a labor press service WORLD OUTLOOK PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE Un service de presse ouvrier PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 21 rue d'Aboukir, Paris 2, France NEW YORK OFFICE: World Outlook, P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N.Y. 10010

Vol. 4, No. 9	April 1,	1966
De assoer whe persistented inclue estade	The difference is a	
the fail in addition to lineering fear		
In this issue		Page.
A pression where they should be attacked by	a will applicate the start of	12.01
Worldwide Demonstrations Against Johnson's		1 and yes
138,000 in Tokyo Rally Against U.S. Treaty		4 .
Mao Deepens the Split with Moscow Chilean Copper Strike Reported Near Settlem	Contract of the second s	5
Chilean Copper Strike Reported Near Settlem	nent	10
High Time for New Policy on China, Say U.S.	Experts	
by George Novack		11
Prize-Winning Joke in Democratic Party	- The same management of the first same in a second strate same same	14
Tories Hunt for Issues on Eve of British El	lection	
by John Walters	the set of	14
Germans Fail to Salute McNamara Scheme		16
Soviet Intellectuals Protest Any Move to Re	ehabilitate Stalin	16
The Bell Still Tolls in Hiroshima	and have been protected a property of the second	17
Iranian Courts Substitute Witch-Hunt for Ju	istice	18
Committee Set Up to Defend Iranian Politica		
Venezuelan Leftists Released from Prison	an an an an an an an the start of the second sec	19
After the Tricontinental Conference		0.0
by Livio Maitan		20
Documents:	in the deton without	00
Documents: Yugoslavs Score the Tricontinental Confer	cence and a contract of the co	28
The Cubans Answer Belgrade	atom a provinsion company and a second s	30

WORLDWIDE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST JOHNSON'S WAR IN VIETNAM


The demonstrations that were held around the world on March 25-26 to protest U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam constituted a big step forward in the struggle to halt the drift toward a wider conflict in Asia with all its potential catastrophic consequences.

The turnout in New York was symptomatic. It was much bigger than previous demonstrations, better organized and more militant. The committee in charge put the actual parade at 21,800 participants according to a count made by four professors who used automatic count-

Reba Hansen, Business Manager,

P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station,

WORLD OUTLOOK specializes in weekly political analysis and interpretation of events for labor, socialist, colonial independence and Negro freedom publications. Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of WORLD OUTLOOK. Unsigned material expresses, insofar as editorial opinion may appear, the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism. To subscribe for 26 issues send \$7.50 or £2/15s. or 37.50 francs to: Reba Hansen, Business Manager, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N.Y. 10010.



The turnout in New York was symptomatic. It was much bigger than previous demonstrations, better organized and more militant. The committee in charge put the actual parade at 21,800 participants

according to a count made by four professors who used automatic count-

Reba Hansen, Business Manager,

P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station,

New York, N.Y. 10010

WORLD OUTLOOK specializes in weekly political analysis and interpretation of events for labor, socialist, colonial independence and Negro freedom publications. Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of WORLD OUTLOOK. Unsigned material expresses, insofar as editorial opinion may appear, the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism. To subscribe for 26 issues send \$7.50 or £2/15s. or 37.50 francs to: Reba Hansen, Business Manager, P.O. Box 635, Modison Sq. Station, New York, N. Y. 10010.

ers. The police, evidently trying to minimize the size of the protest movement, gave as their estimate "more than 15,000."

However, at the Central Park Mall where the paraders congregated to hear speakers, the crowd swelled enormously. Many of them joined the parade in the last few blocks; others came directly to the Mall. Radio commentators gave 50,000 as the lowest estimate; and reported that news correspondents considered 100,000 a more accurate figure. In its nationwide TV newscast, CBS said that the crowd at the Mall was between 75,000 and 100,000.

The difference in the number who participated in the parade and those who showed up at the Mall is ascribable to lingering fear from the days of McCarthyism. People in the U.S. are still reluctant to stand out prominently in parades where they might be attacked by reactionary bystanders or where they might be easily identified and fired from their jobs as a result of taking a political stand. One of the leaders of the march, a former Marine Corps master sergeant who was disabled in World War II, gave as his reason for refusing to identify himself to a newspaper reporter that it could mean his job.

These facts are of significance in estimating the size of the underlying mass opposition in the United States to Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam.

While the giant demonstration was occurring in New York, tens of thousands of participants were marching in scores of other American cities. Taken as a whole, these demonstrations represented one of the most significant political developments in the United States since the thirties.

A decided increase in the militancy of the slogans was observable in the demonstrations. In New York, for instance, earlier demonstrations were dominated by demands for "negotiations" or simply for "peace" in Vietnam. The majority of the slogans in the March 26 parade called for withdrawal of American troops.

One of the most encouraging aspects of the development of the movement has been the shift away from red-baiting and the banning of certain groups. In pacifist parades only a few years ago, it was routine procedure for such leading organizations as SANE to demand the exclusion of militant groups.

In the current demonstrations there has been little of this. The principle of "nonexclusion" has become generally accepted. As a result it has been easier to generate enthusiasm and the parades have shown a great variety of slogans, reflecting the heterogeneous political views of the participants, who nevertheless realize the need for a united front on an issue as basic as this. This was stressed by the veteran pacifist battler A.J.Muste in his opening remarks as chairman of the meeting at the Mall.

Only in Chicago was a sour note struck in this respect. The SANE representatives and some others refused to participate on the grounds that the Young Socialist Alliance and similar groups were involved. (They were among the most active organizers of the demonstration.)

In a speech in New York at the Mall, Donald Duncan, the Vietnam veteran who skyrocketed to fame recently with his exposure of the brutal methods inculcated and practiced by the Pentagon in Vietnam, referred to this. He said that he did not know who the sponsors of the parade were, nor did he care. In Chicago, he said, some groups withdrew because "Trotskyites" were active in the work. This, he maintained, was wrong. There should be no exclusion and no "guilt by association."

One of the most important aspects of the demonstrations was their international character. Simultaneously, all over the world, wherever it was possible, similar marches and meetings were being held. It was a genuine instance of "hands across the sea" in a huge international protest movement against the drive of the Johnson administration toward another world war.

Among the outstanding characteristics of the protest parades were the following:

(1) They came in the face of, and as a countertendency to the deepening division between Moscow and Peking, the two presumed centers of world Communism. As against the incapacity or unwillingness of Moscow and Peking to form a united front, the masses in many countries are seeking forms of coordination against the escalation of the conflict in Southeast Asia and the threat of a wider war.

(2) The initiative for this movement came from within the stronghold of American imperialism itself. It began among the university students, professors and other intellectuals shortly after Johnson ordered the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in February 1965. It has now spread through the United States, involving other age levels and social layers although it has not yet directly caught on in the organized labor movement.

(3) The protest movement in its international extension has begun to affect Communist parties that up to now have refrained, out of deference to the Kremlin's line of "peaceful coexistence," from engaging in significant protest actions against the U.S. imperialist course in Vietnam. Thus the Italian Communist party was reported to have decided to stage a big demonstration in Rome on March 27.

(4) The widespread protest movement appears to have encouraged not only the freedom fighters of the National Liberation Front, who are defending their country against an imperialist invader arms in hand; it appears to have inspired resistance among still broader circles in south Vietnam. Thus while as many as 100,000 were actively protesting in New York, the radio reported a demonstration of 20,000 in the south Vietnam city of Hué which demanded an end to Ky's military dictatorship and a return to civilian rule. Another demonstration, involving student forces, was reported in Saigon itself.

These developments offer the greatest encouragement to revolu-

tionary socialists throughout the world. A fresh breeze is blowing. It can serve to counter the grave setbacks and defeats experienced the past few years in a number of colonial countries.

138,000 IN TOKYO RALLY AGAINST U.S. TREATY

A crowd, estimated by police to number 138,000, rallied at Harumi Pier in Tokyo port March 20 to protest the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The rally, called by the Japan Communist party, was part of a nationwide protest movement which brought out more than 1,000,000 demonstraters in more than 400 cities and towns.

Unions, students and pacifist organizations participated in the rallies. In the Tokyo demonstration, farmers came in from Tomisato in Chiba Prefecture. They are against the proposed construction of a second Tokyo international airport in the area.

The Tokyo rally adopted a resolution calling for an end to the war in Vietnam. A resolution was also passed demanding that the government cancel a proposed visit to Japan by the south Vietnam puppet premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

Meanwhile the Japan Socialist party tossed the Japanese government a hot potato by inviting the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs to send a delegation to Japan.

The Chinese institute responded with a telegram accepting the invitation. The telegram added:

"On the basis of our fourth joint communiqué, we should like to exchange opinions in a friendly atmosphere in order to step up our campaign against U.S. imperialism."

The Japan Socialist party immediately put pressure on the Japanese government to grant visas to the Chinese, who stated that they expected to arrive in Tokyo on or about April 10 for a threeweek stay.

Apparently the government would not be averse to a further détente in relations with China, but the problem is very "subtle and delicate." In brief there is the pressure of the Big Brother in Washington to consider. Consequently, the Foreign Office stated that it was giving "very careful study" to the request.

One of the sticklers is the clear announcement of the Chinese visitors that their purpose is to discuss a campaign against U.S. imperialism. If the Japanese Foreign Office decides that this is a "political" aim, the visas will most likely be denied, since visitors from countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Japan are barred from entering the country if their objective is "political."

MAO DEEPENS THE SPLIT WITH MOSCOW

The refusal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party to send a delegation to the twenty-third congress of the Soviet Communist party, consummates the split between Peking and Moscow on the party level. It remains to be seen how much this rupture will affect their governmental relations.

In view of the deepening differences since 1959 and the bitterness of their public disputes since 1963 this event is neither sudden nor surprising. But the final bill of divorcement which disposes of the last hopes of reconciliation is bound to have great repercussions among the Communist parties everywhere and condition the entire development of the international revolutionary movement for years, if not decades, to come.

The showdown has been precipitated by the immense pressures exerted upon both Moscow and Peking by the escalation of U.S. military intervention in Southeast Asia. The bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in February 1965 was the first armed imperialist assault on a workers state since the Korean war. These attacks confronted the two leading Communist regimes with a direct threat to their own security as well as to the independence and integrity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Neither Moscow nor Peking responded to the military aggression of U.S. imperialism in a manner commensurate with the obligations imposed by the situation. Moscow protested but did not take any serious countermeasures to deter Johnson's escalation of the conflict. It did not even encourage the Communist parties under its influence in the West to conduct sustained mass protest campaigns against U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

For its part Peking has persistently rejected common action with the Soviet Union in defense of Vietnam on the fallacious ground that it was impossible or impermissible to engage in a united front with "revisionists" and "renegades" who were conspiring with Washington to encircle China.

The March 22 open letter of the Chinese Communist Central Committee turning down the invitation to attend the twenty-third congress refers to the "anti-Chinese" letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU, circulated among the leaders of the East European Communist parties, which accuses the Chinese CP of accentuating the split in "the socialist community as well as the world communist movement." The full text of this document, which is generally accepted as authentic, was published in the West German paper, <u>Die Welt</u> of Hamburg. The English translation of its main points appeared in the March 24 <u>New York</u> Times.

The CCP Central Committee said that the Soviet letter was aimed at instigating other Communist parties to join Moscow in opposing China. It "wantonly vilified the Chinese Communist party" as being "bellicose" and "pseudorevolutionary," as "refusing to oppose imperialism" and "encouraging United States imperialist aggression," and as being guilty of "adventurism," "splitism," "Trotskyism," "nationalism," "great power chauvinism," "dogmatism," and so on.

The Peking statement charged the Kremlin with spreading rumors that China "is obstructing aid to Vietnam" and that "China has been encroaching on Soviet territory." "You have even gone so far as to state," the letter said, that "China is not a Socialist country."

The Maoists castigated the Soviet leaders for exposing Stalin's crimes at their twentieth congress. "You suddenly lashed out at Stalin. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist. In attacking Stalin, you were attacking Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union, Communist parties, China, the people and all the Marxist-Leninists of the world." Peking sees a grievous fault in one of the few meritorious acts of Stalin's successors.

There is somewhat more validity to their charge that the Kremlin leaders "have all along been acting in coordination with the United States in its plot for peace talks, vainly attempting to sell out the struggle of the Vietnamese people against United States aggression and for national salvation and to drag the Vietnamese question into the orbit of Soviet-United States collaboration."

"You have worked hand in glove with the United States in a whole series of dirty deals inside and outside the United Nations," the letter added. "In close cooperation with the counterrevolutionary 'global strategy' of United States imperialism you are now actively trying to build a ring of encirclement around Socialist China."

The letter ended with a pledge to the Soviet people that "once the Soviet Union meets with imperialist aggression and puts up resolute resistance, China will definitely stand side by side with the Soviet Union and fight against the common enemy."

The first half of the "private" Soviet letter reviews the efforts made by the Soviet leaders over the past year and a half to arrive at an understanding with Peking on joint aid to Vietnam. Khrushchev's successors contend that they have sought to refrain from open polemics against the positions and attacks of Peking and accuse the Chinese leaders of rejecting their overtures and positive steps for resuming cooperation in various spheres.

The second part of the letter deals with China's relations with the world Communist movement. The gravest charges are that China is provoking border conflicts with the Soviet Union and trying to embroil the Soviet Union in a war with the United States.

The document alleges that the Chinese leadership is replacing the course toward socialist revolution "with a course toward a world war."

This accusation is especially perfidious and poisonous since it is the aggressive actions of the U.S. imperialists directed against China through Vietnam which are threatening to engulf Asia and the world in armed conflict.

The Kremlin's attempt to shift responsibility for the danger of world war from Washington, where it really rests, to the People's Republic of China serves to substantiate Peking's contention that the Soviet heads are aligning themselves with the imperialists "to establish a holy alliance against China."

The second part of the letter assails the concepts of world revolution presented in the celebrated article by Lin Piao, deputy chairman of the CCP, published in September 1965. It interprets these to mean that the whole arsenal of revolutionary struggle is reduced to the single form of armed revolt and war. This is more than an apology for the multiple roads to socialism, including the gradual, peaceful parliamentary path, advocated by Moscow and practiced by its followers from Paris to New York.

Under the guise of attacking the Chinese leaders for an ultraleft and adventurist policy, it is a thinly veiled polemic against the Cuban line of armed guerrilla struggle in the Latin-American revolution adopted at the recent Tricontinental Conference in Havana.

The Soviet letter alludes to a speech by Kao Kolin, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, on November 11, 1965, which categorically rejects the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union while recognizing the possibility of cooperation with "representatives of the upper strata of many nationalist countries" and with part of the "monopoly bourgeoisie." At the same time the letter complains that the CCP leadership "ignore the fact that in a number of former colonies and semicolonial countries, patriotic and revolutionary-democratic forces are in power. It is natural that the Chinese appeals for armed actions against these governments spark protests by the democratic forces."

Here again, under the guise of criticizing the extremism of Peking, Moscow is trying to justify its policy of supporting the bourgeois-bureaucratic heads of friendly neocolonialist regimes against the forces and movements striving to lift the national liberation struggle to a higher stage and clear the way for the rule of the popular masses on genuinely socialist foundations.

The letter concludes by pointing out that the Chinese leaders, who are so free in criticizing other Communist parties and countries for their lack of revolutionary spirit, "show an extraordinary caution in their own political deeds, as well as extreme patience toward imperialist powers and their policy, including the policy that is aimed against China itself."

This is a well-aimed shot at the most vulnerable opening in the Chinese armor. It is becoming widely recognized, not only in capitalist circles but among their opponents, that Peking's revolutionism in words has by no means been matched in the field of action, as the caution of its conduct in the Vietnam conflict indicates. At the same time, this accusation, coming from the Kremlin, is utterly cynical. The Soviet Union is the only power in the world with a nuclear stockpile sufficient to really deter U.S. imperialism. When Khrushchev scrapped the nuclear pact between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in hope of thereby winning a "peaceful coexistence" deal with Washington, China's military defense was greatly weakened. It was precisely this weakening of China's defenses that encouraged the Pentagon to plunge into its military adventure in Vietnam and to begin actively considering a military attack against China with the possible use of nuclear weapons. In view of Washington's threat to attack China and the absence of guaranteed military support from the Soviet Union, particularly nuclear support, the caution of the Chinese government is not without justification whatever its exaggeration.

While Peking and Moscow pointed accusing fingers at each other for responsibility in a situation that is seriously weakening both of them in the world relation of forces, Washington has busied itself in scheming how to take further advantage of the deepening division. The latest exchange of missives between Mao and Brezhnev-Kosygin has led to a new stir of activity among the strategic planners in the Pentagon.

The <u>New York Times</u>, which has very good connections in U.S. government circles, indicated this in its March 27 issue:

"For if Russia can indeed be counted out as Communist China's military ally, the question arises: Can American military pressures against North Vietnam and even China be escalated with relative impunity since China alone has neither the air power nor the nuclear resources to take on the United States?"

When the Sino-Soviet dispute first came into the open several years ago, the Mao regime took the offensive against Moscow and for a while made considerable headway in gaining sympathy and support for its views both among the leaderships and the ranks of the Communist parties and the colonial revolutionists. Today, as the split reaches its climax, Peking finds itself on the defensive and more isolated than ever within the Communist world. What accounts for this weakening of its position since neither of the antagonists have changed their fundamental ideas?

First, the serious setbacks to the colonial revolution on three continents, initiated by the military take-over in Brazil in 1964, extending into Africa from Algeria through the Congo to Ghana, and culminating in the anti-Communist blood bath in Indonesia have dealt heavy blows to the prestige and influence of Peking. There are explicit references to this in the Soviet letter.

More directly detrimental has been the factional policy Peking has pursued in stubbornly opposing united action in defense of Vietnam. Chairman Mao and his associates propose to persist in this ruinous course. They try to justify it in a March 24 editorial in the official newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao with the specious argument that the world's peoples are already supporting one another in "the

broadest united front."

This flies in the face of the facts and no amount of bluster and bravado from Peking can canceal them. In reality, the peoples of the world, and especially among the workers states, are sorely divided at a time when the expansion of the war in Vietnam demands the greatest unity. Peking cannot escape its share of the blame for this state of affairs which issues from its sectarian rejection of joint action with Moscow's leadership.

The united front of workers states and parties is rendered necessary in the first place by the existence of deep and unbridgeable political and organizational differences among the forces and movements facing a common enemy. It is designed to achieve unity in action against a mutual danger despite existing differences.

If Moscow is as revisionist and conciliatory toward the imperialists as Peking insists, this should come out and be manifested in the further course of the struggle. The task of exposure will thereby be facilitated, not hindered, by the creation of a united front. As it now stands, the other Communist governments and parties are being called upon to trust in Peking's words rather than to make up their own minds on the basis of Moscow's actions.

The Soviet leaders boast in their letter that they have sent over half a billion dollars in military aid to north Vietnam and the National Liberation Front this past year. This is not much compared with the \$14 billion additional military appropriation for Vietnam just voted by the U.S.Congress. It has proved far from adequate to protect the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from bomber raids. Peking is less able to provide military matériel than Moscow while its opposition to united action lays it open to accusations of obstructing the transport of Soviet supplies to Vietnam.

The wrongness of the Chinese attitude on this crucial matter is emphasized by the alienation of its closest allies. The Japanese Communist leaders have been vainly pleading with Peking to abandon its intransigence and promote unity in face of the U.S. military operations in Vietnam. Last week they joined with the North Korean Communist leaders in declaring that it was "the first and foremost task" of all Communist parties "to unite broad anti-imperialist forces and concentrate all strength on the struggle against U.S. imperialism" despite "difficulties in realizing this." Instead Peking has increased the difficulties from its side.

Now the governments of North Vietnam and North Korea, which have been Peking's two foremost allies in Asia and in its dispute with Moscow, are sending top-level delegations to the Soviet Communist party's Congress, despite China's denunciation and boycott of it. The South Vietnamese Communists will also attend.

These steps must be regarded as sharp rebukes to Peking for its divisive stand which intensifies its isolation. At the moment, apart from sympathizers in the ranks of the Communist parties and pro-Moscow groups, Mao is left with no unquestioning supporters but the Albanian government and the New Zealand Communists.

The Kremlin has been exploiting the untenable position of the Mao leadership in respect to Vietnam to the hilt and with much success. The third major point on the agenda of the twenty-third congress will be a report on the situation within the international Communist movement.

The discussion around this question should indicate what steps the Soviet leaders propose to take in the light of the consummation of the split. The March 23 Le Monde reports that Soviet CP Secretary Brezhnev has sent personal messages to the first secretaries of the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian parties again insisting on the need for an international conference to discuss coordination of aid for Vietnam but really designed to condemn and further isolate Peking.

CHILEAN COPPER STRIKE REPORTED NEAR SETTLEMENT

The union representatives of the striking mine workers at the big El Teniente copper mine, were reported to have agreed to new wage proposals made by the Braden Copper Co., a subsidiary of the Kennecott Copper Corporation. The strike began January 3.

Their acceptance was conditional, however. They insist that proceedings be dropped against their comrades in the mines at Potrerillos and El Salvador who have been charged with injuring the security of the state by staging sympathy demonstrations in behalf of the El Teniente strikers.

President Frei, who has done his utmost to break the determination of the strikers, even going so far as to utilize police violence against sympathy walkouts, stated that he would not agree to dropping the charges. He added that acceptance of the wage offer of the Braden management rendered further pursuit of the strike at El Teniente aimless. Presumably this was a move to declaring it illegal to continue strike action to help the El Salvador and Potrerillos victims.

Meanwhile Fidel Castro again stated his opinion about the reactionary nature of Frei's government. Castro's first attack on March 13 caused a sensation in Chile, being pictured as "intervention" in the internal affairs of the country. Castro later denied that he had any intention to intervene in Chilean affairs.

Again returning to the subject, Castro was quoted by Agence France Press March 23 as declaring: "For the Latin-American revolutionists, the Chilean experience will serve to justify still more their decision to follow the Cuban road." Castro added that "Mr. Frei is president of Chile thanks to his unmeasured demagogy, the abundant aid of Yankee and German capital, and also, as he puts it, by the grace of God." HIGH TIME FOR NEW POLICY ON CHINA, SAY U.S. EXPERTS

of same life

By George Novack

The continuing debate on Asian policy in Washington has temporarily shifted its focus from Vietnam to China.

Two diametrically different courses of action are being urged upon the decision makers in the White House, State Department and Pentagon¹ to replace their present policy.

A coterie of "hard-line" militarists has been persistently pressing the administration to create pretexts for a preventive nuclear war with China. A much broader segment of opinion is proposing a more moderate and flexible diplomacy to unfreeze relations with Peking. The first group operates behind the scenes; the other has become more vocal in public.

Meanwhile Johnson's team is sticking to the same unbending line that U.S. imperialism has pursued toward the People's Republic of China since 1949. That is to clamp a diplomatic, military and economic quarantine around China and keep it isolated.

For the administration, war against China remains in the same category of "contingency planning" as the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi. On the other hand, it resists any relenting of its all-out hostility toward Peking.

Most of the participants in the discussions on the China problem these past weeks have been highly critical of the official containment and isolation policy and have advocated steps toward its relaxation as inducement for China to become as conciliatory as the Kremlin toward U.S. imperialism.

The lead in this proposed revision of the American attitude toward Peking has been given by Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who is the most highly placed dissenter against Johnson's belligerence in Vietnam.

Fulbright asserted that the U.S. has had a "frozen attitude" toward China and "someone has to take the steps to try to break this down to where communications can be established." He advised an accord with Communist China to neutralize all Southeast Asia.

"Unless we are prepared to fight a general war to eliminate the effects of Chinese power in all of Southeast Asia," he said, "we have no alternative but to seek a general accommodation." He recommended that "we indicate to the Chinese that we are prepared to remove American military power not only from Vietnam but from all of Southeast Asia in return for a similar prohibition on her part."

Fulbright compared the presence of U.S. troops in Vietnam to the Soviet missile build-up in Cuba in 1962. Total withdrawal of American troops over the years, following the conclusion of a neutralization pact with China, was desirable, he states, because "our presence itself is the principal reason for most of the activity, the insurgency, the energy and the willingness of the enemy to sacrifice."

The senator from Arkansas also recommended that the U.S. drop its opposition to Communist China's entry into the U.N., adding that "it may be too much for this administration, just before an election, to take that drastic step."

Republican Senator Javits of New York, who supports Johnson's Vietnam actions, likewise condemned the stagnancy of present U.S. policy. He urged direct discussions with Communist China on all issues, including the possibility of U.N. membership for Peking, to arrive at an understanding which could bring peace to Asia.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a number of America's leading scholars who support the present intervention in Vietnam, nevertheless challenged many of the premises long used by Washington to justify its unremitting animosity toward Peking. They denied that the Chinese Communist leaders are plotting revolution around the world or getting ready to invade and conquer neighboring lands. They pictured Mao's regime as preoccupied with enormous economic and social problems at home and pursuing an inept foreign policy that had antagonized not only the United States but the Soviet Union and other countries. Professor A. Doak Barnett of Columbia proposed to modify the present policy into one of containment without isolation.

On the other side, Dr. Milorad Drachkovitch of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University defended the policy of containment and isolation on the ground that it had brought "tangible results, as witness the latest events in Ghana and Indonesia."

Weighty support was swung behind Fulbright's plea for revision in a policy statement signed by 198 academic experts on China belonging to the Association of Asian Scholars. They said that even government officials recognize that U.S. policy with respect to China is out of date and proposed six measures to change it:

(1) Abandonment of opposition to Communist China's admission to the U.N.

(2) Negotiations for the establishment of full diplomatic

(3) Opening of negotiations on such matters as arms control.

(4) Cultural, educational and social exchanges between the two countries.

(5) An end to the total trade embargo now imposed on Communist China.

(6) Discarding the fiction that Chiang's puppet regime on

Taiwan represents mainland China.

Most of the scholarly witnesses agreed with the administration estimate that Peking would not intervene in the Vietnam war unless the north Vietnamese regime was in danger of being smashed or U.S. troops moved close to China's border. Secretary of Defense McNamara, who has so consistently miscalculated the development of the conflict in Vietnam, observed last week that "the risk of unlimited war is not very great."

However, General Ridgway, retired Army chief of staff and commander of the U.S. forces during the Korean war, warned in an article in the April 5 Look magazine that "With no clear-cut limit upon our immediate military objective, we commit ourselves to an upward-spiraling course that may approach annihilation." He wrote that Communist China might attack south Vietnam and might also reopen the Korea front if provoked.

<u>New York Times</u> correspondent Tom Wicker reported from Washington March 20 that "no one expects the administration to retreat this year or anytime from its stand against admitting Communist China to the United Nations" or giving diplomatic recognition to Peking. But it is not adverse to the hearings because it believes China's admission to the U.N. is inevitable and they might serve to soften up "public opinion for what will be a major American diplomatic defeat."

The administration's reluctance to moderate its intransigence was underscored by its sudden change of mind on the projected sale of a \$150,000,000 steel mill to the People's Republic of China by a European consortium organized by West German promoters. After giving the nod to the Bonn government, Secretary of State Rusk spoke out against the deal on March 20. According to the <u>New York Times</u>, he is one of the administration officials "who is most pessimistic about the chance of eventually coming to an understanding with Peking." The president has promised to keep Rusk as head of his cabinet.

Even though the Johnson administration refuses to alter its hostility toward Peking, it is a mark of progress that the seventeenyear taboo in top circles against questioning the wisdom of trying to completely isolate China is being broken. It is another sign of changing times that the academic community is bringing its influence to bear in Washington.

The direct involvement of intellectuals of very different sorts in questions of foreign affairs is an offshoot of the teachins and antiwar demonstrations sparked by the campus rebels. The "eggheads," who were so scorned under Truman and Eisenhowever, are now not only taking a part in forming public opinion but demanding a voice in reshaping government policy in the most sensitive area of foreign relations.

Fig. As a second provide data and the fig. Math. But the first second was a start of the second s Second s Second seco

PRIZE-WINNING JOKE IN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, known in top circles of the Democratic party as a real clown, told the Gridiron Club a ribtickler about his friends, the Johnsons.

When it became necessary to trim down the list of guests to be invited to daughter Luci's wedding, a suggestion was made that they could eliminate the 27,000,000 who voted for Goldwater.

Johnson stopped that nonsense. "They may vote for me in 1968. And why shouldn't they vote for me? After all, what Goldwater promised -- I delivered."

TORIES HUNT FOR ISSUES ON EVE OF BRITISH ELECTION

By John Walters

London

A number of issues have arisen in the course of the election campaign which have been seized on by the Tories in an attempt to stampede sections of the middle class who in recent polls and byelections have been swinging to Labour. However, there seems little evidence that they are having much success. One of the features of the election so far has been its lack of enthusiasm.

A national poll published in the March 13 <u>Observer</u> gave voting intentions as, Labour 49.6 per cent, Tories 44.9 per cent, with the Liberals coming way behind with 8.1 per cent. This shows some reduction in the Labour lead since the start of the election, but this was to be expected as the election campaign proceeded. Even on this showing Labour could win a 75-seat majority in the new Parliament if the present lead is maintained on polling day.

One of the issues that the Tories, and most of the press, have tried to use as a scare campaign has been the question of "workers courts." The press seized eagerly on a report that eight workers had been fined by their work mates for working during an unofficial strike at the British Motor Corporation works at Cowley in Oxford. There have been large headlines about "Kangaroo Courts," "infringement of individual liberties," demands for police investigations into alleged intimidation. There was much talk about a noose hanging up at the meeting where this "fine" was alleged to have been imposed. As usual in such cases the press have been able to find someone who is ready to "tell all." This character, a shop steward, has been sounding off to the press about a secret body known as the "M6 Cabinet" which, it is alleged, was the body behind all the disputes, etc., at the plant.

It is noteworthy that the Labour leaders joined in the baying

of the capitalist press and Tories in denouncing all of these things before any attempt had been made to verify the truth of the muddy statements. Ray Gunter the Minister of Labour jumped in with both feet in his usual style in denouncing the workers concerned. But what were the facts?

The Transport and General Workers Union set up an enquiry into the incidents and reported their findings on March 17. The statement said, "There had been no workers court, no fines, no intimidation. Certain newspapers had taken statements out of context and there had been frequent cases of gross distortion." Further on it said, "We are astonished that prominent politicians have made strong statements from public platforms condemning thousands of decent British working men and women without first ascertaining the facts. While some actions at B.M.C. [British Motor Corporation] Service have been unconstitutional and cannot be condoned by the union we are satisfied that the whole affair has been so grotesquely distorted by sections of the press that in order to protect the good name of British journalism the Press Council should institute an enquiry." Harry Urwin, the union spokesman said, "There was a piece of rope but a man would have had to have been two foot tall to get under it." Also the so-called M6 Cabinet was in fact a group of shop stewards who met during tea breaks to discuss shop affairs, there being nothing secret or furtive about the whole thing at all. As for the 'fines' these had been voluntary donations to charity.

This whole thing has been used as an election stunt in the best yellow press tradition of Tory electioneering. The question arises why they were able to do this. Why was it that for over a week both the press and radio, etc., made the "workers courts" issue headline news, trying to work up an antiunion fever among the middleclass electorate? Much of the responsibility rests with the present right-wing Labour leadership. One of their first acts when arriving in office was the setting up of a Royal Commission on Trade Unions, and since then there has been a growing volume of loose talk in the press about the need to "reform" the trade unions, and the need for radical or tough measures. Of course when the capitalist press talk about radical reform of the trade unions they mean hog-tying them, or emasculating them as instruments for defending the workers interests. Because of the utterances of various Labour leaders, especially of Gunter, there has been created a climate where the press and the Tories have been able to exploit the situation.

The logic of the situation is that every time the Labour government has taken steps to the right they have opened the way for the Tories to move further to the right. It is noticeable that in the last election the question of the unions was only marginal but in this one they have been made a central issue, with the Tories on the offensive.

At the time of writing, there have been other issues pushed to the front, such as the question of Britain's entry into the European Common Market, and also the question of NATO. On NATO Labour has stood on the side of the U.S. in its dispute with France, while the Tories have been ambiguous. The Common Market issue has only just been raised so that at the moment the parties are still only sparring for openings. What is evident, however, is that the Tories are feverishly picking up issues one after another in an attempt to retrieve their poor showing so far.

March 19, 1966

GERMANS FAIL TO SALUTE MCNAMARA SCHEME

Frankfurt

A statement made by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at one of the congressional hearings about counting on the Germans to play a far greater role in areas outside Europe, caused some astonishment in the country where U.S. troops are still stationed as a "protective" measure.

Writing in the illustrated <u>Stern</u> [circulation almost two million], Sebastian Haffner declared:

"What is proposed by McNamara would give a completely new content to the alliance between America and the German Federal Republic, and, in my opinion, a content that is unacceptable to the Germans...If the Americans are now telling us, 'Sorry we couldn't do much for you, but from now on you can do something for us. Get out and fight our wars in Asia, Africa and South America! Germans, to the front!' -- this is really going too far. We already know that in several unhealthful regions of the world, Americans are involved in wars -- wars that used to be called colonial wars -- but why should this be our worry? Thank God, Germany has been out of the colonial business since 1919. German soldiers are not Ghurkas and the German Federal Army is no foreign legion. We have not gone in for that!"

SOVIET INTELLECTUALS PROTEST ANY MOVE TO REHABILITATE STALIN

On the eve of the twenty-third congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, considerable uneasiness was reported among intellectuals over the possible partial rehabilitation of Stalin.

One of the signs was a collective letter sent by twenty-seven prominent intellectuals to the Central Committee of the party asking that no such move be made at the congress.

The signers of the letter have been regarded up to now as being part of the Kremlin's "establishment." Among them appeared such well-known names as Nobel Prize winner Igor Tamm, the physicist Peter Kapitsa, the writers Nekrassov, Simonov and Tvardovski, the ballet dancer Plissetskaya and the poet Alexander Surkov, secretary of the Writers Union.

These figures were disturbed by recent articles in the Soviet press that have featured Stalin's "role" in favorable terms not heard since the days of the notorious "cult of the personality." -000 (.....

The collective letter argued that rehabilitation of Stalin would create great confusion in the USSR, particularly among the youth who have been drilled on Stalin's injurious role, and that abroad it would greatly complicate relations with sister parties at a time when the difficulties with Peking require maximum unity with the East European parties, who long ago condemned the cult of the personality. Finally, the rehabilitation of Stalin would endanger the policy of "coexistence," damage the prestige of the Soviet Union in the "third world" and isolate the country.

Henri Pierre, the Moscow correspondent of <u>Le Monde</u>, reports [March 19] that another reason for the uneasiness of the intellectuals, even those not associated with the most progressive circles and the "turbulent" groups of poets and writers is foreboding over a return to his methods: "Even if Stalin is not rehabilitated -- and everything indicates that he will not be -- is it not to be feared that his methods, after a period of eclipse, will be restored? Under pretext of rewriting history in an objective way so as to restore Stalin to the place he merits in the national heritage, will not justification be offered for his style of government which it was thought had been definitively condemned?"

Another sign of uneasiness over the possibility that Stalin might be rehabilitated was the demonstration which former inmates of the concentration camps sought to organize in Moscow's Red Square on March 5. [This was erroneously reported in the March 25 World] Outlook as March 4.] They invited a number of survivors of Stalin's terror to assemble in the square to protest any move to rehabilitate Stalin. The occasion was the thirteenth anniversary of Stalin's death. 가는 가슴을 수나요.

According to a March 21 Associated Press dispatch, many of those who were invited, "fearing they might be victims of a police provocation, did not show up at Red Square."

Those who did, continues the dispatch, "found themselves facing an imposing deployment of police, both uniformed and in plain clothes. Some of them were taken to police headquarters and then released, it is said." ngaté na ser la ser no ser Set se ser ser ser ser

a barr

THE BELL STILL TOLLS IN HIROSHIMA

1996 - N

More than twenty years after the bomb was dropped on Truman's orders, the hospital in Hiroshima for those affected by the radioactive burst and fallout has had to be increased forty-two per cent in capacity. This is due to the rise in victims suffering long-range effects.

In 1965, for instance, the number of deaths in the hospital ~~~~ was sixty-seven, more than double the 1964 figure.

IRANIAN COURTS SUBSTITUTE WITCH-HUNT FOR JUSTICE

Roland Rappaport, who was delegated by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers to attend two political trials in Iran as an observer, returned to Paris without being able to accomplish his mission. Matin Daftari, chairman of the Commission of Justice in the Iranian Senate, made special efforts to have Rappaport admitted to the courtroom but without success.

In one trial in Teheran, fifty-five young persons belonging to a religious oppositional tendency were condemned. In another trial, three socialist leaders were given prison sentences.

In an interview reported in the March 23 issue of <u>Le Monde</u>, Rappaport said: "Although it is practically never decreed that the trials must be held behind closed doors, and although theoretically the hearings are public, no Iranian or foreigner can attend a political trial without special authorization.

"In the case of fifty-five young Moslems, I learned that they had been arrested in October 1965, but this was not officially announced until the eve of the trial in February 1966. The preparation of the case by the prosecution was completely secret, no attorney being granted the possibility of meeting with the defendants. The main defendant, Budjenurdi was severely tortured. The local press gave no news whatever about the course of the hearings, limiting itself to announcing the opening of the trial, publishing the charges and reporting the sentences, one of which was capital punishment."

In the case of Khalil Maleki, Reza Shaian and Ali Djan Shansi, the procedure was different. At first silence was maintained on the trial of the three socialist leaders. Then the local press suddenly began to publish long reports. But at the same time, the foreign correspondents who had been following the trial were denied admittance.

"However," Rappaport declared, "I was able to learn that the declarations of the defendants that were published in Iran, were altered, amputated, falsified."

In the opinion of the French attorney, other trials are being held in Iran in the greatest secrecy. This may be the case with Darius Forhuar, first secretary of the Melat Iran party.

"The situation of the defendants is disquieting," Rappaport said. "Some of them are held with the greatest secrecy for years. University people, members of the National Front, a legal party, and religious organizations are being held in Borazdjan. Separated from each other, they are forced to live night and day with a guard in their cell.

"A purge of the courts is underway. In the past three months, sixty-six magistrates have been suspended. More than 600 mullahs, out

of a total of 16,000 members of the clergy, are in prison. A dozen religious leaders, including Khomeini, have been taken to the frontier and exiled, although there is nothing in the law providing for such a measure. Twenty political leaders have met with the same fate."

COMMITTEE SET UP TO DEFEND IRANIAN-POLITICAL PRISONERS

A "Committee for the Defense of the Iranian Political Prisoners" has been set up in Paris under the chairmanship of Jean-Paul Sartre. In a press release March 21 the committee declared:

"Political trials are held behind closed doors by the Iranian military tribunals. Despite the declaration of the prime minister of Iran concerning 'suppression of the censorship,' the public is poorly or not at all informed on what occurs or is said at these trials....

"The political prisoners are submitted systematically to torture. Mr. Ali Djan Shansi of the League of Iranian Socialists, after trying to commit suicide in prison, gave the military court a shocking account of the tortures to which he had been submitted.

"Foreign observers and journalists are no longer authorized to attend the trials. Thus the sole possibility the prisoners have of making their side known has been taken away.

"In view of such a state of things, in view of the disregard the Iranian government is displaying for the most elementary rights of man, we protest indignantly and express our solidarity anew with the fighters of the democratic Iranian opposition."

The committee members, besides Jean-Paul Sartre, are Simone de Beauvoir, N. Braun, Mme and M. Jacques Madaule, J. Pontheil, Madeleine Riffaud, Elsa Triolet, François Mauriac, Pierre Abraham, Aragon, Chesne, Edouard Depreux, Jean Dresch, Pierre Gamarra, Vladimir Jankelevitch, J. Matarasso and J. Nordmann.

The address of the committee is Jean-Paul Sartre, 9 rue Delambre, Paris.

VENEZUELAN LEFTISTS RELEASED FROM PRISON

Four leftist leaders in Venezuela, imprisoned since October 1963 because of their political views, were released March 18. Domingo Alberto Rangel and Jesús María Casals, of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, and Jesús Faria, a former Communist party leader, were ordered exiled. They were put on a plane for Rome. Manuel Villavicencio, another MIR leader, was allowed to stay in Caracas. It is thought that the government released the four because they have argued against continuing guerrilla activities.

AFTER THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE By Livio Maitan

The Tricontinental Conference, which took place in Havana last January, was an unusual gathering of representatives of revolutionary movements in those sectors of the world where the most important events of the past fifteen years have occurred; and there was good reason for the virulent response of American imperialism and its puppets. Its repercussions in the development of coming anti-imperialist struggles, particularly in Latin America, will probably be considerable. It would, however, be a mistake to accept the favorable interpretations without taking into account all the distinct, even contradictory elements; it would likewise be a mistake to minimize the internal conflicts that reflected more or less directly the various interests of the different forces present.

Projected for some time, the conference was finally convoked at a time when on the one hand imperialism was concretizing in action its determination to crush the freedom struggle of the peoples of the colonial and semicolonial countries, including by means of outright war and at the risk of unleashing a nuclear conflagration; and on the other hand when the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict rendered it more and more difficult to organize an effective reply from the side of the workers states and the world anti-imperialist forces. The need to get together and to work out, if only partially, a strategy for present and prospective struggles was thus the motive for holding the conference. If it is impossible to agree with the impressionistic interpretation that the conference was of such nature as to enable it to play the role of an International, the Tricontinental testified unquestionably to the existence of a profound need and provided material that ought to give cause for thought to all the partisans of the so-called national roads -- the fragmentation, in practice, of the workers and world anti-imperialist movement. At the same time it provided a glimpse of the new forces that will necessarily be among the components of the mass revolutionary International which is a major objective of the struggle we are conducting.

The Forces Present and the Cuban Success

1)

Attention must be directed first of all to the rather heterogeneous composition of the conference. The fact was that alongside representatives of revolutionary movements that are fighting, arms in hand, against imperialism and the indigenous conservative forces -- in Africa and especially Latin America -- there were a considerable number of delegations which, whatever their formal designation, were in reality government delegations. And if a good part of them came from workers states, there were also others, from Asia and Africa. For example, one Asian delegation officially represented the kingdom of Cambodia, another the government of Pakistan. Among the African delegations was one from the KANU [Kenya African National Union], which is becoming dominated more and more by conservative

neocolonialist tendencies.* In addition, the rules limited each country to a single delegation and one vote, the aim being to foster the formation of united fronts; but this inhibited the confrontation of positions and an often indispensable political differentiation. The consequence was that conflicts broke out over the recognition of delegations. In certain instances this finally ended in inexcusable exclusions.**

This extremely varied composition, the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the public outbreak of the violent Sino-Cuban dispute on the very eve of the opening of the conference, and some other latent conflicts within formally united delegations inevitably gave rise to very sharp confrontations and real faction struggles. The deliberations were, in fact, featured by a stubborn struggle from beginning to end, during the official meetings and in the corridors. This was noted by all the serious reporters and confirmed in addition by the extension of the conference and by the commentaries in official organs of the parties or movements represented there.***

From an analysis of the documents that were adopted, particularly the most important political resolutions, it must be concluded that the partisans of a radical line gained indubitable successes. We would call attention in particular to the following points:

(a) Certain essential aspects of the dialectical interrelation of different motor forces of the world revolution were recognized.

(b) Solidarity with Vietnam and the struggle against American imperialism were listed as the most important problems of the present stage.

*According to a report in the January 8 Granma, up to January 5 there were a total of 743 delegates, observers and guests; 80 organizations representing 79 countries. The Cubans had the highest number of representatives (40), followed by the Soviet Union and China with 34 each. The United Arab Republic stood fourth with 21 plus 3. The government delegations were the most numerous. As for the observers and guests, the choice was often unfortunate. There were utterly tarnished figures like Renato Bitossi, chairman of the World Federation of Trade Unions, professional political traveling salesmen who adapt themselves to every turn, highly questionable intellectuals, including the celebrated novelist Alberto Moravia who upon returning to Italy wrote reactionary articles for the conservative newspapers.

**The most scandalous exclusion was that of the MR-13 [Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre] of Guatemala. But the FNLA [National Liberation Front of Angola] was also absent although it has fought for five years against Portuguese imperialism. Also one can only deplore the nonadmission of the Unity Movement, the popular movement which has real roots and which is carrying on a stubborn struggle in South Africa.

***See, for example, the Chinese commentaries. Also the articles that appeared in l'Unità, the newspaper of the Italian Communist party.

(c) The revolutionary road was viewed as a requisite to meet the violence of imperialism.*

(d) Radical measures to expropriate both the imperialist owners and the indigenous possessing classes were held indispensable, particularly in the economic resolution; and this was placed within the framework of a "noncapitalist road" and a general socialist perspective.

10 A 17 A 1

It is clear that it was the Cubans especially who succeeded to a considerable degree in carrying their line. Moreover the essential points as they saw them were particularly stressed in the opening speech by Dorticós; in the remarks by Cienfuegos, who emphasized the necessity and the objective possibility of the revolutionary road, utilizing formulas testifying to an internationalist spirit; in the important fiery declarations of Raúl Roa; and above all in Fidel Castro's closing speech.** This speech in particular has been widely circulated and we will not consider it in detail. Here it is sufficient to note two central themes; namely, solidarity with Vietnam, expressed in an offer of direct Cuban participation in the defense of that country and the outline of a concrete orientation of coordinated struggle in Latin America to settle accounts with North American imperialism.***

The political success of the Cubans was clinched, moreover, by an organizational success. The choice of Havana instead of Cairo as the headquarters for the bodies set up by the Tricontinental had a significance that did not escape anyone, and with good reason; it was around this question that one of the sharpest conflicts of the whole conference centered. Among the Cuban gains must also be listed formation of the Latin-American Solidarity Organization [Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad], the composition of the top committee constituting an additional guarantee from their point of view.****

*This line was concretized in addition in particular resolutions on un attat Peru, the Congo, Venezuela, etc. an se gre

**Dorticós spoke particularly of "our determination to carry out the commitment that we have made with other peoples, even if we thus imperil our works and achievements." [Granma January 4.] Raúl Roa said, among other things: "The people of Cuba, the revolutionary government of Cuba, and the Communist party of Cuba do not preach with words; they preach with deeds like fists." [Granma January 16.]

***We are referring to the part of the speech stressing that "The correlation of forces of the imperialists on this Continent, the proximity of its metropolitan territory, the zeal with which they will try to defend their dominions in this part of the world, require a common strategy on this Continent, more than anywhere else: a common and simultaneous struggle."

****The following countries are represented on the committee: Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, British Guiana, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Guate-mala and Cuba.

The Russians, the Chinese and Cabral's Speech

Within the framework of a conference in which the most radical concepts had every chance to prevail and in the context of an international situation featured by the intensification of the crisis over Vietnam and the decision of imperialism to utilize all the means at its disposal to block from the beginning any revolutionary process in Latin America, the Soviet representatives obviously had little choice but to accept a series of formulations concerning responding with revolutionary violence to the imperialist violence and to reiterate their promises of aid for the peoples struggling against imperialism. Their posture enabled them to exploit in a profitable way the tension in Sino-Cuban relations and certain extremely sectarian moves made by the Chinese.

Thus in the conflict shaking the international Communist movement, they scored some points; and they succeeded, among other things, in bringing back into play certain Latin-American Communist parties, partisans of their concepts, who, because of their opportunist views and their political zigzags became cut off from the rank and file of the revolutionary current in their continent.

On the other hand they had to accept a kind of consecration of the Fidelista leadership in Latin America and give up their opening position concerning the headquarters for the bodies set up by the Tricontinental. (It is well known that they wanted Cairo.) They also had to accept continuation of the Afro-Asian organization which they would have liked to bury in order to impede the activities of the Chinese. They even suffered a defeat on the composition of the Asian representation in the Executive Secretariat elected by the conference.* In the more strictly political sphere, they did not succeed in introducing their concept of peaceful coexistence as the central idea in the general resolution, although they did get it adopted by a majority under unclear conditions** in a special resolution which is also rather restrictive.

In contrast to this, they scored a certain success in opposing proposals which they considered to be extremist, such as open and explicit condemnation of the UN in an ad hoc resolution submitted by a delegate from Santo Domingo (a sugar-coated condemnation was included in the general document) or that of a delegate from Cambodia who wanted all relations with the United States broken off.***

1 gran

*In accordance with a proposal on which agreement was reached, the Asian delegation is to include Korea, South Vietnam, Pakistan and Syria. The Soviet representatives pressed their own candidacy at the end, but they did not win.

**At least this is the claim of the Chinese commentaries, which give details on the course of the voting.

***Among the most fervent partisans of the Soviet position was the delegate of the African National Congress of South Africa.

The balance sheet of the Chinese was not brilliant, despite the optimism of their official commentaries. Whatever the reciprocal responsibility -- we do not propose to analyze the subject here -the fact that the Cubans were now lined up on the Soviet side and even delivered some of the most violent attacks yet launched, represented a major defeat for Peking, the repercussions of which were visible at the conference itself. But all the same it is not true that they found themselves in complete isolation. Thus their opposition to the resolution on coexistence was shared by a certain number of delegations who either voted against it or abstained;* and even their posture rejecting any united action with the Soviet Union was supported by Japan, Indonesia, Malaya and Thailand. Contrariwise, after the rules on recognizing delegations were adopted, their positions received but little support in the Latin-American sector.

Aside from the delegations that necessarily played a fundamental role, the attention of those at the conference centered particularly on the delegations of certain movements, including those from Peru, Venezuela and Guatemala,** who expressed in a very clear way the orientation of armed struggle. Among the Africans, the man who stood out most prominently was Amilcar Cabral, leader of the liberation movement in so-called Portuguese Guinea, who gave one of the most important speeches, particularly from the viewpoint of theoretical generalizations. He insisted above all on the need to reach a theoretical view of the whole and to reject all demagogic concepts and any extolling of the empiricism that represents in reality, in his opinion, "the greatest deficiency in our struggle against imperialism." After giving a brief historical sketch, he advanced the thesis that it is possible to jump over historical stages, which boils down more concretely to affirming the possibility for underdeveloped peoples to reach socialism without having to go through a capitalist phase. He stressed in addition the multiple dangers of neocolonialism and the danger of regressive tendencies. On the latter, he analyzed in greater detail the relatively progressive role played by the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, who can nevertheless undergo a conservative retrogression. In bringing out, finally, the anticapitalist dynamics of the struggle unfolding in the three continents which have suffered imperialist exploitation, he underlined the necessity for a vanguard to lead the struggle.*** 100 · · __.

*In addition to China, those voting against included Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, Uganda, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, South West Africa, Nepal and Pakistan. The Congolese delegate also condemned the Soviet attitude.

**With regard to Guatemala, the play given to Turcios over Yon Sosa was undoubtedly due to factional reasons.

***We also note the following very pertinent remark: "The experiences of certain peoples, the present conditions of the freedom struggle in the world, the condition of permanent violence (or, at least, contradictions and disorder) in certain countries that have conquered independence along the 'peaceful road' show us not only that any compromise with imperialism is self-defeating, but also that the normal road to freedom is through armed struggle." It would be interesting to know the reasons that brought Cabral to deliver this speech to the conference and to play the role he did in general. Aside from some of his formulations which were, of course, debatable, his speech in any case was one of the most rigorous and best thought out. What Is the True Balance Sheet?

If one cares to go through the documents adopted at Havana with a fine-tooth comb, you can find gaps, equivocal statements, formulations that have covered up the opportunist practices of not a few big workers organizations for decades. Particularly to be noted is the lack of clarity on the so-called national bourgeoisie -- whose representatives, moreover, were present at Havana -- passages tending to engender confusion on the nature of the dynamics of the struggle to be conducted, acceptance of an antimonopolist and not outright anticapitalist outlook for the workers movement of the countries of Western Europe and North America.* But all this should not be taken as decisive in judging the conference. The real question, which without doubt not a few delegates posed at the time and which are still posed two months after the deliberations ended, is the following: to what degree will the resolutions be carried out in life? To what degree will the decisions actually aid the revolutionary movements, in Latin America first of all?

We do not agree with the simplistic sectarian interpretation according to which the gist of the conference was to put on a propaganda display, the Cubans themselves seeking to use revolutionary phrases as a cover while in substance giving up active support of the struggles in Latin America. We are not unaware of the difficulties faced by the Cubans and we do not idealize any leadership, no matter how revolutionary. Our analysis is based on a concrete fact -in the final analysis, Cuba's state of health will be determined not by the economic and military aid of the USSR and the other workers states -- which nevertheless remains indispensable -- but by the extension of the revolution in other Latin-American countries. This is a basic truth that no Cuban leader can forget without going against his own interests and hope of survival. That is why we do not doubt that the Fidelista team wanted the conference with the objective of furthering concrete political action and will try to utilize for this all the means which they now have at their disposal.

This does not at all signify ignoring powerful factors operating in the opposite direction. In the first place are the actions and constant pressure of the bureaucratic leadership of the USSR for whom adoption of the resolutions at the Tricontinental was far from having the same meaning as for the Cuban revolutionists. Moscow's general line remains that of coexistence based on finding a modus vivendi with American imperialism and therefore of avoiding any supplementary causes of friction. A possible revolutionary explosion in no matter what country of Latin America would heighten international

*The general declaration talks about struggling against the domination of monopoly capital, a theme on which it was easy to get agreement from both the Soviet and Chinese representatives.

tension and, in face of the probable intervention of imperialism, would place the Soviet leaders before the disagreeable choice of organizing a reply or of demonstrating that they do not want, or are not able, to effectively counteract the imperialist action. Thus it is likely that they will do everything to prevent the line of the conference from being translated into practice; and arguments will not be lacking, both from them and their partisans, seeking to utilize the thesis of the absence of mature objective conditions.*

In the second place there is the problem of a series of Latin-American Communist parties. Apparently they made a turn, accepting the Cuban line by and large and giving up their traditional positions. But to what degree does this represent a genuine change? To what degree, even admitting that the about-face was sincere, are they in such shape as to be able to carry out the profound renovation of the their concepts, their structures, their methods which a revolutionary orientation demands? It cannot be excluded a priori, of course, that in an explosive context some of the parties that do not have a big crystallized apparatus and whose composition could change with the influx of new elements, particularly the young generation, could in practice take the revolutionary road advocated by the Havana documents (there have already been examples along this line); but, aside from the fact that there is no certainty about this and it would thus be a mistake to give up a consistent struggle within the revolutionary movement, is it possible to seriously envisage this variant for parties which have a rather long tradition of opportunism and which at the same time have very bureaucratized apparatuses, as, for example, the Argentine and Chilean Communist parties? Can we believe that even a Salvador Allende, who has symbolized the "democratic" road, is inclined to turn to the solution offered by the revolutionary road?**

Finally, it cannot be forgotten that in certain countries there are or there can be real objective difficulties in the immediate future which will continue to be reflected even within the movement engaged in armed struggle. In Peru there are differences over the choice of conditions made by the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left] and its courageous militants for launching guerrilla warfare and there is no doubt that the experience begun the past year is running into a more and

*It is not without significance that the Soviet press did not call attention to the most revolutionary aspects of the conference and Fidel Castro's speeches.

计计算机 计通知

**Nothing indicates, for example, that the Chilean Communist party, which makes no secret of its "Italian" inclinations, has made a turn away from its preceding course. As for Salvador Allende, some of his declarations at Havana leave the door open: "Each country," he said January 5 (see <u>Granma</u> January 6), "has its own reality and in relation with this logically its own tactics and strategy..."

more difficult situation.* In Venezuela the government repression has unquestionably scored gains that have lately favored the tendencies in the Communist party and the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria] which have for some time advocated a turn toward more or less "legal" forms of struggle. And even in Havana there have been echoes of the polemics going on in the Venezuelan movement.**

In this article we have left aside the problem of the attack against the Trotskyist movement made by Fidel Castro in his closing speech. This problem did not directly involve the conference, but the repercussions of Castro's attitude, if this attitude is maintained and not rectified, cannot be minimized -- all the more so since the virulent polemic between the Cubans and the Chinese broke out at the same time. What is to be feared is bitter factional struggles developing in the vanguard sectors in Latin America, faction struggles conducted by the baneful methods of reciprocal distortion of positions, of denigration, of slander -- which will do just the contrary of helping to clarify the basic tactical and strategical questions. The Fourth International, which endured the worst campaigns of Stalin's time without yielding, is not at all alarmed at the perspective of such a confrontation -- but it feels that with his accusations in the purest Stalinist style and his grotesque amalgams, Fidel Castro created additional difficulties, risking ending up with the opposite of what he claims he set out to achieve. Instead of helping unity and joint revolutionary action, he will have contributed to deepening the divisions and obscuring the real problems that require specific analysis and a strategic line.***

For all these reasons, the true balance sheet of the Havana conference cannot be drawn up at present. Only the experience of the coming months and years will tell whether the resolutions adopted there had a real meaning, thus marking a stage of revolutionary history, particularly in Latin America, or whether the factors working in the opposite direction gained the upper hand.

March 18, 1966

*The Peruvian FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario -- Front of the Revolutionary Left] holds that conditions did not exist for success in the initiative taken by de la Puente and his comrades in arms.

**According to Niedergang, the correspondent of <u>Le Monde</u>, the militants of the MIR have not spared their criticisms of a declaration made by Pompeyo Marquez, one of the leaders of the Communist party of Venezuela.

***This has already occurred in the case of Guatemala. On this subject see my article, "Castro's Intervention in the Guatemalan Dispute," <u>World Outlook</u>, March 4. YUGOSLAVS SCORE THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE

[The dispute between Havana and Peking, which Fidel Castro brought into the public arena last January, has tended to obscure the differences between Havana and Belgrade that go back some time. Thus some analysts, seeing Castro evidently coming out on the side of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict, reached the conclusion that the Cuban revolutionists no longer seek to maintain their own independent position.

[A recent exchange between Borba, the official organ of the League of Yugoslav Communists, and Granma, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Cuba, should serve as a reminder that the situation is not that simple. The polemics between the two publications occurred over estimates of the aims and results of the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana during the first part of January. We have translated the two editorials, publishing them below. In the case of Borba, we utilized the version reprinted in the February 12 issue of Granma. The Cuban reply appeared the following day in the same publication.

[According to Granma, the Borba editorial appeared January 24, bore the title, "After the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. Negative Estimates in Latin America," and was signed by Z. Bozic.

[We should like to call the special attention of the ultraleft sectarians to these two editorials. The theoreticians of the Socialist Labour League in London have argued that the "main purpose" of the Tricontinental Conference "was to provide a safety-valve for middle-class charlatans like Cheddi Jagan and upper-class demagogues like Allende to blow off steam against imperialism, neocolonialism and what-have-you." (Michael Banda in the February 5 <u>Newsletter.</u>) This conclusion, it would appear, flows from the SLL view that Cuba is not a workers state but a "capitalist state." The very same theoreticians agree, however -- unless they have recently changed -- that Yugoslavia is a workers state. The exchange between Havana and Belgrade should thus provide valuable subject matter for further lucubrations from these experts enlightening us on how it is possible for the peculiar Cuban "capitalist state" to stand to the left of the Yugoslav workers state.] a de la companya de l

The first reactions of the governments of many Latin-American countries to the deliberations and final documents of the Tricontinental Conference in Havana have been resoundingly negative. Already in the short period since the conference ended there have been energetic efforts to attack and condemn in principle the conclusions of the Havana Conference, as they were understood by most governments, and to create a practical mechanism to fight them. In addition, the right redoubled its crusade against everything progressive, using the conclusions of the Tricontinental Conference as motive for its brutal measures.

后的"心理教师"的""是""我们",我们这些错误。"我们",我们不能是"是"。"我们不能是"。 我们也想到了一句,"握你了这个人,我们还不能是",我们不能是"我们",我们还是你们不能是

At the request of Peru, the Council of the OAS [Organization of American States] met in Washington on Monday to examine the possible hemispheric repercussions of the Havana Conference and the measures to be taken against its decisions. One of the representatives of Peru stated that the meeting would deal in particular with the fact that the Soviet Union gave its support to the proliferation of subversive activities against Peru and other countries in Latin America barely two weeks after the UN adopted the resolution condemning intervention of any kind. The Peruvian initiative is declared to be similar to the actions of the OAS in 1962, during the Caribbean Crisis, when that organization took a position against the Soviet Union and supported all the U.S. actions against Cuba.

To the surprise of many, the government of Uruguay, one of the most liberal in the hemisphere, which condemned the American intervention in the Dominican Republic with extraordinary sharpness, yesterday described the Tricontinental Conference as an attempt to organize an international system of subversion that would represent a brutal destruction of the principles of nonintervention and selfdetermination.

.

In particular the creation of a special Latin-American organization by this conference was condemned.

In certain liberal bourgeois journals it was emphasized that the decisions of the Havana Conference impeded the principled struggle of the broad front of progressive Latin-American forces against the designs of the right to definitively liquidate the principles of nonintervention and self-determination. It is general knowledge that the U.S. is working for the formation of an inter-American armed force and that this, in essence, will be the principal theme of a series of OAS meetings on the ministerial level (Panama, Buenos Aires). These journals stress that the practical effect of the decisions of the Havana Conference is to strengthen the U.S. position and to strengthen its previously feeble arguments.

It is expected that an overwhelming majority of the governments will condemn the decisions of the Tricontinental Conference.

In addition, it seems that a certain number of the Communist Parties of Latin America also hold reservations about the Conference and the tactics of struggle it decided on.

According to reports from Venezuela, the leaders of the CPV [Communist party of Venezuela], in prison since 1963, have decided to break publicly with the FALN [Fuerzas Armados de Liberación Nacional], whose tactic of guerrilla struggle they consider to be erroneous and harmful. They stress that armed struggle in Venezuela has no possibilities of success at present, that it only separates the Party from the masses, and that it makes it impossible to carry out any broad political activity. In Havana, the representative of the FALN was treated as the representative of the most progressive movement in Latin America.

[The editors of Granma do not indicate whether the emphasis.

is in the original or has been added.]

In the meantime, the right has initiated new attacks against the progressive movements.

The Dominican army stepped up its campaign of terror shortly after the Movimiento Popular Dominicano issued its call for a general struggle. The Movimiento Popular Dominicano has been branded as pro-Peking. The Dominican navy maintains a strict watch in the passage between the Dominican Republic and Cuba. General Rivera Caminero justifies the use of repressive measures out of desire to root out Communist subversion in the country. Many constitutionalists have perished in the excesses of the rightists, and a few days ago the son of Juan Bosch was mortally wounded.

There are indications that full-blown anti-Communist hysteria will be ignited. It is symptomatic that the police in São Paulo the day before yesterday confiscated as subversive 25,000 books valued at 100 million cruzeiros. This included, among others, the well-known works of the Nobel Prize-winner Dimitri Sholokhov, all of the works of Karl Marx, Engels, Plekhanov and Feuerbach; and even some of the works of anti-Communist writers were picked up because they contained a few paragraphs quoting from the works of Marx.

The order called for books to be confiscated if the titles contained the words, Marxism, Socialism or Communism, and all books by Russian authors. Even today's <u>Jornal do Brasil</u> condemned this action of the São Paulo police as ridiculous and absurd.

이 제 가지 않나? 좋는다.

THE CUBANS ANSWER BELGRADE

[As indicated in the editorial note on page 28, the following editorial in reply to the Yugoslav attack against the Tricontinental Conference has been translated from the February 13 issue of <u>Granma</u>.

[While the Cuban reply is aimed directly at the Yugoslavs, it also appears to have in mind other protagonists of the line of "peaceful coexistence."

[The title of the <u>Granma</u> editorial is "Reply to <u>Borba</u>, Organ of the so-called 'League of the Yugoslav Communists.'" The subtitles appear in the original.]

Borba, the official organ of the so-called League of Yugoslav Communists -- one of whose slanderous editorials was printed in yesterday's <u>Granma</u> -- and other publications in that country have in recent weeks been attacking Cuba and the revolutionary accords approved at the Tricontinental Conference. This constitutes an attack at the same time against the revolutionary road of the peoples of Latin America. We must spend a great deal of time and energy fighting the main enemy which is Yankee imperialism; but Cuba cannot disregard this series of attacks against its political positions, against the accords of the Tricontinental Conference, and the even less tolerable crude campaign against the Latin-American revolutionary movement carried on by those whose acts, intrigues and propaganda cunningly serve this main enemy. These systematic attacks reveal the anger of the Yugoslav political leadership over the Cuban position, opposing the attempt of the so-called League of Yugoslav Communists to send a representative as an observer to the Tricontinental Conference.

There are many reasons why the so-called League of Yugoslav Communists had no right to participate in an event like the Tricontinental Conference. But without going to the root of the question, When this point was discussed in Cairo in the International Preparatory Committee, Cuba based its opposition on a very concrete reason:

The Yugoslav government has in actuality supported the attempts of the imperialists in trying to compel the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to negotiate without the condition being previously met of withdrawing the Yankee troops now on Vietnamese soil. As is well known, this is in flagrant violation of the Geneva agreement and in open contradiction to the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. Furthermore in no document or declaration has the Yugoslav government condemned the imperialist attacks on the people of south Vietnam or demanded strict observance of the Geneva agreement.

The subsequent reaction of the Yugoslav press, which expresses the anger felt over the attitude of Cuba and the International Preparatory Committee and which opposes the line approved unanimously by the conference, demonstrates the correctness of the decisions of the International Preparatory Committee and the firm position taken by our country.

Borba Slanders the Venezuelan Communists

The growth of the guerrilla struggle in Venezuela was clearly shown at the Tricontinental Conference; some of its glorious fighters, members of the Communist party, of the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria] and the FALN [Fuerzas Amedos de Liberación Nacional] were present. Nonetheless, <u>Borba</u> makes an insinuation, slanderously claiming that the Communist party of Venezuela has renounced the guerrilla struggle.

This attitude is not strange, since the Yugoslav government, on more than one occasion, has proposed that the puppet regimes, first of Rómulo Betancourt and then of Raúl Leoni, tyrants over the Venezuelan people and familiar instruments of imperialism in its maneuvers against Cuba, be invited to the conferences of unaligned countries. For the government of Yugoslavia, the Venezuelan tyranny, which murders workers and peasants, set up and maintained by imperialism, is not "aligned." While the blood of the fighters of this sister people continues to flow in the mountains and cities and the heroic struggle of its guerrillas grows stronger, the Yugoslav leaders keep up very close political and commercial relations with the mortal enemy of the Venezuelan people, with the reactionary, pro-imperialist government of Leoni.

Borba makes another insinuation when it claims that some Latin-American Communist parties are in disagreement with the resolutions and the line adopted at the conference. At bottom, what irritates the Yugoslav leaders is the firm unity that was gained and the impressive advance of the most militant and radical revolutionary position. The militant unity and consciousness of the revolutionary organizations of Latin America are stronger than ever. This was also clearly to be seen at the conference.

We Reject Unity with the Puppets of the Imperialists

Borba maliciously seeks to prove that the Tricontinental Conference did not achieve positive results by noting and emphasizing the negative reactions of the pro-imperialist governments of Latin America. The veiled insinuations of the journal of the so-called League of Yugoslav Communists can only reflect a crawling position of submission to imperialism.

We must tell <u>Borba</u> that, on the contrary, the obvious proof that the Tricontinental Conference achieved its objectives lies precisely in the fact that the oligarchies and imperialism through their reactionary press and through their ruling camarillas have felt compelled to do something about its revolutionary results.

With real malice <u>Borba</u> quotes "certain liberal bourgeois journals" which hold, according to the Yugoslav daily, that the outcome of the conference "impeded the principled struggle of the broad front of progressive Latin-American forces." That is, in <u>Borba's</u> definitive judgment, Latin-American governments which are in reality puppets of imperialism, which oppose the Cuban Revolution, which exploit their people, and which support or resign themselves to the brutal Yankee military intervention in Santo Domingo, form a part of this "broad front."

Let <u>Borba</u> know that a broad front of the genuine revolutionary and progressive forces of Latin America is not achieved by crawling before imperialism, through deals with governments that are puppets of imperialism. On the contrary, this broad front is attained by revolutionary means, as the Cuban Revolution demonstrates in a clear and definitive way.

Borba calls a government like the one in Uruguay "liberal" -a government that surrendered to the dictates of Yankee imperialism, broke diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba, and that has persecuted the people, repressing strikes, attacking unions and universities and hurling police against the students and workers.

For <u>Borba</u> a proof of the collapse of the conference or its failure to attain its objectives is that the government of Peru, which has carried out a cruel repression against the people and in whose territory guerrillas are fighting heroically to shake off the oppression of imperialism and the oligarchies, presented a notoriously cynical denunciation to the OAS "accusing Cuba and the conference."

Borba considers it a negative result of the conference that the puppet governments belonging to the OAS, in fact, the Yankee Ministry of Colonies, held a meeting and sent a cynical and shameless document to the president of the Security Council.

The Yugoslav journal would have liked the revolutionary forces of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to bow to the imperialists and their lackeys. This was not, however, the objective of the Tricontinental Conference.

The Yugoslav Positions

Are Opposed to the Second Declaration of Havana

These Yugoslav positions are radically opposed to the line proclaimed and maintained by Cuba in the Second Declaration of Havana, which says in this respect:

"In the antifeudal and anti-imperialist struggle it is possible to rally the majority of the people resolutely behind freedom goals that unite the determination of the working class, the peasants, the intellectual workers, the petty bourgeoisie and the most progressive layers of the national bourgeoisie. These sectors constitute the immense majority of the population, combining great social forces capable of sweeping out imperialist domination and feudal reaction."

Leoni, Belaúnde, the Government Council of Uruguay, and the rest of the camarillas that have sold out to Yankee imperialism will never represent these forces. They will always be in the service of the imperialists, the same as their <u>Borba</u> apologists. The immense majority of the revolutionary forces and organizations were represented at the conference: the National Liberation Front of Venezuela, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Guatemala, the revolutionary guerrilla movements of Peru and Colombia, the heroic people of Santo Domingo who today are fighting foreign intervention and the occupation of their country by imperialist troops, the Left Liberation Front of Uruguay, FRAP [Frente Revolucionario de Acción Popular] of Chile and the fighting organizations of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, British Guiana, Jamaica, Brazil, Guadalupe, French Guiana, Haiti, Martinique, Mexico, Puerto Rico and Trinidad-Tobago.

At the conference, Cuba sought and won a united front of the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America and of all the progressive forces ready to fight against imperialism. This means solidarity of the revolutionary movements in sweeping away the oligarchies, imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism.

The Only Ones Who Can Make the Revolution in This Continent, Are Going To Do It

But in addition to this, the Declaration of Havana, whose essential postulates with respect to the struggle in Latin America received the vigorous support of the revolutionary movements of the three continents represented at the conference, is very clear and explicit concerning the road which the subjugated peoples of this continent will follow in shaking off the imperialist yoke.

The initiative, which received unanimous support, to establish the Latin-American Solidarity Organization came from the hearts of the revolutionary representatives of the continent.

Borba seeks in vain to toll the bell for the revolutionary theses. It seeks in vain to frighten us with the Holy Alliance between the reactionary gorillas (among whom are its Leonis, its Beltrans, its Uruguayan rulers and company) and Yankee imperialism. The only ones who can make the revolution on this continent are going to make it; and in some countries like Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and Santo Domingo they are already struggling heroically and without the least sign of demoralization. No one can divert them from this road, and no force in the world can halt their impetuous advance; because now more than ever "this great mass of humanity has said, 'Enough!' and has begun to march. And they will not halt in their giant march until they conquer genuine independence."

n an an der er den en der einen som en s En som NEXT ISSUE 2 - C A statement by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on the situation in Indonesia. . . and the second second · · · · · · ·

n an fraite an an an that the second sec A second seco A second seco