandenburg Party organisation, 60% of the Party membership belonged to factory nuclei in 1926; in the course of two years the percentage was reduced from 60 to 25%. The reduction of the percentage of Party members belonging to factory nuclei in 1928, is not a purely German phenomenon, it applies to all the Parties.

In America, factory nuclei had in their ranks 1638 Party members, and 1224 in 1928; the number of members in street nuclei was 8115 in 1925, and 9461 in 1928 (in connection with the crisis in the C.P. of America, the number of Party members has probably decreased now).

Let us take Norway. The C.P. of Norway has 5208 members of whom only 999, namely 19%, belong to factory nuclei.

In Czechoslovakia, in the industrial centre Bruenn where 80% of all industrial workers are to be found, 10% of the Party membership belong to factory nuclei. If I remember right, 15% of the Party membership belonged last year to factory nuclei. In Prague, 18% of the Party membership belong to factory nuclei. In the Vitkovitz works which employs 19,000 workers and which should be the most important citadel of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia, 500 communists are working, but only 126 Party members belong to the nucleus.

France. We have very little information about the C.P. of France, but we can see from the few data at our disposal culled from official Party reports, that the Party had about 56,000 members in February 1928, including 17,448 in factory nuclei, which constitutes 31.15% co-ordinated in 898 factory

nuclei. In April 1929, at the time of the VI Congress of the C. P. of France the membership of the Party, according to the report of the C. C., amounted to 45,000 only 24% of whom belonged to factory nuclei.

Such is the picture of the work of the Communist Parties in the enterprises. What should be done, comrades, in view of this state of affairs? One should certainly remove from street nuclei all Communists employed in factories and works, compelling them to join the nuclei in the enterprises. In enterprises where no nuclei exist, communists detached or removed from street nuclei, should form factory nuclei. Let us take, for instance, the Vitkovitz works which I have already mentioned. Only 126 communists of the 500 employed in this gigantic works belong to the Party nucleus. The remaining 374 Party members belong to street nuclei in their residential districts where no broad basis for Party work exists. If they all belonged to the factory nucleus, our work among the 19,000 men and women employed in this important works would be given an impetus. Unfortunately, the Vitkovitz works is not an exception.

In what factories and works are communists employed? I am giving below a characteristic statistic concerning the C.P. of Germany which covers 15 out of the 27 Party districts. This statistic can also be very well applied to all the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries.

(The number of Party members employed in factories and works is taken as 100):

Party members employed	In enterprises with:						
	Up to 50 workers	up to 100	up to 500	up to 1000	up to 3000	up to over 5000	
in 1927	36.13	11.39	21.56	8.79	14.37	8.09	2.77
in 1928	39.—	11.42	18.76	9.59	12.81	3.10	3.21

This table shows firstly, that the mass of the membership of the C.P. of Germany (79%) were employed in 1928 in factories and works employing up to 500 workers, and secondly, that in 1928 compared with the preceding year, the number of Party members employed in big works and factories, with the exception of enterprises employing up to 1000 workers and over 5000 male and female workers, has decreased.

That the majority of members of Communist Parties in the capitalist countries are mainly employed in small and medium enterprises, is also confirmed by the statistical data of 1929 of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia. (The number of Party members employed in factories and works is taken as 100):

8.2% of Party members are employed in enterprises employing up to 50 workers,

67% of Party members are employed in enterprises employing up to 50—100 workers,

20% of Party members are employed in enterprises employing up to 100—1000 workers,

1% of Party members are employed in enterprises employing over 1000 workers.

There are of course communists also in big and even very big enterprises, but not in all of them by far. The Party nuclei are conspicuous by their absence in the biggest enterprises of the most important industries, and where they do exist, they are very small and not up to the mark, because they are left in most cases without leadership on the part of the higher Party organs. The Communist Parties must strain every nerve to penetrate into the biggest enterprises and most important industries. They (the Communist Parties) must pay special attention to Party nuclei in the big enterprises.

I will deal now with the work of street and factory nuclei. To judge by the number of members in street nuclei, one would think that they are carrying on a gigantic work. But unfortunately, all the data at our disposal tell us that in their work they do not differ in the least from the old residential organisations. Just like the former residential organisations, most of them are passive, except when Party campaigns are taking place. It is very characteristic that as soon as a Party campaign has to be organised, the Party Committees mobilise

the members of factory nuclei in order to strengthen the work in the street nuclei. Of course, I do not mean to say by this that there are no street nuclei which work well. Taken as a whole, they work badly, they meet seldom and wake up only on the eve of big campaigns (elections) and Party conferences.

The work of factory nuclei is not much better. I can see that some comrades are not pleased with what I am saying about the work of street and factory nuclei. Of course, if I dealt with the nucleus work of every factory and works separately, I would point out that there is a nucleus in this or that works which is working admirably, for there are really in every country factory nuclei which do wonders. But I am only giving you a picture of the general situation, that factory nuclei are working inadequately on the whole, is a common phenomenon. (Remmele: To listen to you, one would think that no progress is made in Party work).

This is not so, comrade Remmele. Already the fact that Communist Parties have begun to work in enterprises, have already factory nuclei, which was not the case in 1924, means success. The Communist Parties had considerable influence on the proletariat even when the basis of the Party was the residential organisation of the Party members. But all the big events of the last decade, since the establishment of Communist Parties, have shown that it is impossible to consolidate organisationally this influence without the existence (and of course good work) of nuclei in enterprises and communist fractions in workers mass organisations (trade unions, factory committees, etc). Take, for instance, the revolutionary events of 1923 in Germany. If the C.P. of Germany had at that time established close contact with the workers in factories and works and had been aware of the mood of the workers (especially if the C.P. of Germany had been pursuing then a correct revolutionary line), the issue of the events would have certainly been different. The Communist Parties are, of course, progressing, in spite of the inadequate work of most of the factory nuclei. But if the nuclei worked better in the enterprises, the Communist Parties would be even more successful. This is what I mean. I do not in the least minimise the successes of our Parties. I will show you presently that factory workers are coming themselves to the Party committees to ask them to organise meetings in the factories. With a few exceptions, factory nuclei meet as a rule very seldom — once a month or once every two months. Factory nuclei work very inadequately among the workers of the respective enterprises. How could one otherwise explain the strange thing that factory nuclei did not know that strikes had begun in their enterprises. There have been such cases. (Neumann: very seldom).

I have given many such facts in my articles on Party construction.

There were cases quite recently, during the elections to the factory committees in Germany, which proved that Party nuclei were not familiar with the mood of the workers, that nuclei were opposed to independent lists of candidates put up by the Communist Party and trade union opposition, and that the workers compelled them to put up such lists.

I will describe you the state of affairs in the factory nuclei of the C.P. of France. In the few factory nuclei which the C.P. of France possesses — and you have seen that according to the official statistics of the C.C. of the C.P. of France — only 24% of the Party membership belong to factory nuclei — there is a big percentage of attached members. If we take as 100 the 24% of Party members who belong to factory nuclei, the members attached to these nuclei constitute 21% of the Party membership, i. e. over 1/5th of the members of factory nuclei. Who are these attached members? They are comrades who either do not work in enterprises, or are employed in very small enterprises. We have in many cases a state of affairs that two to three members of the factory nucleus are employed in the factory, whereas the remainder are attached members. In a state of affairs when 1/3 or 2/3rds of the nucleus members are attached to the nuclei, it is but natural that the nuclei either do not study the questions which concern the given enterprise at all, or go into them very seldom, because these questions can hardly interest the attached comrades. In the capitalist countries, the avenue to factories is closed to them.

Considerable success was achieved in the preceding years in regard to the publication of factory newspapers. These newspapers played an important role in the mobilisation of the masses and in spreading communist ideas among the workers. These newspapers have serious defects. Nevertheless, they played an important role. According to the rather scrappy information at our disposal, there were 170 factory newspapers in Germany in 1926; 300 in France; 40 in America and 24 in Great Britain; the latter are published regularly and have a big edition.

In 1928, the factory newspapers were no longer published periodically. Their publication coincided mainly with the campaigns. The number of the newspapers decreased in all countries. According to information re Czechoslovakia, 60 factory newspapers were published there in 1926; 806 in 1927 with a total edition of 80,000, whereas now their number has been reduced by approximately one third. And yet, in as far as work in enterprises is becoming more and more difficult owing to the terrorist methods of employers and reformists, these newspapers are an important factor of propaganda and communist mobilisation of the masses. Our big press — the editors present here must not feel offended — is very tedious and has not a big circulation. Do these newspapers reach the masses? Certainly not, if we take the masses who are reading, let us say, the Social Democratic press. Factory newspapers can reach and do reach all workers employed in factories and works, and they are also read by Social Democratic workers. If these papers are well conducted, if economic demands are linked up with political demands, these newspapers can be an invaluable factor.

Do the C.C.'s of Communist Parties and Party Committees take an interest in these newspapers? It cannot be said they do. Instead of increasing their number a hundred times, in many places their number is being reduced. Much more attention should be paid to the make-up and publication of factory newspapers. Even in countries where Communist Parties are legal, factory nuclei are obliged to carry on an illegal existence owing to the terrorism of the employers. Factory newspapers, leaflets, etc., provided they be well drawn up and adapted to the workers of the respective enterprise, can make the work of the nucleus among the workers of the enterprise much easier. By the bye, why are factory nuclei doing such unsatisfactory work? I think that in spite of the old Social Democratic traditions which consisted in Party work being carried on — and unfortunately this is still the case in many places — entirely in the residential districts of the workers (party organisations were constructed for work in the residential district of the Party members) which is interfering with the work of the Communists in the enterprises, — factory nuclei could after all do better work in the enterprises, if Party Committees paid more attention to their work. Everyone admits that one must work in enterprises, but when it comes to deeds, when some Party campaign must be carried through, Party Committees generally organise it in the residential districts of the Party members, through the street nuclei, and not in the factories or works through the factory nuclei. Recruiting members is generally carried on thus: Communists go from house to house or stand at street corners and recruit members for the Party. What is the result of such recruiting? The result is that the new member has been registered in the Party but has not been made a member of the nucleus of the factory where he is employed; he has not been drawn into Party work, no attention has been paid to him, with the result that many new members recruited in this manner very soon leave the Party.

I have already given once data concerning the recruiting campaign of the French Communist Party. In one big recruiting campaign, it managed to secure several thousand members. The recruiting took place at big public meetings. The new members left their addresses in the Party Committees, the French C.P. did not know a long time what to do with them, where to fit them in: should they be organised into factory nuclei, should they be sent to Party nuclei in enterprises where new members are working, or should they be co-ordinated in organisations on a residential basis. When they were asked to report themselves in the Party Committees, at least one third of the new members did not turn up. If the recruiting of Party members had taken place in factories and works through Party

nuclei which would have paid attention to the new members, would have given them literature and would have drawn them into Party work, they would not only have stayed in the Party, but through their work in the enterprises would have been strengthened, and contact with the masses established on a wider scale. Needless to say that workers brought into the Party through the nucleus of the enterprise where they are employed, are better known than workers recruited through a house to house canvass and at meetings. One of the reasons of the constant fluctuation of members in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries, is not doubt the mode of recruiting Party members.

Comrade Manuilsky said correctly in his report that if you want to learn how to carry on campaigns, you must go to the French Communist Party, but if you want to consolidate the results of the campaign the French Party will not teach you anything, I quite agree with him on this point. The C. P. of France is an adept at conducting big campaigns. But who is conducting these Party campaigns? "L'Humanite" and the Parliamentary fraction. It frequently happens that deputies go to their constituencies without preliminary notification of the local Party organisations, without the co-operation of these organisations. They organise public meetings, etc. I am of course not against Party organs and deputies participating in Party campaigns. On the contrary, such is their bounden duty. But these big Party campaigns must be carried on by the whole Party, by all the organisations including the factory nuclei of the Party. If on the other hand, big campaigns concerning important questions are carried on quite apart from the Party nuclei, the latter are bound to be passive. I have already pointed out that in many enterprises the workers have compelled the factory nuclei or the trade union opposition to put up their own list of candidates, whereas many nuclei have remained passive in such an important matter as elections to factory committees in which all the workers in the enterprise participate. I could give a whole series of facts published in Party documents on this subject, but I will limit myself to a couple of them. It was possible to call conferences of non-Party workers at the initiative of the Berlin-Brandenburg organisation of the C. P. G. before May Day and immediately after it. Such conferences of representatives of enterprises could not have been called, if it had been very difficult or impossible to carry on Party work in the enterprises. It is not only in Germany that Party work can be carried on in factories and works.

Conferences of non-Party workers were held in factories and works in Paris before May Day. Comrade Manuilsky has already pointed out in his report that owing to these factory conferences it was possible to carry out full strikes in a number of enterprises of the metal, woodworking and building industries on May Day. Could such results have been achieved without these factory conferences?

Here is another characteristic fact which should be mentioned everywhere. I mean the case of the expulsion of comrade Niederkirchner, chairman of the Plumbers Section of the metal workers union of Berlin. After his expulsion, a big campaign was organised in factories and works among metal workers by the Communist fraction of the Metalworkers Union and the Party organisations for annulment of the expulsion. This was a right and proper campaign, and all the other Communist Parties must learn how to carry out such campaigns. How was this blow warded off? The communists of the Plumbers section called a metal workers conference which was attended by 293 representatives of 151 enterprises, including representatives of 27 of the biggest enterprises of Berlin. The conference represented 111,153 workers. Doesn't this prove that we can work in enterprises if we set our mind to it.

Here are, what I would call, characteristic quotations (which I already mentioned) from "Partei Arbeiter" No. 4, p. 100, 1929 (this is a special periodical of the body of active workers in the German Communist Party). I would like to say that such "Partei Arbeiter" should be published by all our Communist Parties. Although the periodical has a number of defects, it is an excellent paper on the whole:

"In the Pillaw and Block firm in Dresden which employs about 1500 workers, our nucleus and the first

chairman of the workers council were against our new tactic in the factory committee elections, and did not want to put up their own list of candidates. But when, by means of a leaflet, a preliminary general workers meeting was called, which was attended by about 500 workers, it came to pass that the factory workers, almost without exception, voted for our list and against the list of the reformist leaders, with the result that our list was the only one in the enterprise. Comrades in the nucleus were surprised at this success."

(Remmele: We have a dozen of such facts.)

This proves that one can work in factories.

(Remmele: And who is denying this?)

Those who do not give an impetus to this work. I have proved by facts that Party work in enterprises is inadequate. Here is another characteristic quotation from the same "Partei Arbeiter":

"Leaflets were published also in the Hartwig and Vogel chocolate factory in order to mobilise all the workers. A number of these leaflets came into the hands of the workers of the Petzold and Aulhorn firm, another big chocolate factory, with the result that delegates from this factory came the next day to our Party committee with the demand that a general meeting should be called also in their factory in order to put up an oppositional list of candidates. Our comrades in this enterprise remained passive in this affair."

What does this prove? What I have been saying since 1924, namely, that Party work is possible in enterprises. We are frequently told that it is very difficult to work in enterprises because communists are dismissed. But do communists really imagine that the class struggle can be carried on without sacrifices?

When Communist Parties are struggling not only against the whole apparatus which is under the control of the State, but also against reformist and yellow trade unions and Social Democratic Parties, sacrifices are inevitable. What happens if even all the Communists have been dismissed from a factory? The next day our Party Committees must endeavour to send there other Party members, or they must send the dismissed comrades to the gates of the factory in order to meet there those who are in sympathy with us and to organise them into a new nucleus. This is the only way that our work can be done, that we can consolidate organisationally the ideological influence we already possess. Of course, all of us know these truths, and yet Party work in factories and work is still very inadequate, as shown by figures and facts.

(Neumann: One should not give only the dark side of the picture.)

I have spoken and do speak very often about the bright side of our Party work in general and the excellent work of some Party nuclei in enterprises. If it were not for the excellent work in some factories and works, probably the people who say and think that it is impossible to work in enterprises would be right. The re-organisation of the Communist Parties on a factory nucleus basis can after all record a certain amount of success compared with previous years, just because excellent work is done in some factories and works.

(Neumann: No-one among us thinks that it is impossible to work in factories and works.)

Comrade Neumann, if you think that there are no such Communists in the C. P. of Germany — and it is one of the best C. I. sections — this does not mean that there are no such people in other C. I. sections.

I think nevertheless that not all the members of even the C. P. of Germany are convinced of the necessity and possibility of working in enterprises, otherwise how could one explain that only 18% of the Party membership employed in enterprises belong to factory nuclei. We have in Germany a considerable number of revolutionary representatives in the factories and works of Germany about which I will say a few words later on. There are trade union representatives in the German factories and works among whom are also our Party members.

Other mass organisations are also beginning to work in factories and works. I ask you, how will you lead all this work in the enterprises, if you are not going to have strong, capable and tried Party nuclei in the factories and works? There are certainly factories in Germany with revolutionary factory committees but no Party nuclei. What should you, German comrades, have done in these cases? You should have taken up immediately the organisation of such Party nuclei, otherwise it will be difficult to lead the work of the revolutionary factory committees. I am very much afraid of a repetition of the experience of 1923, when the C. P. of Germany had enormous, one can say even exceptional, influence on the factory committees in Germany. They were then independent of the reformist trade unions. They were revolutionary organisations compared with the reformist trade unions (it was only after 1923, when the German reformists saw the revolutionary role which the factory committees were playing, that they converted many of them in the course of the last few years into organs of class collaboration), but did the C. P. of Germany have Communist fractions there at that time? Did the C. P. of Germany lead the factory committees through the Communist fractions? If it had led them, Brandler would not have had to call together the functionaries in Chemnitz and ask them if one could and should act or not. If the then C. C. of the C. P. of Germany, headed by Brandler, had called together in October 1923 the Communists from the enterprises or had called workers conferences with representatives from enterprises, the question "to act or not to act" would not have been decided in a negative sense. But at that time the C. P. of Germany was inadequately connected with the factories and works.

(Remmele: This is quite true.)

I am afraid, comrade Remmele, that the C. P. of Germany might again let the leadership of revolutionary factory committees slip out of his hands. I am afraid, in this respect of a repetition of the experience of 1923. Am I justified in this? Yes, I am, for if there are no communist nuclei in enterprises, if communists in factory committees, trade unions and other mass organisations are without Party leadership, this will mean that Party committees will not be able to lead mass organisations through communist fractions and will not be able to consolidate organisationally the ideological influence which the Communist parties have on the working class.

I will deal now with the question of revolutionary representatives. Prior to the Congress of the C. P. of Germany much was written, and at the Congress itself much was said, about revolutionary representatives who must be elected by factory workers. We here were not quite clear as to their role, as to who is to lead them. On comrade Ulbricht's arrival, we asked for information about the role and functions of these revolutionary representatives. It seems that the institute of revolutionary representatives in enterprises must work under the leadership of the factory committees. It must be the organ through which revolutionary factory committees will have their tentacles in all shops, departments, etc., of the enterprise. I am only afraid that the organisations which already exist in the enterprises and those which are to be formed will begin to compete with one another and will bring chaos into the work. If there is a revolutionary factory committee, and side by side with it, an institute of revolutionary representatives not connected with it, the latter will be an unnecessary organ because it will have no constant work, which means that it can lose its influence on the workers. But in factories and works where the factory committees are reformist while the revolutionary representatives are under the influence of the C. P. they must be set against the reformist factory committees, and with their help one will have to act against all organs in the enterprises which are in reformist hands. I shall be very glad if the German comrades would define the functions of the institute of revolutionary representatives in this manner, because I am an enemy of all organisations which are formed only to exist on paper. Every organisation must have definite functions, but if it has no such functions or if there is no longer any need for them, it is better to dissolve it, for such organisations are only wasting the time of comrades who belong to them.

I will deal now with the role of the Party nuclei in factories and works and with the role of factory newspapers in periods of illegality. Where can we get in contact with the workers when Communist Parties have been driven underground, if not in the factories and works? Regardless of all

difficulties and of the efficiency of the spying system of the employers, there is no such force which could prevent communists distributing leaflets in factories and works, exchange views with workers at the bench in the factory itself, at the factory gates or when they go together to work or after work, when they are together with the factory workers in trains, etc. The chief base of Communist work in times of illegality, can and must be only the factories and works.

What is the state of affairs in Rumania and Yugoslavia? The C. P. of Yugoslavia and Rumania had no factory nuclei, which means that they had no connection with factory workers before they became illegal. If they have not lost all contact with the workers, this is only due to the fact that some of the trade unions have remained with them. Although these unions are not working very adequately, our Parties have been able to keep up through them some sort of a connection with the factories and works. If I remember right, it happened in Rumania that during the peasants' march on the capital, the miners organised a "smychka" with them regardless of and without our Party. That our Party was not connected with them is a fact. If the C. P. of Rumania had small nuclei in the factories and works, could Communists have been driven from there? The Yugoslavian and Rumanian Communist Parties must do their utmost to co-ordinate the Party members employed in enterprises into factory nuclei and must begin to publish factory newspapers and leaflets. Thereby they will re-establish the connection with the factory workers. The Yugoslavian and Rumanian example must be taken into consideration by all the C. I. sections, because the accentuation of the class struggle noticeable throughout the world is bound to increase reaction. The May Day incidents in Berlin have shown that Social Democrats who, by words, have been always setting against the Dictatorship of the proletariat of the Bolsheviks in the U. S. S. R. the "pure democracy" of the West, have suppressed the central organ of the C. P. of Germany, which made of course the leadership of the Party and the working class very difficult.

By the bye, as I have come to speak on Germany, I want to find out how the central organ of the C. P. of Germany was published when it was suppressed. I was told — and I would like the German comrades to confirm it — that the "Rote Fahne" did not come out regularly every day after its suppression.

Here is another fact. The Red Front Fighters' Bund has been suppressed. The leaders and rank and file of the Bund and of the Communist Party of Germany declare that the Red Front Fighters' Bund exists, that they defy the proscription. But there is the illegal "Rote Front" which you could not issue allegedly for the reason that you had no money. A Party which has 125,000 dues paying members, a Party with colossal influence on the German working class, could not find means for the publication of an illegal central organ of the Red Front Fighters. Had the publication of the Red Front Fighters appeared regularly, it would have shown to the broad masses of workers who are incensed over the outlawing of the organisation and who are very well disposed towards the Red Front Fighters, that it really lives.

I will now take up the work of the local Party organisations. Do you think that if the local Party organisations, district committees, Party committees and sub-district committees would be sound organisations, that if they would function properly, such a state of affairs in the factory nuclei would be possible? It seems to me that there is no need to expatiate on the matter and that anyone of us would readily reply that these organisations did not work as they should have, because if they had worked properly they would not have chiefly occupied themselves with the publication of posters and the circulation of handbills, but would have chiefly devoted themselves to the establishment of intimate contact with the nuclei, the factories. They would have worked there perhaps to the detriment of the vast quantities of circulars which are being distributed. But they have not worked along these lines, and if they have, the work was badly done. Why do they work badly?

They are excessively centralised which renders the initiative of the local organisations difficult, which kills their initiative. The local Party organisations are waiting for instructions from the centre. The idea of the local organisations is that when the centre will give them instructions, they are sure to make no mistakes and that they will not be accused of deviations.

If they will receive instructions from the centre then they will start to work. But since resolutions and instructions are frequently late, the Party organisations are kept in suspense and do nothing or very little. This situation must be altered. The Party organisations must not wait for instructions from the centre on each given question, but should work within the confines of the general directives outlined by the Party Congresses and the decisions of the Plenums of the C. C. independently. How will they be able to receive instructions from the centre in case of great events if they will be cut off from the centre? Self-initiative must be developed by the local organisations. Moreover, for the sake of economy, posters, leaflets, circulars, etc., are published in the centre and then sent to the locals. But as the post is sometimes late and the material is not delivered in time, and now and then the railway and post officials destroy or throw away the posters, the locals remain without them. In addition to that, if manifestoes are written in the centre, they contain only general issues. If the local organisations would write their circulars, perhaps they would be bad, but with all that they would take local conditions and local issues into consideration. Such manifestoes and circulars would be ten times more useful than the posters and manifestoes which come too late from the centre. That is a fact. But since the centre does everything and everything is centralised, what is the result? The central apparatus are very big, employing 50 to 200 men, while colossal industrial districts, with very few exceptions, have not a single salaried worker in the Party and sub-district committees. This is fact. Let the comrades tell me that it is not so and I am prepared to admit that I am wrong.

Now a few words concerning the membership fluctuation in the Parties. Here are some figures concerning a few of our Parties. I take the statistics of previous years to show the extent of the membership fluctuation.

In the **Communist Party of Czechoslovakia** there were in 1924 138,996 members. In 1925 the membership was 93,220, in 1926, 92,818, in 1927, 138,000, in 1928, during the VI Congress of the C. I. 150,000, and towards the end of the same year 91,000. In 1929 the organisation has only 81,432 dues paying members.

(Ulbricht: That is not true. It is absolutely wrong. It is Jilek's invention.)

Comrade Ulbricht, firstly if I remember right, Jilek was not at the head of the Party in 1924, secondly, we are taking the official figures given by the C. C. of the Czechoslovakian Party in the reports to its Congresses.

In 1926, for example 26,801 people joined the C. P. Cz. Added to the 93,220 members of 1925, the membership in 1926 should have been 120,021. But we find that the 1926 membership was only 92,818. This means that 27,203 members withdrew from the Party in 1926, which is 402 more than the newly joined.

In the **Communist Party of Great Britain** the membership in 1925 was 5,000; in April 1926 it was 6,000; in October 1926 — 10,730; in January 1927 — 9,000; in March 1928 — 5,556. In 1929 the membership is according to some figures, 3,500, and according to others, 4,000. British comrades, are these figures correct?

(Campbell: They are correct.)

In the **French Party** there were in 1924, 68,191 members; by the end of August 1925 the membership was 83,326; in 1926 it was 65,230; in 1927 — 56,010; in 1928 — 52,526. In 1929 it is only 46,000. During that period the Communist Party of France launched several membership drives. In 1926 it took in 5,000 new members, in 1927 it took in 2,500 members in connection with the membership drive in the campaign against the military bill. But with all that the membership of the French Party has been diminishing from year to year.

The **Communist Party of the United States** accepted in 1923 6,532 members; in 1924 — 8,456 members; in 1925 — 4,100; in 1926 — 2,731; in 1927 — 3,257; in 1928 — 2,452. All in all, 27,168 people joined the Party in the course of five years. But in 1929, the membership of that Party is from 9 to 11,000.

From the report of the Berlin-Brandenburg Party organisation at the district Party Conference of April 1929, we find that it accepted in 1928, 6,087 new members, and that 4,965

withdrew from the Party. This means that the membership of the Berlin-Brandenburg organisation has increased only by 1,122 as it lost a good many members.

I am not giving any statistics concerning the **German Party** as its membership has in the last few years remained stable (124,000 dues paying members). This of course does not indicate that there is no fluctuation in the organisations of the German Party.

Is this membership fluctuation in the Sections of the Communist International something accidental? If the Party organisations will work properly and look after each member that is accepted, most of them will of course remain in the Party. Of course, a certain number of members falls out when moving from place to place, etc., but this does not explain the fluctuation in the Party membership. If the Parties would undertake the task of increasing their membership and keeping the members by all means, they would be able to do so and increase their membership. The increased membership they would be able to use in the work of the Party organisations, as well as in the mass organisations. It is only by looking after the new adepts that this fluctuation can be diminished. Is that possible? It is. We are told that it is the opportunists, people who are afraid of difficulties, etc., that leave the Party, while those remaining are 100% revolutionaries. But in the following year some of those who are called revolutionaries also withdraw. An explanation like this is too shallow. It must be admitted that there is fluctuation in all Communist Parties, a thing which must be combated, and it must be combated by means of better work on the part of the local Party organisations. Workers who join the Communist Party regard that organisation as a revolutionary Party which champions the interests of the working class and is capable of leading the workers. They expect to find in the Party organisations constant activity. But in most cases they do not find that. I analysed the data given by the C. P. G. in the pages of the "Communist International" after the VI Congress of the C. I. concerning the causes prompting members of the German Party to leave the organisation, and what happens to these ex-members. (This data is elaborated best by the German Party.) I found that it is chiefly the young Party members who leave the organisation because of the unsatisfactory work of the locals. In time of big campaigns they help the Communist Party. This means that they do not go to other parties and they consider the Communist Party their own. During the recent elections in France, at least 300,000 workers helped the French Party in the election campaign. But these people do not join the Party as the Party organisations cannot interest them with necessary and useful work.

What must be done in order to decrease the fluctuation? Of course I cannot give you a prescription which would be good for all times. There is no doctor who never makes a mistake. It seems to me that the adoption and carrying out of the points I am going to indicate would help the local organisations in combating this evil. I suggest that:

1. Instead of giving paper instructions to the local Party organisations, it is necessary to send live instructors for a considerable length of time. If instructors are sent for three days, and it happened in Germany that an instructor came around, saw that something was wrong, told the Party committee, the higher body, about it, and went away, not much good comes out of it. Instructors should remain for some time in the local organisations and actually try to help to arrange their work.

2. It is necessary to look after the carrying out of decisions. We have excellent decisions, there is nothing that can be criticised, but how many of them are carried out? I think that it is high time to control the carrying out of decisions and to see how they are carried out. It is better to pass fewer resolutions, but to carry those that have been passed into operation.

3. The best people should be put at the head of the local organisations. However, now the best people are kept in the centre. There they sit in the apparatus and write and despatch lifeless paper instructions.

4. It is necessary to call periodical conferences on the question of Party structure, on a national, district, and sub-district scale.

5. It is necessary to teach in all schools of the Sections of the C. I. subjects on Party structure. At the present time

these schools teach all kinds of nonsense, they even teach oratory, but do not teach on the subject of Party structure.

6. It is necessary to distribute properly and expeditiously the Party forces. The situation in the Parties now is such that active members are over-burdened and have so much to do that their work cannot be of benefit to themselves or to the Party.*

(Neumann: Quite right.)

At the same time, from 30 to 60% of the Party members are passive and do nothing. I do not propose that they be expelled as many are inclined to do, I merely suggest that Party duties be properly distributed amongst members, so that no comrade would have more than two duties. (Under illegal conditions of course they may have more).

(Manuilsky: The same happens in the Comintern apparatus.)

Comrade Manuilsky, I will be very much obliged to you if you will help to carry out in the Comintern apparatus what I propose.

7. It is necessary to improve and strengthen the leadership given by the Party Committees through the Communists and Communist fractions in the mass labour organisations.

Now as to the question of cadres. The comrades always complain that we have no cadres. But it is my impression that they think that cadres can come down from somewhere or other, from the skies. How are cadres formed? Cadres are created in organisations which act, which work. In Parties where there are no cadres it means that these Parties do not work properly. That is quite obvious. Do you think perhaps that all that is necessary is to send comrades to school and to teach them Communist wisdom in order to develop cadres, and that no practical experience is necessary? The necessary cadres cannot be secured this way. I do not mean to say that I am opposed to schools. On the contrary, I am in favour of teaching on the subject of Party structure in the schools, I always maintain that schools are necessary. But the comrades must understand that the schools alone cannot give us the necessary cadres. The schools must train the comrades who already have some practical experience. In this connection, the experience of the C. P. S. U. is worth consideration. Up to 1917, we Bolsheviks had some two or three schools abroad. The comrades attending these schools were many years in the Party engaged in underground Party work in tsarist Russia. The Russian Bolshevik cadres were forged at practical work. I think that two thirds of the workers of the old Bolshevik guard had no opportunity whatever to study and to finish Party schools or courses. This, however, does not mean that the cadres of the old Bolshevik guard were bad workers.

There is another bad feature in the Sections of the C. I., and that is that our cadres, the few that we have, are people who have come to us from the Social Democrats. Why have the Communist Parties to this day not yet started to work among the workers in the factories and mills? Chiefly because these cadres are former social-democrats who want to be revolutionaries, who really are revolutionaries, but who still suffer from the old traditions and the old social-democratic experience. They argue: we have managed 30—40 years without work in the factory nuclei, why must we now change our methods of Party work? In the old organisations built on the residential basis, with a membership of 50 to 150, fewer active workers were necessary than now when in the factory and street nuclei there are in most cases not more than from 3 to 50 members. In each nucleus there must be at least one experienced active worker. The more poorly the Party nuclei work, the more inactive they are, the less hope is there to secure the necessary cadres for the Communist Parties. All energy must be exerted in order to overcome this vicious circle. Without intensive work of the nuclei, the local Party organisations, the Communist fractions in the mass organisations, the necessary cadres will not be formed. There must be no division of Party workers into political, organisational and practical workers, which exists in many Sections of the C. I. at the present time. All political workers, including newspaper editors, must work in the nuclei, in the local Party organisations. By this the activity of the Party organisations

will be raised and the necessary cadres will be formed. The new cadres which we are now in need of, and which would approach this work in a new way and would be able to cope with the new tasks confronting us, the revolutionary tasks, can be taken from the Young Communist Leagues. These Leagues must give us new cadres.

Now as to the work of the Y. C. I. and its Sections.

What has the VI. Congress of the C. I. decided concerning the Y. C. I.? It decided:

“The Congress instructs the Young Communist International to examine the question of the tactics and the methods of work of the Young Communist International, with a view to embracing larger sections of the working youth, to adopting more varied methods of recruiting.... Further:

“In those places, where young workers are not eligible for membership in the trade union it is necessary to proceed to organise, under the leadership of the Young Communist Leagues, special youth societies, the object of which shall be to fight for the economic needs of the proletarian youth.”

(From the Theses of the VI. World Congress on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist International. § 39.)

How much has been accomplished during this year of what I have just said? We have figures to show that the Y. C. I. has not only done nothing towards the carrying out of the decisions of the VI. Congress, but that matters are now even in a worse state than they were prior to the Congress. Here are some of the figures.

The Young Communist League of Czechoslovakia had at the time of the V. Congress of the Y. C. I. 12,789 members; now it has only 10,000 — on paper. In reality, it has only 5,000 dues paying members. This figure (5,000) is even mentioned by Comrade Khitarov in his article in the “Pravda”.

The Young Communist League of Germany had 20,000 members at the time of the V. Congress of the Y. C. I. Now it has 22,000 — a slight increase.

The Young Communist League of France had 10,000 members at the time of the Y. C. I. Congress. Its membership now is 8,000 — which is a decrease.

The Young Communist League of Sweden had 14,600 members at the time of the Congress, and now it has 14,652. Here it would seem that matters are not so bad. That is a peculiarity of the Swedish Party. I cannot go into the history of the Swedish Party and Y. C. I. at the present time. The comrades know that themselves.

The Young Communist League of Great Britain had at the time of the Y. C. I. Congress 1,400 members, and now only 900.

The Young Communist League of America had at the time of the Congress 2,480 members, and now 3,479.

The Young Communist League of Austria had at the time of the Congress 1,300 members, and now its membership is 1,000.

The Norwegian League had 3,000 and now it has 2,800. This proves that not only have we failed to move a step forward since the Congress, but we have actually gone backward.

I will now compare the Y. C. I. membership with the respective Party membership. In Germany there are 125,000 dues paying Party members, and 22,000 Young Communists. In Czechoslovakia the respective figures are 81,432 and 5,000.

(Khitarov: And where was the Party?)

I will still speak about that, Comrade Khitarov. You need no think that I am criticising the Young Communist organisations only.

In France the Party has 45,000 members and the League 8,000. The Swedish Party has 20,000 members and the League 14,652. The American Party has 11,500 and the League 3,479.

The British Party has 4,500 members or 3,500, and the League has 900 members.

The basis of the Young Communist Leagues can and should be wider than that of the Parties. The Young Communist Leagues have the vast reserves of young workers, who have no social-democratic traditions, to draw their forces from. The Y.C.L.'s can teach them Communism more easily than the Parties which have to deal with adults who are poisoned with the venom of social-democracy, reformism, catholicism, etc. The Communist Parties in accepting new members, put forward certain conditions, but the Y.C.L.'s can and should accept the young workers into their organisations without any conditions. However, the basis of the Young Communist Leagues is not becoming wider, but narrower. The working methods used by the Y. C. I. must be changed. The Y. C. I.'s must reach the young workers everywhere — in the school, the factory, the evening school, the sport ground, the singing and musical societies, the tenement houses, and finally the Christian, Socialist, Catholic and similar youth organisations. The youth go to the Christian Socialists, the Catholics and Liberals, because they want to find a field where to use their energy. They want to do something, they want to learn. The Y. C. I. must endeavour to draw over these youths, to absorb them. They have no traditions and it will depend on the organisations which they join now as to what they will be in the future. Urgent steps must be taken in order to improve the mass work of the Y. C. I. and its Sections. The Communist Parties will get no cadres unless the Young Communist Leagues will produce them. How narrow the basis of the Young Communist League is even in Germany may be seen from the fact that over 60% of the membership of the C. P. G. formerly belonged to the Social-Democratic and independent Social Democratic Parties and up to 1928, only 2.57% or 1,916 people had been transferred from the Y. C. L. to the Party (in 19 districts with a membership of 76,649).

Are the Y. C. I. and the Y. C. L. organisations alone to blame for that? No, not by any means. The Communist Parties devote very little attention and do not do any Y. C. L. work. Moreover, the Young Communist Leagues have often had to help the Comintern to correct the policies of the Communist Parties not only on Young Communist work, but on all work in general. If our Communist Parties would devote greater attention and energy, if they would give more assistance to the Young Communist Leagues in their work, the latter would become a wide reservoir for the Parties. The Y. C. I., situated in Moscow, cannot work in Germany and elsewhere. By this I do not mean that the Y. C. I. is not to blame for the bad state of affairs in the Y. C. L. organisations in the capitalist countries. The Y. C. I. is responsible. I am not against the Y. C. I.'s dealing with politics, I am not in any way opposed to its consideration and solution of Comintern problems as a Section of the C. I. Neither am I opposed to the Y. C. I.'s being a militant organisation. On the contrary, this is absolutely necessary. But that does not free it from the duty of working among the masses of young workers. It does not free the Y. C. I. from seeing to the work of the Young Communist organisations in all broad youth organisations, wherever young workers are to be found. If it is necessary in the interests of winning over the young workers, we may even go to the Christian Socialists and Catholic and liberal youth organisations. In brief, the Young Communist organisations must work wherever young workers are to be found; but the position of the Y. C. I. was hitherto entirely different.

There is nothing to keep the young workers from joining the Young Communist organisations. Communist Parties must devote greater attention to the Y. C. L.'s than hitherto. In 25 districts in which the Communist Party of Germany has 105,000 members out of a total of 125,000, only 843 belonged in 1928 to the Y. C. L. The Y. C. L. of Germany has 22,000 members. Can these 843 Party members lead the German Y. C. L.? We cannot believe that all of the 843 Party members are active. By no means. There are surely passive members amongst them. That is insufficient. The Y. C. L. must be given more attention and time. Are we going to have a respite of 10 or 15 years that the Communist Parties pay so little attention to the work of the Young Communists? We must not forget that class battles may begin quite unexpectedly, any day. Then it will

be too late to try to improve our Y. C. L. work. We must therefore take all necessary steps right now to ensure that the Y. C. I. makes a change in its working methods.

When I speak of the shortcomings of the Communist Parties in their Y. C. L. work, I do not mean to say that the E. C. C. I. is not to blame for the poor mass work done by the E. C. Y. C. I. The E. C. C. I. did not persist, it did not verify, it did not assist the Y. C. I. in adopting new working methods, such as the VI. Congress of the C. I. called for. The Y. C. I. is given absolutely inadequate guidance by the E. C. C. I. I say this not because I want to accuse anybody in particular. But the time has come when the question must be seriously raised so that the work and methods of work of the Y. C. I. may be changed. The Y. C. I. must be a militant organisation, it should take part in the affairs of the Comintern just as the other Sections of the C. I., it should help the Comintern in its struggle against the opportunists, against the Right wingers, against all those who do not carry out its policies, but it must devote some of its time, the greatest part of its time, to work in the factories, to work among the young workers.

Comrade Khitarov said here yesterday that the Y. C. I. called out representatives of the national Y. C. I. organisations, received reports from them, and gave them instructions showing them that they did not sufficiently work among the masses, etc. That is very nice. But you have not done everything, Comrade Khitarov. When leaders of the Communist Parties make mistakes, you Y. C. I. members demand their removal, you insist upon certain organisational measures. That is alright. But why have you not removed leaders from the national organisations who perchance accept good resolutions, who are orthodox 105% or perhaps 120% Communists, but since they cannot work among the masses they cannot be at the head of the national youth organisations. Remove a few of such comrades from their positions, replace them by others, by better people, by comrades who know how to work among the masses. I listened very attentively to what you said yesterday, but you said nothing about any change in the leadership of the national Sections of the Y. C. I. on the principle of securing good and skilful work among the masses.

(Khitarov: The Young Communist League is an educational organisation, don't forget that.)

Yes, the Young Communist League is an educational organisation. It must educate the youth by more than one method, the method of accepting good and sound resolutions within a narrow circle of members. It must educate the broad masses of the youth. Is this education unnecessary in the broad masses of young workers? If the Y. C. L. will not educate them, the bourgeoisie will do it. Until now, you have been educating only a very small circle of comrades who do not work among the masses or work badly.

Now as to work in the broad mass non-Party organisations. Much has been said here about the mass organisations. But I want to point out that as yet, we have no Communist fractions in all these organisations. These mass organisations are not yet properly guided by the Communist Parties through their fractions. Wherever such fractions exist, they work badly. The mass organisations themselves are not yet everywhere real mass organisations. Let us take the I. R. A. It is a mass organisation partly only in Germany. In the other countries, it is by no means a mass organisation as yet. This is a fact. As to the trade unions, even in Germany the Party Committees did not adequately guide the Communists working in these organisations. However, it is not difficult to work successfully in trade unions. This is illustrated by the successful trade union work in Germany in the metal, mining and factory workers' unions. I have already pointed out how energetic work was done in the factories against the expulsion of Communists. This shows that it is possible to work and all that is necessary is to have the knack of doing it. If the Communist Parties will work as they should in the unions, I am convinced that they will secure invaluable opportunities of being more closely linked up with the broad masses. For this, it is necessary to give better guidance to the Communist fractions wherever such exist and to undertake their organisations wherever they are still absent. Until now, this has not been done to a sufficient extent.

I will go into detail of Communist trade union work in two countries only — Italy and China.

I want to tell you that we workers of the E. C. C. I. are badly informed on what is going on in the Communist Party of Italy at home. We do not know with what success they perform their difficult task, by what ways and means they reach the working masses, etc.

As far as I know, the Italian comrades have not yet done and are not doing one very important piece of work, they do not work in the fascist unions. Here is what the resolution of the V. Enlarged Plenum of the E. C. C. I. said on this question. It said that

"a most vital constituent part of Bolshevisation is devotion of attention a hundred times greater than hitherto to our work in the existing social-democratic and other unions (yellow, national socialist, Christian and fascist). Only under such conditions will the monopoly of the reformist leaders (the labour aristocracy and labour bureaucracy) really be broken in the unions." (Translated anew.)

I am afraid that this decision has not been carried out. Of course we did not demand from the Italian Communists to capture all fascist unions. That is impossible, it is very difficult. We know very well that the workers join the fascist unions not because they want to do so, but because the economic and political situation drives them to it. The Communist Party must therefore work in the fascist unions.

Now as to China. The Resolution of the IV. Congress of the R. I. L. U. on China, said among other things, that:

"Many leaders of the Chinese labour movement in the past thought that it is necessary to restrict or stop entirely the sending of comrades to the reactionary unions as they become corrupted there. That may be interpreted as a refusal to work within these unions with the object of their demoralisation, and the winning over of the workers belonging to them. Without entering the apparatus of the reactionary unions appointed by the military authorities, our comrades must work among the masses of workers belonging to those unions."

Thus, there is a decision. This decision the Chinese comrades surely know. The red unions of China had a large delegation at the IV. Congress of the R. I. L. U. which participated in the drawing up of the resolution which I have just quoted. That delegation surely reported on the decisions of the IV. Congress of the R. I. L. U. I believe that these decisions have already reached China. But why do the Chinese comrades still waver on the question as to whether to work or not to work in the Kuomintang unions? What is the result? The Red unions are small units, and the Kuomintang unions are mass organisations. In the red unions there are the Communists, in the mass unions the Communists are lacking and the Kuomintang people are masters and can influence the workers as much as they like as there is no or practically no Communist work being done there. Is that Bolshevik tactics? I think no. On the question of work in the Kuomintang unions I shall still speak when the trade union question will be under consideration. It was said here that the Communist Party of China can be compared with the C. P. S. U. It works under great difficulties, etc. Of course, that is true. It works under extremely difficult conditions. Our Party never had to work under such conditions.

(Interjection: Under worse conditions.)

The C. P. S. U., or, as it was formerly called, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks), worked under very bad and difficult conditions. It, too, experienced executions, not as many of course as in China. It, too, was confronted with physical extermination and hard labour, etc. But the Russian Bolsheviks never lost their contact with the workers. The working class was the basis of our work. The Bolsheviks always worked in the factories, no matter how difficult that was. And despite all difficulties confronting the Communist Party of China — in speaking of that Party the comrades always speak of the difficulties and the heroic role which that Party played and will still play in the revolutionary movement — we must point out its defects. The Communist Party of China has not a sufficient proletarian base at the present moment. It has practically no basis among the workers. As we

find in a "Pravda" article written by Comrade Tsui Vi-to, a representative of the Chinese Party in the E. C. C. I., the C. P. S. has now 133,655 members, of whom only 3,435 are workers scattered in 30 towns. The cadres of the Chinese Party are therefore members of the petty-bourgeoisie. That is true of the centre as well as the locals. The Party works badly in the mass labour organisations. The Chinese comrades must be told to work in those organisations. I am not an expert on China, I merely read the reports of the Party, receive information from the comrades who have come from China and who saw what the Party is doing there, and I hope that the Chinese comrades will speak on this question. I shall be very glad if the Chinese comrades will tell us whether I am wrong. The Chinese comrades must leave this Plenum not only with a clear solution of the question of fascism and the role of fascism, they must leave here with the conviction that the Communist Party of China must work in the working class, that it must be based on the workers, that it must work in the Kuomintang unions, that it must get in new members and elect comrades to the leadership who will be able to work and who will perform that work regardless of all difficulties.

I have taken much of your time, but I believe that the comrades have themselves realised that we must utilise all possibilities at our disposal. If anyone will come out here and say that everything is being done, that everything is alright, not much significance should be attached to that. No matter how well they work, they can work a hundred times better. (Applause.)

Comrade FORD (U. S. A.):

In my opinion the American question should receive considerably more attention here, than it has, from Comrade Kuusinen and also from Comrade Manuilsky. We must point out to the American comrades not only the results of the American Commission, but the X. Plenum of the E. C. C. I. must make known its position regarding the results and the situation in the American Party. The political consequences should be shown to the Party membership as an enlightenment to the Party, we must make it known that the question of factionalism will not be tolerated.

Take for instance the rising struggles in America, the strike waves that have swept the south and are sweeping America in general. These have taken place primarily because of the effects and results of rationalisation on the American working class. Particularly is this so in the South. But rationalisation is not only having its effects upon the American working class but at the present time is leading American imperialism to further decay and contradictions on an international scale; it was therefore correct that we analysed the American situation as not being exceptional in regard to the international situation.

Our strike waves in the South have brought forward the question of the Negroes in America. And here we have come face to face with the problem of the Negroes in the American class struggle. Here our comrades have great tasks before them in overcoming the question of white chauvinism among the white working class — in the South in particular. For this reason we should give more consideration to the American question in the discussions of the X. Plenum.

I want now to pass on to the question of the colonial situation. In the speeches of Comrades Kuusinen and Manuilsky they have not dealt sufficiently with the question of the events which have taken place since the VI. World Congress in the colonies. Take the mass movement in India, where hundreds of thousands of workers are mobilised in strike waves in opposition to the offensive of the bourgeoisie. Yet India seems to be separated from us as by a Chinese wall. There must be some causes for this and some reasons. At the X. Plenum of the E. C. C. I. we should point out why we have so little contact with India, why it is so small. Why strikes do not take the proper trend and are not sufficiently under revolutionary influence.

I think we do not give sufficient attention to the question of China. Comrade Piatnitzky this morning made some criticism regarding China. I would ask Comrade Piatnitzky to

answer the question as to why the situation in China is as it is. Does not some of the fault for this lie with the E. C. C. I.? What communications do we have with China?

We also have movements in Latin America that are of tremendous importance to us. These movements also to some extent have a certain isolation from our general international revolutionary movement. Indeed, it appears at times that we have organised under the Communist International two international movements — a movement of colonial peoples and a movement of the Western European peoples. We should not have under the International two movements, but we should have one movement under the general direction of the Communist International in which all of our international problems are linked up one with the other, the colonial struggles with the struggles of the West European countries and with America.

Now we come to the question of the **Labour Party** in England. To my mind, on the question of the Labour Party in England, hinges our next approach to the colonial question, particularly the colonies under England. It has been pointed out here that rationalisation in England will be intensified and increased by the Labour Government, at the cost of the working class in England. This is true, but I think there are some other aspects of rationalisation and its effect in England. The Labour Government and bourgeoisie will betray not only the British working class, but also the colonial peoples. We must take into consideration the following aspect of rationalisation in England. In relation to the highly developed rationalisation that has taken place in America and Germany, rationalisation in England is in some of the primitive stages of development. Technical reasons, physical reasons, in the mines and the old standards in the industries of England and so on will prevent their reaching the high level of these countries. It is for this reason that rationalisation in England also has a very important bearing upon the colonies. The MacDonalld Labour Government, in order to try and carry out the rationalisation processes of the English bourgeoisie and to make up for the lack of development and possibilities for further rationalisation in England will try more and more to extend imperialist oppression of the colonies. In the meantime, they will grant concessions, as has been pointed out by some of the British comrades here, to the British working class to cover up all this extension.

Therefore our comrades in Britain have a tremendous problem before them of exposing quite concretely and in their everyday tasks the role of the Labour Government in relation to the colonial peoples. We must win the masses of workers in England over to support the movement in the colonies.

In the meantime it is necessary for our comrades in all the colonial countries to gain more and more contact with the masses. We must more and more penetrate into the masses of our colonial countries, taking to them the lessons of the Russian Revolution and the experiences gained in the Chinese Revolution.

Now I want to pass over to the **Negro question**. Here we still have lack of attention that has brought about further impatience from our Negro comrades in America. We have had communications and letters here from our Negro comrades in America, (of the Chicago district) who have called for a cessation of work in Chicago because of the inattention to the Negro work. These letters of complaint have come from comrades who are old in the Party.

Now in regard to **South Africa**, very little if anything, is said by the comrades in their reports. Strong emphasis must be made, and a strong calling down made to the comrades in South Africa as to the work they are doing there. We had a Party Congress in South Africa shortly after the VI World Congress. The programme adopted was nothing more or less than a social-democratic programme, which is a disgrace to the Communist International. It should be repudiated by the C. I. and investigated by the E. C. C. I. This programme and the general situation in South Africa has been refuted already by our British comrades. The colonial section of the British Party, seeing the situation in South Africa, drew up some few months ago a letter, analysing correctly and completely the opportunist chauvinistic tendencies in the C. P. of Africa. And I wish to support the letter sent by the British Party to the South African Party. This should be followed up.

It is also necessary to call the attention of the Plenum to the publication and popularising of the colonial thesis amongst the European workers on the application of the thesis in practice.

Our comrades in the Western European countries must get into contact with the workers in South Africa.

Another question we must deal with concretely because of the primitive and primary organisational stages of development of the Negro movements, is the question of the training of leaders in Africa.

And finally I do not want to leave out the U. S. A. We also need trained Negro leaders in America.

The whole need, is to stimulate activity among our Negro comrades in these colonial possessions, to train more active workers to lead the movement in their own countries.

Comrade GORKIC (Young Communist International):

Comrades, when we consider the question which opportunism is greater, more important and more dangerous now, the conclusion must be that the kind of opportunism, the representatives of which agree to all decisions, all resolutions, all lines of the Comintern, but do not carry them out in practice. It is the most dangerous kind of opportunism and it is high time to declare war against it.

I must declare that Comrade Piatnitsky's speech has called forth satisfaction among all our comrades. Hitherto we limited ourselves to a few futile phrases concerning the Y. C. I. It is not correct to say, as Comrades Kun or Vassiliev have said, for instance that we have lost 2,000 or 3,000 members here or there, etc. The comrades have not taken the trouble to study our problems.

Comrade Piatnitsky was quite right in asking us why the Y. C. I. has as yet done nothing, although a year has elapsed since the World Congress, for the carrying out of the decisions of that Congress. The main reason why the Y. C. I. has not succeeded in carrying out these decisions until now is the resistance to and the lack of understanding of these decisions shown by our cadres, by the officials in all our Leagues. They did not understand what this change means, they thought it is an ordinary campaign, an ordinary task. When we began to realise the difficulties of the tasks, we met with partially conscious and partially unconscious resistance, which was in part due to the fact that the comrades, in spite of their good will, did not know how to carry through this change.

The best comrades who stood for a change, who understood what it meant, did not bring that change about in their own districts. I will give you an example of the Y. C. L. secretary of Hamburg. He spoke sharply in the Central Committee concerning the change, but at the Hamburg District Conference he introduced a resolution, the political part of which was copied from the resolution of the Party, the part dealing with the change was copied from the resolution of the Youth Executive; but that resolution contained only a few sentences concerning the Hamburg organisation, to the effect that all this applies also to Hamburg. We got stuck in the initial stage, the membership and especially the officials have not yet been able to give a concrete form to the decisions adopted here, and to convert them into the language of the daily work of every organisation and nucleus.

We have begun to get rid of the bureaucratic habits in the Young Communist Leagues (it would be wrong to think that there are no bureaucratic tendencies in our midst, in some Leagues they predominate in the leadership, seeking to guide by means of circular letters, etc.) We have had these bureaucratic elements in the German, French and Czecho-Slovakian Leagues more than anywhere else. We have started to introduce the system of League instructors. We have sent instructors to the most important Leagues for permanent work. By this means we have succeeded in making some headway. But there are still great difficulties to be surmounted. We are preparing to hold conferences and congresses in the various Sections — Germany, France, Great Britain, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, etc. Everywhere the question of the content of the change as applied to the concrete conditions in the respective organisations will be the central question. We are seeking to mobilise the entire membership on this question because without that the change cannot be effected. What are the most important features of the change? Firstly, self-criticism. Is there proper self-criticism in the Communist Parties or the Young Communist Leagues at the present time?

No there is not. We have only bureaucratic self-criticism. We can hear criticism that we have no factory nuclei, but no one goes into the reasons why this is so. Self-criticism is possible only if the rank and file is brought in. Secondly, there is the question of the role of the membership. We see very often the type of the old social-democratic organisation in our organisations. We have in our organisations our staffs and committees, but what are the concrete practical tasks of the membership? The members do not pay their dues regularly and do not regularly attend their meetings. Can we make any progress under such conditions? Can we mobilise the masses with this system of Party and Y. C. L. work? No. That is why we are trying to draw every member into concrete and direct mass work. We must not allow that only a small number of officials should do all the work and that the majority of the members should be inactive. Every member must do some concrete work in the factories, trade unions, mass organisations.

Another question is the question of cadres. Comrade Piatnitsky has already spoken on this question. In substance, Comrade Piatnitsky's conclusion is right, but it is not true that we do not want to recall the unsuitable officials. We do that wherever nothing else can be done, where the people concerned are incurable. But there is a big difference between the Y. C. L. officials and the officials of the Party organisations. The two of them can by no means be put on the same footing. Whereas in the Communist Parties we meet with officials who in most cases have not yet freed themselves from their old social-democratic traditions, such are not to be found in the Y. C. Ls. We have no officials with 20 years social-democratic experience. The people we have to deal with can be developed, they are people who have not been properly shown what road to follow, and that is why it is very essential to explain to them our methods properly. If they cannot be convinced, then it is time to remove them.

And now to the question what can be done now. We are now preparing our Plenum. On the basis of available experience we are going to take up here the questions concretely and after a discussion with representatives of the various Leagues we are going to work out our instructions. In this work we must have the aid of the Communist Parties, such as was given today by Comrade Piatnitsky. This is not as yet everywhere the case. I will give you an example from Czechoslovakia. We have experienced a crisis in the Y. C. L. Cz. We have lost some members there. Bad work was done in that organisation in every respect. We passed a resolution in that League in order to carry through the National Conference on the basis of this resolution. What was the result? The young comrades disagreed with the criticism contained in the resolution and in this they were greatly supported by the Party. The Party of Czechoslovakia not only voted against that resolution, but its representative at the National Conference of the Youth spoke against it. We want no such help from the Communist Parties. We want positive assistance. I have been working already four years in the Y. C. I. but, I cannot recollect a single case of a Comintern representative coming to the Y. C. I.

We know that the change will not be accomplished without crisis and struggles in the various countries. We have already gone through a big struggle in the Czechoslovakian organisation. The majority of the Czechoslovakian Y. C. L. is opposed to the Y. C. I. and so is the Party.

Reimann: Only the Party leadership.

We are going to have such fights, especially in the French and the British Leagues, etc. But we shall try to surmount the difficulties because this question is in our view not an ordinary question, but an important task of preparation of the Young Communist Leagues to meet the attacks of the bourgeoisie which will be undertaken now against the Communist organisations. We cannot be victorious in the struggle if the social-democratic survivals cling to the Young Communist Leagues. We cannot be successful with people who regard the organisations as clubs where one pays his dues and comes and goes whenever he likes. We cannot accomplish our mission with such officials and members. That is why we regard the question of the change not simply as an organisational question, not simply as a change in the methods of work, but as an important political task of the Young Communist International.

Comrade SEEGERS (Holland):

Comrades, I will begin by making a few remarks about Comrade Varga's report. Comrade Varga said that workers understand rationalisation according to statistical figures. He has given us in regard to this statistical data on America, Britain etc. Comrades, this does not differ from the bourgeois ideology. We have exactly the same thing in Holland. We have in Holland statistics which show that the real wage of Dutch workers has increased by 25% since 1913. According to bourgeois conceptions, these calculations are correct, but how are these state statistics compiled? Bourgeois statisticians take, for instance, prices of 20 different important foodstuffs, and make them the basis of their calculations. They do not, for instance, take into account expenditure for rent, and in Holland rent has gone up considerably in the last years. In addition, the bourgeois calculations include big circles of the labour aristocracy. In Holland, wage differences are enormous. For instance, the highest wage is nearly 44 gulden, and the lowest only 15 gulden per week. In its calculation, the bourgeoisie takes the average figure, and yet it is a fact that there are of course more workers earning only 15 gulden than workers earning 44. This fact is very important to the Dutch Party, because it shows the effect of rationalisation. In Holland, rationalisation is making slow progress. There is no need for our bourgeoisie to be in a hurry with rationalisation. It still gets big enough profits from its colonies. This rationalisation is accompanied by a slow veering to the Left of the working class, confirmed by the last elections.

The Party has not yet been able to assume leadership in this veering to the Left of the working class, and I think that one of our Party's greatest mistakes is — that many of our members do not yet realise that in Holland, too, the bourgeoisie is rationalising, that they do not quite see in what facts rationalisation is given expression in Holland. I think that a much sharper struggle should be conducted against social-democracy and also against the renegade spirit of the Wynkoop-Sneevliet group which is still considered revolutionary by the workers, because we did not combat it as we should have done.

In Holland, the Right development of Social Democracy, just as the Left development of the working class, is not as rapid as it is abroad. But there are facts which show unmistakably that the social-democrats are developing to the Right. I think that our Party is not fully aware of this development of the social-democrats. Generally speaking, I think that the Dutch Party is still not strong enough, that it is unable to analyse correctly the development in Holland. We lack, for instance, a correct analysis of the character and prospect of Dutch capitalism, and of the development in the agrarian sphere. Hence, there are errors in our slogans.

It is of the utmost importance that we should make our Party understand that rationalisation exists also in Holland. One could give many concrete examples as a proof that rationalisation is being introduced to a considerable extent in various spheres. For instance, output per head has increased in the Dutch mining industry by 200%, while the number of workers employed in this industry has remained stationary. There is also rationalisation in the wireless industry. It takes the form there of employing young workers. Comrade Varga's formula that we must clearly distinguish the position and the standard of living of the working class, will only encourage the comrades who are not convinced of the effects of rationalisation, in their wrong conception. I think that Comrade Kusinen, too, has spoken in his report not of the standard of living of individual workers, but of the standard of living of the whole working class. I think this term corresponds with that what Comrade Varga wanted to say. The working class includes the most diverse elements, unemployed workers, etc., and I think that we cannot speak in this respect of two conceptions: the standard of living of the working class is exactly the same as the position of the working class.

The greatest danger to the Dutch Party is not the Left or the Right danger, but the danger of passivity.

Comrade TSUI WITO (China):

I believe the Right Danger in the Comintern is expressed not only in general political questions relating to Western Europe; that it is reflected not only in the imperialist countries, but also in the colonies. Moreover, the colonial brethren of the opportunists go a good deal farther than their elder brothers in the imperialist countries. If we take the question of the war danger and the contradictions of the Third Period, we find a fairly good transplantation of the platform of the Right opportunists to Chinese soil.

After the defeat of the Chinese revolution many people began to think that the rapid development of capitalism was going to begin also in China. There exists even a formula to the effect that "in China, after the defeat of the working class and the peasantry, capitalism has been enabled to make gigantic strides forward." Thus, these people are asserting that there is not only a development of capitalism in China, but that China is now developing on imperialist lines. Similar hints were made by the British Delegation at the VI. Congress who spoke about the decolonisation of India and other colonies. Apparently, the British comrades have not gone far from this position even now, seeing that they are recommending their local branches to study the amendments of the British Delegation to the Colonial Theses of the Congress. Furthermore, if the colonial opportunists and the opportunists of the imperialist countries believe that the Third Period is "the period of reconstruction of the whole of the capitalist world", the question arises then about the war danger, about growing international contradictions.

Comrades, do not run away with the idea that the Rights are halting upon this path and are not going any further. In France there are comrades who believe that French imperialism is retreating, that the imperialists desire peace, and consequently, that the war danger is diminished. The question of the war danger is handled in the same way by the opportunists in China, who reason thus: since the U.S.A. has advanced 20 million dollars to the South Manchuria Co., it may be presumed that America is going to exploit China through the agency of Japanese imperialism, and that this inter-locking of the interests of international capital will diminish the menace of war on the Pacific. We know that lately when the Labour Party has got into power in England, and the Minsiuato (i. e. Liberal) Party in Japan, all these phenomena are interpreted as the beginning of a new era of democratic pacifism. Of course, it is presumed that all this will contribute, at least, to some decolonisation of the colonies.

We must say that the same tendency towards underestimating the war danger exists also in regard to the war against the U. S. S. R. We are told that generally the imperialists do not want war or any disturbance which hinders rationalisation, which prevents the consolidation of capitalism, the strengthening of its positions, etc. Hence the deduction is made that also in regard to the U.S.S.R. the capitalists are not going to declare war. This attitude contains a special danger in regard to the Chinese question. It is declared by these elements that in China, after the Civil War which has been going on for twenty years now, everybody is longing for peace, that the imperialists are going to restrain the Chinese militarists from fighting, that they will encourage the development of trade and industry, and consequently, that China is going to develop its industry along the line of capitalist evolution. The essence of all these conceptions is that in the West there is going to be a new era of democratic pacifism, while in the East, in the colonies, there is going to be a possibility for decolonisation and industrialisation.

As a matter of fact, the very opposite is the situation in the colonies. A mere perusal of some of the material on India will be sufficient to convince you that something entirely different is going on in India than what is known as industrialisation or decolonisation. We find there the growing exploitation by British imperialist capital, the growing dependence of native capital on British capital. As regards China, we have such firmly established facts: firstly, in spite of the increased tariffs, the control of the Chinese customs and its management continues to be in the hands of the British. Moreover, lately we have even received news that the British Foreign Office

has signed a treaty with China for the training of Chinese cadets in England. Everything which England is doing in South China, its assistance in building the road between Canton and Hankow, its help in the construction of the Kwang Si-Kuangtung highway, — all this has for its purpose not only the expansion of the market, not only the selling of goods, not only the draining of raw materials from China, but it pursues also the aim of military strategy. And what is the meaning of the creation of a "Chinese fleet, a strong fleet" to be built by British hands? It will actually be a military force of England, not of China.

As regards Japan, whether the Seiukai or the Minsiuato be in power, we can see clearly that there is going to be no substantial change in the situation. Japan has pursued, and is pursuing, the policy of consolidating its military base in Manchuria, and partly also in Inner Mongolia, Shangtung, and Chiji. This we can see quite plainly. There is even news to the effect that Japan is preparing to convene a congress of the Pacific powers at which "Japanese representatives will prove that, both from the military and economic standpoint, Manchuria ought not to belong to China, but to Japan, and will declare that otherwise Japan will be threatened by Bolshevism". All these manoeuvres — the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Shangtung, the recall of certain officials from South Manchuria under the new cabinet — do not alter anything; on the contrary the Minsiuato Government, like the British Labour Government, is only a screen for vigorous war preparations and for a policy of increased exploitation in the colonies, in India, China, etc.

Now as to the United States. If America now advances money to China, it does not signify America's intention to industrialise China, to help the Chinese bourgeoisie to develop its own capitalism. On the contrary, all this shows the intention of America to establish Pacific naval bases in China; for sometimes the American bourgeoisie realises even better than some Communists that it cannot win the Chinese market from England or from Japan without a war. As to the assertions that America in particular, as well as the other imperialists, does not wish to see any warfare within China, does not wish to see any militarist wars in China, this is entirely refuted by the facts of recent months.

On the contrary, Great Britain and Japan are supporting the military cliques in China either openly or covertly, creating the conditions for internal war in China. It should be said that Nanking, after the victory of Chiang Kai-shek over the Kwangsi group, is to a large extent under the influence of America; nevertheless there is a keen struggle in Nanking between Japan, England, and America for the hegemony over this Government, and this creates all the conditions for Civil War, and not for national unity. England and Japan, having their respective spheres of influence in China, will encourage in every way the military cliques and their wars in order to capture an additional slice of Chinese territory, in order to consolidate their spheres of influence.

Apart from Japan or England, even Germany, said to be a poor imperialist country, is demanding and now saying quite openly that it must receive concessions in China.

Some Chinese comrades believe that while supporting the national bourgeoisie in China is out of the question, it should nevertheless be said that the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Li Ti Sing is a war between bourgeois democracy and the feudal militarists, and that for this reason Chiang Kai-shek represents a progressive force in this war, because the victory of Chiang Kai-shek implies the possibility of some decolonisation and industrialisation of China which will create a mighty proletariat in China, the main revolutionary force without which there can be no revolutionary upheaval. Therefore, although we cannot support Chiang Kai-shek, we should consider him as a representative of progress. There is also a standpoint to the effect that for such big colonies as China and India there are two roads of development: firstly, the Soviet road, and secondly, the American road, i. e. the development of industry with the aid of American capital. At the same time we are told that the first road is both impossible and unlikely in view of the absence of a revolutionary situation throughout the world and the ebb of the revolutionary tide in China,

whereas the second road, perhaps, will yield even greater benefits to the workers in the colonies. Why? Because industry will be developed, wages will be increased, the living standard of the colonial proletariat will rise, and consequently, bearing in mind these advantages, the revolution may be given up.

We believe this way of viewing the question harbours a very dangerous tendency. For this reason I must allude to the statement of Comrade Varga that the living standard of the working class is rising to some extent and in any event has not gone down. If this refers to the working class throughout the world, it includes the Chinese coolies and the workers of India, Indonesia, etc. I cannot see how these workers can be ignored in drawing up statistical data.

There is yet another question which we should raise: will the national bourgeoisie develop during the Third Period in the colonies, will the feudal relations gradually, but steadily die out? Is it the inevitable tendency of evolution to substitute the rule of capitalist relations, of laissez-faire, to the rule of feudal survivals? To my mind, this question has not yet been touched upon by the Congress nor by one of our Plenums, whereas it is a question of paramount importance to us in the Chinese Communist Party and to other Communist Parties in the colonies. If capitalism is carrying out rationalisation in the imperialist countries, and even in some colonies, if the export of capital is increased, should this warrant the presumption that there now begins the transition from feudal to capitalist relations in the economic life of the colonies, to increased industrial development, and that the elements of bourgeois-capitalist development will steadily vanquish the feudal survivals in the colonies? If so, then it is true that Chiang Kai-shek stands for progress, that he represents national capitalism which kills and destroys Chinese feudalism, so to speak.

I believe such is not the case. Indeed, at the present time, after the defeat of the Chinese revolution, the national bourgeoisie and national capitalism are becoming even more fused with imperialist capitalism, while it is not at all the intention of the imperialists to bolster up an "independent" national bourgeoisie in place of the old comprador and feudal forces. The materials on India tell us that the British Government is pursuing the policy of pressure on Indian capital. At the same time it openly declares that the native principalities in India are valuable organs which should be preserved, i. e. preserved against the authority of the National Congress or the bourgeoisie. Here we can see the political drift quite plainly: the imperialists are trying to rely upon the feudal forces while at the same time utilising the national bourgeoisie as a new force, as a new manoeuvring ground to consolidate their domination in the colonies. As to the economic aspect, to the extent that imperialist capital will develop in the colonies there will also be increased competition of foreign goods, by rationalisation in the metropolitan countries against the so-called native goods, and these facts, coupled with the feudal survivals in the colonies, will create tremendous obstacles to the investment of small capital (original accumulation) in native industry and agriculture. The natural result will be the extraordinary development of the basest and worst forms of capital, i. e. usury and merchant capital. These conditions create the postulates for the support of the feudal survivals in the colonies, for the increased fusion of the nationalist, more or less capitalist bourgeoisie with the elements of feudal exploitation. I believe, therefore, that the fact of the Chinese militarist wars can explain a good deal in this question. The Chinese wars, above all, are one of the symptoms indicating the growth of a general crisis of capitalism on a world wide scale.

The militarist war between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang should not be considered as the struggle between the bourgeoisie and feudalism in its pure form. For what does Chiang Kai-shek represent? Chiang Kai-shek's military force is made up of the same militarists as the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and Li Ti Sing. It is a well-known fact that Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuang-fung, and subsequently Li Tin Sing were British satellites. Wu Pei-fu has been driven into a monastery. Li Ti Sing is now imprisoned. But this does not mean that the British influence has been interned in a monastery, or thrown into a Nanking jail. Why? Because the old militarists in Canton and Kwangsi who formerly obeyed Li Ti Sing, today obey Chiang Kai-shek, and tomorrow they may spring up as an independent

force. If Feng Yu Hsiang leaves the country, there will remain Lu Tsu-ling, his right hand, who will formally submit for the time being to the Nanking Government, but actually will prepare for a new war against Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek is extending, and has to extend, a good many privileges to other militarists during the war against Li Ti Sing and Feng Yu-Hsiang. Thus, this contributes only to the strengthening of militarist and feudal rule in China.

It is important to observe that Chiang Kai-shek, as the representative of the Shanghai bourgeoisie, of the national bourgeoisie, is trying to gain control of the different local markets like Canton, Tsingtao, Tientsin, etc. He resorts to phrasemongering, declaring himself in favour of unity, decolonisation of the country, the establishment of a firm currency, and so forth. In this manner the national bourgeoisie wants to retain its influence over the mass of the people and to keep them away from the struggle against war. While one cannot speak about constitutional illusions in China, nevertheless there are certain illusions like the illusion of the so-called "unity" which are fostered.

As to the role of the colonial national bourgeoisie in a future war among the imperialists or between the imperialists and the U.S.S.R., it is quite certain that in such a war the colonial bourgeoisie will help the imperialist Governments in restraining the masses from the revolutionary struggle, and that partly the bourgeoisie will even actively fight against the U.S.S.R. This is borne out by numerous facts. Let me mention one. When Hu-Han-Min went to London last year, he proceeded thence to Constantinople where he had a conversation with Kemal Pasha in the course of which he said: "You must bear in mind that the Moslem peoples in the U.S.S.R. are oppressed by the Soviet Government, and that the Soviet Government is forming a very big plan for annexation of Sin-Tsiang." Hu-Han-Min made a great noise about it in Nanking, appealing to Moslems in China to organise for the struggle against Red Soviet Imperialism.

We have a sort of "disproportion" between the Comintern leadership and the leadership of the Communist Parties in colonial countries, because here we write Theses and bolshevist resolutions, while there they study only the text-books, and in the text-book it is said that the bourgeoisie is for democracy, while feudalism stands for monarchy. It is, therefore, taken for granted that the bourgeoisie on coming into power will support democracy. Yet the facts are teaching a different lesson. After the Wuhan coup d'etat there was a time when some Communists expected, if not Chiang Kai-shek, at least Wang Ching-wei to establish some sort of a democratic regime in China which might enable the Chinese Communist Party to wage a legal struggle for the masses; in other words, a possibility for the "tranquil building up of the legal mass organisations"; but it took those comrades only a few days to find out that not only Chiang Kai-shek, but also Wang Ching-wei and Ty Yen-ta had taken up arms in order to destroy the workers and the peasants. Furthermore, the Nanking Government is showering high praise upon Italian fascism, inviting Italian councillors to come to Nanking, and framing the statutes for a "corporation state" in China. I cannot think of the proper name for it, whether it be fascism or anything else, perhaps the term is scientifically incorrect, but this does not matter. It is important that the national bourgeoisie, not only in China, but already even in India, where it has not yet attained power, is already taking up terrorist and dictatorial measures to crush the workers and the peasants in the name of national and social demogogy. We ought to bear in mind that if the domination of monopoly capital exists in Germany, England, and America, which is now beginning to turn into the open dictatorship by means of social-fascism; if such domination of monopoly capital through fascism exists in Italy and other countries, what is going to be the form of this imperialist domination by monopoly finance capital in the colonies? Will the imperialists during the Third Period support the bourgeois-democratic Parliamentary regime, or will they support the terrorist dictatorial regime in which a fairly big role will be played by the national bourgeoisie? I believe the second assumption to be more correct.

Further, — if the national bourgeoisie in big colonies like China, India, etc., represents already a distinct counter-revolutionary force; if this colonial bourgeoisie is already playing

the role of the social-democracy; if it helps the imperialists to maintain their domination; we find on the other hand that the petty-bourgeois political groups like those of Wang Ching-wei, Tin-Yen-ta, the Independence League (Neru Jr.) etc., are in my opinion, playing the same role as the Left Wing of the social-democracy in the West; because the open terror of the national bourgeoisie in China, and the undisguised treachery of the national bourgeoisie in India to the cause of national independence, must soon cause their influence over the masses to wane, while at the same time the Left Wing of this bourgeoisie will furnish a cloak for the real policy of this bourgeoisie by resorting to pacifist, pseudo-revolutionary phraseology and the like. They will endeavour to check the active struggle of the masses; they will deceive the masses, and thus aid the national bourgeoisie and the imperialists. Of course, I am speaking not of the mass of the petty bourgeoisie, but of its upper crust, of the so-called independent leaders who say: "we want a revolution, but we want no tutelage of the Comintern."

These elements are going to play a far more dangerous role than the national bourgeoisie, and for this reason it is essential to have a quite distinct position in this matter. Yet the Right opportunists are still urging the formation of a "national-revolutionary party", just as they have urged the workers' and peasants' organisations to join the Independence League in India. You need not be surprised, comrades, that under such terrorism in China there are even communists who say that it is necessary now to restore the alliance with Wang Ching-wei, and Chen Gunbo on the plea that we are too isolated and detached from the masses, that we should look for some support, for allies in the national-revolutionary movement. The Right opportunists really prefer an alliance with the capitalist bourgeoisie to alliance with the peasantry. Their tactics are the tactics of giving up the independent leadership of the workers' struggle, of abandoning the struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat in the agrarian revolution and in the national-liberation movement; the tactics of adaptation to the perspective of the "democratisation" of the colonies under the hegemony of bourgeoisie. In what situation does the Chinese petty-bourgeoisie find itself just now? All the events, such as the war and the famine which has stricken over 57 million inhabitants, indicate the worsening of the conditions of the majority of the petty-bourgeois masses; nevertheless their leaders are afraid both of Communism and imperialism. Characteristic in this respect is the headline to an article by Wang Ching-wei: "We are between two fires, and there is no escape." Under such circumstances what role will be played by this petty-bourgeoisie? It will play the role of the Left social-democracy, or of the P.P.S., in the sense that it will shout very loudly about revolution, will profusely protest against Nanking and imperialism, but actually it will only be throwing dust in the eyes of the masses. The petty-bourgeoisie, having played a certain disorganising role within the reactionary camp, is only concealing the real nature of the Nanking regime, the nature of the Kuomintang, the nature of the national-reformism of the colonial bourgeoisie. It is, therefore, necessary to wage the most ruthless fight against these leaders, against the upper crust of the petty-bourgeoisie in the colonies.

We know that the agrarian revolution is the axis of the national-anti-imperialist revolution in the colonies, particularly in countries like China and India. The attitude of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie in this question is already clear to us. But here arises the question again: if we are to link up the proletarian revolution with the peasant wars, upon whom should we rely among the peasantry? There is an opinion that the peasantry in the colonies is a solid mass which will follow us entirely, which will follow the banner of revolution, socialism, communism.

Other people go farther and say that we should have an alliance with the kulaks, and that together with the kulaks, we shall overthrow the feudal regime of the landlords. They assert that "only then we would have a democratic dictatorship and not a proletarian dictatorship; for without the kulaks the dictatorship would at once become a proletarian one" (!). There exists such a tendency in the Chinese Party.

There is yet another view of the question of the peasantry which says: the democratic-bourgeois revolution in China has already been completed. We have not only a bourgeois, but

even a kulak government at Nanking; it is, therefore, our task to organise the agricultural labourers and to engage in the so-called "pure class struggle". They say that we have no longer any feudal survivals and that it is, therefore, possible to achieve the proletarian revolution, as it was asserted by Trotsky, only after the overthrow of the imperialists in the other countries. Such a statement of the agrarian question is very dangerous, and we should ruthlessly combat such incorrect views. Of course, the British, American and all the other imperialists will endeavour to promote the development of a well-to-do peasantry through the national bourgeoisie, and the feudal lords, to rely upon the prosperous peasant; such attempts are already being made.

This situation causes some comrades to believe that the Stolypin system can be more easily carried out in China or in India than in Russia, because the kulak in those countries exists already as an organised reactionary force. On these grounds it is presumed that the peasant economy in the Chinese and in the Indian village will steadily develop, so that there will be greater progress in the sense of industrialisation and rationalisation. This causes some of our comrades to come to a conclusion which practically removes the question of the agrarian revolution from the Agenda, saying that the village is getting pacified and that the peasant wars will soon cease. This leads to "economism", to the idea that in the village the economic struggle alone should be pursued. No wonder that the Chinese Party has lost its bearings in this question, because even after the defeat of the revolution, after its severe lessons, we have still such hazy conceptions on this question. I believe we ought to bear in mind that in the colonies we have an agrarian revolution in the sense that the revolution in these countries is still going on upon the basis of two sets of contradictions: 1. the antagonism between the working class and the imperialists and the national capitalists; 2. the antagonism between the "peasantry" in inverted commas and the feudal-landlord forces. These two sets of contradictions are the starting point for the development of the revolution in China, India, and other colonial countries.

Clearly, we should not be at all scared by the process of differentiation of the peasantry in the colonies. This very fact draws the poor peasants and the rural proletariat closer to the urban proletariat. Not only should we fight against the landlords, against the national bourgeoisie which is attached to the feudal survivals by a thousand threads, which actively works against the agrarian revolution, which has failed to carry out any serious land reform; we should fight also against the semi-landlord kulaks, the petty-landlords, and we should never be side-tracked by describing them as peasants.

Secondly, we should fight also against those kulaks who are now taking part in the struggle against the militarists and against the landlords; we should fight them not only because they are reactionaries, because they are, after all, the agents of the urban bourgeoisie; but because they are playing the same role as Wang Ching-wei, Tan Pin-hsiang and Co., on a national scale. Now and then they draw the peasants into the struggle against taxes, against various tricks of the imperialists, because they want to show in this manner that they are able to lead the poor peasants to victory, not like the Communists who are going to confiscate your land. We should fight such kulaks for leadership of these anti-tax movements, etc. among the basic masses of the peasantry.

Thirdly, in all cases and under all circumstances we should strive for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat: this was said a quarter of a century ago and is still a golden truth today. We should pay particular attention to this matter. Only by such tactics towards the kulak shall we be able to achieve the real victory in winning the peasantry. Our present task is to establish contact with the poor peasantry and upon this basis to consolidate our leadership, the proletarian leadership, over the peasantry. This is favoured by the pace at which the bourgeois-democratic revolution grows into the proletarian revolution, because we should not be fighting for democracy and parliamentarism in the colonies and only then to make the second revolution, the proletarian revolution. We are entitled to say, as Lenin said in regard to the transformation of the revolution in Russia: "We shall benefit by the victory of the peasantry over the landlords and the imperialists not in order to help the kulak in his fight against the rural proletariat, but

in order to join the world proletariat in the forward march towards the socialist revolution."

On the question of trade union policy the Right opportunists are working upon the theory that it is essential to be active only within the Yellow trade unions, "to pursue exclusively the economic struggle without even thinking now about the political struggle". Of course, legalism and kindred tendencies in this question have a strong flavour of opportunism. We learn that in our Party in China there is also another view to the effect that we should join the Yellow trade unions, but should not organise any Red trade unions. Why? Because — these comrades say — if we should begin to organise Red trade unions or factions and nuclei within the Yellow trade unions where they already exist, the Kuomintang may accuse us of splitting activity.

(Piatnitsky: "What a terrible thing if they should accuse you of that!")

This is given as the reason why we should not organise Red trade unions or Red factions. This question is still under consideration by the C C of our Party, and I believe it has not yet been solved. I believe we ought to pay particular attention to this question, because the situation in China differs in this respect from other countries. Comrade Piatnitsky was right in pointing out the vacillations in the Delegation. I only wish to make a little correction. Comrade Piatnitsky says that the masses are in the Yellow trade unions, but there is not a single Communist in them. That is not correct. In some organisations there are Communists, but they do their work very badly. After a fight, whether it ends in victory or defeat, the manufacturers and the Yellow trade unions of the Kuomintang adopt the same tactics of looking for the Communist leaders. The latter are arrested. This renders our position very difficult, but one should not say that we are unable to work; because the conditions in the Chinese factories are so unbearable, that regardless of the constant elimination of the workers' leaders, the masses continue the fight, constantly bringing up fresh leading forces. We know that the Japanese manufacturers build their factories so that they look like fortresses. A few thousand workers are herded together in a common barrack within this fortress; inside there are dining rooms, baths, and other necessary things, no outsider is admitted, and none of the inmates is allowed to go out of the fortress except for half a day or Sunday. We have here something like the fascist regulations. The Chinese manufacturers in Shanghai, jointly with the Kuomintang, are organising "trade unions" which are simultaneously company unions and governmental agencies through which the workers are employed upon 18 conditions which include a point like the following: Anyone talking while at work shall be immediately discharged. If a worker submits to these conditions he is taken on, if he objects, he gets no work. Nevertheless these conditions do not prevent our activity in such factories. The local comrades in the factories have devised many clever dodges to "fool" the manufacturers and to wage a fight against them. I believe this question ought to be worked out in detail by the Profintern, by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference. It is necessary to help the Chinese comrades to find the practical methods of activity. It is necessary, above all, that they should have a firm policy on the question of how to win the masses of the workers.

In the first place, it is necessary to join not only the Yellow trade unions, but also the Kuomintang unions, and to work among the masses. (By the way, the workers who refuse to pay dues to these unions are sacked by the employers). We should be active among these masses, this is the prime and indispensable condition. Secondly, our main effort should be to restore the Red trade unions, to establish Red fractions within the Yellow trade unions, and to carry on real activity in the factory committees. Only in this manner shall we be able to achieve organisational consolidation. We know this to be the sorest spot not only in China, but also in other colonial countries. It is necessary to fight against Right deviations, but it is also necessary to bear in mind that passiveness in the Labour movement is one of the most important expressions of opportunism. Left phraseology serves as a shield to opportunism. The opportunist will say, we must not join the Yellow trade unions because thereby we help the Kuomintang to capture the masses. How awfully "Left" this sounds! In

reality, it is nothing of the kind. Why do the Yellow trade unions keep the masses? Only because they have a monopoly of legality. The Yellow trade unions in China are not like those in Europe; they act very simply. If a conflict is started with the capitalists, the leaders of these trade unions say: "We, as Kuomintang officials, have the right of entering the premises of the Mandarin and of conferring with him; we are able to settle these conflicts for you; but if anyone follows the Communists, we will shoot him, and there will be no settlement of the conflict for him! "Of course, this means arbitration, which gives some sort of a settlement, compelling the workers to join these trade unions. Our task is to discredit arbitration and the treacherous role of the Yellow trade unions which help the oppressors, by carrying on our daily activity among the masses.

I shall now deal very briefly with the question of the inner-Party situation. There are people who take up the defence of Brandler, who say that when Lenin was alive he always acted by persuasion, but now the Comintern wants to deal with the leaders of the German Party as with little children — to expel. "There is no leadership, the whole leadership has proved bankrupt," they say. They say further that generally the leadership of the Comintern is not only weak, but is no good at all, that since the retirement of Bukharin there are no forces left in the Comintern. As to the Chinese leadership, they say that it is petty-bourgeois and is composed entirely of opportunists, deviationists, etc. Therefore, they say, the masses no longer trust the Chinese Communist Party, we have nothing, no Party and no revolution. Such is the campaign of discredit which is carried on fairly widely, although secretly.

(Ercoli: "Who does this, the Lefts or the Rights?")

The Rights. We have information that there are even Trotskyists in China who publish their own organ at Shanghai. Their theory is known; they are only screening their liquidatory counter-revolutionary nature. Moreover, in such a situation there are also distinct conciliatory sentiments which have found their expression in a certain document in which it is said that the most essential thing for the Chinese Party was "peace within the Party". The comrade writes in that article: "Comrade Bukharin spoke at the VI. Congress of the Comintern about the concentration of forces. If you now begin to criticise individual putschists or opportunists, you are causing dissension within the Party, upsetting the "friendly co-operation". Thus we have in China our Brandlerites and Trotskyists, as well as our conciliators. I may say further that our attitude to the colonial Parties used to be such that since the colonial Parties are very young and since they understand very little in questions of Marxism and Leninism, they should be treated with great consideration. One may point out their mistakes, one may put them right, but one should be more considerate towards them. To my mind, this attitude harbours also some negative aspects.

What is the period which confronts us? What is new in the colonies now as compared with the "first period" after the war? If during the war and afterwards there was a good deal more of spontaneity in the growth of the colonial revolutions, we should emphasise particularly the organisational role of the Communist Party in the colonies, the leading role of the proletariat in the course of the subsequent revolutionary events. If immediately after the victory of the October Revolution there was an almost casual synchronisation of the Russian Revolution with the Turkish Revolution, of the revolution in China and in India (in 1921), while the leading role in India was played by the national bourgeoisie; now we are finding ourselves in an entirely different period; when the national bourgeoisie in the colonies and semi-colonies has reached such a stage of development that its "active hostility" to the working class is manifested even in its actions against the Soviet Union, while against the Comintern it already carries on a furious campaign. We should therefore increase a hundredfold our organisational role in the creation of a genuine revolutionary leadership in the colonies. In the further struggle the organisational role of the Communist Parties will be far more important than it was during the period of the preceding revolutionary wave.

We must therefore call the attention of the Plenum to the task which deserves our utmost attention, the task of forming and strengthening the Communist Parties of the colonies during

this period, and we must give them a clear-cut Bolshevik line of policy in the struggle against the Right and conciliatory sentiments and deviations, creating upon the basis of this really Bolshevik line a genuine revolutionary leadership for the revolutionary vanguard in the colonies. I have in mind India, China, and other colonial countries, because in these countries we are confronted with the question of organising, building, and strengthening our Bolshevik Parties.

With regard to the struggle for the masses it has been properly pointed out by several comrades that in the colonies, besides the working class, we should bear in mind also the peasantry and the anti-imperialist movement, so as to build accordingly the mass organisations of workers, peasants, etc. We know that during the first period of our activity we had to combat the sentiments of infantile leftism which refused to

go into the Kuomintang, which refused to recognise any democratic revolution, and so forth. Now we have quite a different attitude, and we must warn against the Right danger in the colonial countries. Along with the struggle against "Left" sentiments, sectarianism, etc., it is essential to lay particular stress on the Right danger, to combat ruthlessly such deviations which cling to the "Chinese" opportunistic heritage and which lead to the refusal of the proletarian hegemony in the anti-imperialist bourgeois-democratic revolution, to the refusal of the proletariat to lead independently the struggle of the working masses, through its refusal to lead the peasant wars, to an under-estimation of the counter-revolutionary nature of the national bourgeoisie, to conciliation with "Left" nationalists and reformists, to a denial of the role of the Party, to liquidatorship. Against such deviations and conciliationism it is necessary to fight with all our strength.

Eighth Session.

6th July, 1929 (afternoon).

Comrade REMMELE (Germany):

Comrades, I will deal first of all with the two lines pursued in Comrade Kuusinen's report and Comrade Varga's arguments in regard to the appraisal of the economic situation. There is no doubt whatever that there is here a conflict of opinion in regard to the appraisal of the economic development. The increase of production has been given too much prominence by Comrade Varga, whilst he has not taken sufficiently into consideration the elements which make for the growth of contradictions within the capitalist system. This kind of appraisal is contrary to the tendencies which we observe in all spheres, and especially in the political sphere. In my opinion, it leaves out of account the fact that the production capacity is increasing to a much greater extent than the production figures, and that one is, therefore, justified in talking about the shrinkage of markets. If Comrade Varga's analysis were correct, how could we explain the strong swing to the Left in the proletariat, how could we explain the fact that the bourgeoisie in nearly all the countries is compelled to take coercive measures for the suppression of the proletariat.

I also think that Comrade Varga's arguments concerning the standard of living of the proletariat and the position of the working class are not correct. When he noticed that the comrades' disagreed with his assertion that the standard of living of the proletariat is improving, he beat a retreat by declaring that the conditions of life of the working class is something different from its standard of living. The conditions of life of the proletariat and its political rights are inseparable. Thus, Comrade Varga asserts that while the standard of living is improving, the workers' conditions of life are getting worse. We cannot accept such a Thesis. If the standard of living improves, workers' conditions of life cannot get worse, because the two things are closely connected. When the bourgeoisie is compelled to take away from the workers, the political and other rights which it had to concede, when it is compelled to use coercive measures, when the proletariat begins to rebel against existing conditions, when the bourgeoisie is no longer able to provide a living for its slaves, in such a situation it is impossible to speak of an improvement of the standard of living. This shows what a faulty picture Varga has given us. Comrade Varga's conception fitted perhaps the Second Period. But it certainly does not fit the Third Period. If what Comrade Varga says were correct, there would be no sense or justification for what we said about the Third Period. How did Comrade Varga arrive at the conclusion that the standard of living of the workers is improving? He gave us the figure of the wage agreement statistic. I maintain that this statistic is correct. It describes the wage agreements between the industrial associations and the trade unions. But we have in Germany not only the wage rate statistic, but also another official statistic, namely that of the state insurance department concerning the stamps affixed according to the workers' wages. I advise Comrade Varga to have a look at this statistic. He will find there that after a temporary stabilisation of wages, a steady wage reduction is

indicated. This official statistic gives a full survey of all wages, whereas the statistic of the wage rates covers only a small section of the proletariat. There is also a third statistic, namely the statistic on the consumption of food stuffs. In a compilation made by us approximately a year ago, which was taken from the statistical year books of the Reich, it was ascertained that the consumption of foodstuffs, especially of those with the necessary complement of calories, is up to 33% lower than before the war. These facts refute Varga's theory on the development of the position of the working class in the present period.

Comrades I would like to express on behalf of our Delegation our full agreement with Comrades Kuusinen's and Manuilsky's reports. I would like to say something about some smaller problems which, I think, are playing an important, if not a foremost, role in the whole political development in Europe.

The comrades here know about our struggle against the Right and Conciliatory Groups after the VI. World Congress: against the Brandlerites who assert that the Third Period has been invented by Stalin for the sole purpose of making an onslaught on the Right, and against the Conciliators who assert a "further development" of capitalist stabilisation is taking place. The accentuation of repressive methods against the working class which we have hitherto experienced, is only the beginning. Comrade Kopenig has already brought to our notice a further development of fascism, if only in Austria. This development of fascism in Austria, which is similar to the development of fascism in Italy, can lead to far-reaching changes in Europe. The victory of fascism in Austria would build a bridge for Italy to Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia, to all the Terrorist Balkan countries. But it would also have an effect on Germany. Separation tendencies, such as we have witnessed before, would once more make their appearance in Germany. Movements in favour of separation from the Reich would spring up in Bavaria, Württemberg, and other countries.

Social fascism is what we are most interested in now, in Germany. We would like to supplement from the practical side the arguments brought forward here in the report, and by the "experts". In this connection, I want to lay stress on the character of the present mass struggle in Germany. This question is of importance to all the Sections of the Comintern, because the problem of mass struggle which is confronting the C. P. G. today, can arise also in the other Parties. Comrade Kuusinen pointed out quite rightly, the unevenness of the development in the various countries. But this unevenness does not mean that the phenomena which we observe at present in the biggest industrial countries, are of no importance to the other countries. Neither must this unevenness mean that we can draw from it conclusions re the unevenness of the Communist Parties, and the unevenness of interpretations of the most important problems which are confronting us. Let us take, for instance, Communist appreciation of social democracy in the Communist Parties is appreciation of social democracy. I assert that unevenness in the

much greater than the unevenness in the appreciation of the other questions of the capitalist world.

The class struggles in Germany have reached a stage which we can designate without exaggeration as a period leading directly to very revolutionary situations, a new era of revolutionary upheavals, as correctly stated in the Resolution before us. We do not assert that we find ourselves in an acutely revolutionary situation, we do not say that we are on the threshold of decisive battles of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. But we are going towards such a period of big decisive class struggles. This is the characteristic feature of the present period. This development is all the more complicated, because simultaneously the atmosphere is fraught with an increase of the war danger and the possibility of an outbreak of war.

I will deal briefly with the period through which we are going now. The comrades are aware that the May struggles were due to the prohibition of the May-Day demonstration. Zörgiebel, the social-fascist Chief of Police, and Greszinski and Severing, the social-fascist Ministers of the Interior of Prussia and the Reich, prohibited the May-Day demonstration in Berlin. What does this mean? For 40 years, the Berlin proletariat held its demonstrations even under the Kaiser Government. Even when an order against May-Day demonstrations was issued, they were carried through just as if no such order existed. The Communist Party had to decide what its reply should be to this order. It had no choice in the question. To the Communist Party only one thing was possible: to follow the best traditions of the revolutionary class struggle of the German proletariat. These traditions and these usages, which were maintained for decades by the same social democracy which now prohibits the demonstrations, are laid down in a whole series of documents of the pre-war period of social democracy. The Minutes of the Party Congresses bear witness of the tactic of the pre-war social democracy in regard to the police regime on such occasions. I will quote only one remark made by a leader of the pre-war social democracy. On a similar occasion, Bebel said at the Jena Party Congress in 1905:

"After all, one can reach a point when the question of damage does no longer count . . . I would call vile and contemptible the working class which allowed itself to be treated like curs, which dared not resist its oppressors . . . You don't know the German workers, if you think them capable of this".

Bebel said in so many words that the German proletariat is not frightened of police measures, but will fight for the Rights and civil liberties it has gained. We knew that the contemporary police is no longer the police of the pre-war period; we knew that in the course of ten years the social democrats have trained for themselves a citizens' guard unequalled in any other country.

If one takes into consideration that the army is only 100,000 strong, whereas the police force, the citizens' guard of the Severings and the Greszinski's, are 250,000 strong, (180,000 in Prussia alone), if one also takes into consideration that the Reichswehr, i. e. the army, is not allowed to have tanks and other heavy war machinery, whereas the police are allowed to have armoured cars, etc., one must come to the conclusion that this army was formed only for civil war against the working class. We knew that, and yet we had to hold the demonstration, although the social-fascist police are somewhat different from the police of the pre-war period. Because the struggle which May-Day implied was much more difficult, we placed the movement on as broad a platform as possible organisationally. We established for this purpose the May Committee which was formed at a Conference of representatives of the biggest giant enterprises, as well as representatives of medium enterprises. This matter was discussed at special factory meetings and delegates were elected to this Conference.

But already during the preparations for the demonstration, the social-fascists thought that they could frighten the workers by threatening with dead and wounded. They tried to represent Communists as criminals, intent on bloodshed on May-Day. I would like to remind you that Künstler, Chairman of the Berlin Socialdemocratic Party, is responsible for informing the Press that Comrade Manuilsky was present at the meeting of the District Executive of our Party, and that he demanded there the carrying through of measures which were bound to lead to collisions with the police. We were credited with having said, the May-Day demonstration must be such as to leave 200

dead on the battlefield. These 200 dead played an important role in the struggle of the social-fascists against us. As soon as the social-fascists took up this provocative attitude, we knew that they intended to organise a bloodbath on May-Day, to provoke disorder in the Berlin streets in order to drive our Party to desperate deeds. We have already some experience of this kind of thing. I have only to remind you of the March action, 1921, which was launched by a similar provocative act. The May-Day question was discussed by us in the Press. It was discussed by the May Committee, and at another meeting of factory representatives. It was decided by all the bodies of revolutionary Berlin workers to down tools on the 2nd of May, to carry through a mass strike if Zörgiebel attempted bloodshed in the streets of Berlin on May 1st. We could see that even after this provocation, the workers were not intimidated, but were ready to discuss new fighting methods at the factory meetings in order to give a fitting reply to the police provocation.

The comrades know that there were sanguinary collisions and dead already during the first hour of the May-Day demonstration. At 12 o'clock (noon) the police forced their way into the Plumbers meeting. Then shots were fired at our Party premises, and there was provocation in the Köstlinerstraße where 90 red flags were put up on 24 buildings. All these attacks on Berlin workers and inhabitants in general, show that a police provocation against the Party was intended. The Berlin District Executive met at 5 p. m. to discuss the situation. But as no important incidents took place apart from a number of collisions, we did not issue special slogans for May 2nd.

But our Session had hardly come to an end, when the first news about the barricade fighting was received. At first, at 8 o'clock in Wedding and later on at 10 o'clock in Neukölln. We had to meet again to consider these new struggles. It was clear to us that a sanguinary provocation was intended. It was also clear that we could not counter this provocation by an armed insurrection. No organisational or military preparations had been made by way of arming the workers, etc. But we had to deal now with a situation when so-called normal means were no longer sufficient. We immediately expressed our complete solidarity with the barricade fights. If you ask us what our stand must be in regard to barricade fights, we say that we are not only for but on the barricades. As communists, we have to stand by the workers who are in the forefront. Even if they have got several steps ahead of the mass of the proletariat. This was our standpoint. We were in direct and constant touch with the districts and the shops, in order to understand the situation and take our measure accordingly. In the night from May 1st to 2nd, several Party districts, not only town but also outside Berlin districts, came to us with the question whether they are to take up the fight against the police like in Wedding and Neukölln. The Party was in a frame of mind which confronted us with the question of arming. The workers did not say, give us arms, they knew that there were only typewriters on the Party premises. But they said, as soon as you agree with arming, we will get the arms wherever we can.

The Party Executive had a difficult problem to solve what to say to the workers when the question of arming them was brought forward by them. We could not evade the question, we had to say something. We answered the question as follows: armed insurrection becomes a necessity in a definite period, at a definite moment of the proletarian class struggle, but the then situation was not the right moment for it. We explained to the workers that we did not find ourselves in an acutely revolutionary situation, and that the Party could not, therefore, begin an armed insurrection. But we also said that in spite of this we are on the side of the barricade fighters, and that our only slogan in support of them can be the mobilisation of the widest possible masses: calling the factory masses into the streets to support the workers who had taken to the barricades as a means of struggle. After May-Day, the social-fascists have expressed interesting views about the problem of barricade fighting, which views we have fully utilised. The social-fascist strategists re street fighting and barricades, tried to prove to the workers that barricades are no longer effective against the armoured cars of the social-fascists, etc. Schützinger, a colonel in the police force, has told us in "Vorwärts" that with the help of the social-democratic Minister of the Interior and Chief of Police, the State is so well armed that it is useless to undertake barricade fighting. But we knew that this did not

really express the true feelings of the fascists and Government socialists.

We got to know the feelings of the other side. We have seen the limits of police authority in Berlin. It was precisely the perseverance and stubbornness of the workers who put up the barricades which did the most effective disintegrative work the Berlin police ranks have ever experienced. They had a greater effect than leaflets and propaganda. In spite of the formidable array of police forces and in spite of martial law in the North and South of the city, we called our protest demonstration on May 2nd in the Pharus Hall. The result was that in the evening of May 2nd, just before the meeting, thousands of workers filled the streets where a few hours ago the barricade fighting had taken place, and formed processions which marched to the Hall where the meeting was to be held. According to the bourgeois press, over 9,000 workers could not get admittance to the meeting because the Hall was full to overflowing. This shows that the masses will not give up their right to the street. In spite of the display of arms and a big array of police forces in the streets, fifteen thousand workers demonstrated, and it is ludicrous to assert that no crowds were to be seen on May-Day. May 1st and 2nd were a demonstration of the gigantic heroism of the workers. In spite of all these great incidents, we must say that there was also something which did not come up to our expectations and wishes. I mean the political mass strike which we had called for May 2nd. It was already announced by the May Committee before May 1st, but unfortunately the result was unsatisfactory. Only small and medium enterprises participated in this mass-strike, whereas big enterprises with 20—30,000 workers such as Siemens, AEG, the transport services, the underground railways, the tramways, the motor buses, etc, did not participate in the strike. But it is just these enterprises which count in Berlin. A political mass strike in Berlin must be a strike in which at least 200—250,000 workers participate. In such a case alone, one could speak of success. But on May 2nd, only 25,000 workers participated. Nevertheless, this movement produced a considerable effect throughout the Reich: in a considerable number of industrial centres, whole factories downed tools spontaneously and surpassed even Berlin. I recall the fact that the Hamburg shipwrights who only a few weeks before had carried through a long strike, left the shipyards on May 2nd as soon as they heard the Berlin news and came out on strike. We witnessed the same in the Ruhr, where a number of groups struck work to show their sympathy with their fellow-workers. There were big strike movements in Halle-Merseburg on May 3 especially in the town of Halle itself, where a half-day general strike was carried through. The same happened in Chemnitz and in other regions, so that 75,000 workers were drawn on the whole into this strike movement. This is not a big figure for Germany. 75,000 is a very small figure for Germany, which has millions of workers. But we must not forget that this is the first time since 1923 that a movement has been started in which the working class is again fighting for political ends. This was the biggest success in connection with this campaign. These events are a turning point. We must not forget that also in 1923, the big revolutionary struggles did not assume a revolutionary character until they became direct political mass actions. This is the criterion for the revolutionary character of a struggle. That is why we are justified in speaking of a turning point in connection with the May Day struggles; it was the first time since 1923 that the struggle assumed a political character.

In spite of the inadequacy of the political mass strike, the stir and excitement, also in the giant enterprises, were such as have not been experienced since 1923. We had three to four meetings in enterprises in one week, a thing which has not happened for years. We must repudiate the presentation of the whole struggle as a defeat or even a partial defeat. We fail to see any facts which give the least justification for speaking of defeat or partial defeat. We willingly admit that there were many defects and weak points in the struggle, which must be discussed here. There was lack of co-ordination in the May-Day demonstrations. When the various groups of demonstrators got separated, contact could not be immediately re-established. One could feel that no proper organisational preparation had taken place which would have taken away the spontaneous character of the demonstrations. This is, of course, due to inadequate organisation, which is again due to the fact that we are still accustomed to the conditions of the Second Period and have

not yet prepared ourselves for the Third Period. This is connected with the failure of the revolutionary struggles we had in 1918—23.

Immediately after May-Day, the Party determined to profit by these lessons and began to organise self-defence in enterprises and street nuclei. We have already tested these self-defence groups at several subsequent demonstrations, and we have come to the conclusion that at these demonstrations our people kept together much better.

We were blamed here for not publishing daily the "Rote Sturmflamme". We did publish the "Rote Sturmflamme" at first, but the police gangs raided the printing works, and this left us without a daily for weeks. The "Rote Sturmflamme" was issued only every now and then. But we have learned another lesson during this period. When the "Rote Fahne" was suppressed for the second time, the workers themselves gave evidence of energy and initiative unprecedented in the history of the Party. In those days, hundreds of factory newspapers were published in Berlin. On their own initiative, the workers resisted the suppression of our press: when the "Rote Fahne" was suppressed for the second time, the factory newspapers proved an effective weapon against the measures of the class enemy, against the Terrorist methods used against our Press.

What is the meaning of the provocation which took place on May-Day in Berlin? This provocation means that an attempt has been made to challenge the Communist Party, in order to have an excuse for sharp measures against the class struggle. In order to inflict a defeat on it and isolate it from the mass of the workers. Even after the May-Day failure, social-fascism has not given up this tactic. Provocation goes on by various means. I will give you only a few facts connected with recent events. In Hanover, secret police agents smuggled a box containing about half a hundred weight of dynamite into the Bureau of the I. R. A., a quantity enough to blow up half of Hanover. As soon as our comrades discovered the box, they asked the police to take it where it had come from. It was only three hours later and after our comrades had called twice at the Police Station to insist on the removal of the box, that the latter was fetched by the police. An outrage was committed two hours later in the same house where a bank has also its offices. What was the intention of the police? The intention was to smuggle the box of dynamite into the I. R. A. office, then to commit the outrage, in order that the police should afterwards discover the dynamite in the I. R. A. bureau and could implicate them in the matter. The box exploded where it came from, in the Hanover Police Station, the quarters of the social-fascists. This shows clearly what methods the social-fascist Police gangs are using.

Lately, throughout Germany the Executives of Communist Parties have been offered arms, not only revolvers and hand grenades, (one does go in for such trifles), but mine-throwers, flame throwers, machine guns and other big war machines. This shows by what means the bourgeoisie and social-fascism are working against the Communist movement. But this and dynamite are not the only means used against the Communist Party. There are other means which are meant to have the same effect as dynamite, namely, slanderous campaigns by which even some of our best members have been taken in. I recall the slanderous campaigns turned out in Germany in "factories", especially established for this purpose: the Lenin Bund under Hugo Urbahn's leadership, kept going by Stampfer, and the other firm, Brandler and Thalheimer, who still had their people in the ranks of the Party and were supported by the Conciliators. Do you think that September 26 would have been possible in the C. C. if the slander-agents had not had their own creatures in the C. C. itself? If you take this into consideration, you will understand why we gave short shrift in the Central Committee to the agents of the Right, the Conciliators. Could we in the event of war expect a single revolutionary action from leadership such as we witnessed on September 26? With such leadership we should have experienced another August 4th.

The methods used by the bourgeoisie and social-fascism against our Party, indicate the atmosphere of the Third Period which is the Period of new revolutionary upheavals. The class enemy is armed for civil war; he continues to arm; he is already using means of civil war. But we must not rest content with a bare statement of facts, we must find out what the tasks of the German Party will be.

I will deal now with the war danger. It has been discussed in

our Party, if in connection with the Paris Reparation negotiations the problem of war between Britain and America is not given so much prominence that the differences of the imperialist countries in regard to the Soviet Union are relegated to the background. There is no doubt whatever that the reparation negotiations in Paris have brought strongly to the fore all the contradictions which exist in the imperialist countries, but there is also no doubt whatever that in spite of these contradictions, bargaining has been going on there for the complete establishment of the imperialist war front against the Soviet Union, and that Germany has participated in this bargaining in order to obtain better reparation conditions. More than that, a special commission has been sitting during these negotiations, in which a number of German so-called "experts", not financial experts but experts in armaments and military power, Reichswehr generals, etc. have negotiated with the big Powers concerning a war pact against the Soviet Union. It was only in the last few days that our representatives brought these facts to the notice of the German Reichstag. The Foreign Minister, Stresemann, could not deny this fact. Here we see once more that even when it looks as if the differences between the imperialist Powers are almost irreconcilable, the point of departure in the negotiations and arrangements of the imperialist powers is always the idea: to prepare war against the Soviet Union.

This question has played a considerable role in our Party discussion. The Conciliators have represented the view that the differences between Soviet Russia and the imperialist powers recede into the background at this stage of the reparation negotiations, whereas the differences between the imperialist countries become accentuated to the extent of constituting an immediate war danger. I think that such a conception, and such propaganda would divert our Party from the mobilisation of the masses against imperialist war.

In judging the war problem, we must give prominence to the main world contradiction: socialist economy versus capitalist economy. It is precisely the development of these two economic currents which shows clearly the crystallisation points of the war danger. Every ton of coal, every ton of iron with which the Soviet Union develops its industrialisation, widens especially in connection with the Five-Year Plan. But we must the gulf between the imperialist countries and Soviet Russia, not look only on this side of the problem, we must also look on the side of the revolutionary development in the capitalist countries. Everyone knows that at all times rulers have tried to evade revolutionary situations by plunging countries into war. The fact that the Soviet Union is the centre of the revolutionary movement of the world, is an important factor in the war preparations of the capitalists, the bourgeoisie, and especially the social-fascists.

A third problem: the nearer we get to the struggle for the conquest of the majority of the proletariat, the nearer the decisive battle between reformism and bolshevism, the more evident it is that social-fascism is the driving power in the war preparations against the Soviet Union. The fourth fact, is the national revolutionary movement in the colonies which is adding to the seriousness of the crisis and difficulties in the mother countries. This movement, too, derives its main support from the fact of the existence of the Soviet Union. The greater the difficulties of the imperialist powers in the colonies, the greater their desire to wage war for the destruction of the Soviet Union. I think that we must give special prominence to this fact in our Anti-war propaganda and especially on August 1st.

I want to make a few remarks on the development of social-fascism in connection with the Left social democrats. It is frequently asserted that the Left social democrats play a different role from the out and out Right social democrats in the development of social democracy into fascism. I will, therefore, quote here the latest document produced by one of the most Left of the Left social democrats about the defence question. There was already a big discussion on the defence question before the S. P. G. Congress, and a dozen defence programmes were brought forward. But the most interesting defence programme comes from Paul Levi. Paul Levi, a former Communist, in his pamphlet on the problems of war and the defence programme says that the world war was not the last war, because it can happen that two peace disturbers seize upon the earliest opportunity for making war, and these two peace disturbers, are: Mussolini in Italy and Stalin in Moscow.

But what does he say about the defence problem? He says, that the bourgeoisie cannot solve the defence problem, it cannot create armies in which class differences are eliminated. But can Germany remain defenceless? Certainly not, Germany must arm for war against the wicked peace disturbers, Italy and the Soviet Union. But how can Germany do this? This must be undertaken by the social-democratic party and the trade unions; the army must be formed by the trade unions and the social-democratic party, the non-class army which alone is destined and able to conduct war and defend the Fatherland.

Pacifism in Germany is of a similar aspect. In the May Days, for instance, Herr von Gerlach, the leader of the German Pacifists, wrote that the May sinners, the May-Day criminals are to be sought not in Berlin, but in Moscow. Thus, from this side, too, propaganda in the direction of incitement to war against the Soviet Union. The entire May Day provocation was used in the whole bourgeois press of Germany for the widest possible ideological mobilisation for war against the Soviet Union. I will read you a few quotations from the bourgeois press. The "Vorwärts" writes:

"Moscow ordered the bloodbath in Berlin!" "Bolshevik emissaries from Moscow superintended personally the attacks on police officials who were going their way peacefully!"

Another statement is:

"At the session of the district Executive of the C. P. G., the general staff officer of the Red Army, Manuilsky, developed the plan of attack on the police and the police headquarters."

I therefore reiterate that it is absolutely no exaggeration to connect these May Day incidents with the danger of war against the Soviet Union. The whole bourgeois press has proved this to the hilt.

Our struggle now is against social-fascism and simultaneously for capturing the main sections of the German proletariat, i. e. of the majority of the working class. For this struggle, we must fully understand the character of the radicalisation process in Germany. Between 1918 and 1923, we found ourselves repeatedly in acutely revolutionary situations in which wide sections of the toiling masses rallied around the revolutionary leaders and followed them. This process is different now from what it was then. At that time, the depreciation of the currency, inflation, economic disintegration drove wide sections of workers as well as wide sections of the middle class, the small peasantry and the agricultural labourers towards the revolutionary vanguard. Today, the reason is quite different. Today, rationalisation in the enterprises determines the radicalisation process. Owing to rationalisation, wide sections of industrial workers who remained in those years with the social-democrats, are coming over to the Communist movement direct from the rationalised enterprises, or become followers of the Communist Party. Radicalisation is not as spasmodic as in 1923, neither does it fluctuate as it did then. I recall merely the year of 1924 when we polled 4½ million votes at the Reichstag elections in May, whereas our poll in December was only 2,800,000 votes. Today, the radicalisation process is perhaps not as rapid as then. It is slower but surer, more solid, stable and durable. Moreover, the masses who now join the Communist movement are above all industrial workers, the main section of the German proletariat. To this, above all, is due the enormous extension of the class struggle in Germany. In Germany and certainly also in a number of other countries, the situation is such that the simplest wage struggles can very rapidly develop into sharp political struggles, barricade fighting, etc. Thus, with our demand "the street belongs to the proletariat!" we kept up the struggle in Berlin for 3 days, so that the street had to be given back to the proletariat. Then, there is the fact that only a few days ago the defence of the Republic Act was repealed. We are in the midst of a development process which is manifold and presents a variegated picture. In this connection, we must realise that the accentuation of the struggle determines the whole process of development.

In conclusion, a few words about the reorganisation of the Parties. Transition from the second to the third period, demands reorganisation of the whole Party. In the course of this reorganisation, one can see clearly that in the second period — I won't say Sections — but certainly groups and elements

have firmly established themselves within the Party who cannot be called anything but backward and ossified. Comrade Gorkic has given us a vivid picture of the fight which had to be put up in the individual Sections of the Young Communist International in order to carry through even the simplest things in the C. C.'s of these organisations. If this is the state of affairs in the C. C.'s of the Young Communist Leagues, what must it look like in the lower Party organisations. Of course, the same phenomena are to be seen also there, only on a smaller scale. At the same time, we have another phenomenon there, namely, sections of workers are becoming radicalised more rapidly than our Party cadres. We had Party cadres which lagged behind the progress of the workers. Non-party workers called factory meetings and compelled the Communist nucleus to put up Red factory committee lists. (Interjection by Thälmann: Sometimes against the Communist nucleus!). Yes, sometimes even against the Communist nucleus. What was the meaning of this? The meaning was that the mass of the proletariat are beginning to control our Party nuclei, to see if they really carry out the Party decisions. But this is only possible if we enforce the change decided upon by the VI. World Congress, categorically and ruthlessly, not shrinking from the impediments and difficulties which crop up below, in the Party nuclei.

Many of our brother Parties thought that the German Party was too sharp and ruthless in its measures against the Right and the conciliators, and that it was perhaps not doing the right thing in regard to some matters. Several sections have asked us for information on this matter. We were willing to give them this information. We had to learn our lesson from past defeats which must be ascribed to the fact that we had no Bolshevik Party in Germany. These defeats would be repeated if we did not do our utmost to convert our Party in Germany into a real Bolshevik Party. If we are to fulfil this task, we must act ruthlessly. It is necessary to instil Bolshevik spirit into the Party. But we must not confine ourselves to our own Party. On the strength of our rich experience we must appeal to our brother sections to do the same. If we do justice to these tasks, our further work will be in the nature of revolutionary development. (Applause.)

Comrade KOLAROV (Bulgaria):

Comrades, the first question I should like to deal with is the theory of Comrade Varga about the rise in the living standard of the working class and the third period of the post-war crisis of capitalism. This is the fundamental question of the international proletarian revolution, a question of dispute between revolutionary Marxism and reformism. If modern capitalism in the third period of the post-war crisis is in a position to raise the living standard of the working class, this means the liquidation of the revolutionary period, the liquidation of the basic contradiction between the development of the forces of production and the capacity of the home market. Comrade Varga speaks about the inevitable forthcoming crisis. Yet it is rather strange, whence will this crisis come if the third period be distinguished by a rise in the living standard of the working class? What does this mean? It means the increased purchasing capacity of the proletariat. And the increased purchasing capacity of the proletariat means the increased demand for commodities. Consequently, this constitutes a factor for diminishing the causes of industrial crisis. In my opinion, Comrade Varga is renewing the attempt of the reformists in the 90's to revise Marxism in one of its fundamental principles. Of course, Comrade Varga does not speak about revisionism, he does not yet speak about the permanent tendency of capitalism, he does not yet generalise, he observes now, in the commencement of the third period. But, comrades, if the commencement of the third period of capitalism is generally distinguished by such a fact, it may be assumed that the same fact will go on further during the whole existence and development of the third period of world capitalism, and that it will obviate the very crisis of world capitalism.

The matter becomes even more serious in view of the fact that in order to prove this theory, Comrade Varga alludes to Germany. If a capitalist country like Germany, without colonial profits and with a huge burden of reparations, can afford to raise the living standard of the working class, it means such a strengthening of capitalism as will, at least, put off for a long time the advent of the revolutionary crisis.

The revisionists used to back their assertions with official

statistical data. They did the same as Comrade Varga is doing now, 30 years afterwards. True, Comrade Varga admits the fact that the bourgeois statistics are falsified. But they have only once been falsified, and since then never again. And he refers to these bourgeois statisticians and economists who are at this very moment carrying on an ideological struggle against the revolutionary positions of the Comintern. Comrade Varga forgets that it is the business of bourgeois statistics, at all moments and in all periods of the revolutionary class struggle, to place the ideological weapon in the hands of the bourgeois politicians of the bourgeois counter-revolution. As a matter of fact, bourgeois statistics have now entered into the period of their fascisation, becoming transformed into fascist statistics. This is the fact which Comrade Varga overlooks.

Comrade Varga is anxious to explain away the reformist character of his theory. Moreover, one fails to understand his illogical assertion that, while the living standard of the working class is rising, the general conditions of the working class are getting worse. What does this mean? The fundamental thing is the living standard of the proletariat. If the living standard of the proletariat rises, then there ought to be also general amelioration in the conditions of the proletariat. A general amelioration in the conditions of the proletariat we see now only in the Soviet Union. This should be stated and emphasised in most categorical fashion.

Comrades, if the bourgeoisie is able to raise the living standard of the working class, why then Fascism, why the dictatorship, why the disfranchisement of the working class, why all this complex system, of repression in regard to the working class? Obviously, if the bourgeoisie resorts to pressure, if it employs terrorism and political repression, it is because it is unable to raise the living standard of the working class and bring about better conditions of existence for the workers; it is because it needs the extortion of greater profits, of more surplus value from the working class.

I am at one with those comrades who most resolutely repudiate Comrade Varga's attempt to revise revolutionary Marxism in one of its fundamental points. All this compels us to be more circumspect than hitherto in regard to the deductions and conclusions drawn by Comrade Varga in the special field of research in which he is engaged.

I agree that the Italian comrades are making a mistake when they want to represent fascism as an exclusively Italian phenomenon. Under the conditions of universalisation of the economic system, they have no right to a monopoly of fascism (laughter). One can speak only about the peculiar aspect of fascism in Italy, about its peculiar Italian form, and nothing more than that.

Fascism, however, as a more universal phenomenon, is also assuming other peculiar forms.

I should like to refer to another form of fascism, to so-called agrarian fascism. There exists not only social-fascism, but also agrarian fascism. In all the agrarian countries we see already the formation of detachments of a fascist character by the upper strata of the peasantry. In Czechoslovakia and in Roumania we see already the forms of agrarian fascism, the demagogical utilisation of the peasant masses for the defence of private property, for the crushing of the proletarian revolution.

Comrades, fascism in the Balkans began to develop practically after the seizure of power by big capital, after its actual capture of the state apparatus. By this it is distinguished from Italian fascism. Italian fascism came into power in a "revolutionary" way: it overthrew the power of the bourgeois government. In the Balkans we see already the domination of capital in its big form, in the shape of banking capital which resorts to fascist methods in order to stem the tide of revolution and suppress the revolts of the masses of workers and peasants. Fascism in all the Balkan countries relies upon the non-party societies and political organisations, chiefly of a military character. Fascism in Yugoslavia controls the so-called "White Hand", an organisation of army officers. Big capital in Bulgaria, resorting to the use of fascist methods, has also formed an organisation of reserve officers and non-commissioned officers. They constitute the chief military support of the fascist domination. Of course, by the side of these there are also numerous other fascist organisations. In Roumania the present National-Zaranist Government has started the formation of a rural militia made up of the upper elements of the peasantry in order to support the bourgeois domination.

What is the relationship between open dictatorship and the "democratic" forms of government in the Balkan countries? It varies. In Yugoslavia we have a complete military-monarchist dictatorship, the abrogation of all parliamentary and "democratic" forms of government from the top to the bottom. In Bulgaria we still have a parliament, but it is a parliament which actually carries out the dictates of the so-called "irresponsible factors", i. e. of the organisations of reserve officers, non-commissioned officers, etc.

In Roumania and Greece the bourgeoisie for the time being, is still relying entirely upon the parliament and the senate. The groups which back fascism are still enjoying some prestige which allows them to hoodwink the masses and to bolster up the capitalist domination by the aid of a parliament, checked by the senate. Thus, the relationship between open dictatorship and parliamentarism varies.

It is a special task of Balkan fascism to crush the national-revolutionary movement. Balkan fascism is a weapon of international imperialism, particularly of British, French and Italian imperialism, firstly, for supporting and increasing the semi-colonial exploitation of the Balkan peoples, and secondly, for the organisation of war against Soviet Russia. A part of the ideology of Balkan fascism consists in the so-called "national unity", "national ideals", in the creation and defence of the "united national state". This renders Balkan fascism highly aggressive. The means for the solution of the "national ideal" is war alone, and for this reason we find Balkan fascism preparing for wars, firstly, for territorial expansion, and secondly, for the defence of foreign territories already annexed.

How is the situation with regard to the so-called "industrial peace?" In the Balkans one has to speak also about "rural peace", and about "peace in the annexed territories". So far this "peace" in the Balkans is maintained by means of emergency laws, repression, and white terror. There is a repressive regime in all the Balkan countries. Big capital in the Balkans does not feel the need to create any special institutions for "collaboration" of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It manages so far without such institutions. The Balkan social-democrats are backing the idea of forming industrial councils, of transforming the labour unions into organs of the state, of compulsory arbitration, etc.

In all the Balkan countries the efforts of the capitalists to subjugate the masses of the peasants by bribing the upper strata of the peasantry are meeting with some success.

This is particularly the case in Roumania, where such bribery is carried on through the National-Zarunist Government.

Comrades, the struggle against fascism, whether in the shape of social-fascism or agrarian-fascism, constitutes one of the most essential tasks of the Balkan Communist Parties. An under-estimation of the fascist danger in the Balkans is the source of Right deviations in all the Balkan Communist Parties. In the Balkan Communist Parties there is still an under-estimation of the fascist character of the so-called "oppositional" bourgeoisie, an under-estimation of the fascist character of the National-Zarunist Government in Roumania, an under-estimation of the fascist character of the social-democracy in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Against this under-estimation, against this Right deviation, the most energetic struggle ought to be waged.

I must point out that, in my opinion, the draft resolution submitted here on the first item of the agenda is rather inadequate and incomplete. The resolution does not take into consideration the situation in the so-called capitalist countries of the second type, where the peasant question plays an important role in development of the revolutionary process. The resolution makes excessive allusion to the characteristics of the situation in the big capitalist countries where the labour question pre-dominates. Yet the group of countries of the second type is of no mean importance and its numerical strength cannot be ignored. This group includes Poland, Hungary, the Balkans, and a number of other countries. It constitutes a big group of countries with great revolutionary importance. It was positively necessary to provide room in the draft resolution for a description of the situation in these countries.

In all these countries, next to the labour question, an important place is occupied by the peasant question and by the national question. In the Balkans, the problem of winning the

majority is usually taken as the problem of winning a majority of the proletariat. Yet this is inadequate, for it is also necessary to win a majority of the toiling peasantry, and also a majority of the oppressed nationalities. The social-democracy in the Balkan countries is relatively weak, it does not play an appreciable role in any Balkan country; but on the other hand, there are in the Balkans more or less mass organisations of the peasants, in the shape of Parties and alliances. It is just the attitude of the Communist Parties to these basic masses of the peasantry, and to the existing peasant parties, that constitutes the source of all the more or less important political mistakes committed by the Balkan Communist Parties. Therefore, during this third period of the post-war crisis of capitalism, the Communist Parties of these countries should be more definitely instructed as regards activity among the peasants and among the oppressed nationalities.

Comrades, the general situation in the Balkans may be characterised as follows: in the first place, we have here the economic subjection of the Balkan countries to foreign capital and the increased use of colonial methods of exploitation of the workers and peasants by foreign capitalism.

Secondly, in all the Balkan countries there is going on a concentration of capital, the formation of cartels, syndicates, trusts, etc. This is accompanied by the increased exploitation of the workers and peasants. Capitalist rationalisation in the Balkans is going on under peculiar, exceptional forms. The technical progress is rather slight, but there is an increase in the methods of exploitation of the workers, such as longer hours and speeding up.

Thirdly, national subjection in the Balkans is only a means for the economic plunder of the masses in all the subjected territories.

Fourthly, at the same time there is going on an intensification of the class contradictions in town and village. There is both absolute and relative decline in the standard of living of the basic masses of the workers and peasants, the pauperisation of the masses of workers and peasants, and social degeneration.

Under these circumstances in the Balkans, fascism, i. e. the combination of "democratic" deception with the open military and capitalist dictatorship, constitutes the only means for maintaining the domination of big capital over the masses of workers and peasants. There is an exclusive regime of white terror going on in all the Balkan countries. The general result is that there is a steady radicalisation, revolutionisation of the proletariat, of the basic masses of the peasantry, and of the people in the annexed and oppressed territories.

The revolutionisation of the peasant masses resulted in a sort of hegemony by the peasantry and the peasant organisations in the general struggle of the toiling masses against the bourgeoisie and against capitalism. You remember how in Bulgaria a peasant government, followed by the basic mass of the peasantry, tried to wage a fight also against big capital. Thus, the masses of the peasants held the hegemony, so to speak, in the struggle against big capital.

(Martinov: "The hegemony over whom?")

First fiddle in this struggle was played by the Peasant Alliance, by the Peasant Government. Nevertheless, how did it end? It ended in bankruptcy.

(Martinov: "Did the proletariat follow them?")

No, but it played the second fiddle. It existed as a secondary force. But this first role of the peasantry in the struggle against the domination of big capital ended in defeat.

Comrades, in Yugoslavia, after the suppression of the Communist Party and its being driven underground, we see the intensification of the struggle of the peasantry in Croatia and in other oppressed territories. The movement of the working class seems to have died down, as though shifted into the background, with the result that the role of the Communist Party has diminished and has been relegated to a secondary place. You remember how in 1927, when the peasant leaders were killed in parliament, there was a wide wave of peasant rebellion throughout Croatia, causing a tremendous and profound crisis in Yugoslavia. What was the end of this movement? The leaders of the peasant organisation have betrayed the people, and their struggle has ended in bankruptcy.

You remember how in Rumania last year there were tremendous demonstrations by the peasants. You remember the

march of the peasants on Bucharest. The movement was headed by the National-Zarunist Party. The proletariat followed behind the peasantry. The Communist Party played a secondary role. How did it end? The National-Zarunist Party came into power, betrayed the peasantry, and started open capitalistic policies against it. And now, as the result of the short term of office of the National-Zarunist Party, we see already the withdrawal of the mass of the peasantry from the National-Zarunist Party, and the leftward turning of the peasant masses: to the proletariat, to Communism. The peasant masses are seeking the way to the Communist Party; unfortunately, they do not find it so easily.

All this means that the objective development is favourable to the consolidation of the leading role of the proletariat, of its hegemony in the struggle against big capital, and consequently, the consolidation of the leading role of the Communist Party.

Comrades, we have seen in all the Balkan countries, immediately after the failure of the struggle of the peasant masses against big capital, after the deception of the masses by the peasant leaders, how a new period of development has begun, in which the proletariat takes again the first place in the struggle against big capital. Bulgaria is passing through a period of mass upheaval and of revolutionary fighting by the whole proletariat. The country is flooded with a big wave of strikes in spite of the fact that big capital shrinks at nothing in order to strangle this movement. Comrades, there is a movement going on in Bulgaria which, proportionately, cannot be matched in any other country. At the present moment the general strike of the Bulgarian tobacco workers is still going on. The tobacco workers in Bulgaria represent 40% of the entire industrial proletariat. This is a general strike in the fundamental industry of Bulgaria. The whole mass of the workers has gone out on strike unanimously. It has already given victory to the proletariat to the extent of two-thirds. For the first time under the fascist regime raging in the country for the last five years, for the first time after the September upheaval of 1923, we have a mass labour movement, and a break through the fascist front. But, Comrades, this does not mean the end of the movement. Just now the whole of the Bulgarian proletariat is in a state of strong excitement. After the tobacco workers the textile workers have gone out on strike. There is now a big textile strike in Bulgaria's largest textile centre, Slivena; the strike is carried on unanimously, without any betrayal, in spite of repression by the capitalists and the bourgeoisie. The strike involves already a number of other industries. It has spread to Sofia, to Burgaz, and mass conflicts are imminent in all the industrial centres of the country. It is interesting to note that under the most ferocious terror, when no meetings are allowed by the fascist police, the strikers are breaking through the fascist front and are organising their mass meetings under the slogan of the class demands of the proletariat, for the first time in the last 6 years.

This movement involves all the elements of the population that are connected with the working class. Comrades, let me mention a few facts. Some time ago in the already mentioned town of Slivena, a mass strike was declared by the workers in a textile mill in connection with an explosion which had taken place in the mill. The strike was carried out, and the victims of the explosion were buried with an impressive demonstration. On May Day the tobacco workers struck in most of the industrial centres, e. g. at Philippopolis and Habos, and marched in the demonstrations in defiance of the police. At Sofia there was not only a demonstration, but the workers gave battle to the police and gendarmes who had fired upon the demonstration. During the strike at Slivena the police appeared at a public meeting and arrested all the speakers, the whole presidium, and the strike committee. Nevertheless, a crowd of many thousands accompanied the police and their victims, held a powerful demonstration and compelled the police to release the prisoners. Particularly harsh measures were employed by the police against the working women. When women strikers were arrested, all the workers' children left school and went to the police headquarters to join the general demonstration, and the police were compelled to set the women free. As a result of this demonstration, two gendarmes related to workers threw aside their uniforms as a token of protest. Comrades, this struggle, unparalleled in our country, is going

on under the actual leadership of the class organisations of the workers. The Bulgarian Communist Party is actually at the head of this tremendous strike wave.

But I must say that it was no easy matter for the revolutionary organisations to capture this movement. Only a relatively short time ago the Political Secretariat, discussing the situation in Bulgaria, pointed out to the Bulgarian Communist Party the weakness of its organisational basis and its insufficient activity in the preparation and organisation of mass strikes. Forseeing the spontaneous outbreak of mass strikes, the Comintern warned the Party. At first the revolutionary organisations were in a very difficult position, incapable at first of mastering this movement, although they enjoyed great prestige among the workers. This allowed some liquidatory attempts in the leadership. Thus, at Philippopolis, an important centre, the first strike committee came out with a platform of "political neutrality", "pure economic struggle", and with the demand for "government mediation". This enabled the fascist elements to try and capture the movement, but as the struggle went on, the revolutionary organisations succeeded in exposing these attempts, and in forming a real revolutionary leadership.

Comrades, during the further development of this struggle the revolutionary organisations have finally gained the leadership of this movement. Just now the general strike of the textile workers at Slivena is going on not only virtually, but officially under the leadership of the revolutionary trade unions. Under the regime of white terror this struggle is of quite exceptional political importance, and of a distinct revolutionary character. In fact, the whole of this struggle has not been waged against individual employers and bosses. It has been waged, firstly, against trust capital, against the cartels, and secondly, against the fascist regime. At all the meetings there were demands made for the overthrow of the fascist regime, for the declaration of the rights and liberties of the broad masses, for the general amnesty, and for the other slogans of the working class. The Communist Party has endeavoured to broaden and deepen this movement. It has launched the slogan of transforming each partial strike into a general strike, of spreading the strike to other towns and to other trades. As I have already said, a new wave of strikes is imminent which is going to affect other industries in the different localities throughout the country.

Comrades, this struggle has shown a vital example of the tremendous danger of Right deviations in the Party, of the danger of opportunistic vacillation, legalism, opportunism, liquidatorship, etc. Under the conditions of white terror there are objective conditions for these Right deviations. The Party has hitherto successfully combated the manifestations of Right deviations, and now realises the whole seriousness of these deviations. It has had the occasion to see for itself the tremendous danger of the Right deviations, and also to reveal this danger to the masses of the workers. The mass of the workers have become convinced that without transforming their so-called "purely economic" struggle into a large mass and class struggle, into a political struggle against the capitalist class and the capitalist state, they would not have gained the successes which they have actually achieved. Although the victory of the strike is a partial one, it has considerably demonstrated the value of the proper class leadership of the strike movement.

The revolutionary movement now embraces ever larger masses of the proletariat. The objective development and the experience of the past struggle has brought the proletariat to the forefront in the revolutionary struggle. Objectively, the proletariat is gaining the hegemony of the general mass revolutionary movement, the hegemony over the peasantry, the hegemony over the oppressed nationalities. Under these favourable circumstances the Communist Party has both the possibility and the necessity to strengthen its organisational and leading role in the revolutionary movement. The Balkan Parties should realise the full importance of this, their task in the new period in the development of the class struggle in the Balkans. They should accordingly endeavour to strengthen their organisational basis among the masses. The organisational basis in Bulgaria is rather narrow and inadequate. This we find now in practice. Secondly, the Party should apply all means finally to overcome all the sentiments of surrender, liquidation and conciliation within the ranks of the Party, so as to create a united and firm leadership that will indeed be capable of leading the proletariat in this period of tremendous class fights which herald the imminent revolutionary situation. (Applause.)