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FOR LENINIST-STALINIST CADRES (12th ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF LENIN)

K. ZELOS: THE EIGHTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RED ARMY

AN ABUNDANCE OF PRODUCTS IN THE U.S.S.R.

IN MEMORIAM: SHAPURJI SAKLATVALA

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# FOR LENINIST-STALINIST CADRES\*

(Twelfth Anniversary of the Death of Lenin.)

**D**URING the sorrowful Lenin memorial days Communists of all countries examine with especial care the road over which they have passed, review the course taken by the struggle for the cause of LENIN, and take note of the new questions which have arisen before the proletariat, and how they have to be dealt with, guided by the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.

To-day, on the twelfth anniversary of the death of the genius, leader and teacher of the world proletariat, one of these decisive questions at the present stage of the development of the world Communist movement is that of Communist Party cadres.

Lenin built up a NEW TYPE of Party, one different from all the parties of the Second International; a Party equipped with the only truly scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, a Party which is the vanguard of the working class. Lenin taught that the Party cannot be established, cannot grow and develop, and that a mass Bolshevik policy cannot be fulfilled, unless the best people of the working class are organised, unless proletarian revolutionary cadres are established who are hammered out in the mass revolutionary struggle, cadres who are connected by thousands of links with the masses in the factories, and in the mass organisations, etc.

The cultivation, strengthening and correct distribution of revolutionary cadres is the most important condition for the victorious struggle of the proletariat. The conversion of the real possibility of a victorious proletarian revolution into actual revolution depends upon their ideological staunchness, on their ability to behave as real Bolsheviks both in their daily work and, when sharp changes are taking place in the situation, upon their ability to rally the millions to themselves and to lead them into battle.

The period of history which is opening up before the world Communist movement makes new and higher demands upon the Communist Parties. It is required of Communists that they display tremendous revolutionary activity, initiative and boldness in carrying out a mass Bolshevik policy, that they carry on an untiring struggle to establish united action by the working class, the DECISIVE link in preparing the toiling masses for great battles for their emancipation.

The new tactical line adopted by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern demands, in addition, new methods of work and struggle, as well as SPECIAL QUALITIES in those people who have decided

\* Cadres—here referring to active Party workers and functionaries—or officials.

to devote their lives and their strength to the revolution, to the struggle for Communism.

The most important task facing ALL the sections of the Comintern to-day is the struggle to hammer out in the Communist Parties themselves such Party cadres as could in the specific circumstances of each country, work in a new way, and undertake leadership in their own spheres of activity in a new way. What sort of cadres should there be, where are they to be found, how trained, how used, and how can they be helped to grow—these are burning questions of the practical struggle, to which our policy CONCERNING CADRES must reply. In different countries there will be different replies depending on the stage of development of the revolutionary movement in the different countries, on the level of development of the Communist Party itself, the strength of the influence of reformism, the traditions of the working-class movement and, of course, on the general economic and political situation in the country.

But there are, in addition, general tasks in the Party's policy with regard to cadres, which are common to all sections of the Comintern, and which are based upon the very rich experiences of the Bolsheviks, multiplied by the experiences of the international Communist movement. For no other country, wrote Lenin,

“had anything even approximating this revolutionary experience, this rapid and varied succession of different forms of the movement—legal and illegal, peaceful and stormy, open and underground, small circles and mass movements, parliamentary and terrorist.”\*

In no other country, Lenin continues, “was there concentrated during so short a period of time such a wealth of forms, shades and methods of struggle involving ALL classes of modern society . . .”\*

Therefore, to KNOW the fundamental part of the experiences of the Russian Bolsheviks, to KNOW how to use these experiences properly, means to find the most important preconditions of the correct policy with regard to cadres in each section of the Comintern.

As the leader of the Party, no matter what circumstances he found himself in—legal or illegal, in exile, in emigration, or as President of the Council of People's Commissaries—Lenin always considered that one of his first duties was to superintend directly and personally the selection, education, and DISTRIBUTION of cadres. This is also a characteristic feature of the daily, Party and political state, economic, and military work of Comrade STALIN, who has never ceased, nor ceases now, to occupy himself directly and personally,

\*Lenin: “Left-Wing Communism.”

with questions dealing with Party cadres. LENIN and STALIN, as true leaders of Bolshevism, adopted an attitude of extreme contempt towards various Menshevik and Trotskyist "leaders," who regarded themselves as "pure politicians," and, as we know, approached the tedious humdrum work arising in the field of organisational questions disdainfully and in lordly fashion, and especially in regard to the question of cadres.

Long before the revolution, in the most difficult periods of underground work under Tsarism, Lenin, in elaborating the ways and methods to be followed in revolutionary struggle, stressed in every possible way the decisive importance of the problem of cadres.

"Against us, against the small groups of socialists sheltering in the broad Russian "underground," there stands the gigantic mechanism of a most powerful modern State, which is harnessing all its forces to crush socialism and democracy." (Lenin, Vol. II, p. 501).

It was in these circumstances that LENIN had to begin to build up Bolshevik organisations. He worked out methods for creating revolutionary organisations carefully and in full detail, and he gave a DECISIVE PLACE TO QUESTIONS OF CADRES, CONSPIRACY, DISCIPLINE. Lenin wrote:

"Unless we increase and develop revolutionary discipline, organisation and conspiracy, it is impossible to wage a struggle against the government. And conspiracy demands first and foremost that particular circles and people specialise on different functions of the work, and that the unifying rôle be allotted to a central nucleus of the "League of Struggle," numerically as insignificant as possible. The different functions of revolutionary struggle are infinitely various; legal agitators are required, capable of talking among the workers in such a manner that they cannot be brought before the court for what they say, people who know how to say only A, leaving it to others to say B and C. We require distributors of literature and leaflets. We require organisers of workers' circles and groups. We require correspondents from all factories and works, supplying information of all that goes on . . . We require people who will be on the lookout for spies and provocateurs. We require people to fix up quarters for conspirative purposes. We require people to pass on literature, to pass on messages and to maintain connections of all kinds. We require people to collect money. We require agents among the intelligentsia and officials, who are in contact with the workers, with life in the factories and works, with the managing boards (with the police, factory inspectors, etc.). We require people to maintain contacts with different towns in Russia and other countries. We require people to fix up different methods of mechanically reproducing all kinds of literature. We require people to look after the literature and other things, etc. The more divided, the smaller the job undertaken by the individual or individual group, the greater the chances that he will succeed in carefully setting the job going and in best guaranteeing it from failure, in discussing all the conspiratorial particulars, using every possible means to evade the vigilance of the gendarmes and mislead them, the surer, too, the success of the job—the more difficult it will be for the police and gendarmes to track down the revolutionary and his connection with the organisations, and the easier it will be for the

revolutionary party, without any losses for the cause as a whole, to put others in the place of those of its agents and members who perish."\*

At different stages of the development of the revolutionary movement LENIN raised in great detail all the questions concerning the creation and education of cadres; the question of specialisation in revolutionary work, of splitting up the functions, of selecting people for special work, of the selection and education of people who have a complete mastery of these separate functions and who ensure strict conspiracy and discipline.

While educating and training cadres of revolutionaries, leading individual revolutionary circles, carefully working out forms and methods of revolutionary struggle in conditions of police terror and barbarous persecution, LENIN elaborated the plan for building up the future great party, the C.P.S.U., the new type of party. And here LENIN placed in the foreground the problem of cadres—the question of professional revolutionaries.

"I assert: (1) that no movement can be durable without a stable organisation of leaders to maintain continuity; (2) that the more widely the masses are spontaneously drawn into the struggle and form the basis of the movement and participate in it, the more necessary is it to have such an organisation, and the more stable must it be (for it is much easier for demagogues to side-track the more backward sections of the masses); (3) that the organisation must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession; (4) that in a country with an autocratic government, the more we restrict the membership of this organisation to persons who are engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to catch the organisation, and (5) the wider will be the circle of men and women of the working class or of other classes of society able to join the movement and perform active work in it." Lenin "What is to be Done," Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 138.

He saw the working class as the chief source from which to recruit Party cadres. He considered systematic work with the foremost workers so as to train them ideologically and politically, and so as to promote them to the level of professional revolutionaries, to be the chief task facing the professional revolutionaries.

LENIN bitingly laughed to scorn and whipped those of the practical men who were indifferent and careless in their attitude towards revolutionary theory, and who in their activities did not strive towards raising the masses to the level of the vanguard, but who themselves sank down to the level of the non-class-conscious and unorganised workers. With regard to these individuals, Lenin pointed out that they usually constitute reserves for opportunist vacillations in the working-class movement.

As the revolutionary movement has grown, as

\* Lenin, Vol. II, Russ. Edition.

the network of Party organisations has grown, the question of cadres has acquired more and more real importance.

LENIN mercilessly scorned those "organisers" who complained of the lack of Party workers, who considered the problem of cadres an insoluble one; and he taught us that we must seek out new Party workers in the heart of the masses of the workers, and promote them from there.

LENIN, the genius and strategist of revolution, wrote the following during the turbulent rise of the revolutionary movement in 1905:

My advice is to shoot on the spot all those who allow themselves to say there are no people. There are enormous numbers of people in Russia, only you must recruit the youth extensively and boldly, boldly and extensively, still more extensively, and still more boldly. . . We must desperately quickly unite all revolutionary people with initiative and set them in motion. Don't be afraid that they are untrained, don't shake with fear about their inexperience and immaturity." Lenin, Vol. VII, p. 102, Russ. Ed.

In March, 1905, in his article "New Tasks and New Forces," Lenin wrote:

"The revolutionary epoch for Social-Democracy is the same as war time for the Party. We must extend the cadres of our army, transfer it from peaceful to war contingents, mobilise the reserves, call to the colours all those on leave, arrange new independent corps, detachments and services. We must not forget that during the war our ranks will inevitably and essentially be reinforced by less trained recruits, that ever and anon ordinary soldiers will take the place of officers, and the production of officers out of soldiers will be accelerated and simplified."

It is important not only to know how to gather the masses for the struggle at a moment of general revolutionary upsurge. What is no less, if not more important is to KNOW HOW TO RETREAT. After the 1905 revolution, "of all the routed opposition and revolutionary parties, the Bolsheviks retreated in the finest order" (Lenin). The explanation of this was the staunchness of the Bolshevik cadres, their irreconcilable attitude to "revolutionary phrases," their ability to conduct revolutionary work even in the most difficult conditions of reaction and terror by using all legal opportunities.

A FIGHT MUST BE CARRIED ON TO CREATE SUCH CADRES AS WILL NOT FALL INTO PANIC AFTER DEFEAT AND WHO CAN LEARN TO WORK ON BEHALF OF THE REVOLUTION EVEN IN CONDITIONS OF THE MOST FEROCIOUS REACTION; to really work and not to deck themselves out in "ultra-revolutionary" garb and chatter about "not wanting to help the fascists," or about "not wanting to help the reactionary Social-Democrats," i.e., not to adopt the rôle of "the observers and registrars of approaching waves in expectation of fine weather," of whom Comrade Dimitrov spoke so clearly and vividly at the Seventh Congress. We must cultivate such cadres as can self-sacrificingly undertake the offensive at

decisive moments and as can, when circumstances demand, retreat in good order, maintaining contacts with the masses, preserving confidence in oncoming victory, learning how to work in the most difficult conditions, flexibly adapting their methods of work to the changing situation, and who are all the time faithful to the end to the one aim, the one cause, namely, the revolution.

\* \* \*

What were the qualities in cadres which Lenin indicated as being essential prior to the October Revolution? For be it remembered, the struggle to seize power has its culmination in armed uprising. Naturally all the preceding work of the Communist Party and the quality of its cadres are put to the test at this most acute moment.

Prior to the October uprising, in stressing that uprising must be treated as an art, Lenin wrote the following:

"Selection of the most resolute of our 'storm troops'—the working youth and sailors; and formation of small detachments to occupy all the most important points and to take part everywhere in all decisive operations, e.g., to encircle Petersburg and to cut it off from other towns; to take possession of it by a combined attack of the navy, the workers, and the troops—a task which requires ART AND TRIPLE DARING. Formation of detachments composed of the best workers who, armed with rifles and bombs, will march upon and surround the centres of the enemy (Cadet-officers' training schools, telegraph and telephone offices, etc.). The watchword to be: 'PERISH TO THE LAST MAN RATHER THAN LET THE ENEMY PASS.'"

These are the qualities essential in cadres. These demands apply to the masses who take part in the uprising, and ten times more so to the LEADING cadres. But LENIN demanded still more from the leaders. First and foremost, he demanded THE ABILITY TO SUBORDINATE EVERYTHING TO THE SOLUTION OF THE CHIEF TASK, to the victory of the uprising. Further, the ABILITY TO FIX "THE FAVOURABLE MOMENT FOR, AND EXPEDIENT METHODS OF, ATTACKING." And to this end the leaders must MASTER IN FULL MEASURE THE METHODS OF MARXISM-LENINISM, MUST KNOW HOW on this basis, to give an EXHAUSTIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION—of the international situation, the alignment of forces inside the country, the calculation of the forces of the enemy and their own forces, the points of uprising, the possibility of ensuring neutrality among vacillating sections of the population, etc.

The task of CORRECTLY DISTRIBUTING cadres acquires special importance in these conditions—and here the need for the SPECIALISATION of cadres is particularly essential in connection with the solution of strictly defined tasks. The art of leading an uprising, if the time for this uprising is ripe, lies in correctly combining the initiative of the masses with a strictly defined plan of struggle.

The Bolshevik Party attributed tremendous importance to work among the armed forces of the enemy. The cadres sent by the Party on this particularly responsible work must possess many additional qualities. Comrades working in these circumstances must solve at least two tasks: the minimum task—to prevent the armed forces of the enemy from undertaking action against the insurgents, and the maximum—to draw the enemy forces over to their own side. They, better than anyone else, must KNOW HOW TO INTERPRET THE MOODS OF THE MASSES OF SOLDIERS: very much will depend on their work, on their ability to display initiative and link up the Party with the masses, and to correctly estimate the relation of forces.

Immediately after the victorious October Revolution, work had to be done to create such cadres of Bolsheviks as could lead the masses in defence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Then, and in the following period of civil war, the Leninist-Stalinist struggle for cadres meant a struggle to save the dictatorship of the proletariat, a struggle to consolidate and strengthen it. After the end of the civil war, during the time of the famine and the breakdown of the whole of the economic life of the country, it was necessary to gather together cadres capable of fighting self-sacrificingly to restore the economic life of the country, to consolidate the Party and the Soviet organs. During that period, it was necessary to gather together cadres of Bolsheviks who would not lose their heads in the face of the unprecedented difficulties existing, capable of understanding the meaning and importance of the great Leninist turn from “war Communism” to the New Economic Policy.

At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, LENIN said that:

“In connection with N.E.P. we set about making a fuss, remaking institutions and establishing new ones. This is the most harmful chatter. We have come to the conclusion that the crux of the whole position is in people, in the selection of people.”

Comrade Stalin defined the type of leader-organiser the country needs, in the following words:

“What does it mean to be a leader and organiser in our conditions, when the proletariat hold power? It does not mean to select assistants, to set up an office, and hand out instructions through it. To be a leader and organiser in our conditions means, first of all to know workers, to be able to pick out their worthy points and shortcomings, to be able to approach workers, and secondly, to be able to distribute workers in such a way that:

- (1) Each worker feels that he is in his place.
- (2) Each worker can give the revolution the maximum he is at all capable of giving according to his personal qualities to the revolution;
- (3) Such a distribution of workers should result not in a hitch, but in co-ordination, unity, and a general improvement in the work as a whole;

(4) The general direction of the work organised in this way serves as an expression and fulfilment of the political idea in the name of which the workers are distributed to their posts.”

After the death of LENIN there began a new stage of development of the revolution, one which demanded the mobilisation and exertion of all forces to overcome colossal difficulties. The sharpening class struggle in the country found its reflection in the Party and among the working class. The agents of the class enemy inside the Party tried to revise Leninism, to split the Bolshevik Party and turn it from the Leninist-Stalinist path on to the road of capitulation before difficulties, on to the road leading to the restoration of capitalism. The C.P.S.U., led by STALIN, the great comrade-in-arms of Lenin, crushed the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists-Zinovievists, the Right and “Left” capitulators. In this struggle Stalin, true to the teachings and traditions of Lenin, gathered together cadres and educated them in the spirit of loyalty to the behests of Ilyich Lenin.

In this period the struggle for cadres signified the struggle for Party unity, for Leninism, for the building of Socialism in our country, against opportunism, treachery, and capitulation. Calling this period of struggle to mind, Comrade Stalin said:

“We had therefore to arm ourselves with strong nerves, Bolshevik grit, and stubborn patience, in order to counteract the first failures and to march unswervingly towards the great goal, without permitting any wavering or uncertainty in our ranks.”\*

The opportunists and capitulators

“Did not always confine themselves to criticism and passive resistance. They threatened to raise a revolt in the Party against the Central Committee. More, they threatened some of us with bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us and compelling us to leave the Leninist road. These people, forgot that we Bolsheviks are people of a special cut. They forgot that you cannot frighten Bolsheviks by difficulties or by threats. They forgot that we were forged by the great Lenin, our leader, our teacher, our father, who did not know fear in the fight and did not recognise it. They forgot that the more the enemies rage and the more hysterical the foes within the Party become, the more red-hot the Bolsheviks become for fresh struggles and the more vigorously they push forward.” Stalin†: Address to Red Army Graduates).

Under the leadership of Stalin the Party has gained world historic victories: it has converted a poor, devastated, technically weak and uncultured country, into a powerful country, an industrial country, into the land of victorious Socialism. By the 12th anniversary of his death, the cause of Lenin, Socialism, has achieved victory in the U.S.S.R. finally and irrevocably. The moment has

\* J. Stalin: Address to the Graduates from the Red Army Academy. No. 10, 1935.

† Ibid.

arrived when victory, the triumph of the general line of the C.P.S.U. as regards industrialisation and collectivisation, and the building of the classless society has become clear to everybody. It was precisely at this moment that the voice of our mighty Stalin rang out, calling for people, for cadres. Said Stalin:

"Emphasis must now be laid on people, on cadres, on workers who have mastered technique. That is why the old slogan 'technique decides everything,' which is a reflection of a period we have already passed through, a period in which we suffered from a famine in technical resources, must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan 'Cadres decide everything.' That is the main thing now." (J. Stalin: "Address to the Graduates from the Red Army Academy").

The way Comrade Stalin dealt with the question of Party and non-Party Bolshevics became a mighty stimulus to cultivating new millions of builders of Socialism. The Stalinist care of people, his line about the need for a careful and attentive attitude towards every worker, his declaration that "we must solicitously and carefully cultivate people as a gardener cultivates his favourite fruit tree," and the Stalinist fighting slogan to the effect that "cadres decide everything," have now become the fighting programme of the whole Party, the whole country. To-day, the mighty development of the Stakhanov movement is the best reply to the call of our leader, the practical fulfilment of this line taken by the great Stalin.

\* \* \*

Throughout the whole of the course of the history of Bolshevism the problem of cadres has been a most important problem. By carrying out the Leninist-Stalinist policy in regard to cadres and work in connection with cadres, Bolshevism came out victorious. And to-day, in addition, the problem of cadres occupies a central position in the minds of the Bolshevics. Bolshevism, by clearing alien, anti-Party, demoralised, bureaucratic elements and spies out of its ranks, by raising the level of revolutionary vigilance, is thereby strengthening its cadres, first and foremost.

It is the task of all Communist Parties to learn from the Bolshevics this uninterrupted and tireless work with cadres. It is the task of all Communist Parties to understand, to master the Leninist-Stalinist way of raising the question of the rôle and importance of the problem of cadres in the Party and the working-class movement, to understand and master the Leninist-Stalinist methods of work with cadres. It can be noted, without the slightest exaggeration, that the most vulnerable spot in all the parties of the Comintern is their work with cadres. For a number of Parties in the Comintern, the weakness of the work in regard to cultivating, preparing and selecting cadres, the shortcomings and mistakes in this field,

the incorrect policy with regard to cadres have become the chief factors retarding their development. The bourgeois and fascist enemies of the Communist Parties who excellently understand the decisive rôle of cadres and the weakness of the Communist Parties in precisely this field, spare no efforts and money to take advantage of this weakness. While consistently pursuing the system of bloody terror and physical extirpation of the best Party cadres, the bourgeois and fascist governments at the same time spare no means to throw a network of spies and provocateurs over the revolutionary movement. In these circumstances, the most decisive task facing the sections of the Comintern is to raise revolutionary vigilance, and to educate, select and correctly distribute cadres in this spirit.

From the platform of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, Comrade Dimitrov, the comrade-in-arms of our great Stalin, called upon the Communist Parties to concentrate attention upon the problem of cadres.

Making his starting-point the experiences of Bolshevism, Comrade Dimitrov gave a detailed analysis of the correct policy in regard to cadres. He stressed the need for all the leading workers and organs of the Party really to know their people. He emphasised the tremendous importance of skilfully, correctly using cadres and of properly distributing them. Comrade Dimitrov spoke of the need for affording systematic assistance to cadres, for caring for cadres, and for being able to safeguard and preserve cadres. Comrade Dimitrov gave the following main criteria as a guide in selecting cadres:

"What should be our main criteria," says Comrade Dimitrov, in selecting cadres?

First, absolute devotion to the cause of the working class, loyalty to the Party, tested in face of the enemy—in battle, in prison, in court.

Second, the closest possible contact with the masses. The comrades concerned must be wholly absorbed in the interests of the masses, feel the life pulse of the masses, know their sentiments and requirements. The prestige of the leaders of our Party organisation should be based, first of all, on the fact that the masses regard them as their leaders, and are convinced through their own experience of their ability as leaders, and of their determination and self-sacrifice in struggle.

Third, ability independently to find one's bearings and not to be afraid of assuming responsibility in taking decisions. He who fears to take responsibility is not a leader. He who is unable to display initiative, who says: "I will do only what I am told," is not a Bolshevik. Only he is a real Bolshevik leader who does not lose his head at moments of defeat, who does not get a swelled head at moments of success, who displays indomitable firmness in carrying out decisions. Cadres develop and grow best when they are placed in the position of having to solve concrete problems of the struggle independently, and are aware that they are fully responsible for their decisions.

Fourth, discipline and Bolshevik hardening in the

struggle against the class enemy as well as in their irreconcilable opposition to all deviations from the Bolshevik line.

We must place all the more emphasis on these conditions which determine the correct selection of cadres, because in practice preference is very often given to a comrade who, for example, may be able to write well and be a good speaker but is not a man or woman of action, is not as suited for the struggle as some other comrade who perhaps may not be able to write or speak so well, but is a staunch comrade, possessing initiative and contact with the masses, and is capable of going into battle and leading others into battle. (Applause). Have there not been ever so many cases of sectarians, doctrinaires or moralisers crowding out loyal mass workers, genuine working class leaders?

Our leading cadres should combine the knowledge of what they must do—with Bolshevik stamina, revolutionary strength of character and the will power to carry it through.”\*

The basic links of the Party must have cadres who, as the experiences of the C.P.S.U. teach us, and as Comrade Dimitrov points out, are in the closest degree connected with the masses, live their lives in the interests of the workers, feel the pulse of the life of the masses, and their moods and requirements. Only such people should be promoted and selected; and it is in this spirit that the old active Party workers must be educated.

People must be tested in the course of their work and in battles; whether they are promoted to responsible work must depend upon how they have acquitted themselves in the practical daily work among the masses, in overcoming difficulties and particularly in acute moments of struggle. The best test of the Communist is his active struggle together with the masses and at the head of the masses in legal and illegal conditions, his behaviour during strikes, in mass action, in prison, and when on trial before the class court, etc. **THE BEST SCHOOL FOR TESTING, TRAINING AND EDUCATING THE ACTIVE COMMUNIST WORKER IS PRACTICAL WORK AND THE STRUGGLE!**

We have had cases recently of promotion in the Communist Parties which have given good results. We must boldly promote the rank and file party worker, who in class battles with the enemy has acquitted himself as a staunch and skilful fighter, to responsible leading work.

The new tactical line adopted by the Seventh Congress of the Communist International raises in a new way, in addition, the question of cadres. In his speech in reply to the discussion, Comrade Dimitrov said:

“The question of cadres is of particular urgency for the additional reason that under our influence the mass united front movement is gaining momentum and bringing forward many thousands of new working class militants.”

It is absolutely obvious that the united front

\* G. Dimitrov's Speech in Reply to the Discussion, delivered at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern.

movement raises new tasks before the Communist Party cadres. Is it not clear that, for instance, the active Communist worker must work in a different way in the united trade union organisation than he worked hitherto in the old Red trade union? In the united trade union he is compelled to use carefully-thought-out, convincing arguments and to show an example by his own behaviour, and thus to win the masses organised in trade unions to his side.

The broad application of the united front tactics in a new way demands the creation of a new type of active Communist Party worker. He is an active comrade who has a splendid knowledge of the moods and the attitude of the Social-Democratic workers to the burning questions of the daily struggle. He is a comrade who possesses the ability, by argument and advice offered in a comradely manner, to help the workers and functionaries trained in the spirit of reformism, to overcome their prejudices. He is an active worker who can successfully apply all methods of struggle for the daily demands of the working masses and who enjoys authority which goes far beyond the confines of his own Party organisation and is one whom the masses recognise as their leader.

At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Comrade Dimitrov raised the task most categorically before the Communist Parties working in conditions of fascist dictatorship, of working in the mass fascist organisations. Calling to mind the ancient tale of the capture of Troy, when the attacking army with the aid of the famous Trojan horse penetrated into the fortress of the enemy, Comrade Dimitrov said:

“We revolutionary workers, it appears to me, should not be shy about using the same tactics with regard to our fascist foe who is defending himself against the people with the help of the living wall of his cut-throats.” (See Dimitrov's Speech at Seventh Congress, Section II).

However, the application of these tactics demands special skill, special qualities from our active Party comrades. Meanwhile, it must be emphasised with all possible strength that very often our comrades mechanically repeat Dimitrov's words about the Trojan horse and carry on a poor fight for the operation of these tactics in their daily work. The active Communist working in the mass fascist organisations has to conduct his Bolshevik work to mobilise the masses by extensively using both the forms and possibilities created by the policy and activity of the enemy.

The ability to independently find one's bearings in any circumstances, and not to be afraid of assuming responsibility in taking decisions, is undoubtedly one of the most important qualities of the active Communist worker. We must con-

stantly inculcate this quality into each active Communist worker. But this quality assumes particularly great importance in fascist underground conditions, where contact with the higher Party organisations cannot always be reliable, and where this contact frequently breaks down completely.

It goes without saying that the entire complex of direct tasks connected with policy regarding cadres is different in countries where the working-class movement has been driven underground from that in countries where the movement is legal. The requirements of the concrete situation also demand cadres of a definite type.

The tactics of winning the broad masses for the revolutionary struggle now being pursued by the Communist Parties also raises all the inner Party questions in a new way. Masses of new workers and functionaries are finding the way to our Parties. People are coming to us who are far from having as yet outlived their old reformist ideas and views. We must draw them into the live work of our Party and teach them to think and act in Marxist-Leninist fashion. This, first and foremost, confronts the old cadres of our Party organisations with big tasks. These cadres must themselves reorganise their ranks and take themselves in hand.

New big tasks confront the Communist cadres.

The wider the mass policy pursued by the Communist Party, the firmer and better prepared from the Bolshevik standpoint must our Party cadres be.

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A constellation of real Bolsheviks, Leninists-Stalinists, has grown up in the parties of the Comintern.

The Communist Party cadres are learning and will continue to learn from the brilliant examples of Bolshevik struggle displayed by COMRADE DIMITROV, the best representative of the Stalinist guard in countries of capital.

They are acquiring revolutionary grit and self-sacrificing loyalty to the cause of the proletarian revolution, the cause of Communism, from the examples of the heroic struggle carried on by Comrades Thaelmann and Fan Chi-min, Rakoshi and Antikainen, Gramsci and Itsikava, Terraccini and Jonco Panov, from the examples of the struggle carried on by the Bolshevik cadres, trained by Lenin and Stalin.

For all the Communist Parties the question of cadres to-day is decisive. It is essential for us to know how to apply the theory and experience of the Bolsheviks to the requirements of the present stage of the international working-class movement. If we are to successfully solve this question we must make an unswerving study of the works of Lenin and Stalin.

## FOR THE CORRECT CARRYING OUT OF THE LINE OF THE SEVENTH CONGRESS

(Towards the Congress of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia.)

By K. GOTTWALD.

THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY COMRADE GOTTWALD IN THIS ARTICLE ARE OF IMPORTANCE FAR BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA; THEY ARE OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE. THE LESSONS FOR THE C.P. OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA CONTAINED IN THIS ARTICLE ARE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR ALL OTHER SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.  
—Editorial Board.

**I**N the German regions of Czecho-Slovakia, a SICKNESS CAUSED BY HUNGER, Pallagra, has made its appearance. According to official information, the number of unemployed in Czecho-Slovakia in the month of December, 1935, amounted to 800,000, i.e., considerably exceeded the figures for December, 1934. These two TRULY ALARMING FACTS speak more eloquently than whole volumes about the extremely serious position of the toiling people of Czecho-Slovakia and present a grave indictment of the existing régime. If to-day the parties in the government are talking about a "national catas-

trophe," they must be told quite clearly: you are responsible and it is a serious responsibility.

Stoupal, Beran and Vraný—the representatives of the ruling agrarian party — still continue to weave their secret intrigues by negotiating with the reactionaries from the opposition: Stribrny, Kramar, Henlein, and Hlinka. Once more the reactionary fascist bloc which originated in December of last year and was about to fall to pieces during the presidential elections, is beginning to take shape again, under the very noses of the Social-Democratic ministers. In the near future we may expect new attacks by fascist reaction, which is steadily striving to achieve its aims of seizing full power and gaining an opportunity of dealing severely with the whole of the working class movement. The efforts of the die-hard reactionaries and fascists inside and outside

of the government to set up fascist dictatorship in Czecho-Slovakia, are combined with their endeavours to change the course of the foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia, to break off relations with the U.S.S.R., and to establish contacts with fascist Berlin, in a word, to go over from the camp of peace to the camp of the warmongers.

It is these questions, chiefly, which are bringing the different groups of fascist reaction closer together, regardless of differences in nationality. From this angle it is easiest of all for the Czechish patriots, Kramar and Vrano, to come to agreement with their "eternal enemies," Henlein and Brandt, and for the "truly Slovene" Slovaks Hlinka and Sidor to come to terms with the Hungarian "Uriemberek" ("natural masters")—Count Esterházy and Shent-Iwány.

Pallagra in the Sudeta; increased unemployment throughout Czecho-Slovakia; the collecting and shaping of the forces of fascist reaction for a determined blow against all that is proletarian and progressive; the danger that Czecho-Slovakia will be drawn by fascist reaction into a war front under the leadership of Hitler—these are the serious facts and dangers which confront the toiling people of Czecho-Slovakia to-day. These are facts with which it is impossible to reconcile oneself. We must fight against this danger, and fight, moreover, at once, immediately, day in and day out. And in the process of this struggle we must set up a united front of all the workers and all their organisations without delay, and a broad people's front of all sections of the toiling population of town and village. The danger which menaces us can be averted only in this way; only in this way can we repulse the attacks of capital and fascist reaction, and create the pre-conditions for a mighty counter-offensive. And if all the toilers, irrespective of the parties to which they belong, are vitally interested in establishing united working class action and the broad people's fighting front to carry on the struggle against the offensive of capital, fascism and war, then it is clear that everything that hinders the realisation of this great work must be overcome and removed.

The Socialist Parties in the government are connected with the bourgeoisie. Instead of the class struggle they pursue a policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie. They sit side by side with the agrarians in a Cabinet, the Right reactionary wing of which is carrying on negotiations with arrant fascists like Stribrny and Henlein. These governmental socialist parties are in coalition with the reactionary bourgeoisie and stubbornly reject the united front with the Communists. Both inside and out of the government, they cover up, and give their support to the attacks of the bourgeoisie upon the toiling people in the social and econo-

mical spheres, and thus add grist to the mill of fascist reaction. They try to smother every attempt on the part of the masses to resist the attacks of the bourgeoisie. IN THIS, IN THE CLASS COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST PARTIES AND THE BOURGEOISIE IS A GREAT EVIL FOR THE TOILING PEOPLE. Why? Because it forces a considerable section of the working class to dance to the tune of the class enemy; because it splits the working class and sets one worker against another; because it demoralises and weakens the working class politically and ideologically; because it encourages strife between the working class and the toiling peasantry, and leads to the working class being isolated from the remaining sections of the toiling population. Consequently, class collaboration with the bourgeoisie is THE CHIEF STUMBLING-BLOCK in the way of united working class action and the establishment of a broad people's front of all sections of the toiling population UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT.

It is therefore the task of the Communists to see that the Socialist workers and their organisations, all honest elements in their parties, give up the policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie and come over to the class struggle. Only as this process is fulfilled will united working class action and the people's front develop, will resistance and fighting power grow in the struggle against the class enemy. And we must say in advance that here, mere agitation and propaganda of the united front are not enough. This agitation and propaganda must be combined with daily, JOINT ACTIONS between the Communist and Socialist organisations, and also other proletarian organisations such as the trade unions and co-operatives.

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The decisions of the Seventh World Congress gave the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, like all the other Sections of the Comintern, the basis for overcoming the split in the working class. The decisions of the Seventh Congress and Comrade Dimitrov's report provide the platform for mobilising millions. The influence of these decisions upon the toiling masses of Czecho-Slovakia was unusually great and considerably enlivened the united front movement. The Social Democratic workers welcomed the new orientation of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern; their confidence in the Communists has grown; their desire for united action has increased.

The first steps which the Party took along the road to correctly carrying out the new tactical line of the Congress were not bad. As far back as the Seventh Congress the delegation of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia concretely applied the decisions adopted to the conditions in Czecho-Slovakia in a politically correct fashion. The dele-

gation gave a fundamentally correct answer to the most important questions which are worrying the masses of Socialist workers—questions which the reactionary Social Democratic workers have abused above all else, in order to create confusion in the minds of the workers.

For years the Socialist leaders have been drumming it into the heads of the masses that the Communists pursue a policy of "risky adventure and catastrophe." "It is immaterial to them, the Communists, what régime is in power: democracy or fascism. Their principle is: the worse, the better."

Comrade Dimitrov himself gave a definitely clear reply to all calumnious inventions of this kind in the following words:

"We are not anarchists and it is not at all a matter of indifference to us what kind of political régime exists in any given country: whether a bourgeois dictatorship in the form of bourgeois democracy, even with democratic rights and liberties greatly curtailed, or a bourgeois dictatorship in its open, fascist form. Being upholders of Soviet democracy, WE SHALL DEFEND EVERY INCH OF THE DEMOCRATIC GAINS WHICH THE WORKING CLASS HAS WRESTED IN THE COURSE OF YEARS OF STUBBORN STRUGGLE, AND SHALL RESOLUTELY FIGHT TO EXTEND THESE GAINS."\*

And in complete agreement with these words of Comrade Dimitrov, the delegation of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia declared the following at the Congress:

"The whole world knows that we Communists are supporters of SOVIET democracy, the PROLETARIAN democracy which is the broadest while classes still exist, the democracy which most of all answers the interests of the toiling people. It is for this democracy that we are fighting. But if fascism encroaches upon BOURGEOIS democracy, invades the democratic rights extended to the toiling people and won by them at the cost of a serious struggle, we, of course, will stand in defence of these democratic rights. And if you want us to call this 'defence of democracy,' then let it be as you will. We shall not quarrel about names."

Day in and day out the Social Democratic leaders have persuaded their supporters in the ranks of the working class that the Communists are against the republic and the national independence of the Czechs. It is immaterial they have said, to the Communists, if Prague becomes a little provincial town in the Hitler "Third Empire."

And we answered this from the tribune of the Seventh Congress as follows:

"We desire that the republic where the bourgeoisie now hold sway should be a SOVIET republic, a SOCIALIST republic, where the toiling people hold sway. Such is our aim, and we are fighting for this. But if this BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATIC republic should be threatened by bloody fascism, then we shall defend this republic from fascism and we call on all real Socialists, Democrats and Republicans to establish a united fighting front so as to protect this republic from a tremendous disgrace, and the toiling people from a tremendous catastrophe, from bloody fascist dictatorship. And if we are decisively

\*The Working-class Against Fascism Speech in Reply to Discussion, by Georgi Dimitrov. Modern Books Ltd.

against handing over this republic to the Czech Hitler bands, then we are no less decisively determined against it falling under the whip of the German Hitlerites. In our struggle against both these groups, we will conclude an agreement with any one whatsoever in defence of the republic against fascists, within and without the country. However, my dear sirs, the republic must make it possible for us to do so. It must provide complete freedom to the peoples, it must give up persecuting the workers. It must give up imprisoning Communists and revolutionary workers. If the republic acts in the way it has done hitherto, it itself makes it impossible to secure its DEFENCE."

The Social Democratic leaders have constantly asserted that the policy pursued by the Communists on the National question plays into the hands of Hitler, Horthy and Pilsudsky.

To which we have replied, that YOUR policy (i.e., that of the Social Democratic leaders) of the national oppression of the non-Czech population is driving the latter into the arms of irredentism.\* And if there is anything that can create and strengthen a fraternal alliance between the peoples of Czecho-Slovakia, it is precisely the establishment of equal rights for all sections of the non-Czech population in all spheres, on social and economic questions, in the sphere of political rights, on questions of school education, languages, culture, etc. The Communists have declared hundreds of times that they are against uniting even one single little village with Hitler Germany, with Horthy's Hungary, or fascist Poland. And under conditions of complete and equal rights for all nationalities of Czecho-Slovakia, the recognition of the right to self-determination would only strengthen the fraternal alliance among the peoples of Czecho-Slovakia.

The reactionary leaders have frightened the Social-Democratic workers with the idea that the revolutionary programme and policy of the Communists is driving the peasantry and middle sections in the towns into the arms of fascism, while collaboration between the Socialists and Communists would still further increase this danger.

To which we have objected that the very opposite is the truth. It is precisely the policy of coalition between the Socialist Parties and the bourgeoisie which is pushing the peasantry and the middle sections of the population in the towns into the arms of the fascist demagogues. Why? Because the Socialists in the government cover up, support, and participate in, the attacks of the bourgeoisie against the toiling peasantry and the middle sections in the towns. Because the whole of the working class is thereby compromised in the eyes of the middle sections of the population. Because, on account of this, the middle sections

\*Irredentism—a movement for the separation of the non-Czechish territories and their affiliation in this case, to fascist countries.—Ed.

are losing their faith in the working class, are standing aloof from them, and easily fall victims to the influence of the first fascist adventurists that make their appearance. On the contrary, the establishment of united working class action and the joint struggle not only for the demands of the working class, but for the interests of the toiling peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, would afford an opportunity of bringing these sections over to the working class, and would lead to the establishment of a powerful people's front of all toilers against the handful of capitalist robbers. And then fascist demagoguery would lose its foothold.

The Socialist leaders finally stated the following: the Communists make it a condition for the united front that we resign from the government. But after us only the fascists can come to power. To this we replied as follows: If by your long years of coalition policy you have brought things to such a pass that the fascists are now on the threshold of taking power, this in itself is a sufficiently weighty proof of the ruinous character of your policy. However, we do not demand your resignation from the government as a condition for concluding the united front with you. But we want at least to fight with you for what you yourselves have promised, and are always promising, the people. That is the first point. And, secondly, the strength of the working class is not in ministerial benches in the bourgeois coalition government. On the contrary, their strength only gets lost there. How? Just think what a price the working class pay for having Socialists participating in the coalition governments of the bourgeoisie. To be tolerated in the government, the government Socialists are compelled to cover up, approve of, and take part in the attacks of the bourgeoisie against the toiling masses. They are compelled to prevent the working class from uniting for the struggle against capital, to prevent the working class from offering resistance to the attacks of capital and reaction. In other words, for the sake of a few ministerial posts — out of which, incidentally, the bourgeoisie will drive them at a moment's notice without any compunction—the Socialists in the government must hand over the working class, bound hand and foot, to the bourgeoisie. No, the strength of the working class is not in ministerial portfolios in the bourgeois coalition government, but in the factories, in the organisations of the toilers, in the localities, on the streets. The strength of the working class lies in the working class themselves. And if these forces are united and led in a broad front to battle, if the working class are freed from all the bonds which tie them to the bourgeoisie, if they conduct an independent class policy, they will shake to the

foundations the positions held by the bourgeoisie among other sections of the toilers as well, they will exert strong pressure upon the apparatus of the bourgeois government, so as not to give the bourgeoisie an opportunity of going over to a fascist dictatorship.

The Socialist workers have accepted our new united front policy with enthusiasm. A mighty wave of closer fraternal collaboration has arisen between the Communist and Socialist workers. Even before the Seventh Congress of the Comintern we had quite good contacts with the Social-Democratic workers and their organisations. After the Congress we have considerably increased the number of these contacts. We can say that the majority of our organisations have established contacts in one form or another with the corresponding Social-Democratic organisations. Many joint demonstrations, joint activities, and joint actions have been conducted in which, under the pressure brought to bear by the workers, some of the middle links of the Socialist Parties, and primarily the trade union organisations, willy-nilly took part. In a word, it appears that the decisions of the Seventh Congress and the appeal made by Comrade Dimitrov, have provided the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia with a powerful lever for mobilising the masses, for establishing united action, and increasing the fighting efficiency of the toiling people in the struggle against their class enemy.

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Five months have passed since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia is now on the eve of its Seventh Congress, which will be of great importance for the further development of the working class movement in Czecho-Slovakia. In the centre of the work of the Congress will be the question of how to bring about united working class action, trade union unity, and the people's front of all sections of the toilers, in Czecho-Slovakia. From this point of view, the policy of the Party for the last few months must be examined and tested, so that in the interest of united action and raising the fighting ability of the proletariat we may reveal and remove all the weak sides and mistakes which hinder the establishment of united action.

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In his report at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Comrade Dimitrov said:

"We want our Parties in the capitalist countries to come out and act as real POLITICAL PARTIES of the working class, to become in actual fact a POLITICAL FACTOR in the life of their countries, to pursue at all times an ACTIVE BOLSHEVIK MASS POLICY, and not to confine themselves to PROPAGANDA AND CRITICISM, AND BARE APPEALS TO STRUGGLE FOR PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP."

In the same speech Comrade Dimitrov further said:

"We want them (i.e., the Communist Parties—K.G.) as quickly as possible to learn how to SAIL ON THE TURBULENT WATERS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE, and not to remain on the shores as observers and registrars of the surging waves in the expectation of fine weather."

Consequently, the Communists must not be a sect of propagandists, but a POLITICAL factor, and nothing must escape their attention. They must actively interfere in all political problems in their own country, and seek to secure their solution in the interests of the toiling people. Therefore, the Party behaved CORRECTLY in NOT declaring, on Hodza's advent to power that: "Until the dictatorship of the proletariat is established, we are not interested in who stands at the head of the government: Hodza or Malypetr; it is immaterial to us." Therefore, the Party was right in NOT adopting the following position when the budget was being debated: "This or any other budget is all the same; we are not interested in what budget the capitalist government will pass." Therefore, the Party was right in NOT declaring, in connection with the Presidential elections: "It's all the same to us who becomes President, Benes or Nemetz." Therefore, the Party acted correctly in NOT declaring that: "The foreign policy of the capitalist government is of no interest to us, it is all the same to us what course capitalist Czecho-Slovakia steers in its foreign policy: towards Berlin or Moscow." The Communist Party was and is correct when it "does not limit itself" on all these and similar questions, "to a bare appeal to struggle for the proletarian dictatorship," but strives to adopt a CONCRETE position on each individual political question, and to propose a CONCRETE solution of it. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, the leadership of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia left out of account one old truth, namely: for the proletariat to influence the solution of one political question or another in their own spirit, they must operate primarily, and mainly by means of INDEPENDENT MASS ACTION FROM BELOW IN THE FACTORIES, IN THE ORGANISATIONS, ON THE STREETS. The Party leadership has asked, implored, invoked and warned everybody possible—deputies, ministers, the government, and the executive committees of the various parties. The Party leadership has done its utmost to persuade Hampel, the Czech and Benes. It has done its utmost to prove to them the good intentions of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia in the joint struggle against reactions and fascism. And the leadership forgot just one thing; namely, the masses; it forgot the fact that the masses must be appealed to, must be organised and led into independent action from below, the fact that these

mass activities make a bigger impression upon all these gentlemen, who sit at the top, than all the most eloquent efforts at persuasion and arguments.

In short, the Party leadership at times SUBSTITUTED parliamentary combinations in place of the mobilisation of and action by the masses. This has nothing in common with the "active Bolshevik mass policy," of which Comrade Dimitrov spoke. And as a result, the Party is not becoming a "political factor in the life of its country" as the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and the interests of the toiling people demand, but on the contrary is subjectively, without wanting to do so, facilitating the conduct of the policy of the class enemy, as was revealed, for example, in the fact that our Parliamentary faction voted for two articles in the State Budget (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and social insurance).

This vote was a political mistake. And not because it is a political mistake in GENERAL to vote for any measures of a bourgeois government. For an occasion may arise when a bourgeois government, under strong pressure from a powerful mass movement, may be forced to propose some measure which corresponds with the interests of the toiling people, the interests of the anti-fascist struggle and to which all reactionaries and fascists are opposed. In that case, the Communists, basing themselves upon the mass movement which is demanding that such a measure be adopted, would vote for it. However, there was nothing of this kind when the State Budget was voted in the Czech Parliament. In the draft it brought in, the government did not take account of a single demand of the toiling masses in the spirit of the slogan, "make the rich pay." The government did not take a single step against the fascists, not a single step to extend democratic rights, on the contrary, it negotiated and is still negotiating with fascist reaction, and is moving further and further to the right. And by voting for the articles in the budget they proposed, we ourselves have expressed our confidence in SUCH a government. And what is this but tying our own hands, giving up independence in policy, and misleading and confusing the masses?

All the danger of this policy of resorting to parliamentary combinations in place of the independent mobilisation of, and action by, the masses, is still more sharply revealed if looked at from the following angle: the reactionary leaders of the Socialist Parties in the government base their policy of class-collaboration with the bourgeoisie on the following piece of deception:

"All the former methods of class struggle—strikes, demonstrations, actions on the streets, etc.—are behind the times. We have invented much more convenient

methods of class struggle. Workers, only try your hardest to get as many votes as possible for us at parliamentary elections, then we shall have a large number of ministers, and they will conduct the "class struggle" for you up there, in the Council of Ministers. And you keep calm, and don't get alarmed, don't let yourselves be dragged into "irresponsible actions" like demonstrations and strikes. We, up there at the top, will settle everything for you so that you will not have to exert yourselves or take any risks."

As we know, the working class has had to pay, and is still paying, dearly for this sort of policy. And not only because capital and reaction always gain their own ends at the expense of the toilers when the "class struggle" is conducted in this way, but also because this policy blunts the class-consciousness of the working masses and deprives them of their fighting ability. Obviously the working class should and must use all the positions at its disposal in parliament, in the local government bodies, etc. However, the source of power of the representatives of the working class in such and similar bodies lies in the working class itself, in its organisations, in its competence, in its will to fight actually for the demands it puts forward. Unless the masses are mobilised from below, even the best, even the most honest, representatives of the working class in bourgeois bodies will find themselves powerless. Therefore, in the interests of the whole of the working class, the Communists must not allow the appearance in their policy of even a shade of the shameful tendency to lull the masses with illusions to the effect that anything can be obtained for them "from above," without their own independent interference, without their own class struggle.

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Is the Party right, in view of the menace of fascism in having called for, and still calling for, the establishment of an anti-fascist people's front of all anti-fascists, in clearly declaring itself in favour of defending democracy against fascism? It is absolutely correct! Is the Party right, in view of the danger that Hitler Germany may attack Czecho-Slovakia, in having clearly declared itself in favour, and still declaring in favour to-day, of defending the republic from foreign fascism? It is absolutely correct? There is not the slightest doubt that this viewpoint has brought us closer to the Social-Democratic workers and made it easier for us to establish unity of action.

But what does it mean—to defend democracy from fascism; what does it mean—to fight to prevent the establishment of a fascist dictatorship? Of course, we must concentrate our fire against those reactionary groups of the bourgeoisie who are openly striving to bring about a fascist dictatorship, i.e., against all the Kramars, Strirny, Stoupals, Henleins. Of course, we must do every-

thing to secure that the influence of these openly fascist groupings does not grow any stronger, but declines. This, however, can only be achieved on condition that we fight energetically and determinedly against all those measures, all those steps, adopted by the PRESENT government, which are objectively favourable to fascist reaction and pave the way for fascism. This is what we must explain to the masses of Socialist workers: every attack made by the present coalition government, in which representatives of your Party take part, against the standard of living of the toiling population, every step taken by this government in the direction of restricting the democratic rights of the masses of the population, such as the maintenance of the censorship, prohibition against working-class organisations, persecution of working-class functionaries, etc., etc.—every blow of this kind weakens the anti-fascist front and helps Stribrny, Henlein and Co. All the more essential then is the joint struggle of all workers and all toilers against such measures adopted by the PRESENT government. And the Party must organise this struggle and guide it. Moreover, this must be a CONCRETE, PRACTICAL AND A DAILY struggle for the CONCRETE, PRACTICAL, DAILY rights and demands of the toiling population of town and village.

If we really conduct such a struggle, nobody can form the impression that in advancing the slogan of the defence of democracy against fascism, the Communists have revised their views in principle concerning bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois state, and have adopted a policy "acceptable to the state" in the spirit of Social Democracy. And yet it is inevitable that such an impression was bound to be formed in Czechoslovakia. Although the Party has said much about defence of democracy and the republic against fascism, it has far less taken account of the poverty, the hunger, the absence of liberties, all the calamities which have befallen the toiling people already under the PRESENT democracy and in the PRESENT republic. Of course, under fascist dictatorship the toilers are subjected to far harder trials. That is true. But it on no account follows that we can reconcile ourselves to the present misfortunes and blows; the more so since to do so would immediately be the signal for yet heavier blows. It goes without saying that our Party has never anywhere said anything about such reconciliation. But the fact that it has neglected the CONCRETE struggle for the CONCRETE rights and demands of the people against the PRESENT régime, puts it in a position dangerously close to that régime in the eyes of the masses. The point is not that we apparently do not put forward any demands to the present government. It is not that which is

important. Demands have been and are being put forward to a sufficient degree. But where we have frequently been found wanting is IN ORGANISING THE MASS STRUGGLE to achieve the fulfilment of the demands put forward. Here there has been revealed a certain tendency to evade a sharp conflict with the existing régime, not to create any difficulties for the régime, not to sharpen the situation—and all this was alleged to be in the interests of the struggle against fascism. Why, such a strange theory as that about “mitigating the tense class relations” came to the surface. For example, in the *Plamen*, No. 2 of 1935, among other monstrous assertions in an article we read the following:

“Can the class struggle be stopped in capitalist countries? Never. Can we mitigate the strained relations between the classes? We can. If the toiling class will only act unanimously on behalf of their demands. That is, as a result of a retreat by the bourgeoisie.”

The author forgets that the bourgeoisie will retreat only if COMPELLED to do so. He has also forgotten the circumstance that the united proletariat can force the bourgeoisie to retreat only by INTENSIFYING THE CLASS STRUGGLE. Neither does the author understand that when the bourgeoisie have been compelled to retreat, they do not let things rest there, but after regrouping their forces, resort to ever new attacks; and if the proletariat want to consolidate their gains and secure still more from the bourgeoisie, they must never let their forces become scattered, but on the contrary must prepare for further, still more difficult struggles. It does not occur to the author that all this inevitably INCREASES THE TENSITY OF THE CLASS RELATIONS. On the contrary, he talks about the “mitigation” of class relations. What other political idea can this “theory” contain but the naïve proposal to the present government to afford an opportunity for compromise to be arrived at between them and us by means of a “reasonable” policy? Is there, then, anything surprising in the fact that the masses, through their healthy class instinct, have sensed “loyal opposition” behind all this devilish stuff. Is it surprising that the impression has been created that on the question of bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois state, the Communists have given up their viewpoint in principle and have adopted the platform of Social Democracy? Is it surprising that this has misled the masses and hindered the establishment of united action? And consequently, just the opposite has happened to that which the Party has subjectively been trying to achieve.

Probably even more confusion must have been created in the minds of the workers by some statements made by various Party organs on the

question of the army and armaments. The Party, obviously, was right when it interfered in affairs concerning the army. In just the same way it was and remains correct for the Party to put forward a number of concrete demands aiming at the democratisation of the army, and which would make it difficult for the fascists to use the army in their own interests. The proletariat are in the greatest degree interested in seeing that in the struggles against fascism, the army is not on the side of the fascists, but on the side of their enemies. It would be short-sighted and a fatal mistake on the part of the working class, not to be interested in what is taking place in the army. Thus, the Party was absolutely correct when it demanded that measures be adopted to democratise the army, and when it fought to prevent the army from becoming a hotbed of reaction and fascism. However, it was entirely wrong and impermissible from the proletarian point of view, to approve the policy of armaments pursued by the present government, and even to call for an increase in these armaments. And yet, this is what actually took place:

“Not a single honest toiling man in the republic is against the army and against armaments to-day! The army must be given the best, and we must have armaments! We will all take up arms against fascism that menaces us. And we want these arms to be in as great a quantity as possible, and that they should be the best possible!

“In the War Commission, the Minister of National Defence proposed a programme of material demands for supplies to the army. His demands were great, but they are essential. And were it not for the profits that the offspring of the wealthy put into their pockets . . . the army would have, instead of one gun, supplied by Czech patriotic munitions manufacturers, two, instead of one aeroplane—two, instead of one machine-gun—two . . .

“We must all be prepared to sacrifice for the sake of the army. Sacrifices are made by workers, handicraftsmen, peasants, civil servants, and officials. They also sacrifice their lives in battle, But they want to be sure that nobody will pocket hundreds of millions gained at the expense of the heavy sacrifices they make.”

Anyone who has not seen this with his own eyes, will find it difficult to believe that such things could be printed in a Communist newspaper. And yet, this is exactly the case. Take the “Rude Pravo,” the Central Organ of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia for November 27, 1935, and you will find it there, written by a man who is obviously alien and hostile to the proletariat and the Party. True, there have been no other similarly monstrous distortions of the class principles of the Party in any other Party utterances. But the fact that after such an unheard-of business, the culprit was not immediately swept out of the Party with an iron broom, as an agent of the class enemy, shows that there

was no clear, consistent, Bolshevik line in the Party on the question of the army.

Comrades apparently have forgotten one of the most important questions, namely, the CLASS CHARACTER OF THE ARMY. They have forgotten that the question of the class character of the army is determined by the point as to which class holds the reins of POWER; that the BOURGEOIS army remains a weapon of oppression in the hands of the bourgeoisie even when a non-fascist, bourgeois government is in power, and even if Socialists are members of this government, and therefore the working class CANNOT APPROVE the allocation of funds and armaments to such an army and such a government—otherwise they betray their own class interests. Instead of patiently explaining all this to the workers, the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia committed the unheard-of act quoted above.

In this particular case, our comrades obviously fell victims to the agitation of the enemy who had been shouting in every key: "If the Communists really and truly are in favour of the republic, then they must vote for the war budget as well. How else can we defend the republic?" At first sight this may seem logical. But that is only at first sight. Actually things are quite different.

The toiling population of Czecho-Slovakia want to defend their country against Hitler and other fascists abroad. In this respect can they rely upon the bourgeoisie? Undoubtedly not. We shall not speak of the German and Hungarian bourgeoisie, whose friendly relations with Hitler and Horthy are sufficiently well-known. But what about the Czech and Slovene bourgeoisie? Are not all these Kramars, Stribrnys, Stoupals and Hlinkas now conspiring with Henlein, flirting with Berlin? Are there no strong reactionary currents in the present government, in favour of creating a broad reactionary bloc which, on coming to power, would pursue a home and foreign policy which suits Kramars, i.e., a course leading to Berlin? By pursuing their policy of class co-operation, by constantly capitulating to reaction, and rejecting the united front, do not the Socialist Parties in the government add grist to the mill of these reactionary strivings? And is it not true that in consequence of this the danger already exists that those who to-day are shouting louder than anybody else about defending the republic, will, one fine day, sell this republic, lock, stock and barrel, including the army, to Hitler Berlin? How can the toiling people resist this danger? Obviously only by mustering all their forces in an anti-fascist people's front, by setting this front against the forces of the ruling bourgeoisie, by isolating the latter from the people and depriving

them of the opportunity of using the armed forces of the country against the interests of the people. Obviously only by LAUNCHING THE CLASS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE BOURGEOISIE. In these circumstances what is the meaning of a vote in favour of the war budget of the present government? It means a vote of confidence in the government, the rejection of the class struggle and, finally, even to hand over the fate of the national independence of the country to people who are clearly not fit for it.

Consequently, precisely because we really want to defend the republic from fascism at home and abroad, we shall not vote in favour of giving war credits to the present government and the ruling bourgeoisie, because we know that in the HANDS OF THE BOURGEOISIE these funds can always be used not only against the class interests, but also against the national interests of the toiling people. PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON we tell the workers and all the toiling people, that the struggle against alien fascism can also virtually be only the class struggle against the bourgeoisie "at home." And a COMPONENT part of this class struggle against one's own bourgeoisie is the struggle to democratise the army, to secure the destruction therein of all the nests of fascism, to give the soldiers all civil rights, to imbue the spirit of the anti-fascist struggle into the main units of the army, so as to prevent the fascists using the army in the interests of their own and foreign adventurists.

Perhaps some comrades, in determining their attitude towards the government, towards the bourgeois state and the army were embarrassed by the present relations between Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has now concluded a mutual assistance pact with Czecho-Slovakia. But does this in any way alter the relations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in Czecho-Slovakia? Not a wit! The interests of the Soviet proletariat are the same as those of the entire international proletariat. However, the forms and methods of defending these interests may be DIFFERENT. This is to be explained by the fact that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. act and speak as a RULING class, while the proletariat of all other countries do so as an OPPRESSED class. In the given case the government of the Soviet Union has signed an agreement with the ruling bourgeoisie of Czecho-Slovakia for the purpose of prolonging peace. This wholly corresponds to the interests of the toiling people of all countries. But the OPPRESSED PROLETARIAT of Czecho-Slovakia have not concluded ANY AGREEMENT on civil peace with the RULING BOURGEOISIE of Czecho-Slovakia. And the ruling bourgeoisie of Czecho-Slovakia has not concluded any sort of agreement with the proletariat that it will not use the army against the

proletariat. The Czech proletariat, as hitherto, are still interested in throwing off the yoke of capitalism as quickly as possible, just as the bourgeoisie as hitherto are interested in enslaving, exploiting and oppressing the proletariat of Czecho-Slovakia. Hence it follows that the class relations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of Czecho-Slovakia DO NOT CHANGE in consequence of the agreement concluded between the Czech bourgeois government and the U.S.S.R.

This, obviously, applies to the ARMY as well. Those who say "Our," i.e., the Czech army is now an ally of the Red Army, therefore you must vote for war credits, simplify the question too much. No, things are not quite so simple.

The toiling people can entrust the army only to such a government as is a REAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE. But is the present coalition government in Czecho-Slovakia such a government? Not by any means; the whole world knows that. And therefore, everything is not all in good order as regards this "friendship" with the Red Army. Let us take just one example. The fact that General Wojchechovsky, a former active Kolchak officer, is the Governor-General of Bohemia, is convincing proof of the fact that the Czech army is not led and managed in the interests of the people. At the same time, this fact proves convincingly that the Czech army is not "our" army, i.e., not the army of the toiling people. It is quite another thing when our efforts result in this army REALLY becoming our army, the army of the toiling people, the REAL ALLY of the Red Army. Look at the Soviet Union and you will see what the toiling people can do, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, with their own armed forces. And as for you, gentlemen, we shall leave the old slogan in force: "Not a man, not a penny!"

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The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia was and remains quite correct when, in declaring quite definitely and proving by a number of political deeds, its preparedness to establish UNITY of action against fascism and against capital, with the Socialist Parties AS A WHOLE, i.e., including the leading bodies. The Party was right in constantly and unendingly explaining to the workers the tremendous force which UNITED ACTION between the three Socialist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia together with the Communist Party would constitute; how much the fighting ability of the whole of the working class would grow if other organisations as well, and first and foremost the TRADE UNIONS, were to join forces on a class basis; what a magnetic force the proletariat, united in joint action, would be for the masses and the peasantry and the middle sections of the town, and their

organisations, it thus becoming possible to arouse the overwhelming majority of the people against fascism and reaction, i.e., to thereby create a BROAD PEOPLE'S FRONT. The Party was absolutely right in showing the toiling masses this way out of the deadlock into which the toiling people had been driven by the policy of class collaboration pursued by the government Socialists and by constant capitulation to reaction.

Where, however, did the lapse occur? When our comrades began to forget that all this—united working class action, trade union unity and the people's front—can only be achieved by overcoming numerous difficulties. And that they can only be attained in the course of stubborn, tense, hard, prolonged struggle. The lapse began when our comrades began to accept their desires as the reality, when they began to imagine that things would move faster if we retreat in the face of difficulties, taking the line of least resistance. Let us give a few examples.

What is it that most of all hinders the establishment of united working class action? The policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie. It is precisely in consequence of this policy that the ranks of the proletariat are split. And the working class must be freed from this poison if they are to become united and strong. The resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on the report delivered by Comrade Dimitrov quite justly emphasises the following point:

5. "Joint action with the Social-Democratic Parties and organisations not only does not preclude, but, on the contrary, RENDERS STILL MORE NECESSARY the serious and well-founded criticism of reformism, of Social-Democracy as the ideology and practice of class-collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and the patient exposition of the principles and programme of Communism to the Social-Democratic workers."\*

The leaders of the government Socialists in Czecho-Slovakia qualified our new tactical line as capitulation to Social-Democracy, AND AS GOING OVER TO ITS POSITION. At first this was not clear to the Social-Democratic workers also. For the Communists talk about defending democracy and the republic against fascists at home and abroad. Is this not the same as is done by the Social-Democratic Parties which participate in the government? There is no doubt that a section of the Social-Democratic workers asked themselves this question? And instead of patiently explaining to these workers, over and over again, and proving day after day, on the basis of concrete examples, that the policy of their party, the policy of class-collaboration with the bourgeoisie, paves the way for fascism at home and abroad, even though the leaders of these parties swear a dozen times a day that they "will defend democracy and the republic"

\* See C.I., No. 17/18.

lic"; instead of showing absolutely clearly to these honest Social-Democratic workers, that the only salvation from fascism, both at home and abroad, lies in consistent class struggle against their own bourgeoisie (something the very opposite to what their parties have been doing up to now); instead of this, we actually weakened our criticism of the Social-Democratic Parties on these fundamental questions. It became a favourite expression to declare that "We won't emphasise what divides us, but what brings us together." I agree that we must put forward all that can bring us closer together, but at the same time we must also say "Let us get rid of all that prevents us coming closer together!" And class-collaboration with the bourgeoisie hinders us. And the less workers listen to the preachers of this harmful doctrine of class-collaboration, the sooner and the closer will we come together. However, we have often forgotten this point. The government Socialists furiously attacked us on questions of principle. We defended ourselves poorly; and on a number of questions of principle, as already indicated above, we retreated before Social-Democratic ideology. Consequently, we again behaved in exactly the opposite way to that which the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and the interests of the toilers of Czecho-Slovakia demanded of us.

We must not regard the process of establishing unity of action in a schematic manner, i.e., we must not imagine that the Social-Democratic Parties in their entirety will suddenly adopt the platform of the united front. It is a question of explaining the altering outlook inside Social-Democracy; of the struggle of the Social-Democratic workers who are coming closer to the revolution, against the reactionary elements of Social-Democracy; against their reactionary policy. And the Communists must help the Social-Democratic workers in this struggle. How? We are told this in the resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on the report delivered by Comrade Dimitrov:

"While revealing to the masses the meaning of the demagogic arguments advanced by the Right Social-Democratic leaders against the united front, WHILE INTENSIFYING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REACTIONARY SECTION of Social-Democracy, the Communists must establish the closest co-operation with those Left Social-Democratic workers, functionaries and ORGANISATIONS THAT FIGHT AGAINST THE REFORMIST POLICY AND ADVOCATE A UNITED FRONT WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTY. The more we intensify our fight against the reactionary camp of Social Democracy, which is participating in a bloc with the bourgeoisie, the more effective will be the assistance we give to that part of Social Democracy which is becoming revolutionised."\*

And what has been the practice in Czecho-

Slovakia of late? Our comrades simply invented such "Left" Social-Democratic leaders. BECHYNE once declared frankly that he was against the united front with the Communists and in favour of a united front with the employers. Bechyně undoubtedly is a real reactionary. But then HAMPFEL once said somewhere that "the perspectives of setting up working class unity have improved," and that seems to have been enough for our Czech comrades to convert Hampel into a Left, not in the least embarrassed by the fact that Hampel never at any time moved a finger to do anything to bring about the united front. Our comrades converted Hampel into a Left, although this "Left," on the question as to why, as a matter of fact, the perspectives for achieving unity among the workers had improved, gave the ambiguous reply that the policy of the Communists had gone bankrupt, and the policy of Social-Democracy had justified itself, and so, by virtue of this, the conditions have arisen for uniting the working class on the platform of "constructive socialism." In that case, probably all the leadership of Social-Democracy can be included among the "Lefts." And it is naive tricks like this, of artificially decking out Rights as Lefts, that have been performed by a number of our editors as regards a number of other leading government Socialists like, for instance, Tucny, Necas and others.

But are there no REAL Lefts in the ranks of any of the Social-Democratic Parties which take part in the government? Of course there are many, tens of thousands. There are the functionaries from among the workers, the dissatisfied intellectuals and hundreds of local organisations. It is on these truly Left forces advancing towards the revolution inside the Socialist Parties, that the Communists must concentrate their attention, help them to form a strong Left wing, and conduct a fight against the incorrigible arrant reactionaries, the assistants of the bourgeoisie and enemies of the united front who adopt an attitude towards the members of their organisations, and who rule the roost in their own parties, as a bailiff does on the estate he manages. But what help do we give to the real Lefts, when our Party members artificially convert Right reactionaries into Left fighters, convert devils into angels? And really, this must mislead the Left Social-Democratic workers and officials, must lead them astray and facilitate the manoeuvres of the reactionary demagogues who can easily come to the indignant members of their organisations and say: you see, am I so bad after all? Even the Communists are compelled to admit that I am a Left.

The artificial creation of "Lefts" where there are none, the inability to aim at winning the real

\* C.I. No. 17/18, 1935.

rank and file Lefts, is all obviously connected with the view point that mere agitation, bare appeals to those at the top, are sufficient for the establishment of united action. This is a profound mistake. How many times have we argued with Hampel, have we tried to persuade him and others like him, how many times have we implored and pleaded with them? We have tried to persuade Hampel in every possible way. But he remained stubborn as a mule. All right, go on persuading Hampel, but do not forget the most important thing, namely: **THE NEED TO AROUSE THE MASSES OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORKERS AND ORGANISATIONS, TO CALL UPON THEM TO ESTABLISH UNITED ACTION, TO ORGANISE THEM AND LEAD THEM.** Of course, we want Hampel, i.e., the leadership of Social-Democracy, to set up unity of action with us. And obviously we appeal to the Social-Democratic workers and their organisations to demand of the leaders of their parties that they conduct a joint struggle with us for the common demands of the toilers against the bourgeoisie. But what are we to do if Hampel refuses to agree? If he likes the society of the Vranys and Stoupsals better than that of the Communists? If for the sake of this company of reactionaries he relinquishes one position of the proletariat after another, encourages one attack after another against the working class? If he derives little instruction from the example of his colleagues Wels and Bauer? What are we to do then? Wait until Hampel sees reason? It may cost a great deal if we wait. Well, then, we shall have to act without the Hampels for the time being, to set up a united front without them, to bring about united action against the bourgeoisie without them and against their will. And if these Hampels can be persuaded in any way by anything at all, it is precisely by means of the workers themselves, the members of their parties, their officials, their organisations, confronting the Hampels with the accomplished fact. In the resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on the report delivered by Comrade Dimitrov we find the following:

"2. Without for a moment giving up their independent work in the sphere of Communist education, organisation and mobilisation of the masses, the Communists, in order to render the road to unity of action easier for the workers, must strive to secure joint action with the social-democratic parties, reformist trade unions and other organisations of the toilers against the class enemies of the proletariat, on the basis of short or long-term agreements. At the same time, attention must be directed mainly to the development of mass action in the various localities conducted by the lower organisations through local agreements."\*

What is the position in Czecho-Slovakia? We have several times made proposals to the Social-Democratic Parties and trade unions to conclude

an agreement for joint struggle, and each time we have met with refusal. However, this does not confuse us. We shall make similar proposals to them again and again. If we conclude an agreement, we shall observe it. However, in actual practice we have often conducted ourselves **AS THOUGH WE ALREADY HAD AN AGREEMENT FOR JOINT STRUGGLE** with the leading organs of the Social-Democratic Parties, instead of saying the following to the Social-Democratic workers and organisations: there is nothing to be done, your leading bodies do not want to; you will have to begin yourselves. Instead of this, a number of our comrades began to invent things as follows: "and what if the Social-Democratic leadership consider it disloyal action on our part? Won't they say that we are simply manoeuvring and that our proposals are not sincere? And will they agree in the future to negotiate with us if to-day we appeal direct to their organisations?" As a result the following position arose: the leaders of the government Socialists knocked us over the head, and our people hadn't the courage to tread on their corns, out of the mistaken view that the united front will be set up more quickly by showing a spirit of accommodation. We are determinedly against beginning with abuses and quarrelling. However, we cannot reply to the insolent sallies of the leaders of the government Socialists against the united front with sighs and expression of regret, but must reply by fighting still more energetically for the establishment of the united front together with the Social-Democratic workers and organisations, and still more strongly organise joint action with them.

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In his concluding speech at the Seventh Congress, Comrade Dimitrov said:

"There are wisecracks, who will sense in all this (in the new tactical line of the Comintern—G.) a digression from our basic positions, some sort of turn to the Right of the straight line of Bolshevism. Well, in my country, Bulgaria, they say that a hungry chicken always dreams of millet (Laughter, stormy applause).

"Let those political chickens think so. (Laughter, stormy applause).

"This interests us little. For us it is important that our own parties and the broad masses of the whole world should correctly understand what we are striving for." ("The Working Class Against Fascism," G. Dimitrov).

And if now, five months after the Seventh Congress, we examine how correctly the leaders of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia have been able to understand and apply the new line of the Seventh Congress, we are compelled to admit that in its hunt after easy, rapid successes, it has incorrectly and in an opportunist fashion interpreted and applied this line. Only during the last few weeks have there been certain improve-

\* C.I., No. 17/18, 1935.

ments and a new, fighting spirit can be felt in the policy of the Party. However, the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will have to draw the necessary conclusions from the preceding period of opportunist policy: let the Party see wherein lie the roots of the mistakes, so that it can in the future avoid any repetition of these mistakes.

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Many Party members will very likely ask themselves the question: how could it happen that such gross distortions of the Party line made their appearance in the operation of the Party policy. There are many causes for this. However, the chief reason is that our Party lacked, and still lacks, **REVOLUTIONARY VIGILANCE**. There is an absence of revolutionary vigilance in relation to the Party line, the purity of Party policy, and also in relation to its attitude towards the people who have to operate the policy of the Party, namely, **THE PARTY CADRES**. There is a lack of revolutionary vigilance both in the **CENTRAL COMMITTEE** and in the **LOCAL PARTY ORGANISATIONS**.

Opportunist mistakes do not manifest themselves immediately so that a blind man can distinguish them. It is frequently difficult to recognise them in the beginning. Truly Bolshevik, revolutionary vigilance is required to do so. But with us, after all, it was not a question of newly manifested small slips, but of opportunist mistakes which were a mote in the eye of the Communist Party. Take, for instance, the disgraceful article in the *Rude Pravo*, we have mentioned, calling for increased armaments in Czecho-Slovakia, the constant disgusting obsequiousness and compliments to Hampel, Necas and others, who are artificially decked out as "Lefts," the voting for two articles in the Budget proposed by the government, and all the nonsense and blather about "mitigating the tensity of class relations," etc. Would the Party leadership have tolerated and abetted in all this if it had possessed revolutionary vigilance? Would it not, had such vigilance existed, have sounded the alarm in time, and seriously taken up the task of searching out the source of all this opportunist impurity? And if our organisations, our Party members were vigilant in a revolutionary fashion, could they have tolerated for so long these opportunist distortions of the line of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on such important questions? Of course, any opportunist tendencies in the Party would have been strangled at birth, if the leadership and the whole of the Party had displayed sufficient revolutionary vigilance. For in the main the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia is healthy, relatively steeled, possesses big experiences of struggle against opportunism, and

knows how to deal with opportunists. However, the indifferent attitude and inattention to individual unhealthy phenomena in the Party policy facilitated the parasitic growth of opportunism. We usually begin to shout when the house is already on fire. But when the sparks of the fire are only glowing, we do not notice them.

Revolutionary vigilance in respect to the Party policy must not be separated from revolutionary vigilance **IN RESPECT TO PARTY FORCES**. The Party pursues its policy not by letting things take their own course. People operate this policy. How the policy is operated, where it leads the Party, all depends, in the long run, upon people, upon cadres. Let us call to mind the great words of Comrade Stalin: "Cadres decide everything." Without doubt these words of Stalin have been repeated in our Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia as well. But it never entered our heads to draw the proper conclusions from them, to apply them to our own practical work. A type of an individual like Budin sat at the head of the editorial board of the central organ of our Party. He committed one outrage after another. People got angry with him, they argued with him, they reprimanded him, and yet he was left at the head of the editorial board. And he continued to carry on in the good old way. It was only when an intolerable stench arose that the Party leadership took a closer interest in the work of Budin, and after a careful investigation became convinced that here was a case of downright wrecking by an individual who was alien and hostile to the Party. And only then was an end put to this business. But how much harm has this Budin caused the Party! And this is only one of the examples, a clear example, of the fact that in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia there was no vigilant attitude towards cadres, that the leadership tolerated the presence of incompetent, foreign elements in responsible positions.

A policy of systematically educating cadres and adopting a careful attitude towards good and loyal Party forces, has not been pursued and is still not pursued in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. It was not for nothing that in his concluding speech on the report at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Comrade Dimitrov devoted so much space to the question of cadres. Comrade Dimitrov pointed out that a correct policy as regards Party cadres should answer the following conditions: firstly, it is essential to **KNOW PEOPLE**. Secondly, we must know how to **SELECT AND ADVANCE CADRES CORRECTLY**. Thirdly, we must make **SKILFUL USE OF CADRES**. Fourthly, **THE CADRES MUST BE CORRECTLY PLACED**. Fifthly, **SYSTEMATIC ASSISTANCE MUST BE GIVEN TO CADRES**. Sixthly, **CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO PRESERVE CADRES**.

Comrade Dimitrov also gave a detailed indication as to WHICH cadres should be trained by the Party, WHAT the Party should take account of in selecting cadres, and what qualities should be made use of and developed in cadres.

Firstly: PROFOUND DEVOTION to the cause of the working class, LOYALTY to the Party, tested in battles, in face of the class enemy. Secondly: THE CLOSEST LINKS with the masses. Thirdly: THE ABILITY TO FIND ONE'S BEARINGS INDEPENDENTLY IN ANY SITUATION AND NOT TO BE AFRAID OF TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISIONS ADOPTED. Fourthly: A SENSE OF DISCIPLINE AND BOLSHEVIK STAUNCHNESS both in the struggle against the class enemy, and in the adoption of an irreconcilable attitude towards all deviations from the line of Bolshevism.

Golden words, golden rules! But it appears that in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia they were not read sufficiently attentively, and what is quite certain, they were still less applied. This is why such people as Budin could hold such responsible positions. We have no people available for promotion, some comrades frequently complain. That is not true! Can it be that there are no such people in a proletarian party consisting of tens of thousands of loyal, self-sacrificing working-class functionaries. Let us rather admit that we have not tried to find these people, to get to know them, to educate them, to advance them, to help them, we have not cared about them, we have not tried to help them grow. Let us rather admit that it is precisely because we allowed all those Budins to be around, that there was not enough room and air for proletarian, truly revolutionary, cadres to grow. We must admit that if we had pursued a good Bolshevik policy concerning cadres, we would have been able to avoid many opportunist mistakes in the policy of the Party.

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Without doubt the opportunist mistakes of the last few months have considerably coloured the atmosphere around the Party and inside the Party itself. And this no doubt assisted the acts of provocation of the class enemy, who have tried, and are trying now, and will continue to try, to besmirch the revolutionary name of the Party and

discredit it in the eyes of the masses. However, the class enemy is miscalculating.

The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, led by the Comintern and its helmsman, Comrade Dimitrov, will open up its mistakes, correct them, and strike dumb all those who want to make use of these mistakes for their own dirty ends. The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will correct its line in the spirit of the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and hurl itself into the struggle with open visor and renewed enthusiasm to establish united action among the working class in Czecho-Slovakia.

If we now criticise our mistakes and show the entire working class where the Party took a false step, we do so in the interests of the victory of this struggle, in the interests of the cause of the entire working class. He who works, he who fights, makes mistakes. He who serves the bourgeoisie follows a simple course, namely, he serves the bourgeoisie to self-oblivion. Every worker, the Party, and the class as a whole learn from mistakes made. But we must recognise our mistakes, understand their causes and draw conclusions for the future, so as to avoid repeating the same mistake.

The Party corrects its line AS IT GOES, IN THE COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE. Herein lies the REAL correction of mistakes made. The need for mustering all proletarian truly anti-fascist forces for the joint struggle is dictated by the following facts:

Pallagra in the Sudeta; 800,000 unemployed; the poverty-stricken position of the workers in factories; want and need among the peasantry and handicraft workers; a new drive by fascist reaction; further capitulation by the government socialists, in the face of reaction. We shall get rid of all that is wrong from our tactics, all that hinders the rallying together of this anti-fascist, anti-capitalist fighting front. Inside the Party and out, a fresh wind is already blowing. That is a good thing. Many, very many good comrades in the Party and outside are heaving a sigh of relief. And the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will now take place in the spirit of DIMITROV.

# SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE POLICY OF DEVELOPING PARTY CADRES

By KRAEVSKY.

**A**FTER the historic decisions of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, when the problem of fighting for the masses was raised in a new fashion, the problem of party cadres acquires exceptionally great importance. Comrade Dimitrov raised this question in its full scope in his concluding speech at the Seventh Congress.

Only a party which is able to train strong, united, disciplined, ideologically steeled party cadres can rise to the heights of the tremendous tasks which confront us, can lead the masses in their millions into the struggle to overthrow the power of capital. These masses are now in motion: they are beginning to turn to us. Our cadres must be able to penetrate into the very heart of these masses to make a sober account of the degree to which they have matured, of their fighting capacity, and to skilfully lead them, on the basis of their own experiences, to ever new, higher tasks. On the other hand, our cadres must be able not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from them; they must feel the subterranean processes which are going on among the masses, must take note of all the new forms of struggle which arise in the battles that take place against capital, must grasp every example of initiative which comes from below. Only cadres of this kind grow up themselves in battles, only leaders like this grow into real leaders of the people.

The question of cadres is the more acute since the overwhelming majority of our parties are working in the most severe underground conditions, and a considerable section of our cadres—the most valuable—are constantly being lost in the struggle, for, as Comrade Dimitrov pointed out, we “are not a learned society but a militant movement which is constantly in the firing line.” Fascism is working for the physical annihilation of our cadres, and thus the question of defending and preserving the cadres we have, and of training new forces capable of taking the place of those who are lost, is a question of tremendous importance.

But what are the conditions in which real Bolshevik cadres grow up, are trained, and become steeled for the struggle?

The answer is: only in an atmosphere of loyalty to the great teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, only in the irreconcilable struggle for the purity of the teaching of Lenin, in the struggle on two fronts, in an atmosphere of Bolshevik mass policy, do firm Bolshevik cadres, real leaders of the

working class and of the whole of the toiling people grow up!

Such cadres are not educated and developed by a party which neglects revolutionary theory, which is tainted with rotten liberalism as regards deviations from Leninism; all the mass work of such a party is opportunist through and through, for it does not fight to keep its line untainted, for it besmirches its political face.

Neither does the Party train Bolshevik cadres which declares itself true to Marxism-Leninism in words, but which in practice only repeats formulae it has learned, without examining the concrete situation in which the party is operating, without conducting a consistent, stubborn struggle to win the masses, without conducting a truly Bolshevik, mass policy.

Only the party which combines the greatest ideological irreconcilability, with the greatest flexibility in the struggle to win the masses, can develop cadres capable of standing at the head of the revolutionary struggle of the whole of toiling mankind.

It would, however, be a tremendous mistake to imagine that all these general conditions, if favourable ground exists for the party to develop new cadres, that the tasks facing the Communist Party in this field are exhausted and things can be left to take their own course. On the contrary, all that exists here is a basis for pursuing a planful and steady POLICY CONCERNING CADRES. What is more, unless systematic, consistent work is done to develop cadres the opposite phenomenon can easily arise, namely the weakness of the party's cadres, their inadequate maturity, will in actual practice delay the operation of the correct Bolshevik party line. It is not for nothing that Comrade Stalin warns us:

“After the correct line has been given, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on the manner in which the work is organised, on the organisation of the struggle for the application of the line of the party, on the proper selection of workers, on supervising the fulfilment of the decisions of the leading organs. Without this the correct line of the party and the correct solutions are in danger of being severely damaged. More than that, after the correct political line has been given, the organisational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, i.e., whether it is fulfilled or not.” (See Stalin: Speech at Seventh Party Congress. Section III).

In his speech delivered at the Seventh Congress, Comrade Dimitrov indicated the chief points in the Bolshevik policy of the development of cadres.

The chief element of the policy of the development of cadres is the STUDY OF THE PEOPLE ONE DEALS WITH. Meanwhile, it is no secret that the work of our Communist parties along this line has not yet been properly developed. Not only is no study made of the new forces being advanced, but even such a party as the Communist Party of France, a party to which Comrade Dimitrov made particular reference and which has achieved comparatively big successes in this field during the last few years, has as yet no real knowledge of its basic leading party cadres. And yet in parties which are working in legal conditions, this task is comparatively easy. In the illegal parties, where there are tremendous losses among our cadres, where the young, fresh forces grow up in conditions of ferocious terror, in the most profound underground conditions, this task is incomparably more difficult. All the more persistent, then, must be our work of making a study of our people—without which there can be no promotion, and development of new forces—and all the more intolerable is the position when such a study of our cadres is either completely absent or is carried on insufficiently.

Only by making a systematic study of our cadres can we ensure that they are correctly selected. Here first and foremost the question arises of STRENGTHENING THE PROLETARIAN FRAMEWORK of the party organisation, of regulating its social composition. The party must work systematically to establish contacts with all the most important factories, to make every factory a Bolshevik fortress, to have a strong party organisation there.

But only such an organisation as arranges the work so that the masses, at every step, feel that it exists is a truly Bolshevik cell. The cell must know how to express the moods and the needs of the workers, must know how to mobilise them for action in every conceivable way, using every ground, every conflict—economic or otherwise—for the purpose.

The party organisation in the factory must be able to surround itself with a whole network of various mass organisations—political, economic, cultural. It must encourage their formation, it must work in the existing mass organisations (first and foremost in the trade unions). It must also penetrate into the organisations of the class enemy and work inside them. This, of course, is connected with tremendous difficulties, above all for the illegal parties. But for the illegal parties as well, these methods of work are of vital importance. Only in such conditions does the party acquire a broad field on which it can operate. On the other hand, in these conditions it can the more easily keep its work conspirative, for by obtaining

a broader field of action, it can manoeuvre flexibly, calling on all sympathisers, all who belong to the organisation to undertake different kinds of activities, without these people even knowing (provided the work is arranged properly) who actually belongs to the party cell which has drawn them into this or that form of activity. We must operate according to the exemplary advice given by Vladimir Ilyich during a conversation with comrades: “Where three balalaika\* players come together to play the fourth should be a Bolshevik.”

We must not make a mechanical approach to the question of recruiting workers into the party. The question of increasing the organisational work of the Communist Party, of liquidating the organisational backwardness of our sections in relation to the tremendous political tasks which confront them, has been raised more than once. We have frequently and very convincingly proved that our comrades do not know how to carry on agitation concretely and win workers capable of influencing the masses, that they do not know how in their agitation to make use of all those daily facts which, of course, exist in abundance, and which the Bolshevik party always so masterfully utilised in its agitation. But, although there was a great amount of truth in the instructions we gave, our arguments acted poorly and things went forward extremely slowly. Of course, the main reason was that all our work suffered from many sectarian features. Only now, after the decisions of the Seventh Congress, when the struggle for the united front has been raised in a new fashion, when we have set ourselves the task of fighting for the masses in a new fashion, of overcoming the split in the working class, when we are beginning to find a common tongue with very wide masses for the struggle against the class enemy; when we are finding the road to the social-democratic workers—only now do political pre-conditions exist which ensure that our recruiting among the workers will give mass results. The growth of the Communist Party of France and of a number of other parties in the Comintern on the basis of operating the line of the Seventh Congress is a clear example of this.

However, it is not enough to raise the question of the proletarian framework of the party in a general way: we must have strong contacts with the workers of the LEADING, BASIC BRANCHES of industry of the given country, of the given district, of the given locality. Without a stubborn fight in this direction of course we shall not have leading organs which reflect contact with the leading branches of industry. This is all the more difficult because the Communists are trailed most of

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\* A string instrument.

all in these branches of industry—even in countries where the Communist movement is legal—and it is enough for a Communist to incautiously give himself away, and he is immediately thrown out of the factory, not to mention the risk of being arrested. Thus, for example, if in Germany (before Hitler came to power) out of 918 members of the district committees elected in May, 1931, 849 were working in factories, i.e., 92.5 per cent. (including 337 persons, i.e., over 35 per cent. in big enterprises), in August 1932 of the same number of workers, only 218, i.e., 23.7 per cent. were at work including only 99, i.e., 10 per cent. in big enterprises while 467 persons, i.e., over half were unemployed.

But, of course, the question cannot be reduced to that of factory cells. Here what is wanted is the maximum flexibility in organisational forms, and a sober estimate of the peculiarities of the given concrete situation. The methods of the organisational work of underground parties cannot, of course, be identical with the methods of work of the legal parties. We must always remember what the resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. teach us on questions of party structure. The first point in the resolution runs as follows:

“The party of revolutionary Marxism radically denies all searching after an absolutely correct form of party organisation and equally of methods for its work, absolutely suited to all stages of the revolutionary process. On the contrary, the form of organisation and the methods of work are entirely determined by the peculiarities of the given, concrete historical situation and the tasks which directly arise out of this situation.”

Without for one moment belittling the tremendous importance of the struggle to establish cells in the factories, we would be making an enormous mistake if we failed to understand the need for securing a foothold for ourselves in the mass organisations of all types. If we take present-day Germany for example, it becomes clear that we must also penetrate into all the existing mass organisations. Here all kinds of sectarian resistance must be overcome. For example, two of our comrades declared themselves in favour of working inside the fascist works' groups in principle, but refused to accept the leadership in them because they would be obliged to wear uniforms with two stars on their collars. Is it not clear that in this case sectarian outlook is hindering the development of Bolshevik mass work?

Those comrades who carry on work in the mass fascist organisations soon become convinced that it produces big results. Thus, a woman Communist, who became a treasurer in the Fascist “Labour Front,” made contacts with a number of people from whom she collected subscriptions. Another comrade who undertook the task in the

“Labour Front” of distributing the fascist newspaper “Angriff” also in this way made contacts with other anti-fascist members of the “Labour Front.” Such “legal opportunities” exist even in a country like fascist Germany with its ferocious terror. We must only know how to make use of them, as the Party of Bolsheviks made skilful use of all “legal opportunities” under Tsarism, bearing in mind, of course, the specific features of fascist underground conditions.

In Japan, where the Communists are also working in the most profound underground conditions, and where all the left mass organisations have been dissolved, the capitalist press reported the following case: at the big Nakadzima aeroplane construction works, a worker, taking advantage of the fact that there were a number of workers employed there who hailed from the same district, organised a group of fellow-townsmen, which became the nucleus of an organisation later formed called “The Revolutionary Press Readers' Society.” The Society was divided into three groups, with over 30 persons in each group. And the Communists carried on their work through this society.

It is essential to safeguard the proletarian framework of the party. But even in the advanced capitalist countries this is not all: we must have cadres who can make strong contacts with the poor peasantry, with the intellectuals, with the poor of the towns, etc. This is the more essential in those countries where the peasant population predominates, and especially in the countries of the East, in the colonies, where work among the toiling masses of the nations oppressed by imperialism requires cadres who understand the needs of these masses, who can talk to them in a language they can understand, etc. To train cadres of this kind requires stubborn, systematic work.

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Only by making a systematic study of people at their work can we establish who of the party workers acquit themselves well, who of them cope with the work entrusted to them, and thus can correctly approach the question of promoting cadres.

But the question of promoting cadres, of course, does not consist of merely advancing definite, already existing leading party workers from one post to another.

The basic question of promoting cadres is that of boldly utilising new young forces from among the masses, from all kinds of mass organisations which exist around the party or have been set up by us. It is especially now that new people are coming to us from all sides. The party must

opportunistly seek out, find, and bring into the organisation every honest energetic worker who displays initiative, who has displayed his activity, and is connected with the masses, and give him definite work to do. After a certain necessary period of trial and Bolshevik education the party must help him to advance still further, solicitously raising his political level, and cultivating him "as a gardener cultivates his favourite fruit tree."

It is essential, moreover, to make a skilful approach to each person, to know how to make use of him and develop his special qualities.

Our attitude should be different towards the young working man or woman who has come forward during a strike as a capable organiser, a leader of the masses. We have a different approach to the social-democratic worker or official, whom the trend of events has convinced that the Communists are right. Our attitude is different to the intellectual who declares himself desirous of joining the party. In each of these cases our methods of testing, assimilating, utilising, and of promoting new forces, will be different. And the party, working in legal conditions will work differently from the party in illegal conditions.

Here the question OF OLD AND NEW CADRES arises. Bold initiative in drawing in new cadres on no account means that the rôle of the old cadres must be reduced. True, a certain section of the old cadres not infrequently drop out when sharp historical turns take place, proving unable to cope with the new tasks, but in the main the old cadres are most valuable party capital, such as must be carefully safeguarded.

However, side by side with a most careful attitude towards the old cadres, it is essential that new party cadres are advanced. It not infrequently happens, however, that some of the "old hands" in the party put obstacles in the way of the influx of new forces. Hundreds of revolutionary workers have knocked at the doors of the party, and sometimes have been refused entrance, the excuse being that a "test" was necessary, or that "there was not a sufficient number of party cards in hand." We are not thinking of cases of this sort, but cases where comrades without any evil intentions resist the influx of new forces, because it appears to them, for "conspirative" or other reasons to be somewhat dangerous for the party. In the Communist Party of Spain there was the case when one of the leaders of the district committee was against admitting new forces into the party. But when it was explained to him that the position he had adopted was wrong, he changed his ways. In the Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia there are some evidences to

be observed of a struggle between the young and old cadres, in which the old comrades are trying to keep the leading positions for themselves, while the young ones adopt a somewhat scornful attitude to the old cadres. The one attitude and the other, of course, are harmful to the movement and must be overcome. Or, for example, we know that during the first period of the Hitler régime, an unpleasant attitude existed in some of the organisations of the Communist Party of Germany towards the social-democratic workers who were joining the Communist Party, and that there was a desire to put these former social-democrats in a separate category as "second grade" Communists.

In this field also we must make a decisive break once and for all with sectarian moods. Our tactics are calculated on mobilising the masses in their millions for the struggle and to lead them forward under our guidance. The maximum initiative and the maximum flexibility are required if all these heterogeneous forces are to be merged into a single current which will sweep away all obstacles in its way. It is impossible to solve these tasks if our parties do not absorb the best elements from among these masses and bear the expense of training them. But this task is being and will be solved successfully along the road pointed out by the Seventh Congress.

On this road we are following the advice of the genius, the leader and teacher of toiling mankind, V. I. Lenin, who wrote the following in March, 1905:

"In war time recruits must be trained directly during military operations. So fight boldly for new methods of training, comrades. Boldly form ever new detachments, send them into battle, recruit more of the young workers, widen the usual framework of all the party organisations, beginning with the committees and ending with the factory groups, trade unions, and student circles. Remember that in this work all delay on our part will help the enemies of social-democracy,\* for the new springs are seeking an immediate outlet, and if they do not find the social-democratic stream, they will seek the non-social democratic stream."†

Only a systematic study of our cadres can ensure that we correctly arrange our forces. It is essential, as Comrade Dimitrov pointed out, that there should be strong people who are linked with the masses, and have come from the heart of the masses, people who possess initiative and steadfastness to be in the basic links of the movement. The leading bodies should first and foremost contain such people; such people should also be in all other responsible posts, including also technical work. There is nothing more dangerous

\* The Bolshevik Party was at that time called the R.S.D.L.P. (the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (of Bolsheviks)). A.K.

† Lenin, Vol. VII, p. 149, Russian Edition.

than an under-estimation of the political importance of what is known as the party technical apparatus, than the idea that politically undeveloped, ideologically unsound workers can be used for technical work.

The question of the correct arrangement of cadres is connected with the question of DE-CENTRALISING THE VARIOUS LINKS OF party work; this is of tremendous importance both for the legal and legal parties. This is required by both the principles of conspiracy and the principles of the correct division of labour. And yet in very many parties the work has been arranged in such a way that different spheres of activity were connected with each other, or the leadership of these spheres of activity was entrusted to one "specialist." How great were the opportunities for provocateurs carrying on their work in the party which arose out of this. The following incident occurred not so long ago in one of the parties which has had little experience as regards conspiracy. The distribution of party literature in one region was organised in such a way that the central courier supplied all the district depôts with literature. On being arrested and beaten up he gave everything away. Thus, in consequence of the work being wrongly organised, the whole network of district literature depôts were destroyed.

But the question of the correct use of people cannot be reduced merely to the arrangement of forces inside the party organisations. Our forces must be skilfully allocated in the mass organisations, so that wherever it is expedient, trustworthy Communists full of initiative will be found. Stubborn work is necessary, a clear understanding of the tasks and of the means of fulfilling them is necessary, if we are to secure the correct allocation of our forces, if we are to be in a position to win all positions which are of importance to us.

The correct allocation of our forces also means that everyone of our party "detachments," wherever it may be placed, must be able to surround itself with an active band of sympathisers (from trustworthy people close to the party to casual "fellow-travellers"), must be able to establish contacts with social-democratic workers and other anti-fascist forces, must be able wherever possible not only to establish united action against the class enemy, but also to consolidate this unity organisationally, by creating united front bodies. In estimating the work of our comrades, account should be taken of the question of how far they prove able to build up a body of active workers around themselves, to draw new people and new forces into their spheres of influence, and to educate them. On the other hand, comrades working in the mass organisations, especially in

the organisations of the class enemy, must be afforded systematic assistance, their work must be constantly guided, they must be taught from their mistakes, steered and real Bolsheviks made of them. At their difficult post they must feel the help of the party organisation. This, of course, does not mean that they should not display initiative in carrying out the line of the party.

Finally, the question of correctly allocating cadres depends upon the question of SAFEGUARDING CADRES, as Comrade Dimitrov particularly emphasised in his speech. We must learn to withdraw party workers to the rear whenever circumstances so require, and replace them by others. This is essential from the viewpoint of conspiracy, and frequently from the viewpoint of raising the ideological level of these comrades. The withdrawal of people to the rear and their transfer from place to place, is a matter of tremendous importance. It was not for nothing that in one of his letters to Gusev, Lenin stressed the following:

"I know from my own experience and that of masses of comrades, that it is almost the most difficult thing for a revolutionary to leave a dangerous position IN TIME."\*

The subject of safeguarding cadres, of the principles of conspirative work, of the struggle against provocation, of the way to behave during the interrogation and in court, of using comrades released from prison and from the concentration camp, requires especial examination. We shall not deal with this category of questions now. We shall only remark that our sections are beginning more and more to understand the importance of this sphere of policy in regard to cadres. Quite recently (since the Seventh Congress) a number of our underground parties have begun seriously to study questions of conspiracy. One of these parties especially emphasised the great importance of these questions in a resolution of the Central Committee, and correctly pointed out that the violation of the principles of conspiracy are a menace not only to the comrade guilty of such violation but also to the whole of the mass work of the party.

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It is very long and painstaking task to study cadres, to study the new forces which are coming forward. We must make such a study of our people as enables us to find in each of them the particular feature which constitutes their strong side. Only such a study of our forces can ensure that our cadres are correctly distributed. Only when the leadership is able to put its finger on the special quality in each leading party worker, will it be able to give him the work

\* Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXVIII, p. 465, Russian Edition.

which most of all corresponds to his abilities. And it is while carrying out work correctly selected that party workers grow. On the contrary, if a man is given work which he is incapable of carrying out, which he is not in a position to fulfil, even a loyal comrade can be disillusioned and demoralised as a result.

The question of making correct use of cadres is closely connected with the problem of COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP. Collective leadership means that one leader does not replace the entire leadership, but brings all the comrades into the work, distributing functions and thus building up a certain core of leaders. Of course, in underground conditions it may happen that such a core of leaders in one or other of the organisations does not hold out for long, that failure here or there may break down the collective work — nevertheless, if the work is correctly arranged, and if functions are divided properly, then definite habits, definite methods of work are formed and become established which make it possible for the organisation to attain successes in the most difficult conditions.

All our sections are aware of a large number of facts proving that in this respect things are extremely unsatisfactory. Very many workers are so overburdened with a multitude of functions that they are unable to deal satisfactorily with any of them. Whereas, if a considerable part of these functions were transferred to other party workers, the work would be done better, and new people would be trained and develop. Thus, for example, quite recently in a German town, a leading comrade, responsible for the work of an entire district, at the same time organised underground meetings, arranged the communication service, and set the transport of literature going, and so on. Quite apart from the fact that to carry out all these functions is impermissible from the viewpoint of conspiracy, it is clear that such a comrade is incapable of giving political leadership, and all the more so is he incapable of rallying to himself and training any sort of core of leading comrades.

Only systematic, constant supervision of the work of the party organisations, only a check on the fulfilment of decisions can guarantee real operative guidance. Again, if there is no such leadership, if there is no check on how decisions are fulfilled, if there is no systematic, careful correction in the course of the work of mistakes committed, the growth of cadres will be considerably delayed.

Let us give two examples from the life of the Paris party organisation.

For a whole year, not a single leader from the district visited a certain sub-district of Paris. The

secretary of the district committee had never visited the sub-district at all. The work of the party cells there was absolutely neglected. The rank-and-file were afraid to make use of self-criticism, remembering the days of Barbé-Celor, when severe punishment was meted out for the slightest attempt to indulge in criticism. When the new district committee raised the question of methods of inner-party work, of self-criticism, the situation rapidly changed. The party organisation in that district has doubled, and the fluctuation of the membership has almost completely been eliminated.

In another district of Paris, the rank-and-file themselves gave the signal to the leadership concerning the bad work of the district committee. When the Central Committee decided to investigate the affair, it transpired that the district committee in the main consisted of de-classed, non-proletarian elements with no contacts with the masses of the workers. After a number of these individuals had been removed, the work quickly improved. Thus, the checkup of the work of the organisation helped in the given case to get rid of alien, non-proletarian elements.

The two examples given above point to the tremendous importance of self-criticism. Comrade Stalin has always stressed the point that only through self-criticism "can real cadres and real party leaders be trained."

For precisely this reason groups like the anti-party Barbé-Celor group in the Communist Party of France, Adam-Bulechos-Trilla in the Communist Party of Spain, the Shash-Barn group of provocateurs in the Communist Party of Hungary, suppressed all self-criticism with all means at their disposal, and sabotaged inner-party democracy. Thus, for example, in one of his declarations (in 1931) Barbé was compelled to admit that:

"We have not a single party cell secretary, elected or promoted by the party cell. It is the same in the district and regional committees. We do just the opposite; we create the leadership from the top downward. Of course, this does not give the comrades the chance to develop their initiative and to advance. We no longer have traditions of regular promotion."

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We need, first and foremost, people who are PROFOUNDLY DEVOTED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORKING CLASS, who are true to the party in all and every circumstances, people who have been tested in battles and found staunch in the face of the class enemy. Such cadres are growing up and multiplying. The young generation of party and young Communist League members in all countries are being trained on the heroic example of Dimitrov, the victor at the Leipzig Court, on the example of Thaelmann and Rakoshi,

on the example of Fan Chi-min, the hero of the Chinese people who was tortured and executed by the hangmen of Chang Kai-shek. These growing cadres are invincible.

We want people who can stand in the foremost positions of the struggle at all times, capable of making flexible use of all types of weapons, and who can change them to suit the concrete situation. To-day our comrade is a tribune of the people, inflaming the workers; to-morrow, if circumstances demand, he goes into the severest underground conditions, leading the party work from there; the day after, in new conditions, he is leading the masses to armed uprising, to the storming of capitalism. He knows how to combine strictly underground work with the use of each and every legal opportunity that arises.

And this means that we need people in the closest degree connected with the masses. We require real working-class leaders, who can grasp the peculiar qualities of the masses among whom they are operating, who feel their needs, and know how to talk to them in their own language. We have an example of such simple language which the workers can understand in the election address

issued by Comrade Gallacher, the first candidate of the Communist Party of Great Britain elected to parliament.

We require people with initiative, people who know how to find their bearings independently in the most difficult conditions of struggle. It is clear that normal contacts between the party organisations will be broken during hot mass battles. We require people who can decide the most complicated questions independently, when cut off from the Central leadership, and can boldly take decisions without fearing to assume responsibility. We require people who possess the will firmly to carry into actual practice decisions taken. We require leaders who do not lose their heads in moments of defeat and are not subject to dizziness in moments of success. As Comrade Stalin teaches us, we

“must increase the struggle to forge truly revolutionary party cadres and to select truly revolutionary leaders in the party, people capable of going into battle and leading the proletariat in their train, people who do not show fear in the face of storms, and who will not fall into a panic, but who will steer a course to meet the storm.”\*

\* Stalin: “On the Right Factionists in the American Communist Party.”

## LIFE OF A PROLETARIAN LEADER

**L**IFE is pulsing bright and full-blooded through the Land of the Soviets. It offers tremendous scope for the wonderful, creative initiative of millions. But the remains of the doomed capitalist class and the bankrupt Trotsky-Zinoviev counter-revolutionaries who have been hurled on to the garbage heap of history, still continued, a year ago, to hold out some hopes of introducing disorganisation into the ranks of the Bolsheviks, so they secretly sent in one of their degenerates who crept treacherously behind, and shot our Comrade Kirov in the neck, assassinating one of the greatest of proletarian revolutionaries.

Large, voluminous books are being written, and will yet be written, about the wonderful life of this beloved tribune of the people. In the present sketch, we only give isolated impressions, isolated episodes of this unusually colourful, this heroic life of struggle, from which generations of fighters for the cause of proletarian revolution throughout the whole world, will learn lessons.

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Serge Kostrikov-Kirov was born in 1886 in the little county town of Urzhum, in the former Viatka province, with a population of 4,000 souls, a district extremely uncultured and neglected,

where a handful of rich timber merchants held all the poor of the town in a vice, forcing them to work like slaves.

His father, Miron Kostrikov, was a half-poverty-stricken small bourgeois, with no definite occupation, who abandoned his family for months on end, the care of the children, three of them, falling entirely upon the frail shoulders of their timid, consumptive mother.

By way of making a living, the Kostrikovs offered their hovel as a lodging-house for peasants of their acquaintance when they came to the town on market days.

“Dirt, damp, evil-smelling air steeped in the fumes of MAKHORKA,\* the pungent smell of PORTIANKI† hung up to dry, by the peasant lodgers . . .”—this is the description of the home environment of Kirov’s childhood, given by one of his contemporaries.

When the father finally disappeared without any trace, and the mother broke down and died, the Kostrikov children came under the guardianship of an old woman, an old nurse with a

\* Cheap tobacco.

† Coarse rags wrapped round the feet and legs instead of socks.

monthly pension of three roubles, which came to her as the widow of a soldier killed in action.

Having sufficiently kow-towed to different persons of the gentry, the old woman managed to get Serge put away in an orphanage, and from there he went to the town school.

Kirov's native town served, in those days, as a place of exile for "political criminals." The following interesting fact serves to illustrate the degree of culture of those who were called upon to maintain the law and order of the Tsarist autocracy.

The news somehow came to the ears of the Governor of Viatka that illegal circles were at work among the exiled prisoners, and so he despatched Prince Gagarin, his trusted representative, to investigate the affair on the spot. Upon the arrival of the prince, the exiles were searched, and when the names of Marx and Engels were found in the letters confiscated, the prince issued an order to the local police to discover the place of residence of these two seditious persons, Marx and Engels, and to arrest them.

As a youth of 15, Serge Kostrikov made connections with the political prisoners, and attended their secret meetings held in the forest seven kilometres away from the town.

On finishing the town school in 1901, and being one of the best scholars but without means of support, he was granted a scholarship of 60 roubles a year by the Urzhum Town Charitable Society, on which miserable pittance he had to live and carry on his studies. Joining the mechano-technical school in Kazan, Serge Kostrikov found himself among young people who, though not so very poor as himself, were of poor peasants, and so the changes which were taking place in Tsarist Russia, which were the forerunners of the approaching revolution storms of the year 1905, found a particularly ready response there.

In Kazan, Serge Kostrikov attended illegal circles of students, read revolutionary literature, and developed into a Marxist. On his arrival in Urzhum for the vacations in 1904, he made friends with Nikonov, a student and social-democrat in exile, at whose invitation he moved to Tomsk.

#### The 1905 Days.

In Tomsk, Serge Kostrikov, then 18 years old, joined the party organisation and took a very active part in its work; he belonged to the Left wing of the then united Social-Democratic organisation, where the Mensheviks predominated. Kostrikov was an indomitable Bolshevik-Leninist.

On January 9, 1905, the St. Petersburg workers who marched to the Tsar with a petition, were shot down by his orders. In reply, the fury of the people surged throughout the whole of the tre-

mendous country to farthest Siberia, and the Tomsk Party organisation began preparations for a political protest demonstration. Serge Kostrikov, still a youth, strongly insisted upon the need for demonstrating under arms, despite the fact that few firearms were available.

On the day of the demonstration, January 18, 1905, he marched at the head of an armed guard, whose duty was to defend the standard-bearer, a worker and personal friend of his, Joseph Kononev.

The demonstration was fired into by the Tsarist police. The standard-bearer was killed, but Kostrikov managed to escape while the shooting was still on. The same day he heard from a comrade that the banner behind which they had marched, was undamaged, but was hidden in the breast of the murdered worker, Kononev, where a comrade had managed to hide it. The banner must not be left with the enemy: they would have to go into battle again with it in the future, drenched as it was with the blood of a fighting comrade.

Late in the night, Kostrikov stole away to the mortuary, persuaded the watchman, using the excuse that he was looking for his dead brother, to show him the corpses lying there, and took the flag unnoticed from the breast of his dead friend, and returned it to the Party Committee.

On January 26, the funeral of Kononev, the standard-bearer, killed during the January 18 demonstration, developed into a tremendous mass demonstration at which a fiery proclamation was distributed, written by Kostrikov, entitled "A Wreath for a Fallen Comrade."

On February 2, 1905, Serge Kostrikov himself was thrown into a Tsarist gaol; he was arrested at an illegal meeting. Adhering to Bolshevik tactics, he refused to give any information during the interrogation.

On his release from gaol a short time later, he immediately took up the revolutionary work of his which had been interrupted; he was the chief organiser of a big strike of railwaymen at a station called Taiga, he was the organiser of the May Day demonstration organised by the Tomsk workers, and was entrusted with the task of running the secret printshop of the Tomsk Party Committee.

With the tremendous militant activity which Serge Kostrikov displayed, he came into conflict with a number of obstacles inside the Tomsk Party Committee itself, which included Mensheviks, against whom he had to carry on a constant battle.

Serge Kostrikov was almost the only person in the Committee who regarded the Tsarist mani-

festive of October 17, 1905, as a trap, as an act of provocation, and who pointed to the need for strengthening the workers' fighting units, for making preparations for an armed uprising, while the Mensheviks were ready to rest on their laurels after the receipt of the Tsar's declaration "confering liberties."

The Tomsk fighting units, headed by Serge Kostrikov, played a tremendous rôle in the struggle against the Black Hundreds, which were organised and inspired at that time by the police, and which were particularly unbridled during the days of the Tsarist manifesto.

#### The Days of Reaction.

After the defeat of the Moscow armed uprising in December, 1905, a wave of unprecedented repression swept throughout the whole of Russia. The Tsarist punitive detachments did not miss Siberia. Here, as in other parts, the Tsarist hangmen left a whole forest of gallows behind.

In January, 1906, Serge Kostrikov was arrested, but he had no weapons at the time. It was not discovered whether he took part in the military work or not. The fact that he was under age also went in his favour. The affair was limited merely to a few months' imprisonment in his case.

On his release, he concentrated his attention upon setting up a well-equipped secret printshop, for which purpose, together with two other comrades, he took over a small house with a separate yard, and constructed a well-camouflaged cellar to the house, in which the printing was done.

This was all so cleverly arranged that when the police, sensing that there was a secret printshop in the house, broke into it in the night, they, nevertheless, failed to penetrate into the cellar, and did not find the printshop even though they carried out a careful search, and arrested Serge Kostrikov and his two comrades.

For two years investigations went on, and Kostrikov and his comrades remained in prison, yet the court which then heard the case was compelled to release them for want of proof that there actually was a printshop in existence.

Kostrikov made full use of his long confinement in prison to undertake serious theoretical studies, in spite of the painful prison environment, when often by night the voice of one comrade or another could be heard in the corridor calling out the awful: "Farewell, comrade, they're taking me out to be hanged!"

The most violent reaction reigned throughout Russia between 1908 and 1911, and only towards the end of 1911 was there again "the urge for revolution," as V. I. Lenin put it. During that period all the unstable elements left the Party, drifted away, but the Bolshevik "regulars" were

not the kind to lay down their arms, and young Serge Kostrikov was a Bolshevik in the very broadest sense of the word.

During the years of reaction he was unwaveringly at his post—at first in Irkutsk, where he was occupied with the restoration of the devastated Party organisation in conditions where a desperate struggle had to be carried on not only against the ferocious Tsarist gendarmes, not only against the Mensheviks, but also against the decadent moods and the disillusionment rife among his comrades-in-arms of yesterday.

In 1909 he had to flee from Irkutsk because the Tomsk printshop which earlier had not been discovered by the police, unexpectedly came to light after a period of three years because of a natural accident: the floor of the room collapsed, under which the cellar had been made, and at the time the apartment was occupied by a policeman. There was a great sensation throughout the town, and redoubled efforts were made to discover the whereabouts of Kostrikov and his comrades. Kostrikov, however, had meanwhile successfully covered a distance of several thousand miles from Irkutsk to Vladikavkaz (known as Orjonikidze today).

\* \* \*

At that time Vladikavkaz was one of the main bases for the colonising policy of the Tsarist autocracy. The Tsarist officials, with the cognisance and participation of the mountain feudal lords, kulaks and the clergy, engaged in the most flagrant robbery of the mountain peoples. The Social-Democratic Party organisation was crushed by the police in 1906-1907.

Serge Kostrikov found work on the *Terek*, a local newspaper, liberal for those days, in which, under the pseudonym "Kirov" he sometimes succeeded in outwitting the censorship, and publishing his Bolshevik articles. Through the newspaper and in other ways, he made contacts with local workers and railwaymen, organised illegal study circles, and also set up strong ties with the Party organisations of the nearby proletarian centres of Grozny, Mineralni Vodi, etc., instructing these organisations in the difficult task of carrying on Bolshevik Party work under conditions of ferocious reaction.

In Vladikavkaz, Kirov continued to study very diligently. He closely examined live reality. He would take books with him into the country, and frequently climbed to the villages in the mountains, talked with the mountaineers, obtained a detailed knowledge of the peculiarities of their mode of living, and made a study of the colonial policy of Tsarism on the spot, all of which subsequently became indispensable to Kirov when he

had to find his bearings in the complicated troubles of the internecine strike between these peoples during the period of civil war.

In August, 1911, after two years' search in connection with the affair of the Tomsk printshop, the Tsarist gendarmes found Kirov's whereabouts, arrested him, convoyed him for two months from one bug-infested place to another, the whole of the distance to Tomsk, and there threw him into prison to await his trial.

During the years that had passed, however, Kirov's outward appearance had changed so much that the police-officers called in to bear witness against him, who had carried out the search five years previously, and who now held him under arrest, refused to recognise in him the same Kostrikov, whom they had then arrested. Quite unexpectedly, Kirov was acquitted, and to his comrades' joy returned to Vladikavkaz, where he continued his energetic, illegal revolutionary work until the February revolution.

#### The 1917 Days.

After the downfall of the autocracy, a Soviet of workers' deputies was set up in Vladikavkaz. At that time the Bolsheviks constituted a minority in the Soviet, while opportunists of all kinds were active there, and it was the lot of a small group of Bolsheviks, headed by Kirov, to carry out the difficult task of winning the majority to their side.

Kirov's brilliant speeches, imbued with revolutionary enthusiasm, rang out every day at numerous meetings, and when the best orators from among the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries spoke in opposition to him, they were given a bad hearing, because only Kirov's speeches harmonised with the feelings of the masses.

In May, the influence of the Bolsheviks, who still remained a minority in the Soviet, had increased so much that Kirov, at one of its meetings, successfully secured the passing of a resolution of protest against the supreme local authorities—against the so-called civil committee, which was headed by a Commissar of the provisional government.

Seeing that the influence of the Bolsheviks was growing so rapidly, the counter-revolutionaries began to spread provocative rumours to the effect that the Bolsheviks were allegedly calling upon the mountaineers to seize the Cossack villages, were calling upon them to plunder, as a result of which rumours a bloody collision took place between the Ingushi,\* who had come to market in the town, and the soldiers of the 1935th regiment.

News of the way in which the soldiers had set about the disarmed Ingushi caused tremendous

indignation in the villages; the atmosphere became so electric that there was a serious danger of an internecine war breaking out. But Kirov intervened; he went to the mountain villages, and using his knowledge of local conditions and the mode of living of the mountaineers, found the right words to persuade them, and averted the fratricidal war that was on the point of breaking out.

He succeeded in explaining the true nature of the provocation to the infuriated, backward masses who were thirsting for revenge. Kirov was able on the spot to make firm contacts with the poor people of Osetia and gave all the support he could to the "Kermen" party to which they belonged.

On the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the "Kermen" party which had no clearly defined programme, but which at bottom, supported the Bolsheviks, Kirov had to argue with a number of his own comrades among the Bolsheviks, who had not, like he had, mastered the flexibility of the Leninist tactics in questions of the conduct of the united front.

Subsequently, in 1918, the Kermen party, which had previously fought side by side with the Bolsheviks, formally joined the Communist Party.

By September, 1917, the Bolsheviks gained complete control of the Vladikavkaz Soviet. On October 5, Kirov was chosen as the delegate from Vladikavkaz to the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Arriving in St. Petersburg, during these noteworthy days, he took an active part in the fight for the Soviets, and returned to Vladikavkaz after the great October victory had been won.

#### The Fight For Soviet Power.

The Vladikavkaz theatre was full to overflowing, and the enthusiasm of the revolution was to be felt in every word of the speech delivered by Kirov on his return from Petrograd.

He spoke at many mass meetings, at which he explained all the greatness, the world historic importance of the proletarian victory which has been won in a manner, accessible and understandable to these masses.

It was at this time that there took place, under the direct guidance of Kirov, the final separation from the Mensheviks in Vladikavkaz, or rather the liquidation of the last of them, for of 500 Party members present at a town meeting, 490 were in favour of the Bolsheviks, and only ten supported the Mensheviks.

The Vladikavkaz garrison also went over to the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, the position remained unstable. The local bourgeois counter-revolutionary forces, in the shape of the "Tersk-Dagestan Government," tried to provoke the more

\* Ingushi—a Caucasian tribe.

backward masses by setting one nationality against the other, by drawing the attention of the masses away from the urgent questions of the class struggle, from the burning questions of the land, etc.

At a favourable moment, the white officers made an onslaught on the Soviet and the Bolshevik Committee, signs appeared on the hoardings: "Death to the Bolsheviks," and the white bands searched high and low for Kirov; but Kirov escaped successfully and made his way to Piatagorsk.

The Bolshevik Party organisation went underground. The Whites took possession of Vladikavkaz, but the "victors" kept more to the centre of the town, warily watching the outskirts of the town, where they knew the workers were on the side of the Bolsheviks.

The counter-revolutionary military council called a congress in the town of Mozdok close by, for the purpose of consolidating its forces. But despite the careful selection of delegates, rank-and-file Cossacks, who were dissatisfied with the Whites, also found their way into the congress and complained of the fact that the situation was unstable in the district. Mikhail Blok, a Bolshevik, who had cunningly penetrated into the congress, took up these complaints. He made a proposal that a regional congress be convened in Mozdok, for the purpose of setting up a stable government. The proposal of the Bolshevik Blok was accepted, and the Tersk Regional Congress of Toiling People was convened. While the congress was on, the town was flooded with armed detachments of especially "loyal" Cossacks. But Kirov turned up at the congress, and from its tribune gave a brilliant example of how, in similar situation, THE PEOPLE'S FRONT CAN AND MUST BE mustered against counter-revolution, against the instigators of internecine enmity, against the enemies of the toilers.

Kirov organised and stood at the head of the "Socialist bloc," in which Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries took part, but which was led by Bolsheviks. "If the situation is to be saved in the Tersk region," declared Kirov at the Mozdok Congress, "it can be saved only by THE UNITED FRONT . . . If you do not set up a united front, then we are all lost." A group of delegates proposed that the congress immediately recognise the authority of the Soviet of People's Commissars. But Kirov, correctly taking account of the relation of forces, and considering the proposal premature, spoke AGAINST it. And this was right. The first thing that needed to be done was to isolate the counter-revolutionary leaders, to wrench the toiling Cossacks away from their

influence, to win the confidence of the masses who lived in the hills; the masses had to be led towards the recognition of the Soviet government and to its establishment. Kirov called for the formation of transitional "organs of the power of the people":

"Taking account of the fact that the dark forces who aim at drowning all the conquests of the revolution in fratricidal war, are organising with every day that passes, we say that first of all the people must find among themselves the forces for asserting the authority of the people, by establishing organs of the power of the people in every village, stannitza,\* and aul."†

The correct tactics pursued by Kirov resulted in the Mozdok Congress following his lead. The Congress adopted the proposal put forward by the Bolsheviks that the Congress be converted into the First Session of the Tersk Regional People's Congress.

A few weeks later the Second Session of the Congress was convened in Piatagorsk, where the Bolsheviks had a majority in the Soviet. At this Congress also, where the position of the Bolsheviks was already immeasurably stronger, Kirov again opposed the ultra-revolutionary proposal to BEGIN the Congress by recognising the Soviet Government. First of all he raised before the Congress "all the painful questions which are troubling democracy: the question of the land, the national question, and the labour question." He organised a ceremonial meeting of the Ingushi and Chechen delegates, who for the first time took their places at the Congress side by side with the Russian toilers, and the Cossacks. He paralysed all the attempts of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to divert the Congress from the solution of the fundamental questions of the revolution to mere general talk, which would have meant the breakdown of the Congress and the consolidation of counter-revolution in the North Caucasus. And it was only after the Congress had fundamentally solved the main questions, and solved them, thanks to Kirov's guidance, in the spirit of the October Revolution, that the Congress crowned its work with the triumphant decision to despatch a telegram to LENIN recognising the power of the Soviet of People's Commissaries, and containing greetings from the peoples of the North Caucasus.

There is no need to prove how important such a MODEL OF BOLSHEVIK POLICY is for the Communists of all countries. Kirov's victory in Mozdok and Piatagorsk was not only a victory of the revolution over counter-revolution, a victory of the people over the enemies of the people, but was also the victory of true Leninist-Stalinist

\* Cossack villages.

† Villages.

strategy and tactics over "Left" dogmatism, over phrasemongering, over the lifeless, ruinous repetition of phrases.

It was only with the direct support of the Entente, that the White Guards succeeded in breaking through to the North Caucasus. The counter-revolutionaries, inspired by the approach of the Denikin bands, continued to demoralise the more backward section of the population in the towns and villages, by organising acts of provocation, such as the murder of Osetins by Ingushi people, by calling for blood feuds, etc.

Things came to such a pass that real war broke out between two close-lying villages, and trenches were dug. And it was to these trenches that Kirov set out under rifle fire, leading a delegation from the Congress of the toiling people, and once more he succeeded in securing conciliation between the two hostile sides.

The advance of Denikin upon the North Caucasus created such a dangerous situation that Kirov sets out for help to Moscow, but he did not succeed in returning to Vladikavkaz with this assistance, because the North Caucasus soon fell into the hands of the Whites.

#### **The Civil War Years.**

Kirov set out for Astrakhan, where the hungry, unshod, typhus-stricken units of the 11th Red Army had been gradually returning since December, 1918, after covering a tortuous line of retreat. The army had to receive reinforcements, the men had to be recuperated, to be shod, fed, given rest, and then prepared for the offensive which would clear Denikin out of the North Caucasus.

Occupying a leading position in the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, Kirov carried on a tremendous amount of work to raise the physical and moral state of the men. At this time the devastation, hunger, and epidemics in the town of Astrakhan were being used by the counter-revolutionary elements, who were preparing an uprising. As a result of rapid and determined action by Kirov, the uprising was suppressed. However, Astrakhan was soon surrounded on all sides by the Whites, and it appeared hopeless to defend it. From headquarters, Trotsky hurried with orders to evacuate Astrakhan, but Kirov most categorically protested against the capitulatory attitude of Trotsky and those Communists who fell under his capitulating attitude. Kirov telegraphed direct to Lenin, from whom came the reply: "Defend Astrakhan to the end."

While conducting tremendous work to strengthen the defence, Kirov maintained constant contact with the illegal Party organisations and the partisan detachments operating in the rear among the Whites.

From Baku and Petrovsk, which were in the

hands of the enemy, loyal comrades come to him illegally, over the Caspian Sea on boats, comrades to whom he handed on letters, money and Bolshevik literature, whom he placed in contact with Moscow, and to whom he gave instructions, etc.

By August, the reorganised, reinforced 11th Army, which had recuperated, began to make preparations for the offensive, and then after the taking of Tsarytsin, under Stalin's leadership, the army marched into the North Caucasus, according to the plan drawn up by Kirov, and crushing Denikin's troops, cleared out the Whites.

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In the spring of 1920, Kirov advanced upon Baku on the first Red armoured train.

Here, as everywhere else, he was the central figure in operating the Bolshevik line, and first and foremost restored the normal life of the local Party organisations.

Plunging into the very heart of the new life that was being built in that tremendous proletarian centre, with its population of many nationalities who spoke many tongues, Kirov worked incessantly, worked with enthusiasm, worked at an unheard-of pace, using the tremendous influence, the love, which his personality inspired among the broad masses of oil workers.

In the teeth of fierce resistance offered by the nationalist elements, he carried out the Leninist-Stalinist national policy and organised the Trans-Caucasian Federation.

In Baku, Kirov also coped brilliantly with the most complicated economic task, which was of state importance, namely, with the task of restoring and reconstructing the oil industry which had formerly been backward, and which after the way it had been handled by the Mussavats, was ruined completely.

#### **Against the Counter-Revolutionary Trotskyist-Zinovievists.**

In the end of 1925, the group of October wreckers at the 14th Congress, Zinoviev and Kamenev, try to enter into a general battle against the Party. Having obtained mandates to the Congress from Leningrad by deceitful means, the handful of capitulators set up a howl about the victory of Socialism being impossible in the Soviet Union, and ferociously bombarded the whole policy of the Party. Zinoviev and his supporters proposed that the Party leave the road of Lenin and Stalin and take another road, namely, the road leading to the restoration of capitalism, to the downfall of the Party and the ruin of the revolution.

The Party contemptuously swept aside this handful of deserters and traitors. At the will of the Party Kirov set out for Leningrad, where he remained at the glorious post of leader of the Bol-

sheviks of the town of Lenin to the last minute of his life. With Kirov in Leningrad, the eyes of that section of the Leningrad workers which had been misled by the Zinoviev-Kamenev double-dealers, were quickly opened. Kirov unmasked the Trotskyists-Zinovievists—their counter-revolutionary essence and their foul double-dealing and plots. He unfailingly recognised and relentlessly eradicated Right capitulatory methods in whatever form they appeared. With Kirov in Leningrad, the proletariat of the great town marched as a solid army behind the Party, its Leninist Central Committee, and Comrade Stalin, and against the Right and “Left” opportunists. With Kirov in Leningrad, Socialist industry under his guidance grew at a stormy pace, the collective farms gathered strength and marched to victory, untold wealth was discovered in the bowels of the rough Northern region, and new towns made their appearance with fabulous rapidity. The Stalinist policy brought victory after victory, and under the banner of Stalin, Kirov trained ever more and more new forces of Bolsheviks, Young Communists, and socially active workers in the factories and collective farms.

Kirov was one of the most popular figures in the Party and the country. The disciple, the comrade-in-arms, and closest friend of our Great Stalin, he became a member of the general staff of Bolshevism, of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, of the C.P.S.U., and was appointed one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party.

Kirov foresaw and welcomed the unprecedented flowering of joyful labour in the Soviet Union, which in our days has taken the form of the mighty Stakhanov movement. In his devastatingly powerful speech at the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U., Kirov said: “Our successes are really enormous. Devil take it, to speak in human language, one so wants to go on living and living; why, just see what is going on.”

Then, suddenly, the evil day of December 1, 1934. The treacherous bullet fired in the neck of Kirov struck home. This impetuous, fiery life, the life of a fine Bolshevik, one of the best leaders of the Bolshevik Party, who to his last breath belonged to the Party, to the cause of the proletariat—was cut short in the flower of manhood by the enemy.

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The working class and the whole of the Soviet people replied to this malicious shot fired in the Smolny, with fury, contempt, and hatred of the murderers.

History knows of no treachery more foul than that which the Zinoviev-Kamenev band com-

mitted. Through Comrade Stalin, the Party had long ago uttered a warning that the road of the Zinoviev-Trotskyist opposition would inevitably lead it to the anti-Soviet camp. Pretenders to the rôle of “saviours” of the Party, Zinoviev and Kamenev sunk into the most evil-smelling swamp of fascist counter-revolution. The seeds of fascist hatred towards true sons of the Party, which the supporters of Zinoviev sowed long before their open hostility against the Party, at the 14th Congress of the C.P.S.U., brought forth fruits. The counter-revolutionaries of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc have fallen down to fascist, terrorist methods of fighting against the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev — these are they who directed the hand of the scoundrel who killed Kirov.

The proletarian court brought down its sword upon the heads of the murderers and their accomplices. Is it surprising that the fascist press did not hesitate to stand in defence of these scoundrels? Is it surprising that the Trotskyists, Mensheviks and some of the leaders of the Second International immediately began to mourn the bitter fate of the unmasked Zinoviev-Kamenev band? But the workers of the whole world, including enormous masses of Social-Democratic workers, warmly welcomed the sentence of the proletarian court. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Comrade Thorez said the following, concerning the behaviour of a number of the Social Democratic leaders:

“We condemned this position of the Mensheviks, we called to mind the historic phrase of Robespierre: ‘WE ARE SUSPICIOUS OF SENSITIVENESS WHICH SHEDS TEARS ONLY CONCERNING AFFRONTS AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE.’ We declared our unconditional solidarity with revolutionary, Bolshevik justice. We put the Mensheviks and their friends in the pillory. And they remained silent.”

For the workers of the whole world, the thrice despicable names of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky are branded for all time as sworn enemies of the working class.

The proletariat are firmly aware that their cause is invincible. They know it because they are armed with the only correct science, because the light of the theory of Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, shines upon their path. Their love and loyalty to their Party, to their leaders, their contempt and hatred of the enemy increases their fighting efficiency tenfold and are therefore one of the most important conditions for victory.

The foul murder of Kirov reminds us of this over and over again.

The bright, heroic figure of Kirov will never fade: it calls the proletarians and masses of the people of all countries to the fight against all the dark forces, against all the enemies of the people, to fight to the end, to victory.

# “LENINISTS”

By E. FISHER.

THIS is the title of an article by Gustav Richter, one of the leading members of the party of revolutionary socialists in Austria, published in the January issue of *Kampf*. At the beginning the author polemises against the Trotskyist and semi-Trotskyist elements who call themselves “Leninists,” but who take their time and remain apart from the struggle, managing to repose among quotations of Lenin, as on a soft cushion. They manifest a contempt for the practical people who happen to make mistakes from time to time, while conducting political work instead of “unerringly” serving their time in cafés. The article, not without wit, describes some of these types, but there is one type missing from the picture gallery. That is the type of Social-Democrat who has all of a sudden discovered Lenin in order to use him for the struggle against the Communists, and who manipulates newly-discovered quotations in order to deal a blow at the Communists and to dumbfound everybody with the astounding conclusion that: “Fundamentally the Socialists are better Leninists than the Communists are.” Gustav Richter himself belongs to this category of “Leninists.” He has given us, Communists, bad marks for Leninism. Says Richter:

“That was so to speak non-Party, ‘savage’ Communism. Unfortunately there is still another kind in Austria. If it has hitherto mainly been a question of human imperfection, now it is a question of what is politically dangerous. We are speaking of the ‘Leninism’ officially approved and sanctioned by the Party authorities, of our Communists who have now become real politicians.”

The Trotskyists, semi-Trotskyists and other wreckers in the working-class movement are in Richter’s opinion only “humanly imperfect,” whereas we Communists are “politically dangerous.” As proof of this, Richter quotes a draft of an International Red Aid leaflet in which anti-fascist political prisoners are called “people of progress.” One may call this formula a good or bad one—this is not the point—we have never denied that Communists also make mistakes. It would not be worth while starting a discussion on this subject were it not that more serious questions are at issue. But it is under the excuse of criticising this manifesto that Richter declares against drawing the non-proletarian toiling masses into the anti-fascist struggle, against establishing the people’s front against fascism. In his criticism of the leaflet, Richter appends the following:

“Thus we shall soon have a progressive front. These ‘Leninist’ tactics are particularly widespread in the trade

union sphere. On these grounds the curious idea has arisen that in the conditions of struggle against the authoritarian régime we ought now to act moderately, so as not to complicate the chance of our demands being satisfied, by exaggerating them.”

To “consolidate” his position, Richter refers to one of Lenin’s utterances in 1902:

“It is the traditional servile wisdom of all liberals to display restraint precisely at the time when the government has begun to waver (on some question or other).”

How adroit is our newly-baked Leninist! He has snatched up a quotation on the way so as to accuse the Communists of possessing the “servile wisdom of the liberals.” We shall not reply to him with quotations, we only want to sort out the concrete thought from the general phrases. On what particular question has the government begun to waver, and what “curious idea” are the Communist trade union workers defending? We, Communists, are putting forward the “curious” idea that every revolutionary must work where the working masses, and first and foremost the decisive sections of the working class, are to be found. In Austria the decisive sections of the working class are, in the main, to be found in the government trade unions, it goes without saying not of their own will, not out of conviction; but this does not alter the point in the least. And so the Communist trade union workers have conceived the “curious idea” of working in the government trade unions so as to mobilise the workers there against the government and the employers, and to carry on the struggle for the economic and political demands of the workers.

The workers in many enterprises have passed resolutions in which they have put forward demands—“moderate” demands such as the free election of their representatives, amnesty for all imprisoned anti-fascists, the removal of Commissars from the trade unions, and the abolition of concentration camps. These “moderate” demands have the advantage that they rally wide masses of workers to-day in the enterprises to defend these demands. Some of these partial demands have been successfully carried through, for example, the Christmas amnesty. True, the revolutionary Socialists do not believe that the workers are in a position to achieve even the smallest successes, and with a superior smile explain that the amnesty is exclusively the service rendered by the English Members of Parliament; and that our task for the future is merely to wait until British imperialism overthrows Italian fascism. The Communists, however, are not willing to retreat from their “curious idea”; they are convinced that the

Austrian workers are capable by their own forces of winning successes, though, of course, only on the condition that they do not content themselves merely with distributing leaflets and newspapers; but to organise the struggle against fascism and the employers, making use of all legal opportunities in this connection.

Richter, who is so worried about Leninism, can heave a sigh of relief: our aim is not to achieve one or other reform of fascism, nor to achieve some sort of coalition government with the bourgeoisie. Our aim is the dictatorship of the proletariat. We, of course, consider — however “curious” it may be — that we shall only approach this aim if we do not limit ourselves merely to making declarations to this effect, but in the difficult underground conditions of fascism organise the struggle of the working class and penetrate into all the mass organisations which the toilers join, if, day in and day out, we win over and convince the workers in the course of the struggle for their daily interests. We adhere to our “curious idea” that only on the basis of the experience of the daily struggle can the working masses be persuaded of the correctness of our line. We consider that fascist demagogy can also mislead certain sections of the working class if we do not attack fascism in its own mass organisations, but imagine that we can by agitation alone for long influence the masses in their hundreds of thousands. We do not believe that the masses will remain unaffected by the changing circumstances. We do not believe in the political mathematics which declares that in Austria 40 per cent. of the people are Red, 40 per cent. are Brown, and 20 per cent. Black and Green. Serious corrections in our favour can be introduced into these statistics, provided we work among the masses and not only among the working masses, instead of folding our arms and awaiting changes in the foreign political situation.

A serious struggle for the soul of the worker has begun inside the government trade union. The Communists alone are to-day waging an active struggle against the extremely skilful demagogy of the fascists. Members of the former Committee of Seven\* and the revolutionary Socialists adhere to the old slogan of boycott, which at one time was correct, but is not so now, in the changed conditions. Members of the former Committee of Seven and the revolutionary Socialists have refused to work among the masses in the government trade unions and directly to organise and carry on the daily struggle of these masses for their “moderate” demands. Thereby they are becoming isolated from these masses and are developing more and more into a sect without any political influence. The revolutionary Socialists and other similar groupings in all countries are plunging deeper and deeper into the self-satisfied sectarianism which Comrade Dimitrov condemned at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. The Communists, in direct contradistinction to the revolutionary Socialists, are successfully overcoming their sectarianism.

It is extremely praiseworthy that the revolutionary Socialists make a study of Lenin; however, they should guard themselves against the kind of commentator upon Lenin, who is prepared in all situations that arise to settle the question with a couple of quotations from Lenin, instead of making an all-round investigation of it, and studying its concrete conditions in real Leninist fashion; they must guard themselves against becoming the kind of “Leninists” who teach the masses while standing aloof from them, instead of fighting among the masses and together with the masses, to put Communist principles into practice.

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\* A committee to re-establish the trade unions, organised by the social-democrats.

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## CORRECTION

In the article, “The Stakhanov Movement and our Enemies,” in No. 1 issue, the following errors occurred in the table on page 57: Column 4, line 1, for “Over 200 per shift” read “Over 200 per *hour*”; line 2, for “900 per shift” read “240 per shift”; and line 3, for “240 per shift” read “900 per shift.”

# BUTTER AND GUNS

By ERNEST.

**I**N his speech before the members of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., Comrade Tukhachevsky, the Assistant Commissar for Defence, spoke quietly and convincingly about the menace to general peace and the Soviet Union from the side of Japan, Germany and Poland. Comrade Tukhachevsky explained the measures that need to be taken if the U.S.S.R. and peace generally to be successfully defended, and in this connection reported that the strength of the Red Army of the proletarian state has in peace times been raised to 1,300,000 men.

German Fascism replied to the speech made by Tukhachevsky and to the decisions of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. to increase expenditure on defence, with a hysterical outbreak of fury. Hitler Germany is arming itself for an offensive war. At the Nuremberg Congress of the German fascists, and at other meetings Hitler and Goebbels have with cynical frankness announced a war against the Soviet Union, against "World Bolshevism." Articles in the newspapers and journals of Hitler Fascism declare that the Ukraine must be divided up between Germany and Poland. At the present moment, however, these gentlemen who are urging Germany on towards a catastrophe, have apparently forgotten all these declarations. They are cackling like hens who are threatened by an evil bird, and are attempting, with their cackling, to convince the whole world that it is not Hitler Germany but the Soviet Union which is a menace to general peace.

In its issue dated January 14, Hitler's paper, the "Völkischer Beobachter" wrote the following:

"Thus, the plans for 1936 outdo all ever seen before, for if there is a state which more than doubled its expenditure on armaments from one year to another, then, only the Bolsheviks can allow themselves such an "investment in the cause of soothing peace." There can be no doubt that they will not hesitate for a single moment in Moscow to strengthen these declarations with the corresponding facts. It is sufficient to call to mind with what inhuman consistency and ferocity the first Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union was carried through."

Yes, German Fascism notes with profound apprehension the successes of the first Five-Year Plan and of the subsequent victories of Socialism. As distinct from the Fascist rhetoricians, who deal in thousands of years, and who repudiate all that they have themselves recognised as being for ever unshakable, within the course of a few weeks,—the Bolsheviks on the other hand do what they say, and fulfil their declarations. The Bolsheviks are true to their promises, and if they say that they want not war but peace, then they really strive

for peace. If they declare that they will thrash any aggressor and compel him to be off home, then they will really thrash him and compel him to be off home. People like Hitler and Goebbels feel somewhat out of sorts at this kind of thing.

The policy of Bolshevism is not directed against any single people. It is directed against war and the war-mongers. The Soviet Union wants at all costs to prevent war, and woe to anybody who dares to make an onslaught on it.

While the "Völkischer Beobachter" tries to spread alarm throughout the world regarding the growth, numerical strength and power of the Red Army, the "Angriff," on the other hand, Herr Goebbels' paper, attempts to soothe its Brown supporters and to belittle the importance of the Red Army. And if one method contradicts the other, then what real importance is this for Hitler Germany? The "Angriff" writes the following:

"The boastful blather of the Soviet militarists cannot cover up the fact well known to the whole world that the Russians have always put forward colossal armies. But the only thing is that they have not been victorious with these armies, and this, in our humble opinion, is the main thing. There are quite real examples to show that the technical equipment of an army does not decide the question. The main point is human beings first of all."

Of course, the main thing is human beings, the social system which they represent. The colossal armies of the tsar lost all wars,—and, by the way, the "Angriff" does not need to remind us about this,—Lenin and Stalin have repeatedly drawn attention to this. The Russian tsarist army met with defeat on more than one occasion, for tsarist Russia, reactionary, rotten and torn by internal social and national contradictions, was incapable of winning any kind of war. But the French revolutionary armies were victorious, although they went into battle barefoot, with empty stomachs, and although they were faced by troops considerably superior to them from the technical point of view. They were victorious because they were enthused by the spirit of a new age, by the spirit of the revolution. The Red Guards of the Great Proletarian Revolution in Russia routed the armies of the counter-revolution which were considerably superior to them from the technical point of view, while the Red Army, which came into being in incredibly difficult conditions and was insufficiently armed and trained, settled accounts with the interventionist armies of all the imperialist states. It was victorious because it knew that it was fighting for the victory of the proletarian revolution, for Communism. The "Völkischer Beobachter" is

right in pointing to the fact that the Red Army is filled with this spirit at the present day as well. The success of a cause depends first and foremost on cadres, on people. This is what the "Völkischer Beobachter" says about the people in the Red Army:

"At the present time the Red Army is an army of a million men which has colossal reserves, while to-morrow it will be an army twice more powerful. And this army feels itself a force which is paving the way for the world revolution,—this task is pointed out to it time and again."

There can be no doubt that every Red Army man is filled with revolutionary enthusiasm, he knows that he is fighting for the fatherland of the toilers, for his own country, for the country of his brothers and sisters, the land of Socialism where the well-being of the whole people is rising, and where he is advancing to an ever higher level of culture. The new man, of the Soviet Union, understands that by defending his fatherland, the Soviet Union, he is fighting for the cause of the workers of all lands, for the Socialist system which increases his material well-being with every day that passes, which provides him with more and more butter and meat and with better clothes, creates better living conditions and opens up wide cultural possibilities for him. You are right, gentlemen of the "Angriff," that the decisive factor is the human being. What is necessary is that he knows what he is fighting for. What is the position with you, in Hitler Germany?

Goebbels gave his reply to this question, when, in his speech made on January 18, he declared that the government quite well took account of all the difficulties, but that it had to defend itself against critics and grumblers so as not to be driven to the wall by them, adding:

"The economic situation which is characterised by an unexpected increase in unemployment is somewhat unstable. Our opponents have got the idea in their heads all of a sudden, although they have been vegetarians up to now, that they would like to eat pork. They behave as though we are hens that do not want to lay eggs. We can get on without butter, but we can't get on without guns. If we are attacked, we shall have to defend ourselves, not with butter but with guns."

Hence the conclusion: prepare dinners with the aid of poison gases, bake bread of powder, and

satisfy your hunger with guns,—thus is the recipe given by Goebbels to the German people. A special patriotic dish is being concocted according to this recipe in the German "Hell's kitchen." But guns are an indigestible food, and so the thought is developing in the minds of the German people that world history may be a splendid thing, but if butter, meat and other products become more and more difficult to get, the further Hitler and Goebbels lead them into the heart of world history, then let these gentlemen rid them of such world history. The German man in the street does not want to fall into ever more profound poverty, and to become finally ruined for the sake of technically arming Hitler's army. And the greater the food difficulties being undergone by the people, the more the system cracks on all sides.

German Fascism is depriving the people of butter, depriving them of their last crumbs, dooming them to an uncultured and poverty-stricken existence, so as to make guns and to attack other peoples. The Soviet Union makes its guns so as to defend the growing well-being and growing culture of the people. This is the difference. And this is a world historic difference! It is the difference between the capitalist system, which is doomed to death, a system of ruin, destruction and barbarism, on the one hand, and the Socialist system which is on the upgrade, a system of mass well-being, mass culture, and mass creation, on the other hand. The Hitlerites want war, for they are incapable in peace times of satisfying the elementary needs of the people. The U.S.S.R. wants peace because in peaceful conditions there comes into being the fullness of the socialist life, which more and more clearly convinces the people of the superiority of the Socialist system. The Red Army stands guarding peace, but if war none the less should break out, then its enemies will learn that Socialism is superior to the capitalist system, not merely in peace times.

The Red Army causes the German rulers disquiet, the Fascists are beginning to understand that the "drive Eastwards" which they preach may end in the horse throwing the rider, and the rider breaking his neck.

# HOW LITVINOV FINISHED OFF THE KNIGHT OF THE CHEESE

By ANTONIO.

**T**WO people personifying two systems confronted each other at Geneva: one — the representative of the great Proletarian Revolution, of the great Workers' and Peasants' State, the mighty land of Socialism; the other—the representative of the filthy, bloody counter-revolution in power not only in Uruguay. Litvinov quoted from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in which the political situation of Uruguay is characterised in the following words:

"After the declaration of its independence the history of Uruguay becomes a record of intrigues, financial ruin, and political folly and crime." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911, Vol. 27-28, p. 808.)

This means that in its main features, the policy of Uruguay hardly differs from the policy of the big fascist powers in Europe, that M. Huani, consequently, represented not only his own country, but a definite principle. M. Huani was well aware of his mission. He spoke not so much about his fatherland's cheese as of the foundations of the "civilisation," of which Uruguay considers itself the bulwark with no less justification than does Hitler Germany. And if Goebbels declares that it is not a matter of butter, but of guns, Huani in the same tone asserts that it is not a question of cheese, but of the Holy of Holies of all Christian nations. But Huani was not alone in fulfilling his mission; all the fascist newspapers of Hitler Germany and other countries expressed their solidarity with him, and declared that his affair was their affair. It will therefore be quite correct to regard Litvinov and Huani as representatives of two systems, and to draw conclusions concerning these two systems from their behaviour and methods of discussion.

Litvinov, conscious of his superior position, calmly and ironically analysed the methods of action of the Uruguay Government. The President of Uruguay wanted to inflict a subject, allegedly an anarchist, upon the U.S.S.R., and was very much insulted when the U.S.S.R. replied with a polite refusal. But the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay offered assurances that Monsieur le President could be pacified if his wounds were healed with cheese, i.e., by buying several hundred tons of Uruguay cheese. When the U.S.S.R. declined this proposal as well, the President decided to defend the foundations of civilisation from Bolshevism, and the uprising in neighbouring Brazil became the immediate pretext for this.

Who financed this uprising? Of course, you see, the Soviet Mission in Uruguay. True, Brazil, in consequence of the awful social oppression which reigns there, has for years been notorious, like Uruguay, as a country of constant uprisings. But the unsuccessful cheese deal, the reading of fake documents—speeches, alleged to have been uttered by the Communist, Van Min (moreover, according to the crudely concocted fabrication, Comrade Van Min is not a Chinese, but a Dutch, Communist)—and the wind blowing from other counter-revolutionary states, convinced the dashing President of the guilt of the Soviet Embassy. Out of all these ingredients, a diplomatic note was drawn up, which gave rise to delight among the fascists of all countries.

As regards this note, Litvinov said that:

"While there are no concrete accusations in the Uruguay note, there is a long dissertation on the subject of an uprising which recently took place in Brazil, and the suggestion that since there was a Soviet mission in Uruguay, then there must be some connection between these two phenomena."

The counter-revolution, which gives definite shape to the outlook of the man in the street, with the help of forged documents and the enthusiasm of ignorance, systematically establishes similar connections. In this respect, Litvinov pointed out the following:

"It is not the first time that we have heard such accusations levelled against the Soviet Government, but never, I repeat, never in a single case, have proofs been produced to support such accusations, with the exception of the forged documents fabricated by Russian counter-revolutionary emigrants and the elements close to them. I have no doubt that if the Government of Uruguay or the Fascist Government of Brazil so desire, they will find no difficulty in getting hold of such documents even here in Geneva. The demand for them on the European market has fallen considerably now, and they can probably be obtained at dumping prices."

Further, Comrade Litvinov not only convinced world public opinion that the Government of Uruguay is not in a position to prove a single one of its accusations, but he taught the world situated on the other side of the Soviet frontiers, the world shaken with crisis and want, an extremely edifying lesson in history. He related the bloody history of Brazil and Uruguay, and finally forced all those present to ponder over the fact that revolutions are not made by speeches delivered at a distance of several thousand miles, but necessarily arise out of the internal situation of Brazil and Uruguay (and many other countries). The members of the League of Nations listened to the

masterfully prepared lecture, in which an absolutely businesslike approach was combined with intellectual and moral superiority, and with the full consciousness of his own power.

And his opponent? He was a sufficiently well-known type such as is to be found in many countries, the type of furiously hysterical individual who hides his ignorance behind pathos, and his unimportance in affairs, behind loud phrases. Huani was unable to offer a single atom of proof, was unable to substantiate a single one of his assertions, was unable to refute a single one of the arguments put forward by Comrade Litvinov, but he made up for this by holding forth with such frenzy that Goebbels and Hitler might have envied him. The words with which he ended his speech might well adorn the pages of the *Voelkischer Beobachter*:

"The hour has come for us to defend ourselves against the onslaught of the theories which emanate from Moscow, theories which aim at destroying the foundations of the family, religion, social order, and even civilisation, throughout the world."

Thus it was that M. Huani converted stale cheese into a world philosophy, worthy of the fascism which applauded him and accepted his defeat as a defeat for itself. Comrade Litvinov spoke of the forces with whose aid this knight of the cheese had become transformed into a participant in the Crusade against the U.S.S.R., in the following words:

## LAND OF SOCIALISM

# ON THE ROAD TO AN ABUNDANCE OF PRODUCTS IN THE U.S.S.R.

(From the Report of Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar of the Food Industry, at the Joint Sitting of the All-Union Council and the Council of Nationalities of the Second Session of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R., January 16, 1936: "The Food Industry of the U.S.S.R.")

### The Food Problem Solved.

**P**RACTICALLY all of Comrade Lenin's utterances in the first years of the revolution give voice to one thought: the food problem is one of the biggest difficulties of the Russian Revolution.

In April, 1919, Lenin said:

"I referred here only briefly to the food situation but you all understand that this is our **CHIEF INTERNAL DIFFICULTY.**" (Vol. 24, Russian Edition, p. 232).

At the Party conference in December, 1919, Vladimir Ilyich formulated this thought even more strongly:

"**THE FOOD QUESTION LIES AT THE BASIS OF ALL QUESTIONS . . .** As soon as the military situation improves in the slightest, we must devote as many forces as possible to the work in the food industry as this is **THE BASIS OF EVERYTHING . . .** Only when we solve this problem and

"In allowing itself to cast insinuations against the Soviet Government, the Government of Uruguay undoubtedly speculated on certain prejudices against the Soviet Union which exist among the reactionary circles in many countries.

Unfortunately, speculation of this kind is common not to Uruguay alone. All the countries notorious for their aggressive policy, try to hide their aggression behind similar speculation. The same speculation is used to cover up the violation of the independence of China and the conquest of one of her provinces after another. And an attempt is being made by another state in Europe itself, to use the same speculation to cover up its tremendous armaments for aggressive plans in many directions. Another European country is also beginning to resort to this sort of speculation in its press, simply because the aggression it has committed has not met with the endorsement of the Soviet Government."

Uruguay and its representative, Huani, under cover of the big fascist powers—Japan, Germany and Italy—bore a sheet of cheese-paper as their banner in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Ancient tragedy is followed by satire. This time the fascist stage-managers first staged their satire as a prelude to the world tragedy prepared by them. The result proved to be unsatisfactory for them. Litvinov inflicted a diplomatic defeat upon Huani. This is a warning to any other Huani who may try to attack the U.S.S.R. under the guise of defending civilisation. And if they set out from their world of intrigues, financial ruin, and political folly and crime to undertake an attack on the world of workers and peasants, they will suffer not merely diplomatic defeat . . .

have a socialist foundation will we be able to build on this socialist foundation the entire magnificent edifice of socialism which we have more than once begun to build from the top and which has more than once collapsed." (Vol. 24, Russian Edition, pp. 569-570.)

To-day we may say that this task of solving the food question has been completed. Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin we have already built the socialist foundation and are now successfully building the "magnificent edifice of socialism." To-day the many millions of our country are saying, in the words of Stalin, that "life has become better, life has become more joyous." (Outbursts of applause.)

Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, the great man who is carrying on the work of Lenin, there has been finally solved in the historically shortest space of time in our country, the peasant

problem, this most difficult problem of the Proletarian Revolution. For the first time in the history of mankind, 100 million peasants have discarded a mode of life which had become rooted through thousands of years, and passed on to a new life, to a new socialist mode of production, which is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, event in the entire history of humanity.

All the chief difficulties of the internal development of our country have been successfully overcome by us. It is inexpressibly painful that in these days there is not among us the great Lenin who would join his joy with ours . . .

Old Russia had no real food industry, if we exclude vodka, sugar and tobacco.

The food industry was established properly under the Soviet power and is developing only now.

It was in the years of great difficulties, when there was a shortage of bread, butter, meat, when the ration-card system was introduced to ensure the transition of destitute Russia to a new cultural-technical level, to ensure the going over of our peasant from the wooden plough and sickle to the tractor and combine, it was during this period—the period of food difficulties — that our Soviet food industry was born. It was rapidly built up because this work was directed by the Central Committee of the Party and by Comrade STALIN who led us with undaunted firmness over all the pitfalls and difficulties of the socialist remaking of the country. Even then, when we had few cattle, when we had little bread, Comrade STALIN who saw further ahead than others, pushed forward the construction of meat combinats, canneries, mechanised bread bakeries and new enterprises of the other branches of the food industry.

The Right and "Left" deviationists at that time mocked at us declaring that instead of attending to livestock breeding and grain these cranks are building bread factories and meat combinats, as if bread, if only there was enough of it, could not be eaten without bread factories and meat without combinats. I even recall that a complaint was sent to the C.C. against the People's Commissariat of Supply to the effect that it was squandering money on the construction of the Moscow Meat Combinat instead of using this money for the breeding of cattle. They requested the C.C. to intervene in order to put a stop to this "outrage."

Comrade Stalin then wrote the following note on this complaint: "If the People's Commissariat of Supply is to be blamed at all, it is that the construction of this combinat was begun a year too late." (Applause.)

Now the Moscow Meat Combinat at the peak of the season finds it difficult to handle the flow

of cattle which comes to it. In the autumn of 1935, the Moscow Meat Combinat was handling 9,000 head of cattle a day while between 40,000 and 45,000 head of cattle awaited their turn.

Had we listened to the opportunists and not built our combinats then, what would have happened to our capital now, how would it have been possible for us to live better, to live more joyously without sufficient meat, sausage, frankfurters?

"Pravda" recently quoted the speech of Goering, German Air Minister, on the food question. At one time, during the difficult years here, every speaker, irrespective of the subject of his speech, always spoke on the food question. And now the German Air Minister cannot report on aviation without touching on the food question. It was difficult for us at one time to explain the absence of meat, but it is far more difficult for Goering to do so now.

When we said that to-day there was little bread, butter, meat, we knew that to-morrow there would be much of everything, for we were building collective and state farms, tractor and automobile plants, combine plants in order to re-equip and re-construct the whole of agriculture. We had a programme of a prosperous future, and our difficulties of growth were the difficulties of changing from capitalism to Socialism. Comrade Stalin then taught us: fight, overcome difficulties; we will soon begin to live well and joyously. (Stormy and prolonged applause.) The people believed us, and bravely overcame the difficulties of the transition period, for they all knew that they were difficulties of the change to a better life, and all now see how quickly the policy of the Party was justified in practice.

And now, when millions of the peasantry have changed from individual to collective economy, when food products have appeared here in large quantities, when the ration-card system has become a thing of the past, at this time an advanced capitalist country, Germany, is returning to the card system which we have thrown aside.

We could now sell Germany the remains of our food cards. (Stormy applause. Laughter.) We could give the leftovers of the cards to Comrade Rozengolts (Commissar for External Trade) as a new article of export in place of the articles of food that have been taken off the export list.

Here is what Goering said in his speech:

"We have returned to Germany freedom in armaments. What significance can lack of fats and butter have in comparison with this achievement? So far as I am concerned, I am ready, for the sake of the happiness of the German people, to promise never in my life to touch butter. Every sacrifice should seem easy to us if it helps in the acquisition of cannon, shells, airplanes . . ."

Note, comrades, that he says "ready" to give a promise, but just the same he did not give a promise, and he himself has not as yet given up the use of butter. (Laughter, stormy and prolonged applause.)

But inasmuch as the Minister has to give such a monastic promise—never in his life to touch butter — this shows that the Minister has no prospects, and cannot expect that butter will at some time or other be a food accessible to the population. This is because Germany is witnessing the sunset of capitalism; its economic and political organism is decaying. Here with us even in the most difficult years of revolution, behind the din of construction there was to be heard the tread of the new, happy life, which has now arrived.

We can now say that our country has a food industry just as she has a powerful heavy industry.

During the First Five-Year Plan period 2,000 million roubles were invested in the food industry, and during the three expired years of the Second Five-Year Plan period, 2,800 million roubles. Investments in construction in three years were more than during the whole preceding Five-Year Plan period. Investments indicated for 1936 amount to 1,155 million roubles. As you see, the state is giving enormous amounts of money for the development of the food industry.

During these years 19 large meat combinats were built and put into operation, eight bacon plants, ten new sugar plants, 41 large canning plants, 37 refrigerating plants, 11 flax plants, 205 mechanised butter dairies, 9 candy factories, 33 milk plants, 11 margarine plants, 178 bread bakeries, 22 tea factories, and a number of enterprises of other branches.

I should make the reservation that in my report I am considering only the All-Union food industry, only industry of the People's Commissariat of Food Industry, but there is also the local and handicraft food industry. If we are to include the entire food industry of the country, much must be added to these figures. It must therefore be remembered that in the figures given in my report, only enterprises of the All-Union food industry which are subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Food Industry are spoken of.

As you have already been told by Comrade Molotov in his remarkable report, the 1935 plan of the food industry was fulfilled 111.5 per cent. (Applause.) Output in 1935 was 23 per cent. more than output of the previous year, and 12 per cent. more than the 1935 task of the Second Five-Year Plan. According to the Second Five-Year Plan, the food industry was to have increased production in 1937 2.5 times over that of 1932, the last

year of the First Five-Year Plan period. In 1933 the People's Commissariat of Food Industry increased production 10.3 per cent. as compared with 1932; the increase in 1934 was 26.9 per cent., in 1935—23 per cent. According to the plan for 1936, industry of the People's Commissariat of Food Industry must produce 9,150 million roubles (in fixed 1926-27 prices), which is more than twice the entire production of 1932. (Applause.)

We are fulfilling the Second Five-Year Plan normally, and we do not doubt that we will fulfill it completely and ahead of scheduled date.

Several branches of our industry will produce as much according to the 1936 plan as was planned for the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan. For instance, production of granulated sugar in 1936 will be as much as was planned for 1937 by the Second Five-Year Plan—25 million centners. Production of lump sugar in 1936 will be more than the amount that was to have been produced in the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan period—10 million centners instead of 7.5 million.

In 1936 we shall produce 170,000 tons of sausage, whereas according to plan 135,000 tons were to have been produced in the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan period. We shall produce 600,000 tons of mixed fodder for animals in 1936, which is the amount planned for 1937. And there is a possibility of fulfilling the Five-Year plan in four years in a number of other branches of the food industry. (Applause.)

#### **The Sugar Industry of the U.S.S.R. Occupies First Place in the World for Sugar Output.**

You remember that at the Stakhanov conference, Comrade Stalin in his interjection set the task of producing at least 130 million poods of sugar. This was at the end of November, when the delivery of beet had not yet been completed and the prospects of the production season in the sugar industry were not yet entirely clear. This interjection of Comrade Stalin became a programme of struggle for the workers of the sugar industry. Comrade Stalin's words caused such enthusiasm as we had never before witnessed in the sugar industry. Just to-day the directors of the sugar refineries, the directors of the sugar trusts, and Stakhanovites of the sugar industry have written a report to Comrade Stalin. In this report they say:

"Dear leader and teacher, at the All-Union Stakhanov Conference, you, Comrade Stalin, set us the task of giving the country 130 million poods of sugar from the beet harvest. Our People's Commissar took this task upon himself. We are happy to report to you that your task has been carried out in full." (Prolonged, stormy applause.)

"On January 14, 1936, the sugar refineries had produced 130.3 million poods of sugar." (Applause.)

"We are fighting now to produce by the end of the

production season another 11 to 12 million poods, that is, a total of 141 to 142 million poods of sugar." (Applause.)

"These results have become possible only thanks to the development of the Stakhanov movement in our factories."

Comrades, in this connection it is of interest to cite some figures on the production of sugar in the capitalist countries.

I am taking the figures from the German magazine "DIE ZUCKER-INDUSTRIE."

During the 1934-35 season Germany produced 16.7 million centners of raw sugar, equal in terms of white granulated sugar to 91.8 million poods; Czecho-Slovakia 6.4 million centners or in terms of white sugar 35 million poods; Poland 4.5 million centners or in terms of white sugar 24.5 million poods; France 12.2 million centners or in terms of white sugar 67 million poods; Great Britain produced 6.9 million centners or in terms of white sugar 38 million poods

In the United States the output of beet sugar was 11.8 million centners, and of cane sugar 2.5 million centners (without the colonies), which in terms of white sugar amounts to a total of 78 million poods. Even if we add sugar produced from corn—four million centners, or in terms of white sugar 15 million poods—the total output of all kinds of sugar in the United States was equal to 93 million poods. I am not citing figures on India, as India produces chiefly brown sugar from sugar cane, made in large quantities by domestic and artisan methods.

How far our country, particularly the Ukraine, has progressed in the beet-growing field and in the production of sugar may be seen from the fact that Vinnitsa Province alone, the Vinnitsa sugar trust alone, is producing this year 34.4 million poods of sugar while the whole of Poland produces 24.5 million poods, that is, Vinnitsa Province alone has far outstripped the whole of Poland. (Applause.) The Kiev and Kharkov provinces are each producing more than Poland, too.

In 1921, the year of the lowest decline of the sugar industry, the output of sugar in the country amounted to three million poods.

Even in 1933 our country held sixth place in world production of beet sugar.

In 1934-35 when we produced 78 million poods we at once stepped from sixth to third place.

**NOW IN 1935 WE OCCUPY FIRST PLACE IN THE WORLD PRODUCTION OF SUGAR.** (Applause.)

Comrade STALIN, in his speech at the first Stakhanovite Conference, set the task of harvesting next year in the Ukraine 200 to 250 centners of beet per hectare. This found a reflection in the national economic plan which provides for a gross beet harvest next year of 254 million centners. In terms of sugar, even assuming that digestibility

will be lower than this year, this will mean 210-220 million poods. What place will we then assume in the world production of beet sugar if we are already holding first place this year? (Applause.) Are there any more places? We are producing twice as much sugar as Germany, twice as much as America. (Applause.)

#### **The Fish Industry Has Occupied the Second Place in the World Output.**

Another important branch of the food industry has achieved great successes this year. I have in mind the fish industry.

The following figures tell of the re-equipment of the fish industry.

In 1929 the industry had 560 motor-boats with a total capacity of 37,000 h.p. At present we have 3,150 boats of 230,000 h.p. capacity. In other words, the motor-boat fleet has increased to seven times. By January 1, 1933, the fish industry possessed 19 refrigerators, whereas now we have 26. In 1928 we had only four refrigerators.

We began fish canning in the Far East in 1923 with two small enterprises. By 1929 the number of canneries there was increased to 12. But at present we have 41 canneries in the Far East. (Applause.) A total of 55 fish canneries with a capacity of 252 million cans is now operating throughout the Soviet Union. Twenty-eight plants producing cod liver oil and fish fodder meal are operating in our country. Formerly we had no such enterprises but only several small primitive shops. There are also two very large ship repairing plants, 14 dockyards for wooden ship-building, 26 cooperages, among which are eight plants equipped with most modern coopering machines.

In 1929 the fish industry of the Soviet Union occupied fifth place in the world. In 1925, having caught 15.5 million centners of fish (together with the local industry), we rose to second place. (Applause), leaving behind the U.S.A., England and Norway. First place still belongs to Japan which catches fish from the extreme north to the equator, also including fisheries in our Soviet waters.

#### **Canned Goods.**

I have already spoken of the fish canning industry, but canning is not limited to the preparation of fish. We have organised a large-scale industry for canning meat, fruit, vegetables and milk.

In 1928 we produced 21 million cans of meat products and in 1935—145 million cans, a seven-fold increase. This year we plan to turn out 216 million cans of meat and meats and vegetables combined. In 1928, 33 million cans of fish products were produced and 136 million cans in 1935, whereas this year's programme provides for 178

million cans. Canned vegetables amounted to 20 million cans in 1928, 72 million cans last year and 100 million cans will be turned out in 1936. Canned fruit: three million cans in 1928 and 272 million cans in 1935 whereas the 1936 programme provides for 298 million cans. Tomatoes: 13 million cans in 1928 and 161 million cans in 1935. No canned milk was produced in this country in 1928. We began to produce it only in 1932 when we turned out two million cans. This figure increased to four million in 1933, to 8.9 million cans in 1934 and to 16 million cans in 1935. This year the industry will turn out 25.4 million cans of milk products.

Production of canned milk products is of paramount importance. This is one of the industries for which there are unlimited prospects of development. There is an inadequate supply in the big towns of full-cream milk, which can only be supplied fresh from districts close by, whereas the consumption of milk in our country is constantly growing. Tinned milk is also required for a number of branches of the food industry. Confectionery need not be made from full-cream milk—the children need it. For the same reason we cannot allow full-cream milk to be used for the manufacture of margarine, chocolate, etc. All these products must be made from the best quality tinned condensed milk. The basis for the development of the condensed milk industry is our far-distant outlying regions from where milk cannot be so easily transported, and where there is so much milk that they don't know what to do with it (for example, Kazakstan, Siberia, Bashkiria). Condensed milk will be supplied from these places to the towns, to the Northern regions where there are not sufficient cows, to the cotton fields of Uzbekistan, to Baku, to Magnitogorsk, Halilstroi, Murmansk, Kamchatka, the gold mines, etc. In the winter, in general, there is little milk. How can we compensate for the inadequate supply of milk at this time? The only way is to use condensed milk, which is a highly nutritious product with a pleasant flavour.

We are already able to produce a large quantity of such canned products. We also make milk powder which when dissolved in water produces normal milk as tasty and nutritious as fresh milk. Six plants produce condensed milk and milk powder. We are constructing two new factories and plan to construct another seven in 1937. We have recently begun to produce condensed milk combined with cocoa and coffee. This product is very convenient for expeditions, for tourists, for our Red Army. We shall develop to the utmost the production of this type of canned food.

#### **Meat and Sausages.**

One of the important branches of the food industry is the meat industry. The state meat enterprises, not to mention the local enterprises, produced 343,000 tons of meat (centralised fund) in 1932, and 533,000 tons in 1935, whereas this year the meat combinats are scheduled to produce 650,000 tons, almost twice as much as in 1932. Besides the government supply of meat to the towns, a great deal of meat is supplied to the markets by the collective farms . . . A very important branch of the meat industry is the production of different varieties of sausages. In 1933, the sausage works gave an output of 36,000 tons, in 1934—47,000 tons, in 1935—111,000 tons. In 1936, we must have an output of 170,000 tons of different varieties of sausages. (Applause.)

The sausage industry is soaring upwards. In 1933, the meat industry produced 17 varieties of sausages and smoked foodstuffs. In 1934—41 varieties, and in 1935—111 varieties. (Applause.) In December, 1934, Leningrad produced 92,000 kilograms of small sausages, and in December, 1935—560,000. In December, 1934, Moscow produced 68,000 kilograms and in December, 1935—974,000 kilograms. (Applause.) This is not the limit. We shall produce a considerably larger quantity of these foodstuffs.

Some people may think that Comrade Stalin, who is burdened with big questions of international and home policy, is not in a position to pay attention to things like the production of sausages. That is not true. That is not the case at all. It happens that sometimes the People's Commissar of the Food Industries forgets a little point, and then Comrade Stalin reminds him of it. I once told Comrade Stalin that I wanted to expand the production of sausages; Comrade Stalin approved the decision, remarking in this connection that in America the sausage manufacturers had become rich from this business. And especially so from the sale of hot sausages at sports grounds and other places where the people are gathered in crowds. They had become millionaires, "sausage-kings." (Laughter.)

Of course, comrades, we want no kings, but sausages must be made available everywhere.

I must state that the People's Commissariat of the Food Industries is prepared to ensure to our trading centres a steady supply of meat, sausages, smoked meats, and, what is more, of the best quality. We are paying special attention to-day to the quality of our products.

#### **Butter and Cheese.**

Here are a few figures on the production of butter. They refer only to butter from the fac-

ories, because the home production of butter is not taken into account. In 1928, the amount of butter worked up in factories amounted to 82,000 tons, in 1932 the quantity fell to 71,600 tons, in 1933 it had risen again to 124,000 tons, in 1934—138,000 tons, in 1935—154,000 tons. In 1936 we shall produce 193,000 tons, almost 200,000 tons of good butter. This is almost three times as much as we had in 1932, and twice as much as in 1913. (Applause.)

In 1932, 35,000 tons of butter were sold on the home market and in 1935 this figure rose to 117,000 tons, exceeding more than three times the amount sold in 1932. This increase is seen when one goes shopping in Soviet stores. Everybody sees clearly that there is a sufficient amount of good butter in our country. And there will be still more.

The quality of the butter has improved . . . One comrade asked me the following: how is it that although we have fewer cows than before the war, there is more butter? What is the explanation? I explained this to him quite simply. Our dairy livestock farming has become more productive than before. Before the war, for example, the Siberian cows never had warm sheds. They resisted the attack of the Siberian frosts with their own warm skins, and a tremendous amount of their vital energy went not to produce milk, but to keep their bodies warm. Now the Siberian cow for the first time has gone into its warm shed in the collective and Soviet state farms. It is better cared for, and it gives more milk. And when the productivity of the cows increases still more, and it will rapidly increase, there will be more and more milk. The second reason is the fact that the collective form of farming, and especially the Soviet state farming gives a higher quota of products to the market as compared with the individual peasant farms. It is enough to point to the fact that in 1936 the Soviet state farms alone, with 1,170,000 cows (leaving out of account the farms controlled by various workers' supply organisations) will supply 72,000 tons of butter, i.e., exactly the same amount as was obtained in 1932 from all the cows in the country . . . The butter industry has been re-equipped to a considerable degree. We now have 403 well-equipped mechanised works. These produce high quality butter with an average 92.4 grade. However, we still have a large number of non-mechanised butter works, which must be substituted by up-to-date mechanised, larger works, so that they will supply better quality butter in order to embrace the growing mass of raw material and so as to further improve the quality of the butter . . .

In 1935 we produced 19,500 tons of cheese as against 14,300 in 1932. The manufacture of cheese

in our country is backward, and we must develop it more rapidly. Not all yet have a taste for cheese, but a taste for it should be inculcated. Cheese is one of the most nutritious products, rich in albumens and fats.

Prior to the war Russia produced 10 kinds of manufactured cheese, whereas now we produce 24 varieties and in addition to this five kinds of process cheese. We intend to produce from 60 to 70 kinds of various cheese next year. Why should we have a smaller variety than that produced in France? Our country is richer, we have all kinds of milk and can manufacture a great quantity of different kinds of cheese. That is why in 1936 we shall build new cheese factories and more rapidly finish those which are under construction . . .

#### The Oil and Fats Industry.

A few words about vegetable oil. In 1932 the output of vegetable oil amounted to 338,000 tons and in 1935 to 408,000 tons, whereas this year we are scheduled to produce 475,000 tons . . .

Complete reconstruction of the oil and fats industry, creation of a network of hydrogenation and oleomargarine factories, the putting into operation of powerful oil extracting plants in Voroshilov and Krasnodar, and the forthcoming completion of the oil extracting mill now under construction in Katta-Kurgan will make it possible to develop the production of vegetable oils. The lag of the raw material base of the vegetable oil industry cannot be tolerated any longer. The yield of oil-bearing crops must be sharply raised within the next few years by guaranteed proper care of the sowings and complete fulfilment of the plan for deliveries . . .

. . . A few words on margarine. We produced 83,000 tons of margarine in the past year. Some people here objected to the production of margarine because they had heard that in Europe margarine was made of adulterated products. We make margarine out of excellent vegetable oils to which we add milk and eggs. It is impossible to fry meat in sunflower seed oil; it is also bad to fry meat in sheep fat or suet because these fats congeal rapidly while margarine is very good for frying. Margarine is one of the most nourishing and most easily assimilated products, one which can be almost as easily assimilated as animal fats. We have 11 new first-grade margarine factories. In addition to margarine these factories also produce refined, odourless vegetable oils (that is, clarified and freed from any odours). This fat is sold in packages in the Gastronoms and grocery stores.

We also make various kinds of dressings, the so-called mayonnaise . . .

. . . Up to and throughout 1933 we were very

badly off in so far as the manufacture of soap was concerned. But then Comrade Stalin called us together and demanded that a large quantity of soap of high quality appear in the country. Soap production was transferred from the People's Commissariat of Light Industry to the People's Commissariat of the Food Industry and only then was the production of a large amount of high quality soap begun. In 1932 the soap produced amounted to 292,000 tons, in 1935 to 442,000 tons. Now there is quite enough soap. If there is a lack anywhere it is only because the trading network has been unable to get it there.

And the chief thing is that we are now making soap of the highest quality. When Comrades Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich investigated the question as to the sort of soap we intended producing, the bar was put up against the production of soap containing less than 40 per cent. fats . . . Comrade Stalin devotes attention, in addition, to things for which one would imagine he has no time at all. For example, the production of perfumery and cosmetics. We are producing good soap and eau de cologne, but we are somewhat behind with our perfumes. Comrades Stalin and Molotov gave us their support, supplied us with gold for the import of perfumed oils. Now we are beginning to build up our own aromatic oil industry—rose oil, geranium oil and different varieties of synthetic oils, of which 72 varieties were imported. During the coming 2 or 3 years we shall secure the production of all aromatic oils inside the country.

The perfumery and cosmetics industry has grown to the following dimensions (the year 1935 is expressed in percentages of the year 1932): eau de cologne—210 per cent., perfumes—155 per cent., scented waters—287 per cent., cosmetics—117 per cent., tooth powder—244 per cent. . .

#### **Milk and Ice Cream.**

I shall pass on to the dairy industry. We now have dairy combinats in more than 50 cities. Thirty-three of them are new. The best of them are in Leningrad and Moscow.

Last year the dairy combinats furnished 207,000 tons of milk products compared with the 49,000 tons in 1932. In 1936 they must furnish 285,000 tons. In those cities which have dairy combinats the population gets milk that is 76 per cent. pasteurised. The combinats produce a tremendous amount of various products from milk: different kinds of cream cheese, sweetened chocolate, kefir, sour milk, sour cream, ice cream.

In 1936 we shall build four ice cream plants and many new shops in the refrigerating and dairy combinats. This is a new branch of industry with great prospects. Until now ice cream was

eaten by bourgeois families, on great holidays, at weddings or birthdays, while now ice cream should and can be made a mass product for the day's diet, sold at low prices. Ice cream should be produced summer and winter, in the South and in the North.

#### **Bread-Baking and Confectionery.**

I will not go into details on the bread-baking industries. Comrade Badayev will speak and relate how we have made a complete revolution in the bread industry: 61 per cent. of all the bread produced is baked in mechanised bread bakeries and if we are to take in account all the mechanised bakeries which we have then the total amount of bread baked by mechanical means amounts to 78 per cent. . . .

. . . And now we have automatic bread factories, where the workers are employed for 7 hours a day, where the workers take a shower-bath every day, where no worker is allowed to be employed unless he has passed a medical inspection, and where there is strict medical supervision. Here laboratories have been installed which analyse and test the quality of the bread, the flour, the water, and so on, thus guaranteeing good quality for each ingredient and the highest quality bread. Mechanised bread baking is a new industry, and this industry will grow and develop. From year to year the quality of all articles made from flour will improve. Great advantages accrue from the production of bread in mechanised factories: whereas the cost of producing a pood of bread in ordinary bakeries is 6 roubles, the cost in the automatic factories is only 3 roubles. Half the cost. In the year 1936 we shall try to increase the number of these factories.

After the abolition of the ration card system, the quality of bread improved and an increased number of different varieties was produced. In Moscow and Leningrad to-day, as many as 150 varieties of bread are produced. In towns like Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Sverdlovsk and Minsk, there are over 60 kinds of bread produced—this is less than in Moscow and Leningrad, but it is also pretty fair. But it is bad in the other towns, where only 10 to 12 varieties of bread are produced.

For example, 5 varieties of rye bread are baked in Moscow (sour, sweet, Riga, Finnish, Borodin). Then are ten varieties of white bread, over 30 kinds of buns, and dozens of kinds of rusks and baranki (ring-shaped baked dough) . . . We have a confectionery industry which is well equipped technically, and have good cadres of workers, and can produce confectionery in enormous quantities and of good quality. Why did we produce confectionery of bad quality previously? Formerly,

there was no sugar, and so the consumer bought any quality confectionery, even the very worst. And now that there is an abundance of sugar, our consumer only wants the best sweets. If the sweets are bad, then he prefers to buy sugar . . .

Permit me, comrades, in concluding the survey of the most important branches of industry to pause on the alcohol industry. The alcohol industry has acquired particular significance. Hitherto alcohol was used exclusively for the production of vodka products. Now alcohol has begun to acquire great significance in the chemical industry and in the national economy as a whole.

#### Spirits and Rubber.

In speaking about the results of the first Five-Year Plan, Comrade Stalin said that we had become economically independent of foreign countries, except as regards rubber. And now we can say that as regards rubber also the U.S.S.R. is not dependent upon the capitalist world. The People's Commissariat of the Heavy Industries has begun to make synthetic rubber from spirit. In 1934, 7,000 tons were produced; in 1935—25,000 tons; and in 1936—42,000 tons of rubber will be produced. This Soviet rubber is being made from our good, strong spirit. (Applause.)

True, we still import a certain amount of rubber from abroad, but this will only continue until we have sufficiently developed our own rubber industry.

A few figures on the use of alcohol. Before the war, 75,000 decaliters were used for medicinal purposes; to-day 600,000 are used. Perfumeries (eau de Cologne and perfumes) used 133,000 decaliters before the war; now they use 460,000 decaliters. Hitherto none of it was used for rubber; now 26 per cent. of the total production of our alcohol is used for rubber.

Before the war, 95 per cent. of the total output of spirit went to produce vodka and other wines and strong drink. Now 50 per cent. of the total output of spirit goes to the production of vodka and an additional 5 per cent. for wines. Thus, only 55 per cent. of the output of spirit is used for strong liquors. The remainder is used for technical requirements . . . Some think and say that a great deal of vodka is drunk in Russia, and that little is drunk abroad. This is a totally incorrect idea. Here are the figures of the consumption per capita of vodka, wine and beer in terms of pure alcohol, in the year 1931: France 18.9 litres, Belgium—11.2, England—3.2, U.S.S.R.—1.6 litres.

If we take only vodka and liquors containing vodka (without wines and beer), the figure per capita of the population is as follows: France—9.4 litres, Belgium—3.5, England—1.4, U.S.S.R.—3.7

litres. The consumption of beer per capita in France is 35 litres, Belgium—28 litres, England—62 litres, U.S.S.R.—3 litres.

In France, the consumption of wine per capita is 171 litres, in Belgium—4 litres, U.S.S.R.—only 0.6 litres. Half a litre per person! In the South more wine is drunk and in the North very little. But why is it that the Russians are still considered notorious drinkers? Because under the tsar the people were drunkards, and they did not drink out of joy, but out of misery and poverty. They drank purposely to become drunk and forget all about their cursed lives. An individual would find himself with enough for a bottle of vodka, and would drink it, and not having enough money for food, he would, since there was nothing to eat, make himself drunk. Now life has become more joyful. You don't get drunk when life is good and there is enough to eat. (Laughter, applause.) Life has become more joyful, and we can drink, but drink so that we remain conscious of our surroundings and do not injure our health. (Laughter, applause.)

**The Capitalists Produce Goods for the Sake of Profits, and We Produce to Satisfy the Requirements of the Toilers.**

Comrades, the problem of producing consumers' goods and foodstuffs, as all production in general, is on a different footing in this country than in the capitalist countries. There they manufacture for profits. As soon as the capitalist ceases to derive profits, he either curtails or discontinues production. No profits, no production.

In this country we produce not for profits but in order to satisfy the needs of our population. It happens at times that the State goes in for manufacturing certain commodities at a loss, if they are needed by the country. The satisfaction of the country's demands is our uppermost consideration in economic calculations. Calculation of course is an important matter, but it ought to be subordinated to the problem of satisfying the needs of the country.

In South America not long ago they destroyed huge quantities of coffee, burning 22 million bags of it. Here is the story as told by a bourgeois correspondent:

"Santos is the largest coffee city in Brazil, second in importance in the whole of South America. The first thing which strikes the eye of the foreigner upon arrival in the bay on which this city is situated is a huge bonfire extending 400 m. along the shore. This bonfire is fed by a new kind of fuel, coffee. The whole bay is enshrouded in heavy laden clouds of smoke which are constantly fed by this huge beacon of the economic crisis. The nightmare of these fires haunts the traveller far into the interior of the country. Arriving at night in the Chicago of South America, the largest Brazilian industrial centre at Sao-Paulo, one finds the road illumined by huge flames of burning coffee on either side of the

railway tracks, creating the eerie impression of a living army of fiery ghosts."

Then they went on to destroy the coffee plants. They have now succeeded in reducing the output of coffee by one-half, and they claim to have effected the regulation of coffee supplies in the required proportion. They say so because, having wrecked and curtailed the production of coffee, they have achieved higher prices and begun to derive profits from the sale of coffee. Enormous wealth is thus destroyed by capitalist economy. In Denmark alone 117,000 head of cattle, deemed to be superfluous, were destroyed. In America six million hogs were slaughtered and 225,000 sheep destroyed. There appeared to be no market for them. Of course, a market could be found for meat products, but to do this it would be necessary to do away with unemployment and starvation, and to reduce prices. Capitalists will not go in for this, as profits are their main consideration.

Matters are entirely different in this country. We are developing production for the sake of consumption. Comrade Stalin in his report at the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U., speaking on the development of our national economy and transport, declared that "it is time at last to realise that we are manufacturing commodities in the long run not for the sake of production, but for the sake of consumption." We produce machines not in order to possess machines, but in order to turn out commodities for consumption.

The whole meaning of Socialist production is to supply the country with consumers' goods. Our ultimate aim is not profit and not production for production's sake. We are constantly increasing the output of goods. If we have an abundance of goods, the prices are reduced. The consumer is able to buy goods in the market cheaper and in larger quantities.

And our Soviet policy consists precisely in systematically reducing prices, making the products more and more accessible. Prices have been considerably cut in this country during the last 18 months.

If we take the reduction in prices since October 1, 1934, we see the following picture: the state price of meat has been reduced by 36 per cent., of the most popular variety of sausage—46 per cent., of fish (pike-perch)—36 per cent., cod—66 per cent., Murmansk herring—43 per cent., Caspian herring—16 per cent., loaf sugar—73 per cent., biscuits—41 per cent., canned goods—16-26 per cent., butter—56 per cent., sunflower-seed oil—58 per cent., soap—24 per cent., macaroni—23 per cent., makhorka tobacco—50 per cent., bread—66 per cent.

Price cutting by the state and co-operative trad-

ing led to a considerable fall of prices in the kolkhoz market. Thus, in the Moscow kolkhoz market, the prices of meat dropped 51 per cent. There were considerable reductions in the price of pork. The price of butter was reduced by 53 per cent.

It is the set policy of the Party and the Government to cut prices and enlarge the volume of goods in circulation. As a result of the cutting of state prices and the fall of prices in the market, there is a considerable increase of consumption. This indicates also a growth of cultured and prosperous life.

The Stakhanov movement has called forth a huge growth in the demands of the working population. Stakhanovite workers are now earning from 600 to 700 roubles and more. In this connection we were told by the December Plenum of the C.C. to take stock of the demands of the workers, to give a better assortment and better quality of goods. The quality must be of a high order.

#### **The Collective Farmer Demands Factory-Made Products.**

Life is changing not only in the town, but also in the village. Our village is no longer what it used to be. It has ceased to make homespun cloth, it has ceased to wear bast shoes, and it has ceased to feed solely on stale bread and kvas.\* This is a perfectly natural development. The population has become prosperous. Life is becoming more cultured . . .

. . . The boundary line between town and village life is becoming obliterated. The village has grown considerably more cultured. Therefore we should give more attention to the requirements of the rural consumer. Both the food and light industries should develop production without overlooking for a single moment the demands to be made by the collective farmer for commodities of good quality. We should not lag behind the huge tempo of growth in the requirements of rural consumers . . .

. . . Our village is already in the market for fruit jellies, preserves, canned meat, fish and vegetables, condensed milk. It is simply amazing how the knowledge about such goods is spreading through the villages. And we shall strive our utmost to spread the news even further. It used to be the custom of displaying goods in the window which were not stocked in the store. At the present time the stores are holding abundant stocks. There should be greater display of the goods, more effective dressing of windows.

The discussion held in the present session of the C.E.C. on the subject of our food industry has imposed numerous obligations on us, on the workers of the food industry. It urges us to do

\* Home-brewed rye-beer.—Ed.

even better work, to supply the country with still more products and of still better quality. The demands of the Soviet country are unlimited. They will go on increasing all the time. This opens boundless prospects before our food industry.

The Red Army, which is equipped with the best airplanes and tanks, we shall endeavour also to supply with the best products in the event of war.

I call to mind how the tsarist quartermasters baked rough, tasteless, bread without variety, for the soldiers. I remember how in 1919, when we, a group of Bolsheviks, were brought from Krasnovodsk to Baku, guarded by English soldiers, we were astounded at the fact that the English soldiers ate cakes, canned chicken and meat and canned beef. They had sweets and jam, canned fruits, chocolate and condensed milk.

We may declare that when the Red Army requires food products in the event of war, it is going to get from us an abundance of condensed

milk, coffee and cocoa, meat and chicken preserves, tongue preserves, confectioneries, fruit jellies, and other articles which our country richly possesses. (Applause.) . . .

. . . Comrades, permit me to express the wish that every Communist, that every Party and non-Party Bolshevik, will take such an interest in the food industry as will help and improve it in such a way as is done in regard to the food industry by Comrade Stalin. (Ovation in honour of Comrade Stalin.)

Under the banner of Lenin and Stalin we shall march forward to an abundance of products, to an abundance of consumers' goods, to a cultured life for all the members of our society.

(Stormy, prolonged applause. All rise. Shouts of "Hurrah!" Exclamations: "Long live the great Stalin!" "Hurrah to Mikoyan!" "Comrade Stalin, we shall fight even harder for better quality of production." Greetings to Government and Party leaders from all parts of the hall.)

## THE EIGHTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RED ARMY

By K. ZELOS.

"Amid the surging waves of economic shocks and military-political catastrophes, the U.S.S.R. stands out alone, like a rock, continuing its work of Socialist construction, and its fight to preserve peace." (From Report by Stalin at the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., 1935.)

**T**HESSE words of the leader of the international proletariat have full force even to-day. The Communist Party, the government of the proletarian dictatorship, have not one whit changed their honest desire to maintain peace. Nevertheless, the incessant acts of aggression against the Soviet Union of certain capitalist states, and in particular of Japan, require that the toilers of the first proletarian state in the world should be prepared at a moment's notice to defend it against foreign invasion.

That is why enormous attention is devoted in the Soviet Union to the task of defending the country, of strengthening the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The strength and might of the Red Army increase from year to year. The Red Army to-day is a very stable force. It is strong in its possession of the most up-to-date technique, in its excellent organisation, discipline and solidarity. It is strong in its unbounded loyalty to the cause of Lenin and Stalin. It is strong in the people's love of it, unprecedented anywhere at any time before. "The strength of the Red Army is indomitable." (Voroshilov.)

colourful one. It has its source in the springs of the revolutionary upsurge of the working class movement of 1905. In the struggle against Russian tsarism, the Bolshevik Party, under the leadership of its founder and leader, V. I. LENIN, built up the first cells of the armed proletariat—the fighting guards, which were the embryo of the future army of the proletarian dictatorship. The proletariat learned how to use firearms, learned the elements of the art of warfare, in battles against the tsarist gendarmes and the tsarist army, on the barricades of Moscow, Petersburg (Leningrad), Baku, Rostov and other big towns.

In June, 1905, not long before the December armed uprising in Moscow, Lenin wrote:

"A revolutionary army is necessary because great historic tasks can only be solved by force, and the organisation of force in the present-day struggle is a military organisation (Lenin, Volume VII, p. 383, Russ. Edn.)

The lessons of the 1905 revolution—the general rehearsal of the Great October—were not wasted. In the pre-October days in 1917, in Petrograd alone there were as many as 20,000 armed Red Guards, organised in fighting units and led by commanders appointed by the Party of Bolsheviks.

Thus, the insurgent and victorious proletariat of the Great Socialist Revolution of October, 1917, even before the organisation of their Red Army, had already gained experience in the creation of armed forces, and had had excellent fighting experiences.

After the victorious October revolution, Red

The history of the Red Army is a splendid and

Guard detachments were formed of volunteers, but these detachments would not have been able to withstand the organised units of the counter-revolution at home and on an international scale.

The Soviet Government had to set against the regular troops of the counter-revolution, a big, regular army of its own, with its own commanders, its own military and technical material basis built up on the principles of military organisation.

By Decree of January 28th, 1918, issued by the Government of the Soviet Republic over the signature of V. I. Lenin, the basis was laid for the establishment of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

THE RED ARMY WAS CREATED TO DEFEND THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, TO CONSOLIDATE THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT.

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The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, established by the Party of Lenin and Stalin, is the strongest weapon of proletarian dictatorship. This new type of army, new in world history, had, and has now, nothing in common with the old tsarist army. What are the peculiar features of the Red Army?

"The first and basic peculiar feature of our Red Army is that it is the army of the liberation of the workers and peasants, it is the army of the October Revolution, the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"The second peculiar feature of the Red Army is that it is our army, an army of brotherhood between the peoples, an army to liberate the oppressed peoples, an army to defend the freedom and independence of the Socialist republics which go to constitute the Soviet Union.

"Finally, the third peculiar feature of the Red Army is the spirit of internationalism, the feeling of internationalism which penetrate the whole of our Red Army" (Stalin: "Marxism and Leninism about war and the army.")

This splendid characterisation of the peculiar features of the Red Army given by J. V. Stalin, the comrade-in-arms of our great Lenin, best of all reveals the class character and international significance of the Red Army.

The rôle of Comrade STALIN in organising the victories of the Red Army was immeasurably great. In March, 1919, at the closed session of the Eighth Congress of the then Russian Communist Party, where decisions of importance in principle were adopted on the war question (concerning the use of military specialists, etc.), Comrade STALIN made a speech (as reporter of the C.C. of the Party) in which he was most emphatic in advancing the task of creating a regular, efficient, politically trained Red Army:

"Political education is of tremendous importance in the army. We must ensure that our men, both in the rear and at the front, are educated in the revolutionary spirit. We must ensure that a regular army is established which is ready to go into battle at any moment."

A regular army was formed. The Party, led by Lenin, sent Comrade Stalin to those points where mortal danger menaced the revolution. This was the case on the South-Eastern front, where Stalin's brilliant leadership secured the heroic defence of Tsarytsin, which at that time was the strategic wedge between the forces of the counter-revolution in the South and in the East.

This was the case in the struggle against Denikin in the South, where the brilliant, strategic, Stalinist plan of routing the tsarist general ensured the splendid victory of the Red Army over the numerous forces of the enemy; this was also the case on other fronts.

The Stalinist plan of routing Denikin was to deliver the main blow at the white army through the proletarian Donetz Basin, where the Red Army not only met with the support of the local population, but considerably reinforced its ranks with an excellent, militant contingent of fighters and political leaders from among the proletarians of the Donetz Basin.

This strategic Stalinist plan of operations has gone down in military history as a most brilliant example of military art, based on a complete Marxist analysis of all the factors of the concrete situation. As we know, Trotsky, who, at that time was at the head of the Red Army, resisted the operation of Stalin's plan with all his might. As against Stalin's plan he set his own worthless, politically short-sighted plan of crushing Denikin "by the shortest" route across the Don region, inhabited at that time by counter-revolutionary kulak elements among the Cossacks.

The activities of Trotsky, together with all his advisers—military specialists among whom there were quite a number of direct agents of the counter-revolution—all but ruined the then young Soviet Republic. Only the energetic interference of Lenin, who wholeheartedly supported all the measures proposed by Stalin and who, to all intents and purposes, removed Trotsky from the leadership, saved the situation and ensured the brilliant culminating point of victory over the counter-revolutionary forces of the South.

Trotsky, the old Menshevik, joined the ranks of the Bolsheviks during the period of the stormy rise of the wave of revolution in 1917, hiding away his Menshevik baggage, and later, as we know, took his place in the front ranks of the counter-revolution, occupied an anti-Leninist position not only in his appraisal of the proletarian revolution, the ways of socialist construction, but also on military questions.

The anti-Leninist position of Trotsky on questions of building up the armed forces was expressed in a stubborn struggle against the Party

leadership in the Red Army, in ignoring this leadership. Trotsky resisted the introduction of the institution of military commissars and political departments, and later ignored and tried to discredit these direct representatives of the Party in the ranks of the Red Army.

Trotsky adopted an uncritical attitude on the question of using bourgeois military specialists — he put excessive confidence in them.

Trotsky was also against applying the principles of Marxism to the building up of the Red Army, and denied any place to Marxism in military affairs.

It is to Comrade Stalin that the great merit belongs of establishing the First Cavalry Army, headed by Comrades Voroshilov and Budyonny, in spite of the opposition of Trotsky.

It is characteristic that Trotsky raised quite a number of obstacles in this regard, too. He resisted the creation of the Cavalry Army by all means possible.

No less great was the rôle played by Stalin in wiping out the last armed stronghold of Russian and international counter-revolution, of Baron Wrangel.

The far-from-complete facts quoted, of the activities of Comrade Stalin on the front of the civil war, serve all the more to emphasise the exceptional rôle he played in bringing about the destruction of all the counter-revolutionary armies. The decisive operations performed by the Red Army were carried out against the will of Trotsky and under the direct leadership of Comrade STALIN. The name of Stalin is firmly inscribed in letters of gold on the old fighting banners, blackened by powder and smoke, of regiments, divisions, corps and armies. The most unforgettable days of the magnificent victories of the Red Army on the fields of the civil war are linked up with his name.

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For three years an intense struggle was carried on against the enemies of the proletarian revolution, for three years the Red Army, technically weak but strong in revolutionary enthusiasm, heroically conquered the numerous hordes of its enemies. In this difficult and fierce struggle, the Red Army, under the wise leadership of LENIN and STALIN, the great strategists of the class struggle, grew strong and steeled, and trained and promoted a number of brilliant army leaders, who came from the heart of the masses of the people, and who had never been military specialists. The names of the talented proletarian leaders and commanders of the Red Army — Comrades FRUNZE, VOROSHILOV, KIROV, KUIBYSHEV, BUDYONNY, BLUCHER, TUKHACHEVSKY, YEGOROV, and the legendary heroes,

Chapayev, Shorss, etc.—are familiar and dear not only to the toilers of the U.S.S.R., but to the toilers throughout the world.

Almost fifteen years have passed since the time of the last battles of the civil war years. The Red Army meets its eighteenth anniversary at a time when its country is living in conditions of extraordinary prosperity and might. Wise Leninist-Stalinist leadership has brought the U.S.S.R.—the fatherland of the international proletariat—out of poverty, hunger and cold, on to the bright, broad road of general cultural and technical progress, on to the road to the classless, Socialist society.

The face of the Soviet Union has become unrecognisable, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, its faithful guard, is also unrecognisable.

Having maintained "its three peculiarities," so aptly characterised by Stalin, sacredly safeguarding the fighting traditions of its glorious past, the Red Army, with the wealth of modern technique it has obtained from Socialist industry, has become a modernised army.

"You know our aeroplanes, you often see our tanks, guns, machine-guns, rifles, all our war ammunition. They all look excellent; they are all fine, admirable, powerful armaments," said Comrade Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, in his speech delivered at the All-Union Conference of Stakhanov workers. "Bad tanks," added the People's Commissar for Defence, "cannot cover a distance of 700 kilometres in big groups in the course of a few days, three-quarters of which distance was covered through water, and without a single accident or breakdown. They have to be fine tanks, and they are."

But it is not in technique alone that the Red Army is strong. Speaking at the same conference of Stakhanov workers, Comrade Stalin said:

"You may have first-class technique, first-class mills and factories, but if you have not the people capable of harnessing that technique, you will find that your technique is just bare technique."

The might of the Red Army lies first and foremost in the living people who have mastered this technique. The Stalinist slogan, "Cadres decide Everything," has been the guiding star, the militant programme of the work of the Red Army.

Attention to the needs of the human being and care of people constitute the key to the colossal successes achieved by the Red Army during the last year. These successes in the military and political training of the Red Army merged into a real triumph when, before the end of the academic year, during the Kiev manoeuvres in 1935, it passed the test before all the toilers of the Union, before its leader Voroshilov, for the right to be called the best trained, best organised and disciplined army in the world. Was it not a real triumph, when, during the manoeuvres, 1,200 parachutists jumped simultaneously, and when 2,500 men were landed from aeroplanes in forty

minutes. In a military area adjacent to Kiev, 1,800 men were dropped simultaneously and 5,700 men landed, from aeroplanes. Nowhere in the world is parachuting so widespread as in the U.S.S.R. This is only possible in the Land of Socialism, where the toiling masses are self-sacrificingly devoted to their fatherland, where labour has become a matter of honour, glory, prowess and heroism.

Even foreign military specialists have been compelled to recognise the colossal successes of the Red Army. For example, this is the opinion of General Fayer, Head of the Czech Air Delegation, on Soviet aviation:

"The love for their work and the will that can be seen in the Soviet parachutists and glider and plane pilots is worthy of admiration. One can always create the material side. But it is incomparably more difficult to create strong, conscious, human material. This has been achieved here, and herein lies the greatest achievement."

We might give an infinitely larger number of various utterances by foreign military and civil personages concerning the Red Army, in which we shall find very many praises concerning it.

Side by side with all the praise of the Red Army, there are not a few slanderous accusations against the "imperialist tendencies of the Red Army and the Soviet Government" to be met with in the camp of the bourgeoisie, especially among the German fascists. The Soviet Government, regardless of the fury of the fascists, who spread their slander about the aggressive plans of the U.S.S.R. and about Red imperialism, etc., has adopted a number of measures to increase the defensive power of the U.S.S.R. as a whole, and the fighting strength of the Red Army. The numerical strength of the Red Army has been increased from 900,000 to 1,300,000 men. The number of regular divisions has been increased to cover 77 per cent. of the men in the Red Army and only 23 per cent. of the divisions have remained territorial units.

However, even with this increase, the number of Army men per thousand civilians is considerably smaller in the Soviet Union than in the capitalist countries.

Naturally, the increase in the strength of the Red Army, both in numbers and in technical equipment has made it necessary to increase the expenditure on its upkeep. Whereas in the year 1935 the expenditure of the People's Commissariat of Defence represented 12.8 per cent. of the state budget, the figure estimated for the year 1936 is 18.3 per cent. The budget of the People's Commissariat of Defence, according to the 1936 plan, amounts to 14,800 million roubles as compared with 8,200 million roubles in 1935. This increase in the Budget has been to a considerable degree called forth by the care being taken by the Party

and the Soviet Government to improve the material and cultural conditions of the commanders and political workers and rank and file men in the Red Army. Out of these funds there are to be built well-arranged barracks, houses for the commanders, sanatoria, rest homes, sports grounds, etc. This increase has been heartily endorsed by all toilers in the Soviet Union.

Whereas in capitalist states an increase in expenditure on military requirements brings in its train an inevitable increase in the burden of taxation, and therefore worse living conditions for the toilers, in the Soviet Union, on the contrary, as can be seen from the National Economic Plan for the year 1936, the conditions of the workers and masses of collective farmers are not only not worsened, but are considerably improved. In 1936 the national income will increase by 26.5 per cent. The economic power of the U.S.S.R., the bright prospects of further development allow of the increase in the assignments for the requirements of defence, without any sacrifice of the vital interests of the toilers.

During recent years the forces of the Red Army have grown many, many times, and now, as Comrade Voroshilov correctly declared at the conference of Stakhanov workers:

"We do not raise the question at all as to whether we shall conquer the enemy or not. We shall undoubtedly conquer . . . The question that we now put is: at what price, at the cost of what efforts, and with what sacrifices, shall we conquer?"

Remembering the advice of their leader—"don't get swelled heads," the men and commanders in the Red Army are not resting on their laurels, are not sparing themselves, but with enthusiasm, with tremendous joy and faith in their own strength, are increasing their knowledge, their fighting power, and are mastering the varied technique at their disposal. The Stankhanov movement, which has burst forth like a storm throughout the country, has been caught up with unprecedented enthusiasm by the Red Army as well.

The Stakhanov Red Army men—pilots, tankists, sailors, railwaymen, rank-and-file and communication men—are beating all existing records, are achieving miracles.

The conscious, iron discipline in the Red Army, the extraordinary unanimity between the men and their commanders, the correct relations between them based upon the mutual understanding that exists between them, upon respect and confidence, all encourage this.

During leisure hours, the commanders, from the junior ranks to the high command, play chess, football and tennis with the rank-and-file, and participate on an equal basis with them in the various Party and social organisations.

From the bourgeois viewpoint as regards the organisational principles of the structure of the army, such relations should undermine the authority of the commander and the discipline of the army. But in Red Army conditions, when the basis of the relations between people is respect for the human worth of each citizen of the Soviet Republic, such relations between the men and their commanders, not only do not undermine discipline and the authority of the commanders in the army, but, on the contrary, they strengthen conscious discipline, create an atmosphere of true respect around the commander, imbue the Red Army men with a feeling of sincere love and comradesly loyalty towards their commander.

How great was the pleasure and joy with which the Red Army men greeted the decision of the Soviet Government to allocate individual military ranks to the commanders and political leaders of the army.

"Our lieutenants, captains, and colonels," runs the resolution of a general meeting of the men of the First Rifle Division, "are the sons of workers and peasants, and are connected with us, Red Army men, with the blood ties of our class. We are glad for our commanders, and believe that they will, bear with honour their military ranks, given them by the Workers' and Peasants' Government."

Is this not an illustration of the true respect and love felt by the Red Army men towards their commanders?

A number of writers in the bourgeois press greeted the news of the introduction of military ranks in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with great rejoicing as a return to the old customs. You rejoice in vain, gentlemen! There is not, nor can there be, any return to the old customs. The Red Army commander is a specialist of the art of warfare, and an example of courage, consciousness, and of a cultured outlook, an example of comradesly relations towards the Red Army men. The marshals, colonels, majors and lieutenants of the Red Army remain, flesh and blood, the sons of workers and collective farmers. They are indissolubly connected with their class, they are indissolubly connected with the rank and file men of what is a real people's Red Army.

The toiling masses of the Soviet Union love and are proud of their Red Army, which defends all the peoples included in the 170 million population of the Soviet Union. With what love, with what triumph did the workers and collective farmers meet the Red Army detachments marching past or standing at their posts during the autumn manoeuvres of 1935? With what love the young people of the U.S.S.R. send their letters and various presents to their comrades — the militant frontier guards—who vigilantly protect the Soviet

frontier line which stretches a distance of 60,000 kilometres?

The best people of the Socialist village, for example, the heroic collective farming women, Katerina Androshuk and Christina Chernaya, on their return to their collective farm from Moscow, where the Government awarded them the Order of Lenin, paid their first visit to the Red Army and commanders of the N artillery regiment.

These collective farming women told the men and their commanders how they had gathered 531 centners of beets per hectare, and how they intend in the future to gather 600 centners. Androshuk told of her prosperous life in the collective farm.

Here is yet another interesting fact.

On October 12, last year, a Japano-Manchurian detachment, consisting of over forty men, crossed the Soviet frontier in the Grodekovo region.

The frontier guards began to signal that the detachment had violated the frontier. The Japanese did not retreat. Shooting took place, and in the battle one of the best Red Army men of the outpost, Valentin Kotelnikov, was killed (the outpost is named after him now).

On receipt from the head of the detachment of the news of the death of his brother, Peter Kotelnikov, a young engineer, twenty years old and employed in the "Metalsyrye" Works (Donetz Basin) told his father — a foreman in the same works, that he wanted to join the Red Army voluntarily, without waiting to be called up, and to take the place of his brother. The father approved his son's decision. Peter placed his application with the corresponding authorities, requesting that they despatch him to defend the frontiers. The request of the brother of the frontier guard who so heroically perished was met, and now Peter is a fighter in the frontier detachment where his brother formerly served.

In a cheerful letter written to the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Peter Kotelnikov, among other things, writes: "Life is good here. All the care and attention with which our fathers, brothers, and sisters surround us, sentinels, of our fatherland, is profoundly touching."

In what other country but the proletarian state can such fraternal ties be established between the army and the people?

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Side by side with the general advance in the material well-being of the toilers of the Land of Soviets, and the rise in the cultural and technical level of the workers and collective farmers, the cultural and technical level of the Red Army men is rising at a rapid rate. The Red Army offers the best examples of the Socialist education of people.

"Our Red Army, a school of Socialist education and training in new technique for millions of people is among the most active in raising the cultural level of the population . . . Our Red Army is not only the foundation of our country's defence, but also a school of the new culture of the Workers' and Peasants' State" (Molotov, Concluding Speech at the 2nd Session of the C.E.C. U.S.S.R., Seventh Assembly.)

These admirable words of COMRADE MOLOTOV are confirmed by tens of thousands of facts. Many Stakhanov workers are people who have passed through the school that is the Red Army. Many chairmen of collective farms, brigadiers, and collective farm and Soviet state farm shock-workers are people who have come from the Red Army. Here is a typical letter written by a demobilised Red Army man to his commander:

"Comrade Commander," writes a demobilised Red Army man from Siberia to his Commander, "you cannot imagine how much I long to shake you by the hand and offer my Red Army thanks to you for all, for everything. What was I when I came to the Red Army? Half-illiterate, and without class-consciousness. I would sit at village meetings and understand nothing; nor did I want to listen. There was class-consciousness for you! And now they've elected me Chairman of the collective farm, I conduct a political circle with our collective farmers, I deliver reports in the club, and have organised a dramatic circle; I am very keen to stage a play."

In the Red Army the battle for culture in the broadest sense of the word has been launched all along the front. Now, by the Eighteenth Anniversary of the Red Army, it has throughout the U.S.S.R., thirteen military academies on various specialities, six military faculties attached to civil universities, and many military schools of different kinds, all training army cadres. In the Red Army units there are about 1,000 clubs, 2,000 Red Army libraries with a total number of 12,000,000 books.

The cultural level of the living conditions of the Red Army men and their commanders is improving every year.

The Presidium\* of the last Party Conference of Trans-Caucasus visited the sapper company of the First Georgian Regiment, situated in a lonely part of the Georgian Soviet Republic.

Here are the impressions of their visit as given by the conference delegates:

"We were astonished at the state of affairs we found in the sapper company. There is the cleanliness of an exemplary sanatorium in the rooms of the Red Army men. Excellent spring bedsteads, each man with a tidy locker and books. On the lockers, white cloths and electric table-lamps. By the side of each bed, a soft carpet and carpet slippers. On the wall at the head of each bed, wireless earphones. We dined with the Red Army men. The food was excellent. It appears that over night the men express their desire in writing concerning what they would like for the next day, choosing from the pretty varied assortment of dishes offered in the menu."

\* The Presidium is the group of comrades, usually the most outstanding, elected at the beginning of a conference to guide the proceedings.—Ed.

This example clearly shows the growing culture of the Red Army and its national units, the representatives of which latter were always an object of jeers and insults in the old tsarist barracks. The emancipated peoples of the U.S.S.R., under the leadership of the Communist Party, are building up their national units with tremendous enthusiasm, and many of these units, as regards military and political training, are in no way inferior to the rest of the Red Army units.

A whole number of nationalities, who never before served in the hated tsarist army of old Russia, now bear with great pride the name of Red Army men and commanders of the united Workers' and Peasants' army, and are prepared at the first call of the government of the Soviet Union to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army men from Russia proper, like the Germans, Hungarians, Finns, Latvians and other peoples in the International Red Army regiments fought during the years of civil war, for the life and liberty of the Motherland they had acquired for themselves for the first time.

All these successes are the result of the friendship established between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. In this friendship lies the guarantee that "the peoples of our country will be free and unconquerable. We fear nobody, no enemies either at home or abroad, so long as this friendship lives and flourishes" (Stalin.)

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The care shown for the Red Army by the Party and Government, and especially the personal care evinced by Comrade Stalin, is a tremendous stimulus for the whole of the Red Army in its struggle for the skilful mastery of technique, in the struggle after culture and knowledge. The tens of thousands of people who have grown up in the army, who are displaying self-sacrifice, courage and heroism in their peace-time studies, are the best proof that the U.S.S.R. has an army at its disposal worthy of the fatherland of the proletariat of all countries. The strength of the Red Army is invincible. But the Red Army does not rest content with the successes already achieved, and to the great fear of all the enemies of the proletariat, continues to perfect itself, and to strengthen its military and political might. Broad masses of the toilers in the capitalist countries and the oppressed peoples of the colonies fully recognise that the further consolidation of the might of the Red Army affords the land where Soviet Power is triumphant, an opportunity of peacefully continuing its world historic work of building the classless society. The toiling masses throughout the world understand full well, in addition, that the further consolidation of the Red Army is their own deep concern, for it is defending the cause of the international proletariat.



SHAPURJI SAKLATVALA.

# SHAPURJI SAKLATVALA

## He Will Live Again In The Work To Come

By HARRY POLLITT

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**B**Y the death of Saklatvala, the Indian people have lost their greatest and most sincere champion, the Communist Party one of its most devoted and self-sacrificing leaders, and his family a kindly, gentle, loving husband and father.

The honoured name of Shapurji Saklatvala was known the world over, and he will be mourned by millions of oppressed peoples, who appreciated his fight for their liberation and independence from the yoke of imperialism.

Never have the workers of Britain, and the workers and peasants of India especially, had a leader who did so much and who sacrificed himself so much to their service as Saklatvala.

His amazing vitality, his profound knowledge of anything he undertook, his ready and comradely advice, and his cultural attainments, and his unrivalled abilities as an orator and exponent of the revolutionary principles of the Communist International, leave a wide gap in our ranks.

In very truth we can say of our beloved comrade:—

*"He died for the workers  
In life he was one whose  
Love knew no stint, whom  
No fear could appal."*

Only those who have known him intimately can form any idea of the work that he did. Night after night, year after year, in all parts of Britain he carried out his task of working-class agitation, education and organisation.

Only those who participate in this understand the ceaseless strain and anxiety it entails. No comrade ever did more of this work so uncomplainingly as Comrade Saklatvala.

No call was ever made upon him to which

he did not respond. Be the meeting large or small, it was always the same. Be it near or far, it was all the same.

Countless memories flood in upon me as I write. One of our comrade in 1927 immediately comes to mind when he spoke at a meeting on the Sunday night in Edinburgh, took the night train to Crewe, motored to Ogmere in South Wales for a Miners' May Meeting in the morning, did a further meeting in Swansea at night, and travelled all night back to Battersea for a Committee meeting on the Tuesday morning.

That was how he worked.

Saklatvala was 61 years of age. He was born in Bombay and educated at St. Xavier's College in that city. He studied law in England and was called to the Bar.

On arrival in England in 1905 he was persuaded to join the National Liberal Club, but a few months of its atmosphere was enough for him and when he left it he left the Liberal

Party behind him for ever.

A meeting with Lord Morley was sufficient to disillusion him with Liberal talk, of its friendship for the Indian people.

By 1910 he had become one of the most active members of the Independent Labour Party; he was always striving inside the I.L.P. to combat the MacDonald-Snowden influence.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 made a tremendous impression upon Shapurji Saklatvala and he became one of the foremost in popularising its historic significance, and a leader in the People's Russian Information Bureau.

He also took an active part in the Left-wing group inside the I.L.P. who in 1919 began the political struggle for the I.L.P. to join the Communist International.

He came to the Communist Party in 1921

The Communist International lowers its fighting banner over the coffin of our true Comrade Shapurji Saklatvala, a worthy son of the Indian people, a true friend of the working-class and a tireless fighter in the cause of Socialism.—*Georgi Dimitrov.*

with other members of the I.L.P. and became at once a great force inside the Communist Party. Also, of course, this step of Saklatvala's had a tremendous significance throughout the Indian Nationalist and Revolutionary movements.

In 1922, although a Communist, he was elected Labour Member for North Battersea. He lost his seat in 1923, but regained it in 1924.

In 1929 he was faced with Labour opposition and was defeated.

In September, 1925, Saklatvala was to go to the United States as a member of the British Delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference, but Mr. Kellogg, the Secretary of State, revoked his visa on the grounds that the United States did not admit revolutionaries.

For his activities during the General Strike in May, 1926, he was given two months in jail.

In 1927, Saklatvala went to India and was given a great reception by the masses wherever he went, such as it falls to the lot of few men to get.

From India he wanted to go to Egypt, but was refused permission to do so . . . and on his return to England, the Government revoked his permit to visit India again.

He — an Indian of whom all India was proud—was denied access to his own country.

Even the Labour Government of 1929-31 refused to remove this outrageous ban on one whose life was dedicated to the cause of his people and the freedom of his country.

In 1934 Saklatvala again visited the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and was enthusiastically welcomed by the workers in Leningrad and Moscow.

But the proudest moments of his life, he recently told me, were those he spent in Turkestan, Kazakstan and Trans-Caucasia, where for weeks he was wildly greeted by tens of thousands of peoples freed from the yoke of Tsarism by the Russian Revolution.

He saw the new industry, new collective agriculture, new culture and life, that free peoples can develop when once Communism has given them their independence and emancipation.

"Oh, Harry, what my people could do in India," he said, "if only they were as free as my comrades in those autonomous republics of the U.S.S.R."

This experience seemed to give even Comrade Saklatvala a new and greater energy and impulse in all his later work.

He went with renewed enthusiasm into the struggle for Indian freedom and independence for solidarity between British and Indian workers, and for unity between all those organisations in India that fight against British imperialism.

On the very day of his death he carried on this work. I know that all Thursday, and to within two hours of death claiming him, he had been patiently trying to bring about unity between two groups of Indian comrades in London.

One could say that "Unity, unity alone can give our Indian people its freedom," were his last words.

Saklatvala has gone from our midst. Another soldier of the Revolution has passed on.

We lower our Red Banners before your closed eyes, dear comrade Saklatvala, we pay tribute to all that you have done and taught us.

We are proud that you carried your early work to its logical conclusion by embracing and becoming a fearless exponent of the principles of the Communist International.

You have built better than you knew. Your work will go on.

We swear before your open grave that the Red Banner you held so proudly aloft, the hope and inspiration you gave to millions living in the darkness of imperialist slavery, shall be carried forward to other fights and victories.

We pledge ourselves that your unparalleled devotion and self-sacrifice shall be the example we will endeavour to emulate.

To-day in the mining valleys of South Wales, the cotton towns of Lancashire, the shipyard centres of the North-East Coast, and the factories and shipyards of Scotland, workers mourn and grieve for your passing.

But you will live again in the work that will follow. The workers of the world will unite. They will break their chains.

They will build that new world of which you have been so mighty an architect.

*"We lay him to sleep where his comrades lie sleeping,*

*United in death as in life they had fought.*

*With pride in our hearts though our eyes may be weeping,*

*We follow the path that our Leader has taught."*

## CONCERNING THE "RUDE PRAVO"—CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

By V. KOPETSKY.

**I**N consequence of the loss of revolutionary, Bolshevik vigilance, enemies of the Party wormed their way into the *Rude Pravo*, the central organ of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, and tried, and to some extent were successful, in making use of the central organ for the propaganda of alien ideas, hostile to Bolshevism, and contrary to the line of the Comintern, and of its Seventh World Congress. Further, there were political errors in the *Rude Pravo* prior to the last article as well, which led, finally, to the exposure of Budin, the chief editor of the paper, and to his being driven out of the Party. Here we will try to show in more detail how the enemies of the Party who had entrenched themselves in the central organ of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, gradually prepared the conditions making it possible for them to come out on the pages of the Communist press with openly chauvinist articles.

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During the Seventh Congress of the Comintern the *Rude Pravo* already failed to cope with the task of giving publicity to the work of the Congress and its decisions. While the entire non-Communist press of Czecho-Slovakia reacted in a more lively fashion to the reports and speeches delivered at the Congress, and ran comments on its sessions in leading articles and a large number of articles, the *Rude Pravo* could only find space on the third page for the report delivered by Comrade Dimitrov, which was of tremendous historic importance. The *Rude Pravo* did not even accompany the speech delivered by Comrade Gottwald at the Congress which laid down the programme of new tactics for the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, with any explanations at all, and remained silent in reply to the attacks of the bourgeois and Social-Democratic press against this speech. Neither during the sessions of the Congress nor afterwards, did the *Rude Pravo* deign to print a single comment, or a single original article about the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and its decisions.

Can this unexampled silence concerning the Seventh Congress of the Comintern by the central organ of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia be explained merely as the result of the bad work of our special correspondents? By no means. NOW THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO ADOPT MEASURES AGAINST CERTAIN PERSONS IN THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE "RUDE PRAVO," AS AGENTS OF THE ENEMY CAUGHT RED-HANDED AT THEIR WORK, it has become clear that the indifferent attitude of the *Rude Pravo* to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern signified not merely neglect of their journalistic duties but also DOWNRIGHT POLITICAL SABOTAGE.

The clear words of the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, the clear fashion of raising the new tactical line of the Comintern, met with no interpretation in the Editorial Board of the *Rude Pravo*. But opportunist mistakes and politically incorrect views of the Party leadership, far from the line of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, found enthusiastic interpreters in the *Rude Pravo*. But the *Rude Pravo* did not limit itself to merely stating these incorrect views, but developed them still further. Anything that in the Party policy was merely a wrong step, an opportunist tendency, was often developed in the *Rude Pravo*, into a social-patriotic, bourgeois-democratic viewpoint.

The *Rude Pravo* interpreted in its own way the decisions of the Seventh Congress on the application of united front tactics in the new way, almost entirely refusing in actual practice to criticise Social-Democracy at all, refusing to defend the principles of Communist policy, and creating the impression that since the Seventh Congress the Communists have changed their appraisal of the policy of Social-Democracy, no longer condemn that policy and that this change is the basis for a rapprochement between the Communists and Social-Democrats. Here we already have an open transfer to the Social-Democratic position, and a departure from the line of the Comintern. From that point the road leads straight to the distortions of the decisions of the Congress to the beginning of bouquet presentations to all the Social-Democratic leaders. According to the *Rude Pravo*, Hampel, Nechas and all who in a greater or lesser degree are supporters of the united front, are lefts. The *Rude Pravo* calls Rudolph Bechyne alone a Right. In one of the issues of the *Rude Pravo* the following heading appeared in heavy type: "MINISTER NECHAS MAKES ACCUSATIONS AGAINST CAPITALIST RESISTANCE IN THE GOVERNMENT." Thus, at the desire of the *Rude Pravo*, Minister Nechas,

previously recommended by the paper as a "Left," becomes a bold "warrior" against the capitalists, although with the best will in the world one can find nothing in the report of Nechas' speech except the usual assurances given by the Social-Democrats that they are conducting the class struggle in the Council of Ministers.

Besides painting the Social-Democratic leaders in these colours, the *Rude Pravo* persistently "failed to notice" TENS AND HUNDREDS AND THOUSANDS OF EXTREMELY CLEAR AND DETERMINED ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC AND NATIONAL-SOCIALIST WORKERS AND THEIR ORGANISATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED FRONT, thus directing the masses along the wrong road and sabotaging all attempts made by the masses themselves to find the right road. The *Rude Pravo* never confronted the declarations of Hampel and Tuchny with the activities and resolutions of the Social-Democratic and National Socialist workers and their organisations.

The position of the *Rude Pravo* was particularly clearly shown during the campaign in connection with the passing of the State Budget, which was debated in Parliament in November and December, and during the campaign in connection with the presidential elections, called after the retirement of T. G. Masaryk.

In connection with the debate on the State Budget, a campaign should have been launched, mobilising the broad masses of the toilers to fight for their own demands, AGAINST THE COALITION BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST PARTIES AND THE REACTIONARY BOURGEOISIE. But instead of this, the campaign was conducted in a fashion which caused rumours to be circulated in the press about the alleged preparedness of the Communists to enter the government and their intention to strengthen the positions of the Socialist Parties inside the coalition. And could any other impression arise when by reading the *Rude Pravo* it appeared that the Communists were by no means against the draft Budget brought in by the coalition government, but were even in favour of it, in certain conditions? Could any other impression arise when the vote by the PARLIAMENTARY COMMUNIST FRACTION IN FAVOUR OF THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE sounded like a vote of confidence in the government, which at that time was already headed by the Right agrarian, Hodja, and which had agreed to collaborate with other reactionary parties? Could any other impression arise when the viewpoint of the Parliamentary Communist fraction on the budget of the War Ministry was described in the *Rude Pravo* under the heading: "THE COMMUNISTS ARE IN FAVOUR OF STRONG DEFENCE." Could any other

impression arise, when the Party policy was given such a tone that a comrade, in an article on the political situation and the work of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia could exclaim pathetically: "THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT AFRAID OF PENAL PRISONS, NEITHER DO THEY FEAR MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS."

The tone of loyal opposition inside the bourgeois State which rang out in the *Rude Pravo* in connection with the voting of the draft Budgets of the two ministries and in connection with the Presidential elections, reflected the wrong tendencies manifested in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia on the questions of defending democracy, defending the republic, and defending the independence of the small nations, etc. As regards the defence of the republic and the independence of the Czech nation, the *Rude Pravo* wrote in a spirit as though it was all a matter of the fate of the Czech nation, of the preservation of its state independence. Just as though we are not interested in the fate of other nations in Czecho-Slovakia, as though we had rejected the struggle for their liberation, the struggle for self-determination. The question of the mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia was dealt with in the *Rude Pravo* as though it followed therefrom that the Communists of Czecho-Slovakia must adopt a position of mitigating the struggle against the existing régime, of confidence in bourgeois ministers, of approval of the budgets of the war ministry, of supporting the army, armaments, and so on.

These wrong tendencies were displayed in the whole of the Party press. The *Rude Pravo*, as the central organ of the Party, gave the political line to other Party newspapers, and the *Rote Fahne*, as well as the *Liudovy Dennik* (daily Party newspapers for the German and Slovene regions), reprinted some of the articles from the *Rude Pravo*.

The LANGUAGE used corresponded to this tone of the *Rude Pravo*, which made away even with the terminology of the class struggle on its pages, using instead the style of "high politics," loud phrases and methods peculiar to the petty bourgeois scribes. It was not at all astonishing that the worker correspondents of the *Rude Pravo* had a bad time. And when the workers complained about it in their letters to the *Rude Pravo*, the former Editor-in-Chief, S. BUDIN, wrote a special article on the question in which he gave them an insolent reply, full of mockery. The workers could not but feel that there were not merely alien elements, but class enemies, in the leadership of the central organ of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia.

One of these enemies was the Editor-in-Chief

of the *Rude Pravo*, S. Budin. In the discussion supplement to the *Rude Pravo* published in connection with the preparations for the Seventh Congress of the Party, he published an article entitled: "What is Czech Social-Democracy like?" in which he expounded the following views, with reference to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern:

"We observe a crisis of Social-Democracy in all sections of the Second International. French Social-Democracy is adopting the platform of class struggle. The illegal Social-Democratic Parties in Italy, in Germany and in the Baltic countries are conducting a revolutionary struggle against fascism. The leaders of the Lefts in the Second International, Bauer, Dan and Zhiromsky, have published their theses "The International and War," in which they give an analysis of the tasks of the proletariat in event of war by fascist Germany against the U.S.S.R. and the democratic states, and define these tasks—if we put aside a number of secondary reservations—in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on the report delivered by Comrade Ercoli. The Amsterdam trade unions are returning to their primary mission of proletarian class organisations."

As regards Czech Social-Democracy, S. Budin wrote:

"Czech Social-Democracy to-day is not what it was two years ago. Look at its attitude towards the Soviet Union. To-day, Social-Democracy, unlike the bourgeois 'friends' of the Soviet Union is among its sincere friends. On this question it has wholly arrived at the position to which Bauer arrived two years ago: it recognises the Socialist nature of the Soviet Union, but speaks of the specifically Russian character of Bolshevism. Otto Bauer has already gone considerably farther ahead . . ."

And further:

"Hampel, although with reservations, although not definitely, although, as it seems to us, still trying to manoeuvre as regards us and the agrarians, is nevertheless in favour of the class struggle, in favour of working class unity."

In another article S. Budin wrote:

"To-day the majority of the Social-Democratic Parties are borrowing Communist views on the question of the class struggle, the question of the attitude to the bourgeois state, the question of the social revolution, the question of imperialist war, etc."

These quotations illustrate the fact that Budin had so let himself go that he had decided to conduct open propaganda in the Communist newspaper in favour of Social-Democracy and its leaders under the pretext of "unity." The cycle was complete: from SILENCE on the line of the Comintern, to open PROPAGANDA of anti-Communist slogans.

\* \* \*

Investigations into the wrecking work of Budin revealed many other things: he provided the headings for different reports and articles on the Soviet Union and the Comintern, in which headings in the "Rude Pravo" under guise of irony, Budin was serving an absolutely definite aim: consciously and tendenciously to discredit the Soviet Union, the

Comintern and the Communist movement in general. It has been established that the historic speeches delivered by Comrade Stalin were published in odd corners of the paper, that all criticism not only of Social-Democracy but of the Trotskyists was cut out of articles sent in to the "Rude Pravo"; on the other hand, the "Rude Pravo" even gave publicity to a number of Trotskyists. It has further been established that in the "Rude Pravo" the publication was sabotaged of information and workers' letters about the magnificent successes of the building of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., while the Stakhanov movement was either silently passed over or incorrectly dealt with.

Budin has been expelled from the ranks of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. But his case serves as a warning, and as a proof of how insufficient yet is the revolutionary vigilance in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and in its Central Committee, of the irresponsible fashion in which the most important posts in the Party were filled, and what an unhealthy state of affairs existed on the question of the relation between the leadership of the Party and the leadership of its Central Party organ.

FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, IT IS NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF CORRECTING THE POLITICAL MISTAKES MADE IN THE PRESS, BUT OF LENINIST, BOLSHEVIK GUIDANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF ITS CENTRAL ORGAN BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY.

We must put an end once and for all to the state of affairs where the Editorial Board of the central organ of the Party becomes a second political centre, pursuing its own policy. It cannot be tolerated that there should be a situation where the leadership of the Party does not feel itself fully responsible for its central organ, for its political line. The Central Committee of the Party must take proper control of the "Rude Pravo." The editorial work must not be entrusted to unreliable untried people. In selecting the editors, the comrades have up to now in the main been guided by the bad tradition of sending exclusively literary men, students, intellectuals for the work on the paper, without taking account of whether politically they were absolutely sound and staunch workers. There can and must be no excuses about an alleged lack of worker-editors. These cadres exist, it is only necessary to know how to find them, how to train them properly and make proper use of them. The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia MUST SET ITS PRESS IN ORDER, AND MAKE IT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPONS FOR THE POLITICAL GUIDANCE OF THE MASSES.

The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia is able to publish its press legally. It is not a crime that,

this being so, the press does not fulfil its calling, does not give the proper guidance, but on the contrary disorganises its own ranks and falls under the influence of enemies and wreckers!

In the recent period, the central organ, in consequence of its mistakes, has caused the Party a great deal of harm. And especially to-day, when correcting the mistakes made, the press must occupy a position in the foreground. It must fight for the correct application of the policy of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, against

all distortions, whether of an opportunist or sectarian nature. The press must encourage the further ideological, Bolshevik consolidation of the Party leadership under the banner of the Communist International. The Party press must be imbued with fiery enthusiasm in the face of the great tasks which the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is fully determined to fulfil under the leadership of Comrade Gottwald, in the spirit of the decisions of the Communist International, led by Comrade Dimitrov.

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