



# INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE !

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY NUMBER WITH

*The Programme  
of Revolutionary Marxism*



COMPLETE DOCUMENTS

*of the*

FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS

*of the*

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

WINTER 1958

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### *All Editorial Correspondence to*

PIERRE FRANK  
64, RUE DE RICHELIEU  
PARIS

### *Rates*

Single copies : 35 cents ; 1 year (4 issues) : \$ 1.25  
2 shillings ; 7 shillings

### *Subscriptions and Business Correspondence to*

PIERRE FRANK	LANKA SAMASAMAJA PARTY	SAM BORNSTEIN
64, Rue de Richelieu, Paris	49, Drieberg Av., Colombo, Ceylan	21, Sidney Street, London E1

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# FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

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ENGLISH - LANGUAGE EDITION OF THE THEORETICAL ORGAN OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

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Number 1

Winter 1958

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## Announcement

Quatrième Internationale, theoretical organ of the Fourth International in French, published by its European Executive Committee from 1943 to 1946, and since then by its International Executive Committee, is entering its 16th year. On this occasion the Fifth World Congress voted to undertake the great editorial and financial effort of bringing it out also in English, for the United States, the United Kingdom, Ceylon, India, Australia, and Canada — as well as for those countries, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, China, Japan, etc., where knowledge of English is more widespread than that of French.

In the United States particularly this has become all the more necessary because our former co-thinkers of the Socialist Workers Party have for some years now, despite repeated efforts by the International to heal the breach, refused all collaboration, not only in the technical sense forbidden by the reactionary laws of the U.S.A., but even in the real sense of common programme and coordinated activity. The SWP will apparently « regroup » with anyone except the Fourth International. Thus the true and full voice of Trotskyism is no longer heard in the U.S.

In the United Kingdom, the only revolutionary Marxist theoretical publication to defend the programme and the organization of the Fourth International was the organ of the Revolutionary Socialist League, the small Workers International Review, which this larger present quarterly will replace.

Fourth International is a theoretical organ, not a propaganda review, and even less an agitational magazine. As such it does not duplicate any existing publication in English. It is aimed particularly at advanced cadre elements, both those already in the revolutionary Marxist movement and those drawing close to it. It thus does not write down to its readers, or fail to present its full programme at all times.

It will appear four times a year.

Ordinary issues will consist of: editorials and editorial notes upon the important events of the previous quarter; manifestos, declarations, and documents of the International Executive Committee; articles upon aspects of Marxist theory, upon important developments in individual countries, upon such burning questions as war-&-peace, the progress of the political revolution in the Soviet bloc and of the

social revolution in the capitalist world, the international economic conjuncture, the unending crisis in Stalinism, etc.; historical documents, especially rare articles by Leon Trotsky; reviews of books of interest to revolutionary Marxists; and notes upon the world workers' movement and the International.

The present first number, as readers will immediately observe, is not characteristic, in that it does not follow the foregoing formula. That is because this is a special issue, devoted entirely to the documents of the Fourth International's recent Fifth World Congress. This choice of contents is deliberate, since it is believed that, for those unfamiliar with Trotskyism, there could be no better introduction than a clear and extensive presentation of its full current programme, especially its consideration of the conjuncture, its continuing analysis of the phenomena of the decline and the coming fall of Stalinism, its study of the colonial revolution, and its world revolutionary perspectives. It is believed that this first issue will prove valuable not only for immediate reading but also for long-term reference.

8 February 1958

## Foreword

In October 1957 the Fifth Congress of the Fourth International met in Italy; there were over a hundred delegates and fraternal observers, representing more than 25 countries from all the continents. It was far-and-away the most representative Congress, and the richest in discussions and amplifications, in the entire history of the International.

We have collected in this volume the principal documents of this Congress, whose general line, after a broad and most democratic discussion, was voted unanimously.

These documents are: the theses on international economic and political perspectives, accompanied by the report made

thereon to the Congress by Comrade Pablo; the introduction to the study on the evolution of the colonial revolution since the Second World War, accompanied by the report made thereon to the Congress by Comrade P. Frank; the theses on the rise, decline, and conditions for the fall, of Stalinism, accompanied by the report made thereon to the Congress by Comrade E. Germain; extracts from the report on the activity of the International by Comrade Pablo; and the Manifesto of the Fifth World Congress.

The text on the evolution of the colonial revolution since the Second World War is in reality only a preamble to a more detailed document on the question,

whose preparation the Fifth World Congress entrusted to the new International Executive Committee for adoption at one of its coming plenums.

As for the theses on Stalinism, they include both those voted at the time of the Fourth World Congress of the International in 1954 on the rise and decline of Stalinism, and those voted at the Fifth World Congress on the decline and fall of Stalinism.

Taken together, the documents assembled in this volume give a quite complete idea both of the present positions of the Fourth International on all the great political problems of the hour, and even of our whole epoch, and also of its own

theoretical and political level. They are unquestionably a living proof of the reality of the existence of an authentic international revolutionary Marxist movement, the direct heir to the traditions, the ideas, and the method of thought of the Bolshevism of Lenin and the first years of the Third International, as well as of the Soviet and international left tendency that Leon Trotsky was able to inspire and lead.

The richness, vigor, and revolutionary substance of the present thought of the Fourth International on all the great political problems of the moment strongly stands out from these documents. The realities, problems, and prospects—both of the capitalist world and of those states called « workers' » because of their economic and social bases—are freely and deeply analyzed in the light of the dialectics of revolutionary Marxism, in order to derive therefrom a clear line of fruitful revolutionary action. This is the best demonstration of the correctness of the road on which the movement of the Fourth International set out some years ago, in order to take its stand not as a critical negation of Stalinism but as a positively alternative communist line, in every field of our fantastically extraordinary and dynamic mid-century.

This characteristic of the thought of the Fourth International is both the cause and the effect of its practical line of systematically and patiently sinking the roots of its organizations and militants into the real mass movement of each country.

The Fifth World Congress had the proof of this both in the reports of practical activity, successes, and progress of the sections of the Fourth International, and in the high qualifications of the militants, the atmosphere of the discussions, and the thoroughly free and democratic climate of the organization.

The unanimity which ratified the vote on the general line of the documents, far from being the sign of the uniformity of a bureaucratic organization which strangles or sterilizes critical thought, was in reality the demonstration of the high

degree of political homogeneity reached by the movement of the Fourth International through its free and broad experience.

In many ways the Fifth World Congress capitalized upon, systematized, and rendered fruitful the achievements of all preceding congresses of the Fourth International, particularly the Third (1951) and Fourth (1954) Congresses.

The Third World Congress had drawn attention to the change in the global relationship of forces in the world in favor of the Revolution. This recognition was a starting-point for the development of a whole series of political and tactical consequences: an understanding of war as a form of resistance by imperialism to the forward drive of the Revolution, to the irreversible advance of the colonial revolution; a change in the relationship of forces between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Soviet and international masses; the decline and crisis of Stalinism; the decline and crisis of the traditional mass organizations. The Third World Congress furthermore began the tactical turn toward entrust policy in Socialist or Communist mass organizations.

The Fourth World Congress completed this tactical turn and gave a more thorough analysis of the conditions of the rise and decline of Stalinism. It furthermore proclaimed again, in the teeth of attacks by centrifugal and liquidationist, sectarian or demoralized currents, that the essence, the grounds for existence, and the strength of the international Trotskyist movement lay in the existence of a world democratic-centralist organization: the Fourth International.

The Fifth World Congress renewed and advanced, in a synthesis at a higher level, all these fundamental gains of the Fourth International, deepening its analysis in a whole series of new directions: the economic conjuncture of post-war capitalism, and of possible economic perspectives for the coming decade, both for capitalism and for the workers' states; problems

resulting from the loss of colonies and from the industrialization of colonial and dependent countries; the political problems of the colonial revolution; the conditions and perspectives for the decline and fall of Stalinism; a programme for the political revolution in degenerate or deformed workers' states, taking into account the concrete experience of Stalinism and the revolutionary action of the masses; new problems of the entrust tactic in mass organizations, etc.

Strengthened by these gains, the Fourth International is more than ever convinced that the coming years will see the inevitable triumph of its fundamental ideas and will completely justify the long, tenacious, unequalled struggles of the Trotskyist movement for now more than 30 years. The future belongs to the authentic communism of Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky, that frees the individual from all social exploitation, from all constraint, and aims to create the material conditions for a full flowering of the faculties of man as a social being.

The errors, the crimes, and the monstrous deformations which accompanied the beginnings of the world socialist revolution, as incarnated above all in the Stalinist regime in the USSR, have nowise mortgaged the sure future of communism and of humanity. The fact that, parallel with Stalinism, the movement of the Fourth International exists, shows that the factually monstrous degeneration of the first workers' state must be imputed, not to Marxism, but to its deformation and profanation in a concrete case, under the pressure of specific and temporarily unfavorable historic conditions.

But we have already arrived at the stage of the inevitable liquidation of Stalinism, of the triumph of the Revolution, and consequently of a new dawn of the creative ideas and action of revolutionary Marxism, bringing freedom to man.

That is, in essence, the most profound message of the Fifth World Congress of the Fourth International.

# INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

## I

### Theses

#### PREAMBLE

The object of the following theses is to distinguish the general tendencies of the years to come both in the capitalist economy and in that of the workers' states, *insofar as they can be deduced on the basis of the present conditions and dynamics of both types of economy and in the purely theoretical eventuality of the lack of any major conflict during this period; also to evaluate the influence of these economic tendencies on political developments, in order to derive therefrom certain general political perspectives.*

This method of proceeding from an extrapolation, starting from the present condition and dynamics, ignoring the possibility of major disturbances, is the only possible method of determining the general tendencies and perspectives.

The prognoses thus established will naturally have only a relative value, that is to say, these prognoses will be valid only insofar as the interacting factors which determine the tendencies and perspectives evolve in such a way as to produce roughly the same global result as can be envisaged from the analysis of the present state and dynamics of these factors.

But, if certain of these factors do become considerably modified in the years to come, or other unforeseen factors intervene, the basis of the calculation will be changed.

This is how Marxist prognoses differ from the prophecies of dogmatists.

On the other hand it must be taken into account, especially where economic forecasts are concerned, that politics, particularly in the present advanced stage of imperialism, constantly influence economics, and may reinforce or abruptly interrupt the process of so-called capitalist stabilization.

The class struggle in the capitalist countries is unquestionably influenced by the economic conjuncture, but this in its turn is profoundly influenced by the class struggle.

In fact, in most capitalist countries the margins of economic stabilization are always so narrow that the outbreak of a widespread struggle is enough to undermine all the achievements of the « stabilization » and to start off a new « recession » or crisis.

A Marxist analysis retains all its validity and importance if it helps to forecast a *general tendency*, even if the end-result of the tendency (for example, a crash, war, or revolution) does not actually occur for some time as a result of the intervention of opposing factors.

This is the classical case with numerous analyses and Marxist perspectives, from Marx himself and *Capital* down to the present day.

Errors in a Marxist assessment should be sought either in a mistaken estimation of the present dynamics of the factors analyzed, or in the fact that, subsequently, it has not taken account in time of fundamental modifications in these factors which would necessarily result in a different global effect from that initially foreseen.

★

1.— The implications of the economic situation of capitalism and the workers' states during the decade which has elapsed since the end of the last war (especially since 1946) have greatly influenced the evolution of the general international political situation. They throw even more light both on certain political developments which have taken place during this period and on the political perspectives for the immediate future. Thanks to this retrospective analysis one can gain a better understanding of exactly what has occurred in the basic evolution of the world economy and the tendencies which it is now beginning to show.

2.— The economic evolution of capitalism during this period led it, through minor crises and « recessions, » towards a reconstruction and strengthening of capitalism's productive apparatus, which in its entirety has reached double the industrial production of 1938 and now surpassed even this (1). Although the world capitalist market has had amputated from it the workers' states in Europe and Asia, its productive capacity is even larger than this.

3.— In this general upward evolution, it is necessary to distinguish three interdependent sectors: that of the United States, that of capitalist Europe, and that of the colonial or semi-colonial countries, or countries on the road to becoming new capitalist powers (India, Brazil, Argentina, etc.).

It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between a first rather chaotic period of reconstruction in all these countries, with the exception of the United States, a period which continued by and large until the Korean War, and the period which has succeeded it. It was in this second period that the rising movement of the capitalist economy as a whole towards upswing and boom became manifest.

4.— In the first period, which lasted up to the Korean War, the capitalist economy of Europe, destroyed by the war, was gradually put back on its feet, thanks

(1) From an index figure of 70 in 1938, industrial production reached 100 in 1948 and 146 in 1955 (according to the figures of UNO). The average annual increase of industrial production during the period 1938-1955, as during the period 1948-1955, was around 6 %.

essentially to the economic and military aid of the United States, itself still sustained by the stimulus given to its economy by the war.

In this period, the economy of the colonial and dependent countries benefitted from the need for raw materials and agricultural products, mainly by Europe, and it continued to profit from the advantages it accumulated during the war itself.

In the second period, which started with the Korean War, different processes became apparent in the three sectors of the capitalist economy :

— the United States consolidated and reinforced the sector of war economy which has constituted since then — as during the war — the No. 1 stimulus of the whole economy of the country ;

— reconstructed capitalist Europe, stimulated by the boom in industrial investments and internal demand, advanced, in a relative sense, by increasing its share in world capitalist production and international trade (2) ;

— the colonial and dependent countries, while developing their economy, were outdistanced by the progress of the industrial countries, their relative share of international trade diminishing in comparison with the trade among the industrial countries (3).

The turning point of these processes lay somewhere in 1953. It was after this date that *capitalist Europe experienced a period of almost full employment of its productive capacity in machinery and manpower—unique in the whole history of capitalism since the first World War*, while the United States quickly overcame the slight depression, from 1953 to mid-1954, and entered also on the road of boom. The colonial and dependent countries, on the other hand, experienced a deterioration both in their trade balance and in their finances, and were embroiled in still uncontrollable inflationary difficulties.

From the point of view of the rate of growth of industrial production, both for capitalist Europe and for the United States, the culminating point lay in the year 1955. After that the progress in general continued, but its rhythm slowed down.

5.—The expansion of the European capitalist economy since 1953 is essentially an expansion of industrial production, stimulated by investments in means of production and in durable consumers' goods. It has been supported by the previous action of stimulants such as housing construction and military expenditure.

The expansion of the American economy since the end of 1954 is equally due, apart from military expen-

(2) As becomes clear in the following table which shows the lowering of the percentage of the USA in world capitalist production :

1947	58.6
1948	56.4
1952	52.6
1954	49.4
1955 (first quarter)	50.6

At the same time the share of the USA in the export trade of the capitalist world diminished in favor of Europe.

(3) The share of trade between industrial and non-industrial regions, which was 55 % in 1937, dropped to 53 % in 1950 and to 50.7 % in 1955 (GATT report of world trade in 1955).

diture and construction, to the stimulus of *industrial investments and the maintenance of internal demand, mainly thanks to the considerable extension of consumers' credit.*

On the other hand, the unfavorable evolution of the balance of trade of the colonial and dependent countries, their inflationary process, as well as the relative slowing down of industrialization (due to the slowing down of the accumulation of native capital) are due to changes occurring in world trade.

6.—These changes in the structure of trade, which contrasts with the pattern of world trade before the war, can be summed up and explained as follows :

The share of exports of means of production and durable consumers' goods of the industrial countries to the colonial and dependent countries is increasing at the expense of the share of semi-manufactured or consumers' goods. This reflects the process of increased industrialization of these countries since the last war.

On the other hand, the share of the trade between colonial and dependent countries and industrial countries diminished in comparison to the growth in trade among the industrial countries. This is explained chiefly by the increase in the production of natural raw materials in the industrial countries and by the growing importance of artificial raw materials (4) ; as also by the colonial and dependent countries' own industrialization, which absorbs part of the raw materials previously exported.

Nevertheless, it should not be deduced from this observation that for the industrial countries there has been a lessening of the still vital importance of the colonial and dependent countries, as reserves of indispensable raw materials (all the more so in that the natural reserves of the industrial countries are becoming exhausted because of the drain of the expansion), and as outlets for industrial products and for capital. *There can be deduced from it only a widening of the gap between the industrial and the backward countries*, in spite of the absolute progress of the latter and their continuing industrialization. The present technological revolution (utilization of automatic and atomic energy) threatens to aggravate this situation.

7.—It is partly because of these transformations in the structure of postwar world trade that the political loss of certain colonies — by the accession to power of the native bourgeoisie — has so far not deeply shaken the metropolitan countries. Other factors have operated in the same direction.

The share given up by imperialism to the bourgeoisie of these colonies, in terms of raw materials, industrial production, and capital, was not decisive and could

(4) Chemical products, metal goods, and other means of production are now made in Europe with European raw materials. The total volume of exports of natural raw materials and fuels of the non-industrialized regions to the industrial countries in 1955 did not exceed the 1938 volume by more than about 10 %, while the total of world trade increased during the same period by about 70 %. On the other hand it is calculated that the needs of the industrial regions in imports of natural raw materials coming from non-industrialized regions would be about 40 % more than the actual importations in 1955, if the raw materials produced in the industrial countries had not existed.

be compensated for by the growth of the market in Europe and elsewhere.

In any case imperialism continues to maintain important economic interests in these countries. The loss of colonies does not affect imperialism except where their political independence, combined with social revolution, is brought about under régimes of proletarian dictatorship which detach them structurally from the capitalist circuit. Or, on a long term view, in the case of a important hypothetical development of the national bourgeoisie, which then monopolizes for itself, to the detriment of imperialism, the raw-material market, industrial products, and capital of these countries.

8.—A further new feature of world trade, more especially since 1953, is the increase in trade between the workers' states and the dependent countries (5). This tendency is aided by the strengthening of the industrial potential of the workers' states and by their technological advance, which enables them to export means of production and technicians, i.e., to furnish the material and technical aid which the backward countries need in order to commence and give impetus to their industrialization. *In future this tendency can only be accentuated, with all the political consequences which it implies, coming into head-on collision with the vital interests of imperialism in this field.*

9.—Capitalist expansion, especially since 1950, has undoubtedly taken on unwonted dimensions which have upset the prognoses made in the first post-war period, both by Marxists—including our own movement—and by the most competent bourgeois experts.

Furthermore, the fact that capitalism has not undergone a major economic crisis since the war and is even engaged, especially since 1953, in what appears to be a classical industrial boom, raises the question of a more profound analysis of the reasons for such an evolution and of its perspectives. This leads us in the first place to examine the bases of American «prosperity.»

10.—It is impossible to overemphasize the role played in the American economy by government expenditure, in the form of purchases of goods for its military aims, investment of capital in government military establishments, upkeep of its armed forces (6),

(5) The tendency to increase in trade exchanges between the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China, and the rest of the world, began in the second quarter of 1953. The most important developments have taken place since then in the direction of countries such as Burma, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Japan, and Argentina.

(6) In particular, the full extent of the militarization of the American economy must be appraised both in comparison with its pre-war condition and in an absolute sense. Here are certain data which cast light on this subject:

For the three fiscal years 1937-1938, 1938-1939, 1939-1940, direct military expenditure of the USA was only 3,600 million dollars, which was less than 15 % of the budget and equal to only 1.5 % of the national income (especially for the year 1937-1938).

For the fiscal year 1944-1945, which marked the end of the war, total government expenditure rose to about 98,700 million dollars, of which 84,600 million dollars, i.e. 86 %, were for direct military expenditure.

In 1948-1949, it fell to 14,500 million dollars, i.e. 6.5 % of the national income, only to rise again during the Korean war and to reach 47,700 million dollars, that is 15.8 % of the (official) national income, in 1953-1954.

as well as economic and military aid abroad, amortization of the national debt, support of agricultural prices, and large-scale public works. This is still the principal stimulant of the American economy that prevents it from crossing the borderline between «prosperity» and crisis.

It is equally this stimulant which, thanks to the super-profits of a production with an assured outlet such as those for military purposes, has aided the investment of private capital in industry in order to expand and modernize the American productive apparatus as a whole.

The beginning of the genuine technological revolution represented by the productive utilization of nuclear energy and automation, as well as the accelerated industrialization of the Southern states, are among the manifestations of the impulse thus given to industry as a whole.

It is *these investments* as well as *the extension of credit to consumers* (7) which has since 1953 bolstered up the American economy, exhausted in spite of the stimulus of the war, enabling it to weather the «recession» and start a new boom.

But the other side of the coin of this «prosperity,» which has lasted since roughly the beginning of the last war, consists in the enormous public (8) and private indebtedness of the country, and by the accelerated depreciation of the currency (9).

Furthermore agricultural overproduction, which is becoming more and more of a burden on the economy

Actually, moreover, the total sum of government credits for direct and indirect military purposes is even higher than this and constitutes in recent years about 75 % of all government expenditure.

(7) The private debts for instalment buying of cars and other goods rose in 1955 to 28,000 million dollars, on which the interest and other charges were of the order of 4,000 million dollars! The total of bankers' and mortgage loans during this same year (1955) was 112,000 million dollars.

In 1956 private debts for instalment purchases showed a new rise of about 3,000 million dollars. The others by about 15,000 million dollars.

It is estimated that the increase in consumers' debts in 1957 will be not less than in 1956 (though considerably lower than the remarkable increase in the rate shown by the year 1955 over 1954—more than 6,000 million dollars).

From 1945 to 1955 total private indebtedness rose from 140,000 to 360,000 million dollars, which is an annual increase of about 25,000 million dollars.

(8) The public debt of the United States rose in 1956 to 280,000 million dollars as opposed to 1,000 million dollars in 1902, 19,000 million dollars in 1932, and 72,000 million dollars in 1942. Since 1945 it has increased by 30,000 million dollars. Most of it is held by different financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, etc.) who receive increasing interest rates.

In 1955 the interest on the public debt rose to 6,500 million dollars, which was 10 % of the Federal budget.

The war was financed in a large measure by the extraordinary extension of the public debt in the period 1940-1945, rising to some 194,000 million dollars.

(9) The purchasing power of the dollar has diminished by more than 50 % since 1941. Between January 1946 and December 1956, this purchasing power diminished by about 30 % (according to the recent study by the international expert, Franz Pick).

From this point of view, the gross national product of the United States *per capita* has increased, from 1946 to 1956, in terms of the purchasing power of 1946, only by 16 %, as compared with 63 % in nominal dollars.

of the country as a whole, has become chronic in the United States (10).

11.—The unquestionable result is that the tremendous concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a small group of monopolies and of the state which is completely subservient to them, has allowed them, with the aid of the experience of the 1929-1933 crisis, to perfect a whole arsenal of « anti-depression » measures to deaden the effects of the sudden impact of economic crises and to keep within bounds, to a certain degree, their rapid, cumulative, and uncontrollable extension.

The capitalist state is watching over the economic conjuncture and intervenes with all the means in its power in order to avoid such an outcome. Apart from the weapon of the size and elasticity of its own budgetary expenditure, the state intervenes by means of fiscal policy encouraging investments, by the extension of social security guaranteeing a minimum purchasing power, finally by the credit policy which to a certain extent regularizes the expansion and limits the dangers of stock-exchange speculation and a financial crash.

All these measures have been carefully studied in the United States and flexibly applied by the « brain trust » of advisers, experts, and big capitalists, of the United States government. In addition, the banks are forearmed against a sudden crisis, a considerable part of their resources being invested in state securities.

Finally the continued concentration of US enterprises in giant monopolies (oil, steel, auto) puts at their disposal enormous reserves of capital which enables them to a certain extent to face up to the fluctuations of the conjuncture.

12.—*The conclusion must be that the capitalist monopolies in the United States, making use of a large degree of « planning » by the capitalist state, have the possibility of breaking the force of the onset of limited economic crises and of transforming them into more or less deep and widespread « recessions » (the difference between a depression and a « recession » lying essentially in the fact that a depression does not grow in a cumulative way but rapidly hits the lowest point of the conjuncture and stays there for a longer or shorter time according to the magnitude*

(10) To appreciate in its full significance the chronic agricultural crisis in the USA, which foreshadows the crisis of overproduction of mechanized agriculture in the entire capitalist system, certain statistical data are necessary:

The agricultural population of the USA is constantly decreasing. In 1956 it totaled 22 million individuals (against 25 million in 1950), or 13 % of the total population, as against 60 % a century ago. It is grouped in some 4.8 million farms. Of this number, two million alone provide 85 % of the commercial agricultural production. That is to say, 2.8 million farms produce the remaining 15 %.

The government supports by subsidies the prices of six basic agricultural products and a few others, which constitute about 50 % of agricultural production. It is obvious that this considerable aid (8,500 million dollars of agricultural surplus stocked by the government in 1956; more than 10,000 million dollars this year!) goes mainly to two million privileged farmers. But it is powerless to check the constant decrease in agricultural incomes resulting from the overproduction characteristic of this market as a consequence of the development of productivity and the shrinking of external outlets for American agriculture.

of the causes which precipitated it, and of the new forces which go into action to overcome it).

This is the road that the American economy has followed since the war up to the present time.

The « recessions » (of 1949 and 1953) were an expression of the temporary disequilibrium between increased production and relatively lagging consumption. They were overcome, the first by the conjuncture of the Korean War, which stimulated mainly the military expenditures of the state, the second by the boom of private investments and the expansion of consumer credit.

*But these methods are inoperative in the face of a large-scale crisis, which would necessitate such great increases in public expenditures to soften its effect, that the whole of the monetary system would be in ruins.*

The same reservation applies with equal force to the long-term repetition of even limited crises, since there is a limit to public indebtedness as there is to production and stockpiling of armaments (and military expenditure in general), i.e., a point in the depreciation of the currency beyond which there is a danger of precipitating financial bankruptcy.

Furthermore, insofar as productive capacity constantly increases while consuming capacity (even leaving aside unemployment) is constantly undermined by currency depreciation, the frequency as well as the depth of « recessions » can only become accentuated.

The productive capacity of the United States, merely by increased productivity, is now increasing by an annual average of 3 %. The technological projects now in hand regarding automation, and soon the eventual use of atomic energy on a big scale, will have the effect of maintaining if not of increasing this percentage.

Without an adequate constant increase in production (of at least 4 %) this will mean that at least three million workers (of which 700,000 new ones arrive yearly on the American labor market) will each year enter the industrial reserve army.

Thus the American economy is under the dual pressure of contradictory processes: on the one hand of the expansion of its productive apparatus and productivity, on the other the relative contraction (in relation to the enlargement of productive capacity) of consuming capacity, due to monetary depreciation, to the decrease in agricultural revenues, and to technological unemployment.

*Hence the inevitable perspective of an accelerated rhythm and aggravation of the « recessions. »*

13.—Actually the same considerations apply equally to the European capitalist economy, with some special modifications.

Its present boom was fed by an investment boom, by internal demand, and by exports. The object of the investments was both to expand and to modernize the productive apparatus, in an atmosphere of constantly sharpening international competition. They resulted in a considerable increase in the productive capacity of the European economy (11).

(11) Increase in production of electricity is an indication of the extension of productive capacity. In England this

The internal demand affected mainly housing construction and durable consumers' goods; the external demand being for the means of production, as well as consumers' goods.

In this productive effort, capitalist Europe exhausted its own sources of power and in some places even of manpower. Its dependence on coal and petroleum products from the United States, as well as petroleum products from the Middle East, has increased, simultaneously with its dollar deficit.

Furthermore, in order to improve their position in international competition, as well as to face up to the increased cost of labor power, the European capitalists, in their turn, are getting deeply involved in the technological changes of automation. But this phase, which is manifested by the expansion of the productive apparatus of Europe and constant increase in its productivity, coincides with the tendency to saturation of the home market, which is also undermined once more by the increase in inflation and the sharpening difficulties the colonial countries and dependencies have in draining more imports from the industrial countries.

*Hence the present tendency to a flattening out of the boom, while waiting for a « recession » in the European capitalist economy as well.*

14.—For a more accurate appraisal of the short-term economic perspectives, it would be necessary to know more concretely the volume of industrial investments not yet carried out, and that of new investments. For, if it is admitted that military expenditure in all the capitalist countries has reached a ceiling (except for 1957-58) the main economic stimulant remains at the present time that of *industrial investments*. Now, in comparison with the investments already carried out in recent years or in course of being carried out, new investments, aimed especially at developing automation and fulfilling the programme of atomic power stations, do not appear to encourage especially favorable prognoses for a considerable extension of the market. Investments in automation are by their nature restricted (12). On the other hand, investments in atomic energy could be much greater and play a role of supplementary stimulant to the economy in the case where

production rose from 2,000 million kwh (monthly average) in 1936, to 6,400 million in 1955.

The corresponding figures for Germany are 2,600 to 5,800, and for France 1,500 to 3,800.

The increase in production of electric power between 1948 and 1955 is higher than the total figure for prewar production.

(12) The cost of certain automatic installations is prohibitive for medium and small enterprises. But one must not lose sight of the facts that the cost is diminishing constantly, and that, for many branches of industry, automation adds only a relatively small amount to the total cost of their installation. It is calculated that the average cost of automation of a factory is 6 % of the total.

Consequently it should not be expected that automation will give rise to a considerable development of investments, even remotely comparable, for example, to that of the first industrial revolution.

they are in addition to other public and private expenditures and not instead of them (13).

Furthermore, these investments will not be carried out by the capitalists unless they maintain a high rate of profit—which will depend on the possibility, or otherwise, of reducing the present level of consumption of the masses, now being undermined by the increase of inflation. In case the workers should fight to maintain, if not to increase, their present share of the national income, this will actually result in a fall in the rate of profit of the capitalists and probably also a reduction in the volume of investments.

Thus the probable relatively low level of the investments made in the new technological revolution in process (automation and atomic energy) will contrast with the rather rapid rise in production capacity and productivity of the European productive apparatus that will result from it.

15.—Thus the capitalist regime is now faced with the political and social consequences of an eventual technological transformation of its productive apparatus by the new productive forces now in the possession of humanity: automation and atomic energy.

Assuming that, in the decade now opening before us, capitalism, impelled by the demands of competition, engages in a large-scale programme of automation and atomic energy, *it could only aggravate its evolution by more frequent and serious crises, expressing the fundamental contradiction between an enormously increased capacity for production and the inadequate development of the consuming power of the masses.*

*This last factor will be the combined result of inevitable technological unemployment, including that*

(13) In the case of atomic installations there is unquestionably another possibility of new investments. But they are also mainly of a restricted kind. The example of England, which has just announced a programme of atomic construction undoubtedly vaster than all other countries (apart from the USA and the USSR) is significant in this connection. Here, according to the *Economist* of 9 March 1957, are the investments envisaged for the years 1957-1965 (in millions of pounds):

Years	Installations New Power			T&D*	Total Install.
	Ordin.	Atomic	Total		
1957-60	320	90	410	400	810
1961-65	310	780	1,090	800	1,890
Total	630	870	1,500	1,200	2,700

\* T&D: Transmission and Distribution.

In order the better to judge the influence of these investments as stimulants to the general development of the economy, it is necessary to recall that the annual military budget of England amounts to 1,600 million pounds, and that the reductions in the budget announced by Macmillan amount annually to sums appreciably analogous to those now absorbed by the programme of power stations.

In the same connection of ideas, the programme envisaged by the three European « wise men » concerning the development of atomic power stations planned to fulfill around 1967 the then needs of the « Europe of the Six » in electric power, would absorb 550 million dollars each year, a great part of which would be employed for expenditures in the USA and in England.

of white-collar workers (14), of the purchasing power of currency undermined by the inflation inherent in a régime of war economy and excessive public indebtedness, and of the diminution of agricultural incomes, casualties of inevitable agricultural over-production.

16. — While capitalism confronts the new post-war decade with an enlarged and rebuilt productive apparatus, and is obliged to try somehow to assimilate the technological revolution now in progress, the USSR and, to a rather lesser degree, the other workers' states, are seen to be making great practical achievements and tackling new problems.

Overcoming the enormous destruction of the war, the USSR has developed during the last decade at an annual rate of increase of industrial production which was on the average double the corresponding average capitalist increase (15).

At the same time its productivity, whose backwardness compared with that of the United States is far greater than its backwardness in production, increases annually twice as fast as that of the latter country (16). On the basis of scientific and technical progress, which were rendered possible only by a statified and planified economy, the USSR has furthermore been able to construct a vanguard industry that has proved itself in a sensational manner by the recent demonstrations of the intercontinental ballistic missile and the earth-satellite.

Thanks to this progress, the USSR is now in a position that allows it to envisage the possibility of catching up and outstripping, in the next few years, the total production of capitalist Europe, as well as its per capita production, and on a longer-term basis to come close to the United States in regard to total production in certain branches of industry (17).

(14) One of the results of automation will be to reverse the tendency to an increase in number of office workers, bank clerks, and other employees of the service sector, which has now for a number of years increased very extensively in the United States, from five million in 1940 to eight million in 1954, i.e., from eleven to sixteen per hundred industrial workers. These white-collar workers will be largely replaced by the wholesale introduction of electronic machines.

(15) Industrial production in the USSR has increased since 1930 **twenty times**, at an average annual rate of 12 % (as against 3.5 % in the United States and about 2.4 % in England). This fact is now admitted by a large number of Western economists such as: F. Selton (« An Estimate of Soviet Industrial Expansion » in *Soviet Studies* of October 1955); P.D. Wiles (« Are Adjusted Rubles Rational? » in the same publication); A. Gerschendron (« Notes sur le taux de croissance actuel de l'industrie soviétique » in *Economie Appliquée*, October-December 1953); and even by the American D.R. Hodgman (in the collective work edited by A. Bergson, *Soviet Economic Growth*, 1953, and the same author, *Soviet Industrial Production 1928-1951*, 1954).

(16) Productivity in the USSR, while it is still two to three times lower than that of the USA, is now developing twice as rapidly as that of the USA, and two to three times as rapidly as that of Western Europe. The present annual rate of increase in production per man-hour is about 6 % in the USSR as against 3 % in the United States. (Conclusions of the recent study by Dr. Seymour Melman, of Columbia University.)

(17) Predictions of the comparative evolution of the Soviet economy and the capitalist economy are naturally hazardous, like any extrapolation of this kind based on the average rhythms of the past. We can however mention the

On the other hand, its backwardness in agricultural production and light industry is still considerable.

During the same period, industrial production and

results obtained from this procedure, basing ourselves on the work done in this field by bourgeois economists.

Firstly, on the subject of national income: according to the study « Trends in Economic Growth » made by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress (1955), « in the 1938-1953 period the national income of the United States increased three times as fast as that of Western Europe and twice as fast as that of the USSR. Between 1948 and 1953 it increased only 30 % more quickly than that of Europe, and only 2/3rds as fast as that of the USSR. »

On the subject of steel production: towards 1960, the production of the USSR plus that of the European Peoples' Democracies, while still remaining lower than that of the United States (about 40 % less), should catch up and outstrip that of the whole of capitalist Europe, including per capita production. Towards 1970, at the latest, American and Soviet heavy industries should be equal. Towards 1975, Soviet heavy industry should outstrip that of the United States, including per capita production.

The question of the perspectives of development of the USSR and the United States is now often dealt with by bourgeois economists. Here are two recent versions of this theme:

Extracts from the study of A. Nove in the *Lloyd's Bank Review* (April 1956):

« How does Soviet industrial production compare with that of the United States? It is not possible to give a precise answer. After making all reservations, let us take the figure provisionally advanced by Hodgman, which seems to be very approximately of the correct order of size: in 1950 the Soviets produced 35 % of what was produced by the United States. For illustrative purposes only, let us make certain cautious hypotheses: firstly that American industrial production continues to increase regularly at the same rate as in 1950-1955, i.e. 24 % every five years. Let us take for Soviet expansion during the same period, the conservative estimate of 75 % and not 85 % which they themselves claim to be able to achieve, even if our hypothesis seems to constitute an injustice. Suppose again that the Soviet rate of growth is reduced so that the expansion is only 60 % between 1955 and 1960, and only 50 % between 1960-1965. The following results will follow.

**Industrial Expansion of the USSR and the United States**  
(Base: Industrial Production of the U.S. in 1950: 100.)

Year	USSR	United States	USSR as percentage of USA
1950 .....	35	100	35 %
1955 .....	61	124	49 %
1960 .....	98	154	64 %
1965 .....	147	191	77 %

« This table is based on hypotheses that are in the main favorable to the United States. Nevertheless, it follows from the table that the USSR, although far behind the USA, can by 1963 have achieved about the present production of the United States. »

Extracts from the study of the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, of Berlin, published in its *Wochenbericht* of January 18th 1957:

« Three closely related factors of great importance for an appreciation of the perspectives of development must especially be remembered; the very much higher rate of industrial expansion of the USSR compared with that of the United States, the almost equivalent growth of its production in absolute value despite its distinctly lower present level; finally the fact that, in the space of half a decade, the relationship of industrial production in the USSR to that in the United States has passed from about 1/3 rd to nearly 50 %. All this shows a « vigor of growth » of the USSR stronger than that of the United States and at the same time provides a basis for an appreciation of

productivity in the other workers' states have also progressed at a rate more than double that of the capitalist countries.

As for China, comparison is valid only in relation either to its development before the Revolution or to that of the industrialization of India under the bourgeois regime (18). In both cases the comparison is decisively in favor of the statified and planned economy. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to underestimate the still considerable backwardness of Chinese *per capita* production, which will not be able to catch up to the level of the advanced countries except in the case of a rapid extension of the world socialist revolution.

17. — This development of the USSR and the other workers' states was accomplished in spite of the excesses, the muddles, the errors, and the braking effect of bureaucratic management and the Stalinist regime in general.

If, on the one hand, this regime has been able to achieve a high rate of accumulation, thanks to holding the consumption of the masses and their general well-being down to an extremely low level and to making them work excessively hard, it has, on the other hand, wasted considerable human and material resources, sterilized the creative energy and initiative of the masses, impeded harmonious and rational planning in the whole economic sector of the workers' states, in liaison as far as possible with the rest of the world market.

Its peasant policy alone has undoubtedly given rise to one of the most serious bottlenecks which prevented a more harmonious growth of the economy, a precondition for achieving, at a certain stage, a still more rapid expansion of the forces of production. This means that the Stalinist regime has become, relatively very quickly, a brake on both the quantitative and the qualitative development of production — and of this the masses are becoming more and more conscious, which is what gives the fundamental drive to their growing struggle against the bureaucracy.

18. — The disproportions thus created in the economy of the USSR and the other workers' states by this development are becoming more glaring now that the economy, having exploited to the full the possibilities of progressing somehow without consideration for the

the question of whether the USSR will be able to catch up with United States.

« Assuming that the targets of the sixth Five-Year Plan are achieved and that the rate of expansion during the next Five-Year Plan diminishes at the same rhythm as during the preceding ones, Soviet industry will achieve in seven to eight years from now the present level of production in the United States.

« Even assuming that, during the period necessary for the USSR to raise itself to the level of the United States, the geometrical progression of its rate of expansion is reduced to the average rate of the United States during the last five years (i.e. 4.4 %), the present level of production of the United States will be reached in 1965, i.e., in ten years time. »

(18) Both the percentage of investments (in relation to the national income) and the percentage of industrial production (of steel in particular) of India remains about 1/3 those of China (for a population equal to 2/3 that of China). This disproportion threatens to increase with time, the scale and dynamics of the new Chinese plan being much greater than those of the second Indian five-year plan.

resources in raw materials and labor power, and without regard to production costs, is now at last reaching the phase of its *rationalization*.

The social pressure of the masses, moreover, repressed for a whole period, is now acting in the same direction.

The Soviet economy cannot go on progressing with the same dynamism as in the past without rejecting the management of the bureaucracy in its fundamental aspects.

The problems of economizing raw materials, manpower, and financial resources, of production costs, of quality, of the adjustment of the ratios among heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture are now becoming urgent. They are also intimately bound up with the human factor, with the activity of the working masses, in a double sense: if they remain unsolved, these problems will provoke and exacerbate the discontent of the masses who are more and more chafing at their position under bureaucratic management; and they furthermore cannot be solved without the democratic participation of the masses in the management of the economy and of the state. Thus the democratization of the regime has become imperative not only politically but also from an economic point of view.

The attempts made by the political leadership of the bureaucracy to remedy at least some aspects of bureaucratic management of the economy, to reduce the disproportions, restore some elasticity to the plan, take off the unproductive and paralyzing weight of supercentralization, are so many manifestations of the blind alley into which bureaucratic management has precisely got itself.

The examples and figures given both at the time of the public discussion of Khrushchev's theses on « decentralization » and during their presentation to the Supreme Soviet have sufficiently illustrated the financial and economic excesses of this management.

Insofar, however, as « decentralization » will be made only to the detriment of the people in the central offices and to the benefit of the managers and technicians in the factories, without real democratic participation of the masses, it will only bring an expansion of the basis of the bureaucracy and thus its reinforcement.

But, on the other hand, the decisive struggle for workers' management or bureaucratic management of the enterprises and of the economy in general will thus not fail to be stimulated.

19. — Because of their social and economic structure, the USSR in the first place, and already to a certain extent the other workers' states as well, are infinitely more capable than capitalism of adapting themselves without disturbance to the technological and industrial revolution in progress in regard to automation and atomic energy. In a sense they are leading this revolution, while capitalism remains tensely on the brink, hesitating — with good cause — on the verge of this new era.

The USSR has already embarked on the automation of its productive apparatus, the development of a network of atomic power stations, and research on cheap production of atomic energy.

After an interval of technological changes which imply a certain slowing down in the rhythm of increase in industrial production, it can make a decisive advance over the capitalist states, with all the implications that such an event will have for the relationship of forces.

*This crucial trial of strength on the economic plane should take place, assuming that war does not break out, precisely during the decade which is now beginning, and more especially towards the end of this decade.*

But on the other hand, it is becoming evident that imperialism will closely watch this development and will find in it additional reasons for taking a decision concerning war.

20.—The present state of the capitalist economy, both in the United States (19) and in Europe (20), is

(19) There are grounds for concluding that the real increase of industrial production in the United States in 1956 was less than 3 %. In the last quarter of 1956 it was actually no more than 2.2 %. If official unemployment was no higher, this was probably due to the fact that the official unemployment figures do not include partial unemployment, which has considerably increased, nor do they register the increase in average duration of unemployment among those listed as unemployed. The second explanation rests on the fact « that the actual progress in productivity seems to have been much slower in 1956 than the average long-term progress (estimated at 3 %) and lower than what might have been expected from a colossal and ever increasing investment in new factories and new equipment which has been going on over a number of years. This indicates a growing volume of under-employment with inefficient utilization of manpower; it is what one might call concealed unemployment. In the long run a high rate of increase in productivity must get the upper hand and «concealed» unemployment finally appear clearly, including in statistics, thus perceptibly increasing the apparent or registered amount of unemployment. » (According to the French Commercial Attaché in Washington, in his report of 1 February 1957.)

Concerning the activity of the American economy for the present year and for 1958, the estimates are based on the increase in public expenditure and also on basic investments in new factories and new equipment (down only 10 % compared with those of 1956). It is estimated that the gross national private investment for 1957 will be 3.5 % more than that of 1956 in real volume (compared with an increase of 4.1 % in 1956 over 1955). All this does not make it possible to predict a rate of economic growth superior to 4 % and certainly not 4.5 %, which would be necessary to eliminate the danger of unemployment. Hence the most probable perspective is that of a significant increase in unemployment for the present year and for next year.

(20) The rate of growth of industrial production of the European countries was in general decreasing compared with previous years, save in the case of France. The same applies to the volume of investments. On the other hand the inflationary spiral has started again everywhere in varying degrees. The really new and significant fact about 1956 was the slowing down of German economic activity, the diminution in the volume of investments, and a measurable increase in unemployment.

It seems that «from March to October 1956, industrial production has made practically no progress.» (According to the Deutsche Institut Wirtschafts.) The volume of investments, which in 1955 rose to 25 % of the total national income, is now also declining.

German businessmen seem to be borrowing less and limiting their expenditure on new factories and equipment.

Under these circumstances the prospect for the current year and next year is that Germany, which now possesses a productive capacity much more highly developed than under Hitler, is heading for a more moderate rate of increase, necessarily accompanied by an increase in unemployment.

Armament production, however, is still a stimulus in reserve for the German economy.

characterized by a slowing down of the rate of increase of industrial production, an accentuation of inflation, and the reappearance of serious unemployment. The flattening out of the boom is obvious, and in fact the only questions left to answer are *whether this lowering of activity will become accentuated towards recession, and in how short a time, or whether there will be a serious new upswing.*

The still considerable volume of government expenditure and investments works in favor of the following short-term perspective: *a rate of growth of industrial production less than that of 1956, with an accentuation both of the inflationary process and of unemployment, i.e., an evolution towards a new «recession» but not towards a sudden crisis.*

It is likely that in the beginning this process will be more marked for the United States than for Europe and therein will be more marked for countries like England, Denmark, the other Scandinavian countries, and Spain, than for France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Austria, and Greece.

The longer-term perspective will be affected by the constant increase in the producing capacity of the capitalist productive apparatus (including agriculture) in the face of a no less constant diminution in the consuming capacity of the masses.

The first factor will be the result of inevitable technological progress. The second, already analyzed, will be the result of this progress on employment, as well as the influence of inflation and agricultural over-production on the purchasing power of the laboring masses.

*Without any new and important increase in government expenditure and the volume of investments, the longer-term perspective is that of a «recession» which, by its breadth and depth, will be indistinguishable from a real economic crisis except by a gradual rather than a sudden initial development.*

21.—The colonial and dependent countries run the risk of remaining in their present condition of inflation and relative stagnation of their industrial and agricultural production. This is because there is no possibility that their trade situation with the industrial countries will improve but, on the contrary, will more likely worsen. Which may result, among other things, in slowing down the accumulation of native capital that could stimulate the industrialization of these countries.

But then again, without a rapid industrialization of these countries which would change the structure of their present trade with the industrial countries, their backwardness compared to these countries is likely to increase.

*Hence the conclusion that the revolutionary potential in these colonial and dependent countries will remain at a high and explosive level.*

Hence also the possibilities of imperialism and the workers' states in influencing these countries are different. Imperialism cannot do so save by exporting means of production and technicians, and making massive investments in order to bring about an industrial transformation of these countries under terms of payment which take into account the actual needs and possibilities of these countries, i.e., long-

term repayments in kind. From this point of view the workers' states have a favored position, as the case of Syria has recently demonstrated, except in regard to massive industrial investments on the spot. Nevertheless, the *short-term* possibilities of the United States in particular, in the field of economic and financial aid, should not be underestimated.

22.—In any case, interest in these countries can only increase as well as the struggle to win them over, both between imperialism and the workers' states, and, in the imperialist world, between the USA on the one hand and the other imperialist countries on the other. The principal stake in the struggle between imperialism and the workers' states will be primarily the Middle East region and the whole of the African continent; secondarily, India and Indonesia.

Furthermore, these same regions will be the objects of greed among the different imperialist powers. The economic interest of the Middle East lies in the fact that its immense oil reserves are an answer to the growing industrial needs for this product for the whole of the coming decade, and even for the one following (in view of the shortage of coal and before full-scale production of atomic energy can replace them).

The economic interest of Africa lies in its immense resources, still unexploited and even unexplored, in various raw materials and in hydroelectric power, as well as its role as a potential market for industrial products and capital.

The strategic interest of these two regions moreover lies in the nearness to the USSR of the bases they offer to imperialism, as well as their central position in relation to the USSR, the USA, Eurasia, and the American continents, a position the control of which could decide the outcome of war.

23.—The economic interest of these regions also explains the struggle for influence over them which is going on among the imperialist powers. Without the oil of the Middle East, the British and French imperialists, in particular, are at the mercy of the United States (because of the fact that they depend on the latter's oil and aid in dollars to buy it with).

Africa constitutes, moreover, their last colonial reserve, from whose exploitation they hope to compensate for their losses elsewhere.

But the impossibility for both British and French imperialism of fulfilling the capital requirements of the Arab and African countries, added to their being so compromised in the eyes of the masses of these countries, places them in a very bad position compared with the economic and political possibilities of American imperialism. The latter is now engaged in unscrupulously and brutally supplanting them in these regions.

Germany, at the present time, is a special case, because it is to a certain extent *economically associated with the United States* in the exploitation of the colonial and dependent countries. This, with its obvious political implications, both for the world policy of the United States and for the latter's relationship to the USSR, is an important point to bear in mind.

Investment of American capital in German industrial enterprises is growing in importance, for these enterprises are often entrusted with furnishing the indis-

pensable industrial equipment on behalf of American capitalists to various colonial and dependent countries, including those of Latin America.

24.—The relative economic prosperity of capitalism in recent years, especially by ensuring full employment, has naturally had a considerable effect on the level, extent, and depth of workers' struggles and on the general policy of the bourgeoisie; paternalist and «liberal» at home; patient and «peace-loving» abroad.

The bourgeoisie will depart from this line only if it is faced with a danger of revolution at home or abroad which might affect its vital interests.

This economic conjuncture has certainly been favorable to «peace» at home and abroad. Nevertheless, the relationship of forces, both on the national and international plane, has not ceased to be globally favorable to the proletariat and to the revolution, despite limited defeats suffered here and there. *It is only the existence of the reformist and Stalinist leadership of the masses that has so far prevented them from exploiting more fundamentally the objective conditions which are favorable for the wresting of advantages from capitalism and for extending the conquests of the revolution over a larger part of the world.*

It is also only the absence of a revolutionary leadership of the proletarian masses in the colonial and dependent countries which has prevented the masses of these countries from exploiting more fundamentally the difficulties of imperialism and the national bourgeoisies, in order to advance the revolution.

In the period of full employment the proletariat of the metropolitan countries would have been able to gain substantial concessions from the bourgeoisie in regard to raising of wages, *diminution of working hours*, and *guarantees against unemployment*.

Never, since the First World War, were objective conditions so favorable for such demands. Nevertheless, the lack of revolutionary leadership of the masses resulted in the workers contenting themselves with crumbs, apart from which they have developed an illusion of well-being, thanks to the possibility of overtime and of whole families going out to work. *The 40-hour week (even less in USA) and a substantial guaranteed annual wage* were actually sabotaged by the reformist or Stalinist trade-union leaders.

25.—But the proletariat will enter the new decade—in which it will probably see full employment give way to increased technological unemployment and its purchasing power still further undermined by the excessive indebtedness of states involved in the bankruptcy of militarization and the practice of giving all kinds of support to an inherently failing economy—with its forces in most cases *virtually intact and with strengthened consciousness of its relative class weight in society*. Hence the perspective of serious social struggles accompanying the passage of the conjuncture from «boom» to recession.

This wave of struggles, reinforced by the dangers resulting from the renewed worsening of East-West relations, stimulated at a later stage by the example that the USSR and the other workers' states might give of their ability to assimilate the technological revolution, might make it possible to bring to power and

consolidate Socialist governments in several countries — especially in Britain. In the United States the idea of a labor party based on the trade unions could also this time take on a decisive impetus.

*These are the relatively short-term perspectives, as well as the possible fall of Franco in the near future.*

The bourgeoisie, for its part, will try to solve its problems by attempts at the economic integration of Europe, the exploitation of Africa, and the development of its own atomic industry. The agreements on the « common market » and « Euratom » correspond to these preoccupations.

A certain degree of economic integration of the European capitalist countries, including Britain, is inevitable, for it corresponds to economic and commercial European trends which are already established and which are becoming strengthened. Furthermore, the economic exploitation of African territories cannot be envisaged by any European country separately, without the risk of losing these territories, including on the economic plane, more especially to the advantage of the United States.

In the same way, the development of a genuine European atomic industry, capable of supplying both the military and civil needs of the European bourgeoisie, without a close dependence on the United States, cannot be envisaged except by the common effort of the European countries.

In addition to these economic considerations, the European integration corresponds to the political and military needs of the European bourgeoisie in order to face up better to the « Soviet peril » and to free it, at least partially, from a too close dependence on the United States.

But, on the other hand, there must not be minimized the still existing obstacles and those which will not fail to appear in the future — especially in the case of an unfavorable evolution of the economic conjuncture — in the path of a real unification of Europe, and which flow from the antagonistic nature of the national capitalist powers, principally Germany on the one hand, and France and Britain on the other.

26.—In the colonial and dependent countries the economic difficulties will work in the direction of keeping up and accentuating the present ferment. The main centres of this will be in countries such as Indonesia, the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil. It is especially towards these countries that the centre of gravity of the colonial revolution tends to be shifted.

In all these countries the native bourgeoisie, still weak, has to face a powerful mass movement demanding the effective abolition of the after-effects of imperialism, a substantial raising of their living standards, and real freedom. By contrast, the case of India is a special one, the Congress Party under Nehru having been able — with the complicity of Peking and the Kremlin, and in the absence of a genuine revolutionary leadership of the masses — to neutralize for

a period all effective opposition. As long, however, as the tempo of development of this country will not be able to solve the question of unemployment and the agrarian reform will not be implemented, the political power of the bourgeoisie is sitting on a volcano...

That is the lesson of the 1957 elections, and of the difficulties encountered at present by the country's five-year plan.

27.—The preceding analysis and the perspectives which emerge from it are — as already noted — made to a certain extent without reference to the interpenetration and interaction which in fact exist between the purely economic tendencies, and the political development dependent on them, on the one hand, and on the other the development of relations between East and West.

These presuppose that relations will not become unduly exacerbated and will not rapidly evolve towards war. *But this assumption will be brought into question each time that a really important advance of the Revolution takes place in the colonies or metropolitan countries, or that the political revolution is victorious in other countries in the Soviet orbit, or that capitalism enters a prolonged and deep « recession. »*

The overall situation is such that these possibilities, which are in mutual interrelation, continue to exist on both a long-term and short-term basis.

None of the questions in dispute between the two state camps is settled — either in Europe or in Asia. Furthermore, the arms race, for more and more perfected atomic, and indeed « absolute, » arms, is continuing and becoming generalized at the expense of former arms and former conceptions of strategy and tactics. All eventual discussions and compromises about « disarmament » are in reality concentrated only around « concessions » concerning those aspects rendered superfluous by the era of atomic arms.

The fact is that both the Suez crisis and the Hungarian and Polish events, as well as the new crisis in the Middle East and the sensational advances of Soviet industry, have once more destroyed the unstable equilibrium recently established between the two camps, and initiated a new era of tension, of « cold war. »

In the effort on both sides to profit from this upset of the equilibrium in order to change the balance of power, each in its own favor, any important gain by either side in this sense may provoke the most violent reactions in the other camp.

But one must also count on the spontaneous, autonomous action of the masses which could also profoundly alter the relationship of forces, as it did in October and November 1956.

*Under these conditions the general conclusion could be formulated thus: the economic and political perspectives should develop in the context of a general situation which could suddenly evolve towards the decisive clash in case of any really serious alteration in the present relationship of forces.*

## II

# Report

PRESENTED BY COMRADE MICHEL PABLO

The report on the document titled « International Economic and Political Perspectives, » presented by the International Secretariat in the preparatory discussion for the Fifth World Congress, does not propose to take up again all the ideas contained in the text, but only those among them which it is necessary to develop further.

It will be followed by a section which will examine in greater detail the present economic and political situation. At the end I shall take up the question as a whole in its perspective.

First of all, I shall explain what reasons led us to present this document in the discussion for the World Congress. It was basically for two reasons: in order better to understand what has been going on in the evolution of the economy from the Second World War up until now and thus to render ourselves capable of discerning certain long-term general trends in world economy, which in their turn unquestionably influence international political perspectives; and in order to give answers to a series of questions which have been raised in the international working-class movement, including our own ranks, by the present « prosperity » which the capitalist world has for now some time been enjoying.

I shall also say a few words about the need, and at the same time the difficulty, of a deep-going economic analysis, in the course of which it is possible, and indeed sometimes inevitable, to commit errors, with quite obvious political implications.

The difficulties of a deep-going economic analysis stem from the complexity of the subject, which is determined by a multitude of factors in constant interaction and also by the constant interaction between politics and economics; and further from the inadequacy of economic documentation, both in the capitalist and in the Soviet world.

The inadequacy of capitalist economic documentation is quite explicable. What is far more surprising is that after 40 years of the Russian Revolution Soviet economic science has not reached the point of being able to make up for this lack — which is explicable by the observation that Soviet economic science has become the handmaiden of the opportunist policy of the Soviet bureaucracy.

That is how, for example, Comrade Varga has become a specialist in forecasting, now crises, now lulls, according to which was at any given moment in the interest of the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy. Statistics can be made to say anything one wishes: it suffices to choose the figures in a certain way and to interpret them in a certain manner. Our movement, with its very limited means, can naturally not be required to make up for the inadequacy in this field. For our documentation we are obliged to dip into what exists in economic documentation from either capitalist or Soviet sources.

And yet this work of deep-going economic analysis is absolutely necessary, not only for general and international political perspectives, but also for the day-by-day work of every working-class organization. For example, it is not possible for a revolutionary organization to settle on a correct trade-union tactic without having a quite deep-going understanding of the economic conjuncture which by its changes determines both this or that character of the struggles and the chances of their success or failure.

In the preface to the document, we tried to explain all these reasons which led us to draft it, and we admitted in a frank way that we had been mistaken about some economic predictions, more especially in the document of the Fourth World Congress which in fact had not foreseen the astonishing and unexpected turn of the economic conjuncture, the « boom » which from then on attained the greatest scope in the capitalist world — in the United States and also in Western Europe. In the document of the Fourth Congress we naturally had some reservations concerning the evolution of the economy toward a crisis. We did not say that the economic crisis was inevitable. We had far greater reservations in this field than any other current in the working-class world; but unquestionably we did not foresee so spectacular a turn in the conjuncture toward a boom. For four years now the economy of Western Europe has been experiencing what can be called a classic industrial boom; and for about three years the economy of the United States has also experienced such an economic cycle.

It is for that reason that in this text we have accorded a special importance to the reasons which brought about this turn in the conjuncture, both in the United States and in Europe, in opposition to those who, in the present economic euphoria, have thought they saw structural changes in capitalism which supposedly would eliminate the possibility of crises of the classic type in the future, and who, because of this, saw therein a disproof of the fundamental ideas of Marxism in this field. As for us, we have tried to demonstrate the extreme instability of this turn in the conjuncture and to make clear the inevitability both of new recessions and of genuine economic depressions. I refer for example to the ideas of the Labour Party's theoretician, Strachey, who, in his recent book, *Contemporary Capitalism*, denies in this study of contemporary capitalism the very ideas that he put forward during the period of the 1929-1933 depression, and in reality provides the theoretical basis for the programme recently drawn up by the leadership of the Labour Party to be discussed at the Labour Party Congress that opens at Brighton in a few days, where the emphasis is no longer put on the need of deep, radical, structural changes in capitalism in order to bring about a genuine change of regime, but on the following ideas: markets and prices are at present controlled by what he calls the appearance of oligopolies, of giant monopolies; importance must be assigned to political factors, more especially to political democracy which enables the working class to direct, in an evolutionary manner, the evolution of capitalism toward a socialist society. This term, socialist society, does not even exist in this recently published work by Strachey. He replaces it by a vaguer expression: « towards a society of greater justice and equality. » It is in any case unquestionable that this capitalist prosperity in the United States and in Western Europe has much worried men's minds — and not only in mass social-democratic organizations. (I must add that what is at present going on in Great Britain with the leadership of the Labour Party, we find again in similar form in the ideas that are germinating and in quite concrete projects, in the leading circles of the German social-democracy and of the Austrian social-democracy, ready more or less to abandon the Marxist programme and to find their place in the regime of free-enterprise society.) There has been and there

continues to be a general uneasiness throughout the European working-class movement. Naturally the reality of the present-day world is seen in a fundamentally different manner by the working-class and revolutionary militants of the colonial and dependent countries who are living in a quite other economic reality. Those, however, who have to do with the present-day reality of the United States or Western Europe are obliged to raise the question of deciding whether we are not faced with a new prolonged stabilization of capitalism and to think about the perspectives of such an eventuality. I say that for these reasons we are in a sense obliged to give an answer to these questions in the text that we are now presenting to the Congress, by scrutinizing as thoroughly as we can the foundations of American prosperity as well as the reasons for the present boom in Western Europe, in order to specify their limits and perspectives.

Concerning more particularly the American economy, we wished to illustrate by a series of observations and figures what was the essential base that really enabled the American economy up till now to experience, not a genuine depression, but mere recessions which each time it has been able to overcome. And we think that we were able to demonstrate that it was not the intrinsic healthiness of the American economy that explains the American « miracle. » but the extraordinary proportions taken on by the aid accorded by the capitalist state to this economy. There is no question but that, without this aid from the capitalist state, the economic forces of that country would by themselves never have been sufficient to prevent recessions from being transformed into depressions as deep and catastrophic as those that American capitalism has experienced in the past, and more especially during the period from 1929 to 1939.

Concerning more particularly the recent boom in the American economy, which is unquestionably, I have already stated, a classic industrial boom, following upon the recession that the American economy went through during the 1953-1954 period, we explain it by the extent of industrial investments since that date, and also by the extraordinary increase in consumers' credit. That is to say that, despite the already monstrously important aid of the capitalist state to the American economy, each time that this economy begins to run out of steam and enter into what is called a recession, serious additional means are required to overcome the recession. The boom that started in 1954 in the United States was sparked above all by a considerable extension of industrial investments and consumers' credit. As for the boom in the capitalist economies of Western Europe, this is also to a considerable extent a boom due to the increase in industrial investments, in the production of capital goods, and also in the production of durable consumers' goods, which for a whole period found, both internally and externally, an increased market.

One important point in the text is that it recognizes that in fact, in the present period, the intervention of the capitalist state in the highly developed capitalist countries can, under certain conditions, produce the effect that the economy experiences, not a genuine depression, but just a recession — the essential difference between an economic crisis and a recession being the following. An economic crisis is an abrupt and rapid change from an upsurge down toward the lowest point of the conjuncture; it does not develop in a cumulative way, but very quickly reaches the conjuncture's lowest point. Naturally, later, by the action of new factors, it once more takes on a new upward movement; whereas the retreats that the American capitalist economy has experienced since the war have had a character which in fact distinguishes them from a depression of the classic type. To what should this phenomenon be attributed?

It is explained in the text by the observation that in fact, when economic conditions are not completely ripe for a genuine depression, the capitalist state (in the hands of the big monopolies) — which, on the basis of a now thorough

experience of the way the capitalist economy runs, follows with an extraordinary sensitivity the development of the conjuncture — can intervene with a whole series of measures and produce such a result. These measures are, for example, the very great importance and elasticity of the budget, permitting in such cases an immediate increase in budgetary spending; fiscal policy in the direction of encouraging new investments; the maintenance of credit in the sense of a regularization of expansion and a limitation of the danger of a speculative financial crash, etc.

We have seen that this interventionist policy of the capitalist state has been applied in a particularly extensive manner in the case of the United States, and in fact, up until now, it has produced effective results.

The text, while noting these facts, also specifies the reasons why these measures are totally incapable of avoiding the deepening of recessions and their transformation finally into genuine economic crises. We refute the argument according to which capitalism might supposedly be evolving toward a factual situation where it would no longer experience economic crises but only simple recessions. On the contrary the whole analysis of the text aims at demonstrating that in reality the big upsurge of the capitalist economy tends toward a situation in which recessions will be more frequent, broader, and deeper, and, as a result, there will come a time when practically there will be no distinction between a very deep recession and a genuine economic crisis.

The chapter of the text which examines what will be the consequences of the inevitable mass introduction of new productive forces and practices, of automation and atomic energy, draws the conclusion that this technological revolution now in process can operate only in the direction of an aggravation of economic crises. I shall not in this report amplify the reasons analyzed by the text which justify this conclusion. In any case, the most immediate perspective which the text derives from the present evolution of capitalist economy is that the « boom » is running out of steam already and that we are on the way to a new recession. That is a precise perspective, as precise as possible at the present stage. I shall return to this question in the second part of my report.

Another important point of the text is that which is concerned more particularly with the economy of colonial and dependent countries. The text contains a series of observations which seem to us important, especially by the fact that, on the basis of these observations, certain revolutionary perspectives become quite clearly visible. We do not deny the feature of the process of industrialization of the majority of these countries, which has become pretty nearly general since the Second World War; but at the same time we insist on the following idea: the gap between these countries and the metropolitan countries not only does not become smaller, but widens. This gap arises both from the fact of a change in the structure of the exchanges between these countries and the developed countries, and from another fact, connected with the first, that of the increasing difficulties for these countries to proceed with large-scale industrialization by capitalist methods.

The modifications in the structure of the exchanges, which are a striking fact in the new features of world trade after the Second World War, are due to two reasons: to the fact that the advanced capitalist countries have developed the production of a series of natural raw materials which before the Second World War came from the colonial and dependent countries, and the spread in these countries of the use of artificial raw materials. That is due also to the fact that the colonial and dependent countries, to the extent that they are themselves engaged in a certain industrialization, keep quantities of exportable raw materials for their own industrial needs. Under these conditions the rate of formation of new capital in the colonial and dependent countries relatively diminishes, and, by their own resources exploited in

a capitalist way, these countries are absolutely incapable of finding the bulk of capital needed for large-scale industrialization.

Let us take for example the case of India. In order to finance industrialization, India in reality resorts to the principal source of *foreign loans*. Thus the second five-year plan needs, in foreign aid, some 2,500 million dollars, i.e., 1,500 million dollars more than had been calculated at the outset, because of the inflation that has occurred in the meantime, an inflation due in part to the fact that the other source of financing for the plan was inevitably excessive taxation.

It is absolutely clear that, if India does not find 2,500 million dollars, it will be obliged to revise all the goals of the plan, which runs the risk of causing a genuine disorganization of the economy. This explains the new turn taken by the policy of Nehru in a desperate search for a foreign loan.

One feature of contemporary capitalism, of contemporary imperialism, is that, despite the extraordinary accumulation of capital that exists in the principal industrial countries, the export of capital is not going on at all according to the rhythm of the development needs of the underdeveloped countries: capital finds much more profitable investment, first of all as far as the United States are concerned, in the U.S. market itself, in loans to the American capitalist state, and in certain other countries which cannot be considered exactly as the least favored of the semi-colonial and dependent countries, for example Canada. A minimum proportion in reality goes to the economic development of underdeveloped countries, given the fact that for a whole period capital has to be invested, let us say, without expectation of immediate return. For example it is at present estimated that, since the Second World War, American imperialism has exported, in the form of private capital, about 30,000 million dollars; Latin America, which is the main economic region for American imperialism as the source of a series of raw materials that are decisive for the expansion of the American capitalist economy and also as a market for the export of its industrial products, received only 7,000 million dollars; and in addition the greater part of this economic aid was given to Latin America not so much to help a harmonious industrial development of these countries, which would have contributed to freeing them from the economic tutelage of American imperialism, as it was spent above all on undertakings engaged in the extraction of raw materials.

The question of the industrialization of colonial and dependent countries is unquestionably linked up with the question of their social transformation. It is very interesting to observe that that is the conclusion drawn not only by us, revolutionary Marxists, but also by American observers themselves. I refer to two studies that recently appeared in the United States on this question. First, to the book of two professors of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max Millikan and W. Rostow, entitled *Proposal for a Foreign Policy*, in which these two gentlemen recognize American imperialism's failure to acquire and consolidate lasting allies in the colonial and dependent countries, to gain the sympathy of the masses, and to win over the youth. They attribute this to the bad use made of its foreign aid by American imperialism, to the fact that the greater part has been spent for military purposes, and a very tiny part for productive economic goals. But when they put forward their own solution, their timidity and pettiness reflect the whole structural incapacity of American imperialism to proceed by its aid to a genuine development of colonial and dependent countries. Their proposals, addressed to the men who are directing the foreign policy of the United States, put forward a quite ridiculous figure of 2,000 to 3,000 million dollars per year, needed, according to them, to promote a policy of aid to colonial and dependent countries, while specifying that of course this aid of 2,000 to 3,000 million dollars per year must be granted under conditions which guarantee the political sympathy of these countries toward

the United States, that this aid must naturally be invested in undertakings that do not compete with either American industry or American agricultural production.

Quite different, on the contrary, is the book of another professor, P. Baran, also an American, titled *The Political Economy of Growth*. What is interesting in this study is its conclusion: for colonial and dependent countries, the only possibility of attaining large-scale industrialization is to proceed to make changes of structure, with a system of statified and planified economy.

The difficulties which imperialism now finds in answering the needs of colonial and semi-colonial countries are all the graver in that they coincide with a new phase in the development of the workers' states, of the U.S.S.R. in particular, which has begun to compete in this field.

What is now going on in the Middle East is particularly demonstrative of this new feature, with quite obvious political implications. Let us take Syria, for example, to which the U.S.S.R. has just granted the amount of a loan solicited for years by Syria from the Bank of Reconstruction, and with conditions broadly adapted to the real needs of the country: a serious long-term loan, at very low interest, with purchase of Syria's agricultural surpluses.

The disadvantage at which imperialism finds itself in the race for winning colonial and dependent countries, stems from its very nature: what imperialism is incapable of doing is to grant long-term loans at low interest for projects of economic development which are chosen, not by itself and its experts, but by the country concerned itself; it is to export industrial equipment and technicians aiding the industrial development of the country, and in branches of the economy which are, let us say, competitive with its own. In this race, the workers' states, thanks to their very structure, are in infinitely more favorable conditions, and can in fact win the competition. It is another question how far the Soviet Union can push this competition, that is, what is the scope of the reserves in capital and materiel it has at its disposal in this field.

If we reflect about the struggle which is now going on in the Middle East, and the chances of one side and the other in that race, and on the race's revolutionary political consequences, we must understand that, because of the single fact that in these countries there is a solid incrustation of American oil trusts, there arises an additional obstacle to imperialism's aiding a genuine industrialization of those countries. Because, from both the economic and the political point of view, such an industrialization would become a danger to the oil monopoly. What was really ideal for imperialism in those countries was their current feudal aspect, with nomads feeding themselves on dates amid Biblical scenery.

It is obvious that, beginning with the moment when those countries are transformed and become modern industrial countries, from the economic and political point of view the first idea of the masses will be to seize the absolutely extraordinary wealth constituted by their oil, which must aid the internal development of their own countries, and thus to produce a death threat to the monopoly privileges of imperialism in that region. These observations consequently open the perspective of a long and explosive crisis in the Middle East, a region which will more and more tend to escape from imperialism's control. And the question is, certainly, to see whether imperialism will accept letting this region, an economically and strategically key one, in fact escape from it.

Before finishing with this subject, I should like to examine a paragraph in the text concerning the consequences of the loss of colonies for metropolitan countries.

In reality, this loss has a real effect on these countries only when the colonial and dependent countries are liberated under a proletarian social regime that wrenches them structurally out of the capitalist circuit. If not, this loss is not immediately so very catastrophic. Imperialism continues to maintain important economic residual positions in these

countries. Liberation in this form, moreover, unquestionably produces for a period a speeding-up of the process of industrialization, extends for a period the industrial countries' markets for capital goods and other industrial products. With this form of liberation of colonies, under a national bourgeois regime, the loss of these countries really affects imperialism only in a longer perspective, when the developing native bourgeoisie will corner for itself the market for raw materials, the market for industrial products, and the market for capital.

I do not mean, however, that the loss of colonies does not immediately strike important blows at the economy of metropolitan countries. We may take the example of France. At present the French Union obtains the following advantages for France: approximately 2 % of French agriculture works for the French Union, a little less than 7 % of industry works for the French Union, and a proportion in the neighborhood of 50 % and over of the aviation and merchant marine of France works for the French Union. But above all due to the franc zone, France saves annually about 500 million dollars in foreign exchange by the purchase of a whole series of products which it would otherwise be obliged to buy elsewhere in strong currencies. It is obvious that the breaking-up of the French Union would immediately strike a very important blow at the French economy.

Concerning the economy of the workers' states, the text includes a series of observations of a certain importance. We particularly stressed two points. One which specifies that the Soviet economy has entered a new stage, that of, let us say, its rationalization, which must take into account the labor costs, raw materials, and manufacturing costs—considerations concerning which a whole series of problems have arisen that must be solved. The Soviet bureaucracy is trying, especially since Stalin's death, to solve them by its own methods. But the new economic realities and needs involve a whole series of political implications; they require more imperatively than ever the democratic participation of the masses in the management of production and in the political life of the country. There is one of the factors which is urging on the political revolution now in gestation in the U.S.S.R., but which furthermore opens an era of new rapid progress in the Soviet economy.

It is unquestionable that the U.S.S.R. in particular has absorbed in a much faster manner than the capitalist countries the new technological revolution of automation and atomic power, and that in this field the U.S.S.R. has already achieved quite serious and indeed astonishing advances. British specialists who recently visited the U.S.S.R., for example, were surprised by the advances of automation in the machine-tool industry. They confessed that, in this sector, quite fundamental for industrial development, Russia has an absolutely sensational lead over the present state of the same industry in Britain. Unquestionably there may also be attributed to the existence of a vanguard industry in the U.S.S.R. the very latest achievements, with political implications that are quite obvious and very important, of the intercontinental missile.

The idea stressed by the text is that, in the decade that we are beginning, these advances of the economy of the workers' states will bring them closer and closer to the level of the economy of the capitalist states, even the most developed ones, and that there is approaching the decisive test between the two systems, including on the economic plane. We are of course not saying that this will happen in the first years of this decade. It will come about, if nothing else interferes, on the basis of the present rhythm of evolution, rather more toward the end of the decade. The text quotes a series of extrapolations which were made on the basis of present data, of present rhythms, not by Marxists, not by pro-Soviet persons, but by bourgeois specialists.

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I now begin the second half of my report.

Concerning particularly the present economic and political

situation and its perspectives, I have just said that, on the economic plane, for a certain time now we have been seeing that the « boom » has been in fact running out of steam, both in the United States and in Western Europe. I do not mean that we are yet witnessing a genuine recession, I mean simply that the generally continuing rate of expansion is more limited than in past years, more limited than in 1956, 1956 having been marked by a rate of expansion already less high than that of 1955, the culminating year of the « boom, » as it now appears.

The slow-down in economic activity, now generally noted by all bourgeois observers, is already more serious in the United States than in Europe itself, and more serious in Europe than in the Scandinavian countries (with the exception of Norway), and, partly, more serious in Britain than in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Austria.

I should like to use a certain number of documents to show the evaluations either by capitalist organisms or by private observers concerning the recent evolution of the world economic situation. For example, the economic report of the United Nations, which was made public in July, notes a rate of increase in production less than that of previous years, while pointing out that the rate of increase in industrial production was in 1956 less than that in 1955. In Western Europe, the rate of industrial expansion was at an average of 4 % in 1956 as against 9 % in 1955. In the United States, the 3 % rate of increase of 1956 was a third of the increase of 1955. The only exception in 1956 was that of Japan, whose industrial production increased more than in 1955. We say that economic expansion continued in 1956 but that, in a number of Western European countries and in North America, its rhythm slowed down compared to that of 1955. And it is noted that in fact this slowing down of activity is already greater in the United States than in Europe.

A more recent bulletin of the Deutsches Wirtschaftskonjunktur Institut observes that the economic expansion of the Western world has again slowed down in the first six months of the present year. What is important, and is confirmed from other sources, is that it attributes this slow-down in expansion precisely to a shrinking of the cause that brought about the « boom, » viz, a notable lessening of industrial investments.

This observation has been repeated in the more recent report published two weeks ago by the United Nations, which notes this general slow-down in the economic activity of the capitalist world and which contrasts it with the much more favorable results of the progress of activity in the workers' states and particularly in the U.S.S.R. I believe that you are all aware that, concerning specially the situation in the United States, the general opinion is that we are witnessing the beginning of a new recession. Unquestionably one of the reasons for this new situation in the United States is the fact that, for lack of the stimulus of new budgetary expenditure and also of a greater increase in consumers' credit, sharply cut back in order to face up to inflation, the other lever of expansion which has operated in the last years — industrial investments — is now also much less powerful. Thus the thousand largest industrial firms in the United States have reduced by 29 % compared to last year, the investments planned for this year and next year. As for the annual start-off of one of the key industries of the United States, the automobile industry, that was expected at this period with the launching of new models of cars for 1958, it has not yet occurred, the automobile companies having stocks of about 800,000 1957 cars not yet sold.

I think then that it is a question not of the perspective of a recession still to come, but of one already here in fact, especially concerning the situation in the United States.

If we now examine the picture of the economic situation in Europe, we see similar phenomena, though up till now to a lesser degree and varying from country to country.

Germany unquestionably keeps the lead, followed by countries like Norway, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Italy, in part even France, to the case of which I shall return. To the side of these we find countries like Sweden, Denmark, partly Britain, Greece, and Spain.

About the case of Germany, I want to say that even there the rate of expansion of economic activity has been slowing down for more than a year now. In Germany, however, a new resource has appeared which can still for a period stimulate economic expansion: the country's rearmament. Though part of the expenditure for rearmament is spent in foreign countries, a large part remains devoted to domestic production. Furthermore, we must not forget that the German economy was built up with exports as the main basis of its expansion. In the case of a general recession throughout the capitalist world, it will be one of the countries that will suffer the most.

As for inflationary drives, which we noted both in the document we are now presenting and in a series of other documents of the International, inflation or the threat of inflation continues. It is the case both in the United States and generally in Europe. On the case of the United States I should like to insist a little further. In my opinion, the inflation now going on in that country shows that the American economy has reached a certain ceiling beyond which the economy cannot be stimulated by a very serious new increase in budgetary expenditure without running the risk of a grave inflation. This danger of inflation is now seriously limiting the use of this stimulant in the United States. There is a big discussion in the United States around this question, some maintaining that the phenomenon of inflation is caused by the fact that the workers' productivity is not rising in a way parallel to the steady rise in the cost of labor brought about by the pressure of the unions; that is, naturally, a means of asking for the blocking of salaries, and simultaneously strengthening a drive of the employers against the trade unions. The unions answer, with Reuther as spokesman, that if there is inflation it is because prices are going up, which is of course an explanation that makes no sense, since Reuther does not attack the root of the evil.

The deeper reason for the present inflation in the United States is the extraordinary public and private debt. I might give some figures on this question. From 1947 to 1956, U.S. governmental expenditures were more than half a trillion dollars, 533,000 million dollars, 70 % of these expenditures having been used for military purposes, i.e., either for military expenditure or for paying military debts. This is an astonishing figure, but to understand what it means, it must be compared — because it remains abstract in the imagination — with, not the expenditures, but the total budgets of whole decades for a whole series of European countries. I give this figure in order to show the extent of these expenditures and to explain the stimulant received for years by the American economy; but this on the other hand explains the scope of the phenomenon of inflation and the real dangers of inflation now existent in the United States. For the single fiscal year ending 30 June 1956 the total of governmental expenditures of the federal state and of the individual states reached more than 114,000 million dollars. These sums come from taxes and loans. At present the public debt of the United States has gone above the ceiling of 275,000 million dollars, this sum being piled on top of a private debt that goes beyond a trillion, i.e. a million million, dollars!

These figures simultaneously demonstrate both the extent to which the inflationary stimulant has played a role in the economic activity of the United States, and the danger — beginning at a certain moment — of such economic « prosperity. » They also explain why, despite the quite real danger of bringing about a recession, strict measures have been taken to check the inflationary process. This explanation demonstrates that American imperialism's resour-

ces, in the form of constantly increasing state expenditures, have their limits.

Inflationary phenomena are grave not only in the United States but also in European countries. They have already had certain effects. For some weeks now we have been witnessing a very grave financial disequilibrium in some European countries, which has brought about a devaluation of the French currency, which has weighed enormously on the pound sterling (so that the Labourites are calling for the summoning of the House of Commons to discuss Britain's financial situation), which has brought about the weakening of the Dutch florin and the Danish crown, and which is developing in reality toward a general devaluation of European currencies (apart from the rather special case of Germany).

It is obvious that this situation constitutes a bottleneck for the continuance of Europe's economic expansion, with one series of European countries lacking foreign exchange to keep up their imports, and another series of countries, such as Germany, and Belgium, undergoing the repercussions of such a situation in the field of their exports. Furthermore, the inflation which is now building up in Europe is again striking a very serious blow at savings and the continuation of a plan of investments.

Unquestionably we are faced with a turn in the post-war economic situation, a turn from the « boom. » We are not now yet in a position to evaluate all the consequences of this situation, or the scope of the ebb which is beginning, but we can observe in a very clear way that it is in fact a question of a turn, of a new step backward in the economic progress of the capitalist world. It was, furthermore, inevitable that the « boom » would develop dialectically, creating through and because of « prosperity » the situation of a new imbalance. One of the reasons which in the past has had weight in checking the economic activity of Western Europe, the question of the dollar deficit, has appeared again; hidden during a period by America's aid to Europe and by the better balance of trade of the European countries on the one hand with the United States and on the other with the colonial and dependent countries, it has once more become visible.

Apart from the fact that the exchanges of the metropolitan countries with the colonial and dependent countries have developed in the way I explained in the first part of this report, to the degree to which America is trying to face the danger of a recession by an unquestionably more powerful effort than in the past in the export field, and to the extent to which the « boom » of the European economy has to be supported by increased imports, of which a large part come from the United States themselves, the dollar deficit has reappeared. That shows that in reality this dollar deficit is a characteristic of the new structure of world trade in the post-war capitalist world, i.e., that it is not a transitory cause but in reality far more a structural cause.

The foregoing is how immediate economic prospects concerning the capitalist world can be summarized.

Now a few words concerning the parallel development of the economy of the workers' states. The last report of the United Nations observes that, despite a certain slowing-down in the expansion of economic activity in these countries compared to previous years, they maintain their lead over capitalist countries thanks to the far greater lessening of activity that has meanwhile occurred in the capitalist countries. In this connection, according to Soviet figures, this year's production increased more than expected, i.e., the rate of 7 % was surpassed, to rise to a rate of 10 %.

It is obvious that we must be ready to draw all conclusions, on the level of the activity of our sections, from the analysis of the economic conjuncture. It is obvious that the change in the conjuncture — were it only in the aspect of an aggravation of inflation and a certain threat of unemployment, and especially an attempt by the bosses to block salaries, the only means by which the various bour-

geoisies in a tough spot will now try to correct the situation, all this occurring after a period in which the workers, aided by full employment, had got in the habit of considering that their demands could be very easily met — makes clear a perspective of very broad-scale struggles. This conclusion is already illustrated by what is going on especially in a country like Britain, situated in between prosperity and decline.

As for the present political situation: concerning the international situation, international relations, in the sense of relationships between the workers' states and imperialism, remain always crystallized around two questions: the situation in the Middle East, and the question of disarmament.

Let us first examine the second question, that of disarmament. We have already said in the past that any conditional compromise on the disarmament question through the discussions that have been taking place would not have any bearing on anything essential, and that we must not be taken in by these discussions which in reality covered up — and indeed did not even cover up at all — a faster and more unbridled race than ever toward generalized atomic armament. We now are confronted by the obvious breakdown of the disarmament discussions, which in reality were ended by the spectacular announcement by the Soviet Union of the intercontinental self-guided missile. In the history of disarmament negotiations, the recent discussions were the most extraordinary, interrupted by the detonations of atomic explosions by one side and the other. In reality there is in question here, not a discussion on disarmament, but a test of strength at the level of the atomic age and of intercontinental missiles. It is obvious that, beginning with the accomplishment of such technical progress, the adversary has but a single thought: to bridge the gap which he now observes between himself and his adversary and to surpass him by discovering the « absolute arm » — an arm that is « absolute » in the sense of being able to destroy the adversary while guaranteeing an effective defense against the missiles coming from the enemy. We have had the A-bomb, the H-bomb, we have the intercontinental missile, we shall have the anti-missile missile. The absolute arm is an illusion, a mythical idea, to the degree that there is no limit to technical progress. Anyway, the disarmament discussions have been closed by the discovery of a still more powerful arm, which unquestionably, in the hands at the moment of the workers' states, of the U.S.S.R., will weigh in an extraordinarily powerful way on the formation of the immediate political conjuncture. We see this in a quite clear manner already when we take up the situation in the Middle East.

It is plain that what made the international situation emerge from an appearance of appeasement was on the one hand the events in the Soviet glacis and on the other the October-November 1956 events in the Middle East. Beginning with that period, we have been penetrating little by little into a new stage in the cold war, in reality a sharper one than in the past, since we never saw, after the Second World War, the Soviet bureaucracy take the attitude that it took during the Suez war by launching genuine ultimatums; nor did we witness on the part of the Kremlin so firm an attitude on the question of Germany, saying now in a very categorical manner that there is no question of reunifying Germany other than by a discussion between the two German states themselves, and by launching the idea of a Federation of the two socially different German states. We have never seen the Kremlin act in the way it did in the affair of Syria, by indicating unequivocally to the Turkish government that, if it launched an attack against Syria, Russia would intervene, and that the war thus begun in the Middle East would not be a limited war: following the movements of the U.S. atomic fleet in the Mediterranean by the movements of its own warships; and the Soviet generals and admirals becoming so talkative and writing so openly in

the press that by their armies and their warships they were going to defend Syria if it were attacked.

After the Suez crisis, we witnessed the Jordan crisis and the way in which American imperialism conceived the Eisenhower Doctrine, i.e., in the sense of a genuine test of strength in the Middle East. We were a little surprised, we even said, when the atomic fleet of the United States was heading for the Syrian coast, at the weakness of the Kremlin's reaction at the time. Now the reasons are plain, this weakness stemming from the fact that in Russia at that time there was going on a struggle between two clans in the leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy. But an unvarying characteristic of Kremlin policy in recent years is that it is not disposed to retreat, particularly in the Middle East, a region that is in fact central and in which the antagonism between the two blocs of states is now concentrated. The Kremlin got its own back for the Jordan coup by the Syrian coup, and as a result the trial of strength in the Middle East has risen to a pitch of paroxysm.

I cannot sketch out concrete perspectives concerning developments in this region. It can be said only that it is a new illustration of the explosive character of the period in which we are living. In this test of strength between the two sides, each takes the maximum risks, i.e., risks that lead it to the « brink of the abyss. » We may admire the agility of these acrobats who, up until now, have shown the ability to reach the brink of the abyss without plunging into it. But this is obviously not reassuring about the predominantly very explosive character of the situation. I am absolutely in agreement with the opinion of Comrade Bulganin and the opinion of Mr Bevan that a war begun in the Middle East would be very hard to confine to the Middle East, and that the situation — as Khrushchev said to Bevan — is again in fact tense, extraordinarily tense, and that it is as such that it must be understood and followed.

I should like to speak in a somewhat more detailed way about the particular situation in certain countries of the world, but the time therefor is, unfortunately, lacking. It will be necessary, anyway, in this discussion or in that on the activity of the International, to stress particularly the situation in certain countries that seem the most interesting from the viewpoint of revolutionary perspectives. In Europe, the situation in Britain, France, and Spain; in the Far East, the situation in India and Indonesia; in Latin America, the situation in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia.

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Before ending, I want to clarify a little what is said at the end of the text: that the economic and political perspectives therein foreseen will have meaning only if the coming decade is one in which there is not a major perturbation in present economic and political trends. Naturally, here it is a question rather of a theoretical abstraction, for the fundamental character of the period that we have lived in since the last World War, and more especially since the beginning of the Korean War, has not changed, because from the viewpoint of the deep forces that explain this character, they are accentuating their antagonistic advance. It is a question of a period subject to abrupt changes, to highly explosive situations, putting on the order of the day the question of a decisive struggle between the two social camps. It is within the framework of these reasons that we must place the question of the prospect of war. We have learned in our movement, let us say beginning with the Third World Congress, when we speak of war, to understand that it is a question of the resistance, which we consider still inevitable, made by imperialism to the advance of the world revolution. The revolutionary Marxist notes that every important advance of the world revolution is at present made only through an armed struggle with imperialism. This world is still a world of struggle, of a sharper and more savage struggle, of what is in reality a death-struggle. When we speak of the dangers of war, we speak in reality of « dangers » in another way than before the Second World War.

when war was visualized only as the result of a situation created by the previous crushing of the proletariat. The war then meant a defeat of the proletariat.

We now reach the contrary, war not because of the weakening or crushing of the proletariat, but because of its strength and of the advance of the Revolution. Naturally, armed struggle, with present-day arms, is a monstrous eventuality, and there is no normally constituted human being, no one not either sadistic or insane, who would wish for and want to make the triumph of the world revolution emerge from the atomic mushroom. But what we desire is one thing, and reality is another.

Reality, since the Second World War, has been marked by the struggle between revolution and imperialism which has taken on everywhere an aspect of armed struggle. We were the first in the international working-class movement to note, beginning in 1950, at a date when the general opinion was that American imperialism would remain all-powerful, that the global relationship of forces had changed in favor of the revolution. Since then, facts have proved us right. This idea has now become so common that there are people who go entirely over to the other extreme, thinking that imperialism is no longer capable of resisting the advance of the revolution. We cannot express ourselves before the working-class movement like individuals who are making a bet. If we are responsible toward the working masses, we cannot tell them that the relationship of forces has so changed that the advance of the world revolution will from now on be carried on in reality thanks to the peaceful retreat of world imperialism. We see, on the contrary, that at each grave deterioration of the relationship of forces to the detriment of imperialism, at each very serious advance of the world revolution in the world, the question of imperialism's resistance, including armed resistance, to this advance is always raised. It is certain that in such a case, given the existence of atomic weapons, the struggle can be quite dangerous for the future of humanity. But on the

other hand, there are more and more being created conditions which will permit a rapid disarming of imperialism when it prepares its attempts to resist the advance of the revolution by force.

*The best manner, the best way, of answering all these problems, for us, is to bring about the conditions in which the resistance of imperialism will be weakened the maximum possible by carrying out an effective revolutionary struggle everywhere.* We have never considered that the « war danger » constitutes a sort of continuous process in a straight line which increases every day. The situation, on the contrary, must be understood in the way I have explained, as a situation which is always subject to abrupt changes; which, at the moment of an abrupt change, when certain conditions are combined, becomes explosive and raises the question of war, only to undergo then a certain lull that lasts for a certain period. We must furthermore, of course, take into account in our analyses quite immediate perspectives, and determine, whether we are in the critical and explosive situation or if we have once more entered for a time into a stage of lull.

It is entirely correct to take into account a series of factors which up until now limited and, we may say, braked the irresistible drive from one side and the other toward the decisive clash.

What had a certain braking role was the factual improvement in the economic situation of capitalism, which has been going on for several years now, the conservatism of the Stalinist leadership which is afraid of the role of the masses, also the fear of atomic war in both camps.

But these brakes are only relative compared to the deeper causes setting these camps in opposition and urging them toward a decisive struggle.

It is only that which explains why, despite the existence of brakes, the period is constantly interrupted by crises which lead to highly explosive situations, putting in fact on the order of the day the question of a decisive struggle.

# THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

## *Since the Second World War*

### I

## *Resolution*

1 — *The predominant factor in the world, since the Stalinists and social-democrats betrayed the proletarian revolution in Europe at the end of the second world war, has been the advance of the colonial revolution, which embraces in its movement three-quarters of the earth's population, and which is developing on every continent that has been colonized.*

The first world war and the victorious October Revolution had contributed to the awakening of the colonized peoples, particularly in Asia. The Communist International for the first time drew the interest of the metropolitan workers' movement to the uprisings of the colonial peoples, as being an element of the struggle for the world revolution, and formulated the principles of communist strategy and tactics in the movements of the colonial masses.

In the twelve years elapsed since the end of the second world war, the colonial revolution has increased in extent and continues to spread to all regions that were colonized in past centuries (Asia, Middle East, Africa, Latin America...).

The colonial revolution triumphed as a proletarian revolution in China, then in North Korea and North Vietnam.

The victory of the revolution in China acted as a powerful stimulus to the shifts in the relationship of social forces.

The revolutionary movements which never stop developing not only confirm this change in the relationship of forces; in numerous cases, they have even pushed this balance in a direction more unfavorable to imperialism and more favorable to the masses and to the world revolution. The defeats suffered by the masses have been only partial and limited.

The colonial revolution has placed world imperialism — in spite of its present technical and material superiority — in a situation which, apart from attempts to contain or roll back the revolution in limited sectors, has no other prospect than a third world war against the alliance of the workers' states and the colonial revolution, to re-establish globally its lost equilibrium.

The colonial revolution has set in motion the world's most economically and culturally backward masses, with a view to enabling them to cover in a short historical period the road already covered by the advanced capitalistic countries of Western Europe, and that to the building of a socialist society. Though, on the political plane, the victory of the Chinese Revolu-

tion and the advance of the colonial revolution have henceforth guaranteed the victory of the world revolution, the economic and cultural problems raised by this surge forward of the great majority of mankind will be resolved only with the victory of the revolution in the most advanced capitalist countries.

The colonial revolution has brought about a change in the relationship of forces between the masses on the one hand, and bureaucrats on the other — whether they be the leading Kremlin bureaucracy and its servants, or the reformist bureaucracies. It has therefore strongly contributed to the crisis of the bureaucratic régime in the workers' states and the traditional workers' leaderships in the capitalist world.

On the theoretical level, the colonial revolution has strikingly confirmed the theory of the permanent revolution, a confirmation supported by the weight of 600 million Chinese in current history, and has already driven parts of this theory into the heads of Stalinist-bred communists. It has also enriched the theory itself, and consequently Marxism itself.

### 2 — *THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST REVOLUTION*

#### *a) Because of its own development.*

The progress of the Chinese revolution, from 1911 to 1949, has shown, both by the heavy defeats it suffered and by its final victory, that given the present structure of the world, there is no possibility for the native bourgeoisie to accomplish the whole of the fundamental tasks of the democratic revolution (economic and political national independence, national unity, agrarian reform) and to set up a stable bourgeois regime in which the productive forces would go through a long period of development, as in the XVIIth, XVIIIth, and XIXth century revolutions, and that these countries might become independent imperialist powers.

In spite of the various tempos of its development, resulting mainly, as we shall see further on, from the part played by the Soviet government and the leaderships of the parties it controlled, the drive of the colonial revolution throughout the world can find no effective solution under a bourgeois leadership and its victory can be assured only by a proletarian leadership.

In confirmation of this, the most striking comparison is that between China and India: between China,

where the revolution is guided by a working-class leadership (though a highly empirical and opportunistic one); and India, where the native ruling bourgeoisie can at present avail itself of the financial support of imperialism and the political and material aid of the Soviet government. Such a comparison leads to the following conclusions:

India has not accomplished the essential tasks of the democratic revolution: political independence has been acquired, but national unity is not completed (Pakistan); the agrarian reform has not been carried out.

The bourgeois régime of India offers no real stability; it maintains itself mainly due to the traditions and authority of the Congress Party, acquired during the old struggles against British imperialism, and to Nehru's personality.

To give some answer to the feelings of the Indian masses, impressed by the development of the productive forces in China, the Indian government worked up an ambitious Second Five-Year Plan which was to demonstrate the possibilities of economic development without having to have recourse to revolutionary methods. But the economic situation in India has considerably worsened (inflation, lack of foreign exchange), and the Second Five-Year Plan has got itself into a crisis which at present requires considerable sums (according to the estimates of the Minister of Finances, 2,000 million dollars) to overcome it. Hence, although India unlike China (boycotted by the USA), had normal relations with the entire world, its economic possibilities within the framework of the maintenance of the capitalist system have shown themselves to be very limited.

India will be able to open up the way to a development of her productive forces comparable to that of China only by overthrowing the capitalist régime and carrying out the agrarian reform.

In all countries that have acquired political independence since the end of the second world war, this change, of a political nature, has rapidly dissipated illusions about «national unity» among all social strata, and the masses promptly and vigorously put forward—against the aims of the native bourgeoisie—their own demands, without which national independence for them would be but an empty shell.

In each colonial revolution there has appeared what Nasser has empirically described as the simultaneous advance of «two revolutions,» that is, in Marxist terms, the permanent character of the colonial revolution.

The colonial peoples demand not only formal equality of rights with Western nations. Together with political equality, and so that this does not become just an empty formality without content—they press for equal living conditions. That is why in all colonial or semi-colonial countries, the idea of industrialization exerts such a deep influence on all strata of the population. Given this fact, and the fact that the industrialization is beginning to materialize even within a colonial structure, the positions of the colonial proletariat are getting stronger, and the proletariat could thus more easily push for and win the leadership of the struggle, were it not for the betrayal of the Stalinists and the reformists in tying it to the tail of the native bourgeoisie.

The second law of the permanent revolution (revolutionary transformations and jumps in development in all fields after the establishment of proletarian power) is confirmed in China, as it had been in the USSR.

In this connection the tempo of economic development in colonial and semi-colonial countries after their victory over imperialism depends to a large extent on the help they can obtain from the victory of the revolution in industrially advanced countries. The tremendous task of the colonial revolution is to raise the living standards of about 2,000 million human beings, within a relatively short time, to the present one of some several hundred million people, an indispensable prerequisite for really starting to build socialism. If the countries have to resolve these problems mainly on their own, or with the inevitably limited help of the USSR—such being the case still for China—they will be able to do so only slowly, at the cost of great sacrifices by the toiling masses, and with the risk of bureaucratic deformations, even under an authentically revolutionary leadership.

*b) By its effects on the stability of the metropolitan capitalist régimes.*

In a period when the revolutionary struggle of the European masses has been held back by the social-democratic and Stalinist leaderships, and the revolutionary upsurge of 1944-1945 could be checked, because of the American support of the bourgeois powers on the one hand, and, on the other, the impotence of the Communist Parties geared as they were to support the aims of Kremlin diplomacy, the capitalist world has not been able to re-establish any lasting form of economic or political stability at home, because of the efforts it had to expend against the colonial revolution.

The spread of the colonial revolution has not only weakened the economy of the imperialist countries, it has also served as an effective brake on the growth of the exportation of capital, thus causing an excess of capital in certain countries (United States, Switzerland, Belgium, and partly in Great Britain and Germany) and a persistent delay in the industrialization, even of a colonial type, of certain regions of the world—thus accentuating both the crisis of the colonial countries and the crisis of the world capitalist system as a whole.

The two great XIXth century colonial powers (Great Britain and France) have obviously been those to suffer the most from the effects of the colonial revolution.

British capitalism, in spite of its relatively flexible policy in a number of territories of its ex-empire, has lost position after position—both from the strategic and economic point of view. In the Middle East it is faced by a matter of life and death for its commerce and industry, for its very existence as a capitalist power.

Since 1956 French imperialism has been at war every single day with some colonial people or another. It gave way in the Far East and is fighting with its back against the wall in North Africa, its defeat in Algeria bringing as a consequence the crash of its African empire. Colonial wars weigh heavily on its budget. Hundreds of thousands of men have been called up to

fight them. The morale of its army is deeply affected. French capitalism has survived only because of US aid and the disastrous and criminal policy of the leaderships of the French Communist and Socialist Parties.

As for American imperialism, which still enjoys the benefit of a social equilibrium long since lost in Europe, its whole economic structure is undermined by the fact that there are no real prospects for expansion because of the colonial revolution. It cannot find, as Great Britain did in the XIXth century, adequate outlets for its productive forces. Whereas these forces are considerable, it has to face a contracting capitalist world, and it is only at the expense of its « allies » that it has even limited possibilities of expansion. What is more, even in the United States, in the political and social field the first source of instability derives from the Negro movement which, to a large extent, is influenced by the success of the emancipation movements of the colonial peoples.

In short, both by the very logic of its own development and by its effects on the stability of the metropolitan capitalist regimes, the colonial revolution is an integral part of the world socialist revolution, and, from the end of the second world war up to today, it has been the most important factor in the world revolution.

### 3 — THE PRESENT LEADERSHIPS OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTIONS

The colonial revolution develops at different rhythms and under different leaderships according to countries.

In China, in part of Korea and Vietnam, the revolution was victorious under the leadership of a workers' party of Stalinist origin.

In Ceylon, it is developing under a revolutionary Marxist leadership.

In Bolivia, its possibilities and success depend above all on the capacities of the revolutionary Marxist leadership to fulfill its role effectively.

In most cases, even where there exist fairly powerful working-class organizations, it is at present under a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leadership.

The causes of this situation lie much less in the specific objective conditions in the colonial or semi-colonial countries (newness or weakness of the proletariat, weight of the peasantry and native middle-classes) than in the policy of the metropolitan workers' leaderships, both reformist and Stalinist, and in the Kremlin's policy. These leaderships advocate that in the colonies the workers and the peasant and poor petty-bourgeois masses ally themselves with the native bourgeoisie, under the latter's leadership and on its programme. Lastly, the Stalinists and reformists have paralyzed the metropolitan workers instead of calling on them to demonstrate their solidarity with the colonial peoples. Under these conditions, the colonial peoples do not yet see in socialism and communism an answer to their needs, and tend to turn towards ideologies formulated by the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leaders (Justicialism, Pan-Arabism, etc.).

### 4 — THE COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

During the post-war years the Asian and African countries of colonial structure that had won political independence set up, between the Atlantic coalition of imperialist countries and the alliance of workers' states, the Bandoeng group, which is trying to get the maximum economic and political advantages out of the unstable equilibrium established between the East and West, and their fundamental antagonism.

The Latin-American states have been much less successful in forming a bloc. They do not hesitate to use for their own benefit the inter-imperialist economic rivalries on their continent. Occasionally, they demonstrate feelings of sympathy towards the bourgeois governments of the Bandoeng group against imperialist aims; but they quite clearly line up against the USSR behind American imperialism, since they are bound to it by a network of economic, political, and military agreements in the Organization of the American States, precisely because they are afraid of the growing sympathies of the Latin-American masses towards the USSR and China.

#### a) *The policy of the imperialists.*

The imperialists have a policy that varies according to regions and times.

Whereas Great Britain granted formal political independence to India, Ceylon, and Burma soon after the end of the war, everywhere else each imperialist power has tried to defend its own positions (Holland in Indonesia, France in Vietnam, Great Britain in Malaya). And the United States, while pretending to grant formal independence to the Philippines, has consolidated there a regime completely under its control.

In the Far East, the French and Dutch have lost their key positions. Great Britain maintains but a precarious hold on Malaya.

Economically, it is the United States that tends to supplant the old imperialist powers that have lost their positions. American imperialism which, because of its overwhelming power compared to that of the old imperialisms and its leading rôle in the imperialist coalition, has supported a policy of « moderation » and « understanding, » in order to bring the native bourgeoisies into the general struggle against the rising socialist revolution, has nevertheless proved in Latin America (Guatemala, Argentina...) that it is quite prepared to organize military intervention where it fears that its vital interests may be affected by a mass movement that the native bourgeoisie may not be able to control, or when sectors of the bourgeoisie swing dangerously out of its orbit. It clearly showed in Korea and in its policy towards Iran that it will not hesitate to intervene in this way at any point on the globe.

During the last few years, the French and British imperialists who see their last African positions threatened have adopted differentiating policies on the African continent, granting independence under irresistible pressure to a more or less developed native bourgeoisie (in Morocco, Tunisia, Togoland, and the Gold Coast) but indulging in a frightful repression in countries that occupy strategic positions (Kenya) or

where the mass movement is difficult to canalize (Algeria).

Africa, through a geographic entity, does not have sufficient ethnic unity so that all its countries could jump over the stage of setting up separate nations. But though this stage is being reached in the whole north of the continent, from Casablanca to Suez, and though tomorrow Egypt and doubtless Libya as well will find their place in an Arab Federation of Middle Eastern countries, that part of Africa south of the Sahara was artificially cut up at the time of the imperialist conquest into entities that do not correspond to any historic unity, and the imperialists are now trying to maintain their domination by giving such « nations » an independence or autonomy devoid of real content, by Balkanizing Africa (the Defferre framework-law for the colonial territories of French imperialism). Without underestimating the propagandistic importance for the emancipation movement of the remembrance of vanished ancient Negro kingdoms (Ghana, Songha, the Congo, Kaffirland, etc.), and without failing to exploit all possibilities of reaching political independence even within the framework of today's artificial frontiers, the revolutionary vanguard will resolutely direct its efforts toward the establishment of the Socialist United States of Africa, with the countries of North Africa left free to choose to federate with the Federation of Arab Countries, with Socialist Africa, or with Socialist Europe, according to their own inclination.

The Middle East has witnessed the practical elimination of British imperialism from this region, where it had since the end of the first world war enjoyed an almost complete supremacy (with the exception of Syria and Lebanon, where French imperialism was dominant). Its last attempt, at Suez in October 1956, in liaison with French imperialism and the State of Israel, forced it to give up its position as the imperialist champion to the USA. Since then the USA has demonstrated the extreme importance it accords to this part of the world (« the Eisenhower Doctrine »), which at this moment constitutes one of the most explosive regions for international relations.

#### b) *The policy of the USSR and China.*

Since they have no imperialist economic interests in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, Moscow and Peking — contrary to the imperialists — have had the most friendly attitude towards the native bourgeois governments of the Bandoeng Bloc. They gave them support in their resistance to the imperialists' aims, but, at the same time, they supported these governments, thus backing them against the working masses of these same countries (India, Indonesia, Middle East...).

The Kremlin's influence may grow, all the more since the USSR is now capable of supplying relatively substantial economic aid to these colonial and semi-colonial countries for their industrialization plans and their arms needs, because of the possibilities of Soviet industry, and the stocks of arms produced during the « cold war, » which are now replaced by more modern equipment, and in exchange to guarantee these countries a growing outlet for their production of raw materials and agricultural commodities for which the USSR has an increasing need.

Because of this, the Bandoeng group has had a

« neutralist » attitude, characterized however by more favorable inclinations towards the USSR than towards the capitalist states.

The understanding between the workers' states and those of the Bandoeng group is a fragile one from the viewpoint of the particular interests of their leaderships; when faced with the danger of a mass movement, the national bourgeois leaderships will turn back towards American imperialism. On the other hand, the interests of the masses in the colonies and in the workers' states tend in the direction of a strengthening of this coalition.

The leaderships of the countries of the Bandoeng Conference have diverse interests too, from one country to another, and in some cases there even exists a strong opposition between one and another (divergences amongst the Arab States of the Middle East; divergences between India and Pakistan). Fundamentally, the leaders of these countries are either bourgeois or feudo-capitalist chiefs anxious to maintain the capitalist system, which is the source of their profits. But they turn towards the Soviet leaders, representatives of the ruling bureaucracy, because the latter support them against both the aims of the imperialists and the demands of their own masses.

But none of them today is in a position to disregard the masses which, in both these countries and the workers' states, are in an ascendant revolutionary phase. And, as we have explained above, the aspirations of the masses in the colonial countries join those of the masses in the workers' states: to destroy imperialism and capitalism, and to build a world of well-being and freedom.

#### 5 — *THE BONAPARTIST GOVERNMENTS*

From the end of the second world war till today, the unstable international equilibrium — characterized by a sharp decline of capitalism and the weakening of the imperialist positions, on one hand, and, on the other, by the expanding development of the economy of the USSR and the most gross opportunism of the Kremlin, which has slowed down the movement of the masses — has brought to power in various colonial and semi-colonial countries governments of a Bonapartist type (Nasser, Sukarno, and at one time Peron...).

The men who head these governments sometimes appear to have the support of the whole nation, or at least of the broad masses of their countries. They also act in a Bonapartist way as arbiters between the different strata of society. But an attentive study of their programme clearly reveals, without the slightest doubt, that they express the fundamental interests of the native bourgeoisie that is trying to win for itself a more important position at the expense of the land-owners and comprador bourgeoisie, both of which are allied to imperialism, to develop a larger native market among the peasantry, and eventually to extend this market to neighboring countries.

These men possess a power quite out of proportion to the strength of the native bourgeoisie.

Their strength stems essentially from the possibility they have had of playing a Bonapartist rôle on both the international and national scale. On the international plane, they have been able to exploit the antagonism between East and West; on the national

plane, they have been able to utilize the high combativity of the peasant and worker masses against imperialism, landowners, and the compradores.

The example of Peron however has clearly shown the limits of such governments. They can neither initiate a consistent struggle against imperialism and the other possessing classes, both because of the bonds that unite them to the latter and their fundamental weakness with regard to the masses whose combativity they use for their own ends. They are eventually forced, in times of economic difficulties, to turn against the masses, and to take back some of the concessions won by the masses in the first stages of the struggle. At the moment when they no longer have the masses' support, imperialism and the other possessing strata do not hesitate to attack, speculating basically on the fact that it is impossible for these governments to make the death-defying jump out of the framework of capitalism by arming the masses and attacking capitalist property.

The same hesitations that characterize the political attitude of the native bourgeoisie, swept backwards and forwards between the movement of the masses and imperialism, also characterize its economic policy, not only in structural problems such as the agrarian reform, but also and especially towards the problem of industrialization. The important results obtained in certain cases, like that of Brazil, occurred only in such fields as were stimulated by foreign capital. Nowhere in the world has the industrialization carried out by a native bourgeoisie's own means achieved significant results.

What is more, despite a greater industrialization in colonial countries, their rate of growth has still been inferior to that of the metropolitan countries. The net result is that their relative situation in the world is far from improving: thus, in the favorable period for capitalist economy that has existed since 1954, this conjuncture has affected only the highly developed capitalist countries, whereas the colonized countries, particularly in Latin America, are in serious economic difficulties. A new structure of exchanges is being built up in the capitalist world that is reducing their outlets for a part of their production.

In short, these governments of a Bonapartist type have possessed an apparent strength (that basically, however, was extremely limited in its practical possibilities) because of the international conjuncture, the East-West conflict, and the Kremlin's betrayal of the mass movements that threatened the status quo.

#### 6 — THE PEASANTRY IN THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE PROLETARIAT

In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, together with the problem of overthrowing imperialism, the agrarian question is the most explosive because of the great misery of the peasant masses and of their numerical weight in those countries.

The social structure of the peasantry in those countries varies extremely from one country to another and within any given country. But whether there be big landowners with a semi-feudal structure, or such tiny bits of land that the peasant cannot even make a living from working them, there exists no «peasants' party»

anywhere. The peasantry, for the defense of its economic and political interests, follows the political formations of the cities (whether bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, or proletarian).

Where plantations exist, there is an agricultural proletariat whose essential characteristics are those of any proletariat, and it is part of the proletariat as a social formation.

The victorious colonial revolution means, in short, the uprising of the peasantry, led by the proletariat. In China, the victory was achieved without the intervention of the working class, by the sole fight of peasant armies (led by a workers' party). But this is a unique case, due to quite exceptional circumstances (the extreme decomposition of the bourgeois régime, the considerable numerical disproportion between the peasantry and the proletariat, the policy of the Chinese CP towards the cities, the old tradition of peasant wars, the fact that US policy was turned mainly toward Europe, a Chinese bourgeoisie previously weakened by the Japanese imperialists, Japanese arms captured by the Chinese Red Armies...).

The task of the revolutionary party, in order to guarantee the victory of the colonial revolution, is to combine the struggle of the urban proletariat with that of the peasantry.

This union attains one of its highest expressions in guerilla warfare, which — against the armed forces of imperialism and of the bourgeois state — proves itself to be a powerful means of struggle and a no less powerful factor in political organization.

Guerilla formations of this type can live, develop, and win only when composed of individuals with a very high revolutionary morale, and when connected with the masses of the country. That is to say that they tend to become a selected vanguard that elaborates and applies a policy corresponding to the interests of the masses.

In addition to its vital political importance, the guerilla has also proved itself to be an «economical» form of warfare, needing only limited cadres, a small number of troops, little material equipment, yet that paralyzes and demoralizes considerable enemy forces.

#### 7 — THE PROLETARIAT IN THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

In spite of its numerical weakness, the proletariat of the colonial countries has tended, ever since it existed, to play a leading rôle in the colonial revolution, becoming in anti-imperialist struggles the spokesman for the other strata of the toiling population, and above all of the peasantry from which it has but recently sprung. It should be able to draw tremendous strength from belonging to the international proletariat, the only social class that is not fundamentally divided by local or national interests. But precisely because the proletariat of the colonial countries has not received the necessary international solidarity from the proletariat of the metropolitan countries, it has been weakened in its struggle for the leadership of the colonial revolution.

Whereas the working-class movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries presents different politically varying characteristics from one country to another

and is sometimes under a Stalinist leadership, or, more often, under bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leaderships, one of its main characteristics in every country is the formation of powerful trade-union organizations.

This fact is above all due both to the growth of the class-consciousness of the proletariat in the colonial countries and also to the objective necessity for XXth century capitalism to have an organized labor market. In certain cases the native industrial bourgeoisie has aided working-class trade-union organization as a means of using the strength of the workers in a controlled way against imperialism or against the possessing sectors linked up with it.

Since the colonial revolution is still more often than not under the leadership of the bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeoisie, it often happens that the trade-union leaders belong to the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois parties. Nevertheless, this political affiliation of the leaders in no way alters the fact that the trade unions themselves are workers' organisations, class organisations, and not appendices of the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois parties. Even the leaders of these unions cannot serve *only* the interests of the bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeoisie within these unions. They feel to a greater or lesser degree the pressure of the working-class masses. Very often, these trade-union leaders are pushed into taking a left-wing position within the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois parties.

Given the situation of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is inevitable that the political and trade-union struggles are combined. Wherever mass working-class parties recognized by the masses as such are lacking, the trade unions tend to overflow the framework of trade-unionism and to play the role, when the case arises, of a party, and even the role of organizing workers' power at great moments of crisis.

The fact that the working class of the colonial or semi-colonial countries in many cases begins *its class experience* through trade-union organization will have important consequences in the political development of the working class of these countries. In these cases there is no doubt that the trade unions will be called upon to play an important part in the creation of the mass working-class party.

#### 8 — THE SOCIALIST PARTIES IN THE COLONIAL COUNTRIES

Socialist parties or parties with a socialist ideology exist in some of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. It is impossible to put these parties and those of the capitalist countries on a par from the viewpoint of their class nature. The socialist parties of the metropolitan countries, although they are reformist in their policies, are historically and socially working-class organizations; for such important countries as Germany and Great Britain, they are the mass parties of the working class. On the contrary, the socialist parties of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, even when they have a militant, revolutionary political activity, are not usually specifically working-class parties.

In the majority of cases, they are petty-bourgeois political formations, with a more or less socialist ideology. Historically, there can be no doubt as to their

fate: they will disintegrate between the action of imperialism and that of the toiling masses. From a practical point of view, in certain countries, since these parties begin by rallying together elements from every social stratum, and especially the most combative ones, they must be considered as a suitable area for work in order to form Marxist cadres.

#### 9 — STALINISM AND THE COLONIAL COUNTRIES

All the Stalinist-led parties have placed the interests of the Kremlin and the aims of Soviet diplomacy above the interest of the masses, especially the masses of the colonial countries.

For the metropolitan parties, this subordination has had the most scandalous consequences in France, where the French CP, wanting to pressure the bourgeoisie into an agreement with the Kremlin (against the policy of rearming Germany), struggling for « national independence » with regard to US policy, both at the time of the Vietnam war and now, in the Algerian war, had at most a policy of weak parliamentary opposition; practically, it has let the imperialists do as they wished and, with the pretext of bringing the socialists into a united front, it voted the emergency powers to the government in the Algerian war. By such a policy, the French CP has discredited itself with the revolutionary movements of the colonial countries and has put the Communist Parties of the colonial countries in a difficult position.

The CPs of the colonial countries too, have followed a Kremlin-dictated policy, and the most famous example of treason of a revolutionary movement is that of India in 1942. At present, the mainspring of their policy is that of alliance with the native bourgeoisies, on the latter's programme.

The crisis of the Communist Parties which has been developing since the XXth Congress has, in several countries, because of the place held by the colonial revolution in the present revolutionary struggle, brought into general debate either the policy of the Communist Parties in the colonial question, or their policy towards the national bourgeoisie in those countries.

The Stalinist leaderships in the colonial countries have picked out the most right-wing aspects of the XXth Congress: peaceful co-existence, new roads..., in order to accentuate their policy of collaboration with the native bourgeoisies, on the latter's programme, the price of which is the sacrifice of the interests of the working class and poor peasant masses.

Under these conditions, the Communist Parties of the colonial countries will be faced with more and more serious crises, in which will arise the question of their very existence.

#### 10 — THE METROPOLITAN SOCIALIST PARTIES AND THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

In general, the metropolitan Socialist Parties demonstrate feelings of sympathy towards the colonial peoples insofar as these peoples' movement is no danger to the interests of their metropolitan bourgeoisie. Then, on the contrary, they reveal their true « social-imperialist » nature, as Lenin qualified them during the first world war.

The most striking example at present, and the most vile, is that of the French Socialist Party. It is to the General Secretary of this party that the bourgeoisie entrusted the task of crushing the Algerian revolution; it is also he who proved to be most enthusiastic in preparing and carrying out the war against Egypt. He only gave in when Great Britain stated that it gave up the fight.

As for the British Labour Party, its attitude on the colonial question reflects the evolution it has undergone towards a still very right-wing centrism. It is leading a parliamentary opposition to the manifestations of the British government's imperialist policy.

Politically, social-democratic centrism joins up with Stalinism to encourage the workers of the colonial countries to follow their native bourgeoisies. In this field, the social-democrats transplant to the colonial countries their own policy in the metropolitan countries.

#### 11 — THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AND THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The Fourth International, World Party of the Socialist Revolution, unconditionally supports all the struggles of the colonized peoples against imperialism, regardless of their temporary leadership.

This participation in these struggles is engaged in with complete political independence. The Fourth International, in the course of these movements of the colonial peoples, fights for the following aims:

— The Fourth International fights for the creation of mass workers' parties, independent of the political formations of the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie, and Stalinism.

— The Fourth International fights so that the mass workers' parties and the mass organizations of the working class (in particular the trade unions) shall have a proletarian revolutionary policy independent of the national bourgeoisie.

— The Fourth International fights so that these colonial revolutions shall aim at bringing the working class to power, to the creation of Workers' and Peasants' Governments.

With these ends in view and these prospects, the sections that the Fourth International is trying to construct in all the colonial and semi-colonial countries work out appropriate tactics for the conditions of the mass movements at the present stage.

In the capitalist countries, especially where the bourgeoisie is fighting the colonial movements, the sections of the Fourth International unconditionally support the colonial revolutions and have also the imperative task of struggling to guarantee the help of the metropolitan proletariat in the struggle of the colonial peoples. The

metropolitan sections of the Fourth International must particularly combat, within the workers' ranks, the policy of the reformist and Stalinist leaderships who, even when they denounce colonialism, do so in the name of pseudo-national interests that are endangered by an outdated colonialism, and not in relation to the interests of world socialism. Such an ideology, far from stimulating the support of the metropolitan masses for the colonial revolutions, has a bourgeois social basis, tends politically to seek the support of bourgeois elements who have « good will, » etc., and disarms the workers' movement.

#### 12 — THE PLACE OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION IN THE PROGRESS OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION

After the revolutionary wave of 1917-1923, the progress of the world revolution starting in Russia, was blocked in the West as a result of the combination of the resistance of capitalism, the rôle of the reformists, and the consequences of the victory of the Soviet bureaucracy in the communist movement.

After several heavy defeats, which culminated in the victory of fascism in Germany and the outbreak of the second world war, the world revolution began to break through in the East with the victory of the colonial revolution in China. The social upheaval brought about in Eastern Europe, except in the case of Yugoslavia, was brought about mainly by the military and police intervention of the Soviet armies and, for this very reason, did not act as a stimulus to revolutionary action by the masses in Western Europe, still held back by their traditional social-democratic and Stalinist leaderships.

The break-through in the East changed the balance of power: it brought a decisive contribution to the crisis of Stalinism; it stimulated the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge in the workers' states, but it did not, of itself, bring forth—given the political level of the problems it had to resolve immediately, and the level of the Chinese leadership itself—the necessary elements for an effective solution of the problem of a world revolutionary leadership.

The beginning of the upsurge in the workers' states, in the USSR and in the « People's Democracies, » and above all, the political revolution now in course in Poland and Hungary, have raised the most decisive problems in the whole international communist movement, including that of the world revolutionary leadership, of the Fourth International. It also places on the order of the day the European revolution, the decisive step on the road to world revolution. The colonial revolution therefore will have been the link between the October Revolution and the victory of the World Revolution.

## II

# Report

PRESENTED BY COMRADE PIERRE FRANK

The colonial revolution, the movement of the colonial peoples to free themselves from the imperialist yoke, was the dominant reality in the world during the years which immediately followed the period of the Second World War. It is only now that a factor of equally capital importance is added to the steadily continuing colonial revolution: the political revolution beginning in the workers' states still under the yoke of the bureaucracy.

For more than a dozen years, revolutionary movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries have never ceased to shake the capitalist world. They have won decisive victories. The revolutionary tide continues to rise on all the continents which were colonized.

The colonial revolution has led revolutionary Marxists to a complete reevaluation of their previous perspectives on the progress of the world revolution. In fact, from the first victory of the revolution, from October 1917, until the years immediately following the Second World War, revolutionary Marxists, that is to say, the Third International under Lenin's and Trotsky's leadership, then the Fourth International, had based their orientations on a different perspective which was as follows: the revolution started in the Soviet Union would extend itself and triumph in the West.

We certainly did not underestimate the revolutionary movements in the East. We can find in Lenin's and Trotsky's works phrases envisaging the possibility of victories of the revolution in the East, but these were merely possible eventualities. The revolutionary Marxist strategy was mainly directed toward the West, toward Europe. The defeat of the second Chinese Revolution in 1927 did not make us give up the struggle for reform of the Communist International, because the centre of gravity of the workers' movement still remained in Europe. We had been educated with the perspective of the German revolution, centre of the European revolution, centre of the world revolution. The German labor movement was the centre of the world labor movement, and it was only after its defeat that we moved on from the struggle for reform within the Third International to the struggle for the Fourth International. Even after the years of fascism, at the end of the Second World War, it was still on the revolutionary upsurge in Europe that we were essentially centred.

The march of events has, however, followed quite another road: the world revolution which won its first victory in the Soviet Union has first of all made its way through the countries which today we call under-developed, before its triumph in those countries where capitalism is the most developed. This is an event which has been much exploited by all sorts of revisionists in their fight against Marxism. But Marxism has already run into many others and is none the worse for it. In reality, Marxism is the only instrument which permits precisely to analyze, to understand, and to orient ourselves amid the extremely complex events of these last few years since the end of the Second World War.

The fundamental crisis of capitalism following upon the First then the Second World War has led to a considerable weakening of the capitalist system. At the end of the Second World War, confronted by an extremely intense revolutionary crisis, capitalism was confronted by a very serious choice. Unable to make a stand with equal strength on all fronts, it deliberately concentrated its forces on the European Metropolitan countries and kept minor forces in

Asia. It was necessary for it to maintain the European bastions at all costs. Thanks above all to the betrayals of the Stalinist and reformist leaderships, it has succeeded in establishing a certain equilibrium — unstable, still, a certain equilibrium nevertheless — in the principal European countries.

On the other hand, in Asia where capitalism kept only limited forces and where the native bourgeoisie was also very weak, the colonial revolution in its march forward marked up a most decisive victory in China. Independently of the policy of the Chinese Communist Party, the uprising of the Chinese peasant masses was so powerful that it finally carried along in the struggle the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. And it is the capitalist regime which was swept away.

Imperialism had scarcely regained a certain equilibrium, a sort of stability, in Europe, when it realized that it had lost quite decisive positions in Asia. It is then that it intervened, with the Korean War, in the attempt to halt the advance of the revolution in the Far East.

We have thus arrived at a situation which did not at all enter into the perspectives which we had before the war. The increased decline of capitalism, the very prolonged delay of the European revolution, and the colonial revolution's marking up decisive victories — such is the picture, which has opened a new perspective, a much more concrete one, of the progress of the world revolution. At present, we witness the continuation of the colonial revolution and the first steps made by the political revolution in the workers' states. The most probable perspective now is that the development of both is preparing the outbreak of the proletarian revolution in Europe, while the revolution in the U.S.A. will constitute the final link for the victory of the world revolution.

We do not present such a picture and such perspectives in order to draw a historical fresco. This is a question of primordial importance for such an organization as ours, which has set itself the task of guiding and leading the world revolution, taken as a whole; and this task is a concrete perspective for us, not in a distant future but in a relatively near future. It is a very important question to know where to concentrate our forces, to determine the objectives of the world revolution in this and that sector.

It is also useful to recall this reevaluation that we have made in order to engage in a critical examination of ideas, conceptions, and writings of the past, so that we can judge them in the light of the perspective we had at that time and to understand why certain things appear to us mistaken today and to what extent they were mistaken. All we wrote, all we put forward, in the period preceding the Second World War and at the end of that war was conceived and written according to our previous perspective. We cannot engage in a serious critical examination by taking up only this or that idea, this or that phrase; we must place them in the overall perspective which existed prior to this situation.

For instance, some comrades have wondered whether the theory of the permanent revolution, which has been so well confirmed on the whole, did not however reveal certain lacunæ, whether it might not be necessary to render it more flexible, and whether there might not have been some errors committed on this subject. For example, it is a very important fact that in China the proletariat did not intervene directly as the leadership of the revolution, and the proleta-

rian leadership was assured only indirectly through the leadership of workers' party which furthermore did all it could to prevent the Chinese proletariat from acting. Another remark made by some comrades is that though the in a series of colonial and semi-colonial countries, is a certain industrialization which is not at all negligible, and which has been brought about under a bourgeois leadership. Another remark made by some comrades is that though the imperialist metropolitan countries have lost a certain number of colonies, this has not had immediately catastrophic effects on the capitalist system, since we have in the last few years witnessed a quite extraordinary economic « boom. » Lastly, the example of India has raised many questions among comrades. India obtained, under the leadership of the native bourgeoisie, an independence which was not merely formal, and she is playing a quite important role on the world scale. But we had maintained vigorously before the war that the Indian bourgeoisie would not be able to lead India to independence; we can quote quite characteristic sentences by Trotsky on this subject. The question is therefore raised: did we not underestimate the possibilities of the native bourgeoisie?

We must review all these observations, examine them one by one, but — as I have just said — we cannot make such an examination isolatedly. We have to situate these things in relation to the perspective we had formerly, in relation to the conditions existing at that time. For instance, in the case of China, there is nothing in common between the situation during the years 1925-27 and the situation of 1946-47 and afterwards. I have mentioned the withdrawal of a great part of the forces of imperialism from the Far East. Furthermore, the Chinese bourgeoisie had been considerably weakened during the years of war against Japan. Besides, the Chinese Red Armies received very serious armaments. We were faced with completely exceptional circumstances, in which the factor of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and its policy played a much less important role in the overall picture, not to speak of course of the extreme weakness; from a numerical point of view, of the Chinese proletariat in the whole population, which remained constant throughout the revolution. It is because of these exceptional conditions that we say that the example of China is quite exceptional, that it does not permit of diminishing at all the essential notion of the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution in under-developed countries.

Concerning the problems of the economy, i.e. the development of industrialization and the economic relations between the metropolitan countries and the colonial countries, I would rather leave this question to the report on political and economic perspectives in which it will be more broadly developed. In this report, you will find the explanation on the particular conditions, the reason why the loss of a certain number of colonies has not had catastrophic consequences for imperialism. But I believe it is quite clear, from the violence and the vigor of the imperialists' resistance in the Middle East, that they understand the importance of the struggle and they are fighting in a situation which is for them extremely vital. This is much more decisive for them than what they have already lost.

Let us come to the example of India which is certainly by far the most important. It is quite sure that in 1948 we underestimated the degree of independence secured by India at that time. That is very clear when we reread the document of our Second World Congress on the colonial movements of that period.

What is the origin of this mistake that we committed? It is quite true, I repeat, that we oriented ourselves above all on more rapid victories of the revolution in Europe, which would have had very important repercussions on the development of the Indian proletariat. It would subsequently have made great progress and the Indian bourgeoisie

would not have had so much room for manoeuvre as it in fact has had.

In this connection it is not a bad idea briefly to take up again certain theoretical problems, because I do not think that the question of national independence constitutes an essential part of the theory of the permanent revolution. This appears quite clearly when we retrace it back to its source, that is, when we examine the conditions in which Trotsky developed the theory of the « permanent revolution, » and reread his principal writing on this subject, his book *The Permanent Revolution*.

Trotsky formulated his theory of the permanent revolution in relation to Czarist Russia, which was not only not a colonial or semi-colonial country, but on the contrary was an imperialism of a very particular type. The problem raised was not that of independence, but the following problem. Russia was an economically under-developed country, which had not yet solved the democratic tasks, in the first place the agrarian revolution. It was the tasks of the agrarian revolution that Trotsky put forward both in 1905 and in his 1928 book on the permanent revolution. The basic idea which Trotsky developed in relation to Czarist Russia and which was taken up again later concerning other economically backward countries, is as follows. The bourgeoisie of these countries, he says, is not able to fulfill the role played by the bourgeoisies of the modern capitalist countries who accomplished the revolutions of the XVIIth, XVIIIth, and XIXth Centuries. It is not capable of resolutely taking the leadership of the nation in order to fulfill thoroughly, right through to the end, the tasks completed by its predecessors. It is not able to do this, because it is attached by a thousand ties to imperialism, to landed property, and besides it is too weak and it sees rising up before it the menace of the native proletariat which forms an integral part of the world proletariat. Trotsky never said that the bourgeoisie would not undertake any struggle at all, but only that it would not carry this struggle through to the end; that it could not succeed in creating a stable bourgeois regime as did the bourgeoisies of the European countries in the XVIIth, XVIIIth, and XIXth Centuries; and that, under the new historical conditions, it is up to the proletariat, despite its numerical weakness, to take the leadership of the nation in solving the democratic tasks. The proletariat, in seizing the power, would of course not be able to limit itself to mere democratic tasks and would begin the tasks of the socialist construction of society. These few words recall the essence, the basis, of the theory of the permanent revolution. The principal chapter of Trotsky's book on this subject is entitled: « The permanent revolution is the transformation of the nation under the leadership of the proletariat. »

The permanent revolution does not mean that the native bourgeoisie is not able to conduct a certain struggle against imperialism, that colonial society cannot experience any development under the regime of this native bourgeoisie. It signifies essentially that the native bourgeoisie cannot accomplish the entirety of the democratic tasks and, unlike its forerunners of the last centuries, it cannot install a regime by which capitalism would acquire a stability for a whole historical period. It is from this point of view that we must look at the situation in India, examine what has happened in India since the proclamation of independence.

In this period, the independence of India has become a sure fact. Yet the whole development which we have witnessed is not owing to the intrinsic force of the Indian bourgeoisie, but to the concurrence of most particular circumstances, above all on the international plane. We can see the circumstances that have been in favor of the Indian bourgeoisie. It has received support and aid from both the East and the West. I am not for the moment discussing the importance of this aid. In spite of these circumstances, the Indian bourgeoisie has not solved the democratic tasks; and Nehru's regime, the regime of the Congress, is now

approaching a new stage which, according to all well-informed observers, is full of dangers and will be decisive for the stability of the regime of the Indian bourgeoisie.

It must be noted first that the Indian bourgeoisie has not solved the problem of national unity. On the contrary, it acquired its independence only at the cost of an enormous amputation — the creation of Pakistan which is itself a country composed of detached pieces; and it is quite certain that the question of some form of reunification of India will be posed again on the order of the day. As to the agrarian question, it cannot be said that the Indian bourgeoisie has settled this question, it cannot be said even that it has tackled it. In the past period, Nehru has above all on the one hand exploited international conditions, and on the other played a Bonapartist role in Indian society, exploiting in particular the prestige acquired in the course of past struggles which were in fact conducted mainly under the leadership of the Congress Party.

On the economic plane, the new regime, the regime of the Congress, has not brought the masses very appreciable improvements, and it also offers them very few perspectives for the future. There are comparisons which one can or cannot make by means of statistics; but the masses make comparisons in their own way without looking at charts. More particularly, the Indian masses, like all masses in Asia, make their comparison with the development of China. It is due to the conditions of this comparison that Nehru proposed a second five-year plan destined to give hopes to the masses, to present to them a different road toward socialism, an Indian road toward socialism, a sort of cheap solution which would spare them all kinds of sufferings experienced by the Chinese population.

The second Indian five-year plan was conceived in a quite audacious manner; but once they started to carry it out, they found themselves faced by an economic and financial situation implying very serious dangers which considerably compromise the carrying out of the second five-year plan. India lacks foreign exchange. It is also suffering from inflation; and today it seems that all the projects of the second five-year plan are much compromised, unless India receives enormous credits. That is why we see the Indian government today begging to left and right, or rather to East and West, for quite considerable credits. Nehru starts to behave in a very modest way toward the United States in the attempt to obtain extremely important credits.

This situation in India provokes extremely serious worries among a number of bourgeois or social-democratic observers. Let us quote only two: the American journalist, Walter Lippman, who is a very well-informed specialist on international problems, and the principal economist of the Labour Party, Balogh. They declare that, if there is not a most considerable intervention by the capitalist countries, the United States and Great Britain, if there is not really decisive aid, it will be impossible to maintain the stability of the regime in India, and they add that there will then be a danger of India's taking the road followed by China. Lippman goes even further to say that the Syrian affair is quite a minor affair in face of all that is beginning to appear on the Indian horizon.

I believe that nobody among us has any illusions — after all the experiences we have passed through — about the possibilities for capitalism to intervene in a decisive way in such a country as India to assure the stability of its regime. By this I do not mean that bourgeois India will not receive any aid at all; nor do I mean that things are going directly toward a development of the proletarian revolution, but I believe that we must understand: it is not the stability but the crisis of the bourgeois regime which is on the order of the day.

The conclusion that we can draw from the experience of India is that, in the years from independence up until now, what has happened has not been the manifestation of the intrinsic strength of the Indian bourgeoisie, but has been due

to its possibilities of playing, in a much more prolonged way than we could have imagined, a Bonapartist role, both on the national and the international scale. There has not been stabilization; the day of reckoning is later than we thought, but it is approaching. The transformation of the nation is not being carried out, and has not been carried out, under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. There has been a number of transformations, but not a fundamental one; the deadline is approaching and the problem of the transformation of the nation raises the problem of the leadership of the proletariat.

The example of India has extraordinary significance; it is decisive for a general explanation of what the possibilities of the native bourgeoisie in a number of colonial and semi-colonial countries have seemed to be in the past few years. In each case, there exist specific and particular factors which have played a role. They are different for India and for Egypt. But in no case has the native bourgeoisie played an important role because of its own strength. It has not stabilized the nation. Its role has been out of proportion with its own forces owing to the conditions in which it was placed. Let us recall once again these conditions: a considerable weakening of capitalism, a reinforcement of the workers' states, and a prolonged delay of the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries, above all because of the leaderships of the working class. The tempo of revolutionary developments has been modified and slowed down, but we are unquestionably approaching, or we have already entered into, a new stage. This situation appears very clearly in India, and, by the way, this will be a question that we shall have to examine as to our tasks in the organizational part of this congress.

In the Far East there also arises the question of Indonesia. There too movements of extraordinary importance are taking place: we have already seen in the last few months the very important results of the elections, which are the sign of an unusually powerful revolutionary impulse. I think that a qualified comrade will intervene on this question in detail in the course of the discussion, and so I shall not deal with it in this report.

If we are today witnessing a new revolutionary upsurge appearing on the horizon in the Far East, especially in India and Indonesia, the colonial revolution is now at its climax, on the other hand, in the Arab world, from Casablanca to Bagdad.

The whole world knows the extreme importance of those regions where this revolution is going on; from all points of view: political, economic, and military. At that point three continents converge: Asia, Europe, and Africa. Through it passes the shortest route between Europe and the Far East. It runs all the way from the borders of the Caucasian oil fields to that point on the coast closest to the American continent. The petroleum resources of the Middle East are very well known; now announcement is made of fabulous resources in the Sahara, which lies next to North Africa. It is thus understandable why the game being played on the international scale for these regions is so extremely savage. We face a situation full of great danger for the outbreak of the Third World War. Since the Suez affair, within a year's time, we have already had several incidents, several crises, Jordan, and now Syria; we shall certainly experience several others. To quote Foster Dulles, we are leaning « over the abyss. »

Now let us move on to the question of the revolution's own strength in the Arab countries. These may be divided into two groups, each having a more marked unity of its own: the Middle East on the one hand, and North Africa on the other.

In the Middle East, it is Egypt which plays the leading role, and it will certainly play a more and more important role owing to the fact that it is the most industrialized country of this whole region, of all the Arab countries. This leading role is at present taken by a bourgeois leadership,

that of Nasser. In his own way, and in terms which are not Marxist, Nasser has quite well described the situation which was developing and what his own conceptions were. We have several times quoted in our publications passages from Nasser's book, *The Philosophy of Revolution*, in which he explains the intervention of the Egyptian officers' corps to get rid of corrupted cliques, to transform their country into a modern state with an important economic development. After that, Nasser then explains his own observations: following the military coup d'état which drove out King Farouk, instead of having the unanimity of the nation behind those who had carried out this coup d'état, he saw a swarm of private aspirations and interests rise up. And he comes to the conclusion that in his country there is occurring a combination of two revolutions at once. On the one hand a revolution whose purpose is to liberate the country from the imperialist yoke; on the other hand, a social revolution in which the masses aim at greater well-being, at a new state of affairs.

In his own words — which are not Marxist terms — Nasser rediscovers what we have always said about the theory of permanent revolution, about the dual nature of revolution in under-developed countries. Of course, Nasser also describes his conception, his perspectives, his programme, which are those of a military man who wants things to be done in an orderly way. The two revolutions must not come about at the same time. First the political revolution, the liberation from the imperialist yoke. Once this one is completed, it will be decided at the top how gradually to improve the internal situation. It is very difficult to explain more clearly the conception of the present bourgeois leadership of the Egyptian revolution; it is worded quite clearly. Of course it will develop in a quite different way from what can be decided at the top.

Comrade Mischa will certainly speak on this problem of Egypt and the Middle East. He has already made an important contribution to the preparatory discussion for the Congress, all the more important in that it already outlines a programme for our movement in the Middle East. I wish to mention here only two points. In his articles, Comrade Mischa has very correctly shown the difference between Nasser's and Peron's attitudes toward the working-class movement. This difference is very important and very great; but I think that it is owing especially to the conditions themselves, to the fact that the workers' movement in Argentina, unlike that in Egypt, had a great and long tradition of organization. It is probably the very logic of the struggle, the very logic of the development of the situation, which will compel Nasser also to take the working masses much more into account in the future. During the Port Saïd events, Nasser was bold enough to arm the masses, because the development of the workers' movement is still very weak in Egypt. One can be sure that with the development of the situation, he will show much less daring in such situations, and that his attitude will be much more varied and complicated towards the working masses of Egypt.

Another point to which I wish to draw your attention is the organization which exists especially in Syria and Jordan, and which also engages in illegal action in Iraq. I am speaking of the Socialist Party of Arab Renaissance, the Baath Party. At first sight, this party looks to me like an Arabian variety of a party of the M.N.R. type. We must study this very closely. Here is surely a political centre where Marxist currents can very well develop.

Now I come to North Africa. I will give only a few essential ideas. We shall surely have several speeches which will develop these problems. It must be so, because this is the most advanced point in the combat of the colonial revolution. It requires from us not only political support but also, as much as possible, material aid, to the revolutionary struggle which is taking place.

For years and years, the policy of French imperialism

has been to try to split the three countries composing North Africa, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. It has done this first of all with the hope of maintaining its hold on the whole of North Africa, without granting any concessions. Then it gave a little to Tunisia; it is what was called « internal autonomy. » Next, it had to give Morocco what was called « independence in interdependence »; it was obliged to bring back the sultan who had been exiled to Madagascar.

Having granted Morocco independence, it had to give it to Tunisia immediately.

Under these conditions, French imperialism thought that it could maintain its authority more than ever in Algeria, which is actually the key to all North Africa. Without Algeria's independence, Tunisia's and Morocco's are rather problematical.

All the calculations of imperialism were baffled, for the insurrection began immediately in Algeria in November 1954. French imperialism is making enormous efforts to crush the Algerian revolution. It keeps half a million soldiers of the regular army there, for a population of about 8 million inhabitants. It spends 2 billion francs a day. French imperialism can practically no longer find any natives there ready to play the part of Bao-Dai and to be imperialism's servants. At the moment, the French parliament is discussing a « framework-law » to determine a new status for Algeria. It is being discussed by all French parties. It is being presented to all the governments of the world. It cannot be presented to the Algerians, because there is not one among them all to present it to. But why is French imperialism so obstinate and why does it go on with a policy which is visibly hopeless? Algeria does not have what French bourgeois call, in their own vocabulary, « valid counter-spokesmen, » because of the composition of society in that country. It is difficult, not to say impossible, for them to go through with a political transaction resembling that which they were able to bring off in other colonies. The reign of French imperialism in Algeria since the 1830s has caused the native landowners practically to die out. There are native bourgeois, but they are few, and it is very difficult to say that they form a native bourgeois class in a structural sense. The bourgeois stratum is very limited. There is also an Algerian petty-bourgeoisie, but it is extremely poor. It cannot be anything but poor when one realizes that the great mass of the population is not a proletarian population, a proletariat properly so-called; it is a kind of sub-proletariat, a sort of plebeian mass living in an extremely miserable way, such as there are few to be seen in the world. The best expression to describe this socially is the English word « pauper. » Even the French statistics, the official ones, admit that the great majority of this population has a total income in Algeria lower than the savings sent by the 400,000 Algerian workers living in France, and yet these are paid the lowest salaries while doing the hardest work. I think that the official figure on the income of an Algerian family is 20,000 francs [approximately 42 dollars, or 15 pounds] a year. This is what explains the highly explosive nature of the Algerian revolution and the great difficulty imperialism has in finding a consistent social stratum of owners, capable of assuming the leadership of that country.

Of course this revolution in Algeria plays an explosive part also for the neighboring countries, i.e., Tunisia and Morocco.

Therefore, besides French imperialism, the native bourgeoisies of Tunisia and Morocco are extremely sensitive to what is happening in Algeria, for the social equilibrium in their countries is seriously threatened. In the course of the last month or of the last six weeks, we have seen Bourguiba, the most qualified representative of the Tunisian bourgeoisie, eliminating the monarchy, and we have also seen the Sultan of Morocco taking measures against a certain number of feudal landowners who had been too openly allied to French imperialism. Such measures in Tunisia and Morocco are preventive measures, concessions in face of the ferment

which is going on in these countries, and which is stirred up, stimulated, and strengthened by the struggle of the Algerian people. Bourguiba, the most clear-sighted representative of the bourgeoisie of these countries, wants to find a solution which will enable a bourgeois regime to be established in Algeria. He has taken up, in a certain form, the idea of a North African Federation, which is indeed inherent in the historical development of these countries. But he especially hopes to be able to support, by means of the Tunisian and Moroccan bourgeoisies, whatever Algerian bourgeoisie there may be.

Concerning the working and poor peasant masses in Algeria, we must stress first of all that the native trade-union movement is now freed from the tutelage of the French federations. It must be noted that during all the former period, French imperialism prevented natives from leading the trade unions, from having their own trade-union movement; it preferred to have trade unions even under Stalinist leadership as long as they were dependent on a French federation led by Paris, and tied to it. It was the same thing in Morocco.

Concerning the struggle in Algeria, the National Liberation Front, which is today the real leadership of the Algerian revolution, first put the accent, during a whole period, on military problems, the problems of armed struggle, exclusively from a military point of view. Then it gave its attention to political and social problems, which became concretized in the programme adopted last year at its congress. We reproduced very large excerpts from these texts in *La Vérité des Travailleurs*. Among the most important points, aside from the very important role it gives to the proletariat, the one which it seems most necessary to us to stress is the creation, the establishment, of an organization, a local administration on the basis of committees of a popular type. Of course this must be regarded in a quite relative way, given the complicated situation in which the Algerian revolution is developing.

Certainly the most serious brake on political development in the Algerian revolution is the criminal attitude of the leaderships of the French working class. They have practically done all that was possible, each with its own policy, to break up any action by the French proletariat in aid of the Algerian revolution. As we all know, there have been a few good words said, now and then, by the Stalinist leaders. But it was not really serious, and it is easy to understand that the Algerian Communist Party has in fact disappeared. Last year, when the Guy Mollet government called hundreds of thousands of workers back to the army to send them to Algeria, demonstrations took place throughout France. Spontaneously, the young men in the railroad stations did not want to go. The Communist Party did nothing to organize and develop these struggles, and on the contrary, where there were violent incidents, it denounced them as being the work of provocateurs.

Since the beginning of 1957, we have witnessed a very great political apathy of the toiling masses; and those whom we hear, those who demonstrate, are a reactionary, fascist minority, taking advantage of this situation.

There is in France a series of petty-bourgeois movements, of left-wing petty-bourgeois personalities, who of course do not have an imperialistic attitude, who stand for the independence of Algeria or for negotiations with the Algerians; but their real attitude, if we get to the bottom of their thoughts, is that, let us say, of people supporting a good French Commonwealth, giving good advice in a paternalistic way. The Algerians were right, of course, when in their newspaper they sent them packing and invited them to sweep their own doorstep first.

Under the circumstances thus created for the Algerians, the idea of socialism, the idea of communism, is particularly imperiled. There are European workers, even European Communists, who did not understand for a long time the difference between Guy Mollet and socialism, between Stalin and

communism. For the workers of the colonial countries, whose cultural level is naturally very low, to distinguish socialism, communism, from Guy Mollet, Thorez & Co, becomes a difficult problem.

One very important factor for the future of the Algerian revolution is the existence of several hundreds of thousands of Algerians who have taken part in industrial life as workers in France, in the French workers' movement, who have taken part in its struggles, and have given a good number of cadres to the workers' movement such as factory delegates and trade-union militants, and who have an important part to play in the future of the Algerian revolution.

I should now like to say a few words on a question which surely preoccupies all militants, and on which they have little information outside of France. It is the question of the conflict between the two organizations: the National Liberation Front, and the M.N.A. We must answer first of all the assertion of Lambert's group concerning the M.N.A. which they call the Bolshevik Party in the Algerian revolution. The M.N.A. is not a Bolshevik party. It is not even a workers' party. The M.N.A., like the F.L.N., is a nationalist organization whose social composition is naturally linked to that of the Algerian population. The rank and file of these organizations is composed of workers and very poor peasants.

From the point of view of programme, it is impossible to see a great difference between the texts which are issued. Both of them want independence, an Algerian constitution, agrarian reform. If we, who are used to studying programmes with a microscope, do not see essential differences, it is clear that the Algerian masses, in turning on a broad scale to the Front and not to the M.N.A., do so for other reasons than those of programme. What are the facts from this point of view? From the very beginning, the Front has had greater weight in the revolution in Algeria. At first, the M.N.A. had a very large majority among the Algerian emigration in France. By all the means for verification that we have at our disposal (responses to strike calls, the positions of Algerian delegates in the factories, etc.) we can — if not measure in a precise way, for these things cannot be measured — at least determine just what the tendencies are. On this point there can be no mistake. Today, the majority of the Algerian emigration, which was changing in 1956, is with the Front; and the M.N.A. holds its positions only in the North of France and in Belgium.

For the Algerian masses, it is the Front which is leading the struggle and this is the reason for their choice between the F.L.N. and the M.N.A. Actually, what we learned after a few months of armed struggle were the conditions in which it was launched. It was the men of the Front who began the combat.

The very few French militants who for many years had been watching the Algerian organization, the M.T.L.D., which after the war was the leading organization among the emigration and in Algeria, knew that a crisis was building up in this organization. Beginning in 1947, we learned of a whole series of incidents. They had individual aspects, and not a mass global aspect, but they were important political symptoms. The crisis took on a sharp character during the period 1952-1954, at the moment when the struggle was going on in Tunisia and Morocco, and when, by this struggle, the Tunisians and Moroccans were wrenching out some gains, while during that time the M.T.L.D. was impotent, powerless, and did not move. This brought on a crisis in the top ranks, which were torn among themselves. It also led a series of intermediate cadres, very numerous in this organization, the cadres of what was a para-military organization of the M.T.L.D., disgusted by the crisis at the top, to take the initiative of acting independently of the tops, and of beginning the armed struggle. At the top, after the split in the M.T.L.D., one of the tendencies was completely wiped out. The other one, that of Messali Hadj, for several months adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the insurrec-

tion, and declared itself in favor of the armed struggle only about six months after it had begun. So, in Algeria, Messali's tendency, the M.N.A., was unable to play an important part in the armed struggle. It is the F.L.N., created by the organizers of the insurrection, which has kept the leadership of the armed fight. It seems to us that this is an adequate explanation of the choice of the masses between the F.L.N. and the M.N.A.

Our attitude, and especially that of the French section, has been inspired by the desire to help, to the whole extent of our forces, the victory of the Algerian people. We did not think that this could be done by considering that the social and political contrasts were already clearly established in the revolutionary movements. We think that it is the development of the revolution, its progress, which will enable Marxist currents to arise and grow strong.

One more word must be said on the recent development of the M.N.A. Becoming more and more a minority, the M.N.A. — for reasons of pure manoeuvre, it seems to us — has taken disastrous positions. Did it hope for a better hearing from the Americans? In any case it has made declarations — to the United Nations, to the State Department, to the Adenauer government — which display what the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pineau, called in his speech to the United Nations last February, « pro-occidentalism. » Finally, it has organized Algerian trade unions in France, instead of calling upon the Algerian workers to go into the unions of the workers with whom they are in the factories.

Of course, our position does not copy that of the Lambert group, just substituting one organization for the other. We do not identify ourselves with the F.L.N., which would be politically wrong. *We support the Algerian revolution as it is, with its present leadership as it is.* This does not at all prevent us from giving our political estimate of the policy of the organizations and the leaderships of this revolution.

I have stressed several points; there are still many other aspects of the Algerian revolution to be treated. But I remind you once more that it is the farthest advanced point of the colonial revolution today. Supported only by the other colonized peoples, or those recently freed from the imperialist yoke, it is betrayed every day by the traditional organizations of the proletariat, which have done everything in their power to mislead the French proletariat which is directly concerned with the victory of the Algerian people. It is our duty to intervene everywhere in the movement of the working class to put an end to this scandalous situation. The whole history of our movement is marked by actions, as vigorous as possible, to attract the attention, to stir up the action, of the workers' movement, towards the place where the revolution is grappling closely with the class enemy. We must remain faithful to our tradition in the case of Algeria.

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North Africa and the Middle East bring us to the main bulk of the African continent. The imperialists already feel there, in varying degrees, the peoples' desire of liberation. These peoples start out from a lower level, we often witness the decomposition of tribal structures, and because of this, the transition to socialism will be more abrupt and complicated.

A general survey of these questions has been given in an article by Comrade Germain during the preparatory discussion for this Congress. But it is obvious that we cannot stop at that point. We have to examine carefully the existing movements, the mass movements, the organizations of the intelligentsia who play a very important part in the life of these countries. The trade-union movement also begins to be widely developed there, and in several African countries, we have witnessed widespread strike struggles.

In all these movements there exists a deep intellectual

search for fundamental answers to the problems of the African revolution. The formation now of a few valuable Marxist cadres could have a decisive effect upon the course of the revolution in those countries.

In this report I do not intend to develop the situation and the problems of our party both in Latin America and in Ceylon. The delegates from these countries will do it far better than I could. I will confine myself to a single remark in each case.

In Latin America the first act of force ordered by the United States, the intervention against the Arbenz government of Guatemala, took place at the time of our last Congress. Since then there has occurred the action against Peron. And now, the situation in Bolivia is rising to a paroxysm. But all these events also demonstrate, especially in the example of Argentina, the impossibility for imperialism and its agents in those countries to succeed in stabilizing any regime whatever for however short a time. The same would hold true, if eventually imperialism were to bring back Peron in order to check the social disintegration in Argentina.

As for Ceylon, we wish to stress before the Congress the courageous resistance of our section against the communalist currents on the language question. This attitude strengthened the party and we are convinced that it will pay us dividends before long.

It now remains for us to see how the discussion on the colonial revolution can be concluded. At the meeting of the International Executive Committee which had put this item on the agenda, there were planned: a general preamble — to be prepared by the I.S. — and special texts on the revolution in different parts of the world — which were to be written especially by comrades of sections which are, and with good reason, more directly concerned with these questions. Unfortunately, owing to the considerable tasks of which we are all aware, these last documents are missing. Only a few articles for the discussion could be written by some comrades.

The Colonial Commission which was named at the beginning of this Congress met before the opening of this discussion. It examined what could be done and finally proposes this to you. On one hand, the discussion is to be carried on here on the report and the general preamble, and we must by the end of this Congress have an amended and perfected preamble. But this preamble by its very nature will remain too general. The Commission proposes to use the presence here of many qualified comrades in order to work up texts on the situation in a certain number of countries of the greatest importance for the colonial revolution. These texts should be ready before the end of the month following the Congress. With them the I.S. would prepare a text of synthesis on the present state of the colonial revolution, and this text would be submitted to the next session of the International Executive Committee which would adopt it definitively in the name of the Congress. This is the solution which seems to us to be the most practical.

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For us, it is not only a text that is in question. All of us here are aware of the significance of the colonial revolution for the victory of socialism. In all colonial countries, in all the movements of colonial peoples, there is a search, an ardent desire to understand, to find the solutions for their emancipation. This text that we have to prepare must be not only a document for us, for our own activity as the Fourth International; it must be prepared as a tool for great masses of militants among the colonial peoples, as a weapon for their combat. By helping these men to fight, we shall hasten the progress of our movement. The victory of the colonial peoples is also a victory of the Fourth International.

# RISE, DECLINE, AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FALL, OF STALINISM

## I

### *Rise and Decline of Stalinism*

#### RESOLUTION APPROVED BY THE FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS OF 1954

The evolution of the Soviet Union and of the world working-class movement since 1917 is fundamentally determined by the dynamic of the relation of class forces on the world scale. This development has passed through major phases: the rise of the revolution in 1917-1923; the ebb of the world revolution in 1923-1943, and the new revolutionary rise since 1943.

The October Revolution was the starting point of a new historic stage in numerous fields:

— It gave birth to the first workers' state upon one-sixth of the globe.

— It impelled a part of the working-class movement forward on the theoretical plane and favored its independent organization through the creation of the Communist International and of the Communist Parties.

— It gave a powerful impulsion to the colonial peoples in their initial struggles against imperialism.

The period from 1917 to 1923 is in the first instance a period of struggle for the survival of the new state and for the formation and consolidation of the communist vanguard throughout the world.

The defeat of the world revolution following World War I resulted in the Soviet Union in the crushing of soviet democracy by a bureaucracy which established a dictatorial political power under which the economic and cultural development of the Soviet Union has taken place for the last thirty years. Through the action and weight of this state, the Soviet bureaucracy has exercised a considerable influence over the mass movement throughout the world, in the first place over the organizations and movements created by the impulsion of the Russian Revolution.

The Communist International and the Communist Parties ought to have adjusted their activity to the new stage, that is to say, ought to have consolidated themselves theoretically and politically, strengthened their ties with the masses and in this way prepared

a future revolutionary upsurge. But the weight of the first workers' state and of its bureaucratic degeneration upon organizations that had scarcely emerged from the Social Democracy, without solid cadres, likewise led to a degeneration of these organizations. The Communist International became the principal instrument through which the Kremlin transmitted its orders to the Communist Parties. These parties, whose political and theoretical development was thus derailed and whose selection of cadres and central bodies was accomplished in a bureaucratic manner, utilized the masses and the mass movements not to promote the world revolution but for the benefit of the bureaucracy's interests.

This utilization of Communist Parties in the service of the Kremlin's diplomacy contributed to bringing about a series of heavy defeats of the workers' movement which culminated in the triumph of Nazism in Germany and in the unleashing of World War II.

On the eve of the Second World War, the Communist Parties in the principal capitalist countries were minorities inside the working class. Stalinism, that is to say, subordination of the interests of the world proletariat to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy — operated through a relatively simple system:

— a workers' state under a police dictatorship;  
— weak workers' organizations directed by the Communist International, itself tightly controlled.

At the end of World War II and in the years that followed, events of cardinal importance have brought it about that there now gravitates within the present orbit of Stalinism the following complex aggregate:

a) the *Soviet Union*, which, after putting up an extraordinary resistance during the war thanks to the power of the productive relations established by the October Revolution, and to the attachment the masses feel for those relations,

has continued its economic development which has, in fact, made it now the second industrial power in the world;

b) *new workers' states in Eastern Europe*, which have been established essentially by bureaucratic action, without a prior plan by the Kremlin;

c) *China*, where the Chinese CP has come to power on the basis of a formidable peasant uprising;

d) *a series of colonial movements* under Stalinist or pro-Stalinist leadership;

e) *the Communist Parties in the capitalist world*: those in Western Europe experienced toward the end of World War II important growth as a consequence of the « Resistance Movement »; during the following years the Communist Parties have lost the ground which they had won in a whole series of countries; but in important cases such as France and Italy, these parties have acquired an influence over the majority of the working class and, despite certain fluctuations, have preserved it since then;

f) *Jugoslavia* might have been added to these, up to June 1948; there the JCP had conquered power thanks to a heroic mass struggle which it had led.

The fundamental conditions under which the Soviet bureaucracy and its tight hold over the Communist Parties developed, namely, the ebb of the revolution, the isolation of the Soviet Union and the backward condition of its economy — these conditions have disappeared.

The equilibrium which assured this control prior to World War II — and which in its own way reflected the relative world equilibrium during this same period — has been disrupted.

Far from constituting a factor of consolidation, the « expansion » of Stalinism contained within it tendencies acting toward its own disintegration, which have been demonstrated by: the break-away of the JCP; the numerous purges of the CP leaderships in the « People's Democracies »; the acceptance of a sort of co-leadership with the Chinese CP in regard to the Asian Communist movements; the weakening of certain Communist Parties, to the verge of their virtual liquidation; the end of political immobility within the Soviet Union; and the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge in the glacies.

One of the most striking manifestations of this new situation is the inability of the Kremlin to reestablish, in place of the Communist International dissolved in 1943, an international centre in any way viable.

Finally, despite the growth of the mass Communist Parties and of the attraction of the Soviet Union as a power, there have been formed in the course of

this post-war period mass currents evolving toward the left outside Stalinist influence (Bevanism, Asian Socialist Parties...).

Various factors however are operating to prolong the Kremlin's influence over the world workers' movement and the non-capitalist countries: the threat of imperialist war; the power of the Soviet state exercised over materially weaker partners; the fact that the masses, making use of organizations at their disposal in order to solve problems posed by revolutionary situations, are first rallying around the existing leaderships. There is finally the fact that the conceptions and methods acquired during the period of the rise of Stalinism continue to operate because of inertia and tradition, all the more so because the bureaucratic structure of these parties and countries and their relations with the Soviet Union, have survived.

In no place where the Communist Parties possess a mass base, except in Jugoslavia, have mass breaks with the Kremlin been produced; and similarly there has not been any mass break within these parties. The disintegration of Stalinism has begun by assuming the form of penetration into these organizations of ideas opposed to the interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy; and of a process of modification in the hierarchical bureaucratic relations previously established. It is first of all and above all in this manner that the disintegration of Stalinism will proceed for a whole period: the Communist organizations with a mass base will maintain themselves, but within these forms of organization there will develop tendencies toward a new content, both as regards the ideas which they express and as regards the existing organizational relations through which the tight hold of the Soviet bureaucracy finds its expression.

In countries where the Communist Parties constitute a small minority of the workers' movement, the revolutionary rise, by channeling itself in other organizations, accentuates the isolation of these Communist Parties and thus provokes profound crises in them.

The events which have taken place in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death constitute on the one hand the beginning of the maturing of the objective and subjective conditions for the political revolution in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, these changes likewise constitute the relaxation of the brake, which operated in the most conservative and even reactionary way upon the organizations which today still group together the largest number of revolutionary militants, even in the many countries where the Communist Parties are extremely weak. As a result there has opened up a new stage not only in the Soviet Union but also in the development of the Communist Parties and

of the non-capitalist countries, accelerating the disintegration of Stalinism in the sense indicated above.

The role of the Fourth International, which was created to assure the continuity of the revolutionary Marxist programme and organization in order to build a new revolutionary leadership for the proletariat, has the task of intervening in this disintegration in order to rally around its banner the healthy communist forces influenced up until now by Stalinism.

## I

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF STALINISM  
IN THE SOVIET UNION

1. The revolutionary rise unleashed by the First World War shook only the weakest of the imperialist powers. It left intact the colonial empires and thus permitted those imperialisms that possessed colonies to crush in the bud the upsurge of the revolutionary movement by granting important concessions to the masses (8-hour work day, universal suffrage, etc.). When this revolutionary rise occurred, the United States, having passed through a half-century of feverish economic growth, still had not experienced a social crisis sufficiently deep-going to bring the mass of the American industrial proletariat, constantly renewed by waves of immigration, to trade-union or political consciousness. The field of action of the revolutionary rise was thus limited to Central and Eastern Europe, essentially to Russia, Germany, and Italy among the great countries of the world. But Russia was an economically and culturally backward country, with a very small industrial proletariat, relatively low in skill and culture, crushed under the weight of scores of millions of illiterate peasants. Only the fusion of the Russian Revolution with the German and Italian revolutions could have provided the dictatorship of the proletariat with a material and social base broad enough to be able to guarantee soviet democracy. The defeats of the Italian revolution in 1922 and of the German revolution in 1923 marked the end of the revolutionary wave, leaving the revolution isolated in a backward country. This isolation imposed enormous material sacrifices upon the Russian proletariat, led to the gradual exhaustion of its combat potential and enthusiasm, an increasing abandonment of political activity and interest. In this way the objective conditions were created for its political expropriation by the Soviet bureaucracy.

2. Nevertheless, the end of the revolutionary wave of 1917-1923 did not signify a profound prolonged defeat of the international working-class movement. The sectors of the world proletariat which had remained relatively quiet during the revolu-

tionary rise of 1918-1923 began one after another to move in the following decades: Great Britain in 1925-26; China in 1925-27; Spain in 1931-38; France 1936-38; the United States 1934-37. In Germany itself, the 1929 world economic crisis created conditions favorable for a new revolutionary rise. If, in the end, despite these many opportunities the ebb of the revolution became more and more accentuated, that was not due to the dynamics inherent in the mass movement but to the pernicious role played by the workers' leaderships. In numerous cases, it was above all the Stalinist leadership which brought about the defeat of these movements. If the appearance and rise of Stalinism were determined in the last analysis by the accentuation of the ebb of the world revolution, this development was neither fatal nor inevitable. The efforts of the revolutionary forces in the Soviet Union and the world over (Left Opposition, Bolshevik-Leninists) to reverse the trend, to reënforce the weight of the proletariat in the Soviet Union thanks to industrialization and to victories, even if partial ones, gained on the world scale, prove, as these events recede into the past, to have been perfectly realistic. The junction of the Russian revolution with the world revolution remained possible during this entire period. If such a junction did not come about, that was above all owing to the role of the leadership of the Soviet Union and of the Communist International. Stalinism is just as much the product as the cause of the revolutionary ebb of the entire period from 1923 to 1943.

3. The isolation in a backward country, the overwhelming specific weight of the peasantry, the numerical and cultural weakness of the proletariat, its lack of democratic traditions — all these factors brought about in the Soviet Union the exhaustion of proletarian democracy, growing passivity among the masses, the more and more exclusive wielding of political power by functionaries of the party and the state. The existence of such a body of functionaries is unavoidable during the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism. But they should decrease in number and importance to the extent that the society and the economy issuing from the socialist revolution become consolidated, and that classes, social inequality, and social contradictions wither away. Their withering away is in large measure identical with the withering away of the state. Up to this withering away a strict control exercised over the functionaries by the working class in democratically organized power should as much as possible limit these abuses. What happened in the Soviet Union was quite different. Under conditions of general scarcities and poverty, the political power administering or distributing all of the country's

wealth swiftly became the regulator of distribution, arrogating to itself the essential privileges of consumption. The bureaucratic elements set themselves up as a distinct and conservative bureaucratic layer which defended, in alliance with the exploitive or petty-bourgeois elements (kulaks, Nepmen, etc.) material interests opposed to those of the proletariat; and later as a bureaucratic caste conscious of having special social interests and determined to defend them against any other layer of society. The formation and consolidation of this bureaucratic caste found its principal reflection in the political field, in the factional struggle which tore apart the Bolshevik party, the only arena of political struggle in the country. The Stalinist faction triumphed in this struggle because it received the support of the bureaucracy. This triumph culminated in the destruction of internal party democracy, the last bastion of proletarian democracy in the USSR, in the complete upset of the social superstructure of the country save for the property relations, and in the establishment of the Stalinist Bonapartist dictatorship, based essentially upon the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy and fundamentally defending them.

4. The revolutionary upsurge had found its clearest expression in the victory of the October Revolution. The ebb of the revolution found its essential expression in the victory of the Soviet bureaucracy in the USSR. But this retreat took place within a framework where world capitalism was profoundly characterized by the decline of its system. This decline was already too advanced, the imperialist antagonism too acute on the basis of this decline, the workers' movement still too powerful on a world scale, the wretched remnants of the former Russian possessing classes or the nucleus of a new bourgeoisie still too feeble, in the Soviet Union itself, for the ebb of the proletariat to bring capitalism back to power there. The counter-revolution was, by and large, confined to the domain of the superstructure. The mode of production characterized by the nationalization of the means of production, foreign trade monopoly, and over-all planning of the economy — this foundation, produced by the October Revolution, which detached the Soviet economy from the world system of capitalism and opposed it to the latter, was maintained, strengthened, and consolidated in the course of the history of the Soviet Union. The struggle between capitalism and socialism, which according to Lenin's formula characterizes the period of transition, passed within the Soviet Union itself from the field of production — where practically all capitalist forms were eliminated — to the field of distribution. The Bonapartist dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy is therefore the product of a *political* counter-revolu-

tion; a *political* revolution is needed to overthrow it. But the Soviet state is the product of the *social revolution* of October whose economic and social conquests it continues to defend, even though in a special and often inadequate manner. This state could not be overthrown except by a *social counter-revolution*, reestablishing, if only by stages, the rule of capital and of the private ownership of the means of production. Our definition of the Soviet Union as a *degenerated workers' state* embraces the two fundamental elements of contemporary Soviet social reality: the survival and growth of the social foundations deriving from the October Revolution, on the one side; the victory of a political counter-revolution on these same foundations, on the other. Our policy of the unconditional defense of the Soviet Union corresponds to this same contradictory Soviet reality: to assure the *progress* of the Soviet Union through the overthrow of the bureaucratic dictatorship and the establishment of socialist democracy; to prevent the *defeat* of the Soviet Union which would entail the overthrow of its social foundations and the reestablishment of capitalism.

5. Within the framework of this same Soviet reality there appears the contradictory character, *the dual nature of the Soviet bureaucracy*:

a) On the one side, it is a parasitic caste whose privileges derive from the special social structure of the Soviet Union. It is therefore obliged, in order to survive, to defend in its own way this structure against the internal and international bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces which are seeking to destroy it and to reestablish, whatever may be its form, capitalist economy.

b) On the other side, it is a parasitic caste whose privileges could not be extended and temporarily stabilized except through the political expropriation and the political passivity of the proletariat, its lack of revolutionary perspectives. The bureaucracy is therefore obliged to try to maintain, against the proletariat, domestic and world conditions which would prevent a new upsurge and new revolutionary activity of the Soviet proletariat.

The contradictory nature of the bureaucracy reflects itself equally in the fact that, to the extent that it defends the Soviet Union and its social base against imperialism and against restorationist forces of all kinds, it definitively aids the rebirth of soviet democracy inside the country; while, conversely, to the extent to which it succeeds in temporarily holding back the Soviet proletariat or the world proletarian upsurge, it undermines and disorganizes definitively the social base from which its own privileges derive.

6. This dual and contradictory nature of the Soviet bureaucracy is reflected in its domestic and world policies as a whole since 1923. But the

concrete manner in which this manifests itself depends fundamentally upon conditions beyond the control of the Soviet bureaucracy: the relationship of forces between the classes on the world scale and inside the Soviet Union itself. From this point of view two major stages may be distinguished:

a) From 1923 to 1943: the international retreat of the revolution and of the workers' movement, in connection with the aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system and of the internal contradictions of imperialism, permitted the bureaucracy to consolidate its power by *balancing* itself between the international revolutionary movement and imperialism, among the different imperialist powers, between the classes inside the Soviet Union itself. The Bonapartist dictatorship is the product of these balances. The end pursued by the Soviet bureaucracy's policy is to maintain the *status quo*, to maintain the equilibrium. In this sense the global balance sheet of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy is a reformist one, because the bureaucracy aims not to overthrow world capitalism but simply to maintain the Soviet Union within the framework of the *status quo*.

b) Beginning with 1943: the new revolutionary rise in connection with the aggravation of the crisis of the capitalist system and the establishment of the crushing supremacy of American imperialism in the capitalist world, disrupted both the equilibrium between the international proletariat and imperialism, and the equilibrium among the different imperialist powers. These factors forced these powers to accept, whether they wished to or not, a world imperialist united front against the revolution and the anti-capitalist forces and rendered more and more illusory every policy of seesawing and of maintenance of the *status quo*. The disruption of the basic equilibriums of Stalinist Bonapartism undermines the very foundations of the bureaucratic dictatorship in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the upsurge of the productive forces in the Soviet Union, the numerical and cultural strengthening of the proletariat, and the repercussions of the international revolutionary wave within the country have broken the equilibrium (based on their political prostration) of social forces there, and are preparing the reappearance of the proletarian struggle for soviet democracy.

7. During the phase from 1923 to 1943, the dual and contradictory nature of the Soviet bureaucracy manifested itself at home as well as abroad in a number of sharp turns:

a) 1924-1927: alliance of the bureaucracy with the kulak and NEP elements in the Soviet Union against the proletarian vanguard. A rightist course internationally: unprincipled alliances with Chiang Kai-shek, with the British trade-union bureaucracy, with Balkan peasant parties, etc.

b) 1928-1934: Destruction of kulaks and Nepmen; forced collectivization of agriculture and headlong industrialization. At the same time, the destruction of the remaining political rights of the workers deriving from the October Revolution, the establishing of the omnipotence of the director of each enterprise, the accelerated growth of inequality within the working class. Ultra-leftist course internationally at a time when imperialism was weakened and paralyzed by economic crisis.

c) 1935-1939: A rightist course in the USSR, restoration of private peasant ownership of part of the cattle and of small strips of land; abolition of the old Soviet constitution; extermination of the entire generation of Old Bolsheviks; triumph of reaction in the sphere of morals, culture, etc., and in general encouragement of neo-bourgeois trends. At the same time, a rightist course internationally: alliance with the imperialist « democracies, » acceptance of national defense in these countries and in their colonies; the policy of People's Fronts; the strangling of the Spanish and French revolutions.

d) 1939-1941: Preparation for war including the halt of mass purges in the Soviet Union, and the consolidation of the individual positions of the bureaucracy. On the international scale, the sudden shift of diplomatic alliances results in an ultra-left policy of the Stalinist CPs.

e) 1941-1943: A rightist course during the war. At home: « great patriotic war, » the enrichment of the peasants, massive private appropriation of collective farm land, dissolution of the Communist International, restoration of the Church as an instrument of state policy, Pan-Slavic propaganda, etc. Abroad: close alliance with imperialism, policy of the National Front, struggle against liberation uprisings in the colonies, against the defense of the economic interests of the workers in the allied countries, etc.

8. The period from 1943 to 1947, during which the Soviet bureaucracy seemed at the peak of its power, appeared as a transitional period between the ebb and the new rise of the world revolution. It is, for the same reason, a transitional period between the phase of the rise and the phase of the decline of Stalinism. The world revolutionary rise was still not powerful enough to permit the outflanking of Stalinism; it remained, in general, restricted within limits where the bureaucracy and its agencies were able to control it through more or less traditional methods (France, Italy, Indo-China, Malaya, and in part Indonesia and China); the sole exception was Yugoslavia. But this wave was sufficiently menacing to bring imperialism to seek a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet bureaucracy. The latter undertook to halt or try to force back the revolution in return for territorial and economic concessions. This was the meaning of the Teheran,

Yalta, and Potsdam agreements, of the dismemberment of Germany and the division of Europe into two spheres of influence, of the counter-revolutionary policy of the CPs of Western Europe and of the Far East colonial countries during this same period, of the maintenance of bourgeois remnants in Eastern Europe, and of the joint efforts of U.S. General Marshall and Stalin to set up a coalition government in China. Favoring this same tendency were: the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, the terrible devastations of the war, the extreme scarcities of consumer goods, the 1945-47 economic crisis of reconversion, the pillage of the buffer countries as a bureaucratic means for ameliorating this situation to some extent.

9. But the international revolutionary wave, above all the victory of the Chinese revolution, destroyed the possibility for the Soviet bureaucracy to come to an overall compromise with imperialism. Stifling within a living space far too narrow for its needs, and menaced by a terrible economic shock, imperialism had previously sought to pass to the offensive by restoring capitalist economy in Western Europe with the aim of loosening the Soviet Union's tight hold on the buffer zone (Marshall Plan). Thereafter, outflanked by the colonial revolution, imperialism passed on to armed action (the wars in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Korea), and set about preparing a final settlement of accounts with all the anti-capitalist forces (the Atlantic Pact, M.S.A., Balkan Pact, Middle East Pact, Pacific Pact, remilitarization of Japan and Germany, etc...). Caught between the imperialist threat and the Chinese revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy found itself obliged to ally itself with the People's Republic of China, which emerged from this revolution, against imperialism. This implied a *de facto* recognition of the autonomy and independence of the Chinese C. P. and of the People's Republic of China, and the Sino-Soviet co-leadership of the entire Communist movement in Asia. This marked the opening of a new phase in the world situation in which the Soviet bureaucracy finds itself, a situation characterized by the exacerbation of international class contradictions and by the evolution of the relationship of class forces in a manner more and more favorable to the revolution. This new situation limits more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary manoeuvres by the bureaucracy. It can no longer utilize the entire colonial revolution as small change in order to arrive at a general agreement with imperialism. Its efforts to utilize inter-imperialist contradictions continue, as do the efforts to gain the support of certain bourgeoisies in colonial and semi-colonial countries (India, Argentina, Indonesia) by damping down the *anti-capitalist* struggle of the masses in these countries, by attempts to mobilize all the

classes in these countries, including the « national bourgeoisie, » against imperialism. So also there continue to exist the efforts of the bureaucracy to arrive at temporary and partial agreements with imperialism as well as its role of brake on the unfolding of the colonial revolution (insufficient aid in the course of the Korean war). But the *practical effects* of these efforts become more and more limited and ephemeral in proportion as, on the one side, the upsurge of the masses, despite the attempts to curb them, and, on the other, the pressure and the march of Yankee imperialism towards war, become more accentuated.

10. A parallel evolution has been, in the meantime, produced inside the USSR itself.

The important successes of the Soviet economy since the reconversion crisis of 1945-47 (a crisis corroborated by Malenkov's report to the XIXth Congress) have profoundly altered the position of the country and of its population. If, in regard to the principal products, per capita production still lags behind that of the most advanced capitalist countries, it has already surpassed the level of those capitalist countries which remain stagnant, such as France and Italy. On the other hand, gross production has considerably surpassed the level of all capitalist countries except the USA and, in a number of basic products, has even outstripped the *total* production of two or three of the most important capitalist countries, such as Britain, Germany, Japan. The Soviet Union has become the second industrial power in the world, possessing the second largest stock of machines and increasing its productivity at a more rapid rate than any other country except the USA. If Soviet agriculture has not been able to advance at an equal pace and lags considerably behind, its progress has nevertheless sufficed to eliminate any phenomenon of famine or chronic undernourishment. For the population in the great industrial centres the supply of manufactured consumer goods, although still very inadequate, has been regularized and surpasses anything previously seen in the USSR.

11. As a result of these economic advances, an important social transformation is taking place which finds its expression in a modification of the composition and dynamism of the principal social strata of the country.

a) *The proletariat* has greatly increased in number and skills, the number of industrial workers continuing to increase at the rate of many millions with each Five-Year Plan. From the small minority in Soviet society that it was in 1917 and in 1927, it has become the most numerous social stratum. Illiteracy has disappeared from its ranks. The tremendous mechanization of the Soviet economy for the past seven years has entailed a considerable growth in the number and role of the skilled

workers. The unskilled laborer no longer typifies the Soviet worker but tends to become the exception. Because of this the differentiation of income among the proletariat, although greater than ever, no longer tends to crush the great majority of the working class down to a hunger level.

b) *The peasantry* has been the most shaken up. Year by year it is from its ranks that supplementary industrial labor is drawn. This is the stratum whose number and social weight tend constantly to diminish. Its upper layers are continually being drawn off and converted into the kolkhoz bureaucracy and aristocracy (directors, accountants, agronomists, tractor drivers). The peasantry has not been able to restore the relatively advantageous position it gained during the war and the immediate postwar period. The introduction of the system of labor brigades and the amalgamation of the collective farms have marked important steps along the line of a gradual industrialization of agriculture, but they have run up against passive resistance from the peasants and have not permitted a serious increase in agricultural production. The standard of living in the country has been raised much less than in the cities, and the disproportion between agriculture and industry is steadily accentuated.

c) *The bureaucracy* has increased in number and in weight, but at a less rapid rate than the proletariat. Two important modifications have taken place in the composition of the upper circles of the bureaucracy. First of all in respect to social origin, the number of former capitalists or bourgeois technicians and Nepmen on the one hand, the number of old revolutionary militants of the pre-1917 vintage (Thermidorians) has been more and more reduced; the great mass of the bureaucracy is recruited from privileged individuals who have become adults since the revolution. Second, in their mentality: the tops of the bureaucracy are in their majority no longer a young and rapacious social layer, tending to *conquer* privileges in the field of consumption in the midst of prevailing poverty; the majority constitute a layer of men of mature years or heading into old age, tending to *conserve* the best possible living standards.

12. Although the rise and the consolidation of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the USSR came as the products of a *political* counter-revolution, the bureaucracy has placed its special seal upon Soviet society in all the fields of social life:

a) *The economy*: The entire economy of the epoch of transition is characterized by the contradiction between the non-capitalist mode of production and the survival of bourgeois norms of distribution. But the Soviet bureaucracy has aggravated this contradiction by the enormous development of its privileges and of social inequality. The bureau-

cratic centralization of planning, the abolition of all workers' control over production, the omnipotence, the arbitrariness, and the greed for privileges of the factory bureaucrats provoke new contradictions and new disruptions of equilibrium within the very field of production, which become more and more accentuated to the degree that the economy achieves important progress.

b) *The state*: The abolition of the last vestiges of Soviet democracy together with the disappearance of internal party democracy has resulted, in fact, in an autocratic regime, in which the bulk of the bureaucracy, including its upper circles, is itself excluded from the exercise of political rights. The Bonapartist dictatorship rests essentially upon the apparatus of repression, upon the terror of periodic purges, and in addition controls a system of plebiscitary « elections. » Great Russian nationalism flourishes and the accusations of « bourgeois nationalism » are lodged against national minorities affirming their history and their own rights.

c) *The army*: The old Red Army which took the oath of loyalty to the Soviet constitution and to the Communist International has been replaced by a « patriotic » Soviet army narrowly controlled by the dictatorship, and within it have been introduced the selfsame manifestations of monstrous inequality, arbitrariness, and the omnipotence of the apparatus which prevail in society as a whole.

d) *Ideology*: Marxist theory has been transformed into a pragmatic ideology, tending to justify the practical requirements of the bureaucracy's policy. The history of the party, of the International, and of the country is systematically and periodically revised, rewritten, falsified. Scientific research and free theoretical discussions are suppressed in all the fields of the social sciences and are even beginning to be « oriented » in the field of certain natural sciences. From this suppression stems the necessity for an infallible and omniscient Pope who formulates, at each turn, the dogmas suitable to the then interests of the bureaucracy.

e) *Morals*: The liberation of women and of youth which the October Revolution had carried out during its years of ascendance has been reversed. The equality of women has become the equality in expending the super-human physical effort exacted from the workers and not the right freely to dispose of their own lives. Divorce legislation has become ever stricter; the right of abortion has been abolished. The prohibition of youth from participating in politics is consecrated in the statutes of the youth organization.

13. But the Soviet masses absorbed a great experience during the war (where the limits of the repressive capacity of the apparatus and the reality of the living standards of the Western workers were

simultaneously revealed to them). The Soviet masses, above all the advanced working class youth, are beginning to take more and more cognizance of the contradictions contained in Soviet society and the Bonapartist dictatorship. They are becoming aware above all of the economic contradictions, all the more so because they have transferred all their dynamism and their creative effort into this field. The discussions which preceded the XIXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and those which have taken place during and after this congress, have revealed the following:

a) That to the mind of the vast majority of the Soviet people, the power acquired by Soviet economy more and more appears to come into greater contradiction with the still extremely low level of mass consumption. Above all, the housing crisis is felt by these masses as inexplicable and was universally criticized during the XIXth Congress.

b) That to the minds of the advanced strata of the working class, the lower layers of the party and trade-union functionaries, the Soviet bureaucracy more and more appears to be a brake upon the growth of the productive forces. Having attained for themselves a high level of privileges as consumers, the top circles of the bureaucracy no longer have a major interest in the maximum expansion of production. The greed for gain among the directors of industry, regarded as the principal motor force of accumulation, is turning into a factor limiting and impeding this accumulation. To the degree that the attainment of the goals of the plan continues to depend mainly on the interest of these strata of the bureaucracy, they introduce a further disorganizing force into planning (primacy given to attaining the financial plan at the expense of the production plan). The bureaucratically centralized elaboration of the plan comes into collision with the growing complexity of the economy.

14. In the ideological domain *the contradictions of the bureaucratic dictatorship* have culminated in a serious theoretical crisis which found its reflection not only in the discussion over political economy, but also in the discussion around the « transition toward communism, » and a number of other ideological problems.

a) The ruling strata of the Kremlin have been forced to affirm in the same breath both the disappearance of classes in the USSR, and the survival, even the sharpening, of the class struggle.

b) They have been forced to emphasize that to the degree that advance is made toward communism, social conflicts do not wither away but become accentuated.

c) They have been forced at one and the same time to insist upon the fact that the state, far from withering away, « will be reënforced » with the

transition toward communism, and to recall that the state will end up by withering away with « the triumph of socialism in the principal countries of the world. »

d) They have been forced to affirm at one and the same time that the socialist society has as its « fundamental law » the satisfaction of the *needs* of the population, and that the economy of this society continues to be regulated by « the primacy of the production of the means of production over the production of the means of consumption. »

e) They have been obliged at one and the same time to represent the tendency toward personal enrichment as the principal « vestige of bourgeois mentality » in Soviet society, and to preserve this same tendency as the principal lever of planning.

15. In this way the historically unstable character of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the Soviet Union clearly reveals itself. With the modification of the relationship of forces between the classes on the international scale, with the concurrent modification of this relationship of forces inside the Soviet Union itself, the objective foundations of the dictatorship are in process of rapidly disappearing. Traditionally, the historically transitional and passing character of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the USSR was analyzed correctly in the sense that this dictatorship could lead to two opposed paths of social development: either a reënforcement of the restorationist tendencies within the peasantry and the bureaucracy, which, with the aid of imperialism, would restore capitalism in the Soviet Union by means of a civil war; or, thanks to the extension of the world revolution and the aid brought by the world proletariat to the Soviet proletariat and to the left tendency of the bureaucracy which will rally to the side of the proletariat for the defense of the social bases of the USSR, the overthrow of the Bonapartist dictatorship and the re-establishment of Soviet democracy. But it is evident that the two variants of this alternative imply special dynamics in the class struggle on the world scale. The first appears as the end-product of the retreat of the world revolution, the second as the product of the international victories of the revolution. The present dynamics of the class struggle on the world scale indicates very clearly which is the more likely of these two variants. The entire domestic evolution of the Soviet Union also speaks in the same sense. There, faced by the upsurge of the productive forces, the small islands of petty commodity production which existed and constantly revive no longer possess more than a very reduced specific weight in the totality of economic life. The aggravation of social contradictions, the mounting pressure of imperialism, and the signs of proletarian awakening may provoke within very limited layers

of the bureaucracy reflexes of capitulation and desertion to the bourgeois camp; but that will be nothing more than a by-product of the evolution and not its dominant characteristic. It therefore follows that since in the USSR itself the relationship of forces tends to become modified in favor of the working class, parallel with an analogous modification on a world scale, *the coming decisive battle will not be waged between the restorationist forces launching an offensive to restore private property, and the forces defending the conquests of October. It will be, on the contrary, waged between the forces defending the privileges and administration of the bureaucracy against the assault of the revolutionary forces of the working class embarking on the struggle for the restoration of soviet democracy upon a higher level.*

16. Stalin's death has accentuated all the above-described tendencies and has given them a direct and dramatic manifestation. This is to be explained by the special role that Stalin played in the Soviet Union. Arbiter between the classes, arbiter between the classes and the bureaucracy, and between the different layers of the bureaucracy, Stalin represented in his person the link between the socialist foundation of the Soviet Union and its bureaucratic superstructure. He represented a major guarantee for the economic bureaucracy and the intelligentsia that they would continue to enjoy their privileges and at the same time a major guarantee for the lower levels of the bureaucracy (minor party and trade-union functionaries, Stakhanovists, rising cadres of the youth) that socialized ownership of the means of production would remain intact. His sudden disappearance has deprived the regime of one of its main elements of stability, all the more since the equilibrium of social forces had previously been gradually shaken. To this must be added the element of uncertainty and anxiety in the Bonapartist heights of the dictatorship, accustomed to follow the line laid down by the « Chief, » without personal prestige among the masses and incapable of predicting the effects of Stalin's death on the attitude of different strata of Soviet society. This uncertainty and even panic in the top circles have no doubt accentuated the tendencies which are challenging the absolutism of the dictatorship.

17. The bureaucracy is not a homogeneous social stratum. It consists of millions of individuals, with roots extended into the working class (Stakhanovists) and the peasantry (kolkhoz functionaries); it rises through numerous secondary functionaries of the government and the economy (auditors) toward the higher layers of technicians and engineers, celebrated artists and writers, the higher echelons of the army and the police, all the way up to the heights

of the economy (directors of big factories and trusts), of the army (generals and marshals), of the state and of the party (members of the central committees of the parties of the Soviet republics and of the USSR, ministers of the republics and the USSR, members of the central administrations of the state and of the party). The most conservative and at the same time the most privileged group is indubitably the stratum of directors of the factories and of the central administrations of the economy to whom can be added the chief engineers and principal technicians of the planning and the generals and marshals of the army.

18. Confronting the most privileged heights of the bureaucracy are *the Bonapartist summits of the bureaucracy*, who have wielded political power for more than two decades; who personify the Bonapartist dictatorship and represent the personal connection between the tops of the party and of the state. It is this stratum which has been hardest hit by Stalin's death, which has been seized with panic before the sweep of the discontent of the entire population, and which took the initiative for dramatic measures to « liberalize » the regime (amnesty, announced revisions of the penal code, liberation of the doctors, attack against police arbitrariness and against national and racial discriminations, purge of the GPU and the attacks against it, the tendency to shove into the background the cult of the chief, the new tone introduced into the Soviet press, the modification of the Five-Year Plan increasing the weight of production of the means of consumption).

The measures pursue the following aims:

a) To establish the dictatorship *on a broader basis*, to associate broader sections of the bureaucracy more directly with the exercise of power by guaranteeing them against arbitrary purges.

b) To establish the dictatorship *on a more popular basis*, by taking measures favorably greeted by the entire population, by promising to restore easier and less tormented conditions, by tacitly disavowing the bloodiest phases of the terror of Stalin's epoch, by appearing to concede on the three principal points of this popular discontent: the low level of consumption, the police regime, and national oppression.

Historically, the Malenkov regime thus signalizes *the beginning of the decline of the power of the Bonapartist dictatorship*. The « liberalization » as well as the tightening of the regime only constitute alternative methods of self-defense by the bureaucracy which knows that its powers and privileges are threatened, and which will in any case try to use all the resources at its disposal to defend itself against the rising tide of the Soviet masses. But history has demonstrated that autocrats doomed

to disappear do not save themselves by either of these two methods, or by a combination of both. The Bonapartist dictatorship in the USSR already stands doomed by history. The masses will crush it and wipe out the power and privileges of the bureaucracy with their political revolution.

19. Until now there has been only one first sign that the proletariat has been able to pass to organized action under the new conditions created by Stalin's death (the Vorkuta strike). That is not surprising. For a quarter of a century the Soviet proletariat has been politically atomized and its advanced cadres wiped out by police terror. Though the advances of the international revolution since the end of World War II must have reawakened old hopes among the Soviet workers, the inflexibility of the dictatorship up to Stalin's death did not permit such sentiments to be voiced directly. At most the indirect expression of their concerns, demands, and aspirations could have been found in the lower layers of the petty functionaries of the party, of the trade unions, and of the youth. The « liberalization » of the regime announced by Malenkov cannot have immediate effects favoring political action by the working class, either. *But from now on molecular forces come into play within the Soviet proletariat.* Tests of strength are being prepared in the factories and the trade unions, which will no doubt begin over technical questions whereby the working class will strengthen its consciousness and confidence in its own strength without directly colliding with the Bonapartist dictatorship. To cope with this threat, the new regime, having weakened the GPU, has to lean more on the army, which probably helped liquidate Beria. At the same time within the party and especially within the youth, a spirit of criticism is advancing, questioning the theoretical « heritage » of the Stalinist era, venturing into the domain of political elaboration, winning its first spurs in an ideological struggle against the most petrified representatives of the Stalinist era. *Thus is announced the regroupment of the objective and subjective forces of the Soviet proletariat.*

20. Under the panic of the moment, the first defensive reflex of the directing nucleus, the Bonapartist tops, has not been exclusively the « liberalization » of the regime. Its first reflex has been also its own reorganization and its own extreme centralization. Momentarily the Bonapartist heights of the bureaucracy tried to regroup themselves without major conflict or division around the new chiefs, Malenkov - Beria - Molotov - Khrushchev, since they all felt threatened all together. But this phase of unity and regroupment could be only a fleeting one. *The centrifugal forces appearing in the dictatorship, that the « liberal » regime has*

*accentuated, are beginning to get the upper hand over the monolithism of the ruling group itself.* Herein is the significance of Beria's fall, of the weakening of the GPU apparatus by that of the state and the army. « Liberalism » was supposed to satisfy all layers of the population: the masses because they suffered the most from the police dictatorship; the tops of the bureaucracy because they feel themselves freed from the nightmare of a new wave of arbitrary purges; the lower layers of the bureaucracy, because they hope to be more closely associated with the wielding of power. But if the bureaucracy considered that these measures could consolidate its basis the better to defend its own privileges, the proletariat is trying to use them to challenge these privileges. After an initial phase of expectation, hope and joy, these two divergent tendencies have already begun to collide. The higher layers of the bureaucracy have been impelled to demand more and more legal guarantees to the degree that the popular pressure is deepening, and these demands and uneasinesses are finding their expression in the very midst of the directing nucleus through Beria's elimination and the important blow delivered to the GPU. At the same time the growing mass pressure, that the « liberalization » of the regime has already increased, will also find expression, even though indirect and deformed, at the top of the regime. This process of *differentiation within the party and its upper circles* has been influenced by the beginning of the revolutionary rise in the buffer zone. It will be still more deeply influenced by the evolution of the international situation. An accelerated outbreak of the war could delay this differentiation for an initial period. New victories of the international revolution, a sharpened differentiation within the Communist Parties abroad, would accelerate it.

On the other hand, if the new leading group seeks to gain time on an international scale by making concessions in form and tone to imperialism, it can less than ever before make substantial concessions that might result in a genuine compromise with Wall Street (liquidation of the colonial revolution, opening up of the « People's Democracies » to American goods and capital, etc.). In these conditions the arms race and the preparations for the imperialist war will remain basically the same as set down in the report of the XIIIth Plenum of the IEC.

21. Events unfolding in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death considerably modify the world situation. They signalize the end of the relative stability of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. *Thus one of the principal forces of social conservatism in the world finds itself challenged. The development of the world revolution*

and the struggle for its conscious leadership by the Fourth International find themselves considerably facilitated. A series of conditions favorable for the development of our ideas and our organizations flows from this and it will be necessary to take full advantage of them with the aid of an appropriate tactic.

The most urgent tasks are posed for our movement in the Soviet Union itself. The first cracks in the Bonapartist dictatorship place on the order of the day the struggle for the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union. The programme of action put forward in this connection by the Transitional Programme and which the Second World Congress reaffirmed and concretized now takes on a burning timeliness (1).

(1) « A fresh upsurge of the revolution in the USSR will undoubtedly begin under the banner of the struggle against social inequality and political oppression. Down with the privileges of the bureaucracy. Down with Stakhanovism! Down with the Soviet aristocracy and its ranks and orders! Greater equality of wages for all forms of labor!

« The struggle for the freedom of the trade unions and the factory committees, for the right of assembly and freedom of the press, will unfold in the struggle for the regeneration and development of soviet democracy.

« The bureaucracy replaced the Soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal electoral rights—in the style of Hitler-Goebbels. It is necessary to return to the soviets not only their free democratic form but also their class content. As once the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter the soviets, so now it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy out of the soviets. In the soviets there is room only for the representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants and Red Army men.

« Democratization of the soviets is impossible without legalization of soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet parties.

« A revision of planned economy from top to bottom in the interests of producers and consumers! Factory committees should be returned their right to control production. A democratically organized consumer's cooperative should control the quality and price of products.

« Reorganization of the collective farms in accordance with the will and the interests of the workers engaged therein!

« The reactionary international policy of the bureaucracy should be replaced by the policy of proletarian internationalism. The complete diplomatic correspondence of the Kremlin to be published. Down with secret diplomacy!

« All political trials staged by the Thermidorian bureaucracy to be reviewed in the light of complete publicity and controversial openness and integrity. The organizers of the frame-ups must pay the proper penalty.

It is impossible to carry out this programme without the overthrow of the bureaucracy which maintains itself by violence and falsification. » (Extracts from the Transitional Programme.)

They will demand the application of the democratic right of self-determination, including that of secession, for all national minorities living in the USSR, struggling for the Ukrainian, White-Russian, Estonian, Lithuanian, independent socialist republics.

But the significance of this regeneration has been modified. Today the Soviet Union, because of its industry and its working class, is the second basis of support for socialism in the world. *The socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union, almost as much as the socialist revolution in the USA, would decide the world victory of socialism.* The fact that the hesitations, doubts, and retreats of the new ruling group in the dictatorship aid the struggle for this regeneration places our international movement in new historical conditions of which we must be deeply conscious. *The conditions are being created for the reconstitution and the upsurge of the Bolshevik-Leninist party in the Soviet Union* (2). It is not accidental that at the XIXth Congress Malenkov, after 15 years of silence, referred to the activity of « deviationist, anti-Leninist » groups in the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, on which the victory of the political revolution depends. It is no accident that the Malenkov amnesty expressly excludes political offenders! The International must look for and find the means to aid our Soviet brothers to benefit from conditions favorable for their regrouping; this will be a decisive stage in the world upsurge of our movement.

At the same time our sections ought resolutely to combat any tendency toward apology or justification for the present political regime in the Soviet Union, a tendency which will manifest itself in petty-bourgeois circles inclined to make their peace with the Malenkov power. Even though « liberalizing » itself, the Bonapartist dictatorship nonetheless remains the dictatorship. The proletariat remains politically expropriated in the Soviet Union. The new penal code, a genuine *habeus corpus*, will defend the bureaucratic privileges just as police arbitrariness has defended them up to now. The task of smashing the dictatorship and the privileges of the bureaucracy, the task of a new political revolution in the Soviet Union remains more burning than ever. The significance of the entire recent development is that the conditions which prepare and facilitate this revolution are ripening.

22. The coming war will coincide not with an ebb but a new leap forward of the international revolution. It can therefore act only fundamentally to accentuate still more the phenomena of the disintegration of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the Soviet Union, and the phenomena of revival and revolutionary rise of the Soviet proletariat. The

(2) That is also what the Transitional Programme means: « Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward socialism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection—the party of the Fourth International! »

(Excerpt from the Transitional Programme.)

extension of the revolution to Western European countries with their workers at a high level of culture, technical skill, and democratic traditions; the contact between the Soviet Army and populations accustomed to relatively higher living standards than those of the Soviet toilers; the victories over imperialism; the difficulties of all types as well as the bureaucracy's general behavior in the course of the war—all these factors will operate in the same direction. They will heighten the confidence of the Soviet masses in their own strength, undermine still more the prestige of any repressive apparatus, harden the will of the masses to acquire living conditions economically and politically much closer to the socialist ideal, weaken and disorganize the bureaucracy's capacity of resistance and of counteraction in the face of the masses, accentuate dissensions and centrifugal tendencies within the ranks of the bureaucracy. Whether the open, external manifestations of the rise will become accentuated and hastened even during the very first stage of the war, or whether these will begin by receding before the menace of imperialism only in order to reappear more powerfully than ever at a subsequent stage of the war, when this menace seems to have disappeared — this will depend upon the rapidity with which the revolution spreads, upon the capacity of the proletariat of the advanced countries to carry out this revolution under their own leadership, upon the maturity of political conditions inside the USSR itself, and upon the presence of a new revolutionary leadership. In any case, in the course of the final settlement of accounts with imperialism, the Soviet proletariat aided by the world proletariat will learn to settle accounts also with the Soviet bureaucracy and to overthrow its dictatorship. During the period as a whole running from 1943 to the end of the Third World War, a period which is just a chain of partial wars and temporary armed truces, will be confirmed the prediction of Leon Trotsky that the bureaucracy will be incapable of withstanding the test of a decisive battle with imperialism and the world revolution.

23. To understand that the Soviet bureaucracy is henceforth placed in new conditions which are fundamentally different from the conditions of the epoch of the bureaucracy's rise and growth, and are those of the bureaucracy's decline and ultimate downfall, does not in any way mean to modify the traditional Trotskyist evaluation of the objective and subjective role played by this bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and the world over. The upsurge of the Soviet productive forces has resulted not from the activity of the bureaucracy but despite it. The bureaucracy began by impeding industrialization for a period of five years; and then plunged into it in conditions that disorganized the entire national

economy, causing a terrible crisis in agriculture and popular consumption which required 20 years to overcome. To this day the bureaucracy prevents a complete and rational utilization of the huge productive apparatus with which the dynamics of planning endowed the country. Similarly, the upsurge of the world revolution did not in any respect come about thanks to the Soviet bureaucracy's leadership, but has taken place despite its interventions in the world labor movement. The bureaucracy began by causing the terrible historical defeats of the proletariat from 1923 to 1943. Subsequently it retarded and partially halted the revolutionary wave between 1943 and 1947. To this day it still prevents the complete and rational utilization of the colossal revolutionary potential of the masses on the five continents. Today it is more correct than ever to say that if the domination of imperialism subsists over half of the globe it is thanks to the role played by the bureaucracy and its agencies. In the principal country where this domination has been abolished — in China — this was due to the fact that the Chinese CP was able to shake itself loose from the orders of the Kremlin. What is new in the situation is that we have reached the stage, forecast in the Transitional Programme, where « the laws of history » reveal themselves « stronger than the bureaucratic apparatus. » Of the two factors determining the orientation of the masses — the death agony of capitalism which unlooses immense revolutionary forces on a world scale, and the policy of the reformist and Stalinist bureaucratic apparatuses which play the role of a brake upon the masses — it is the first that is coming more and more to the fore. The revolutionary tide which the Soviet bureaucracy is no longer capable of smashing and arresting is even being nourished by certain of the methods of self-defense applied by this bureaucracy and is preparing the conditions for the overthrow of the bureaucracy by the Soviet proletariat.

## II

### THE RISE AND DECLINE OF STALINISM IN OTHER NON-CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

24. Since the eruption of the revolutionary wave of 1943, new non-capitalist states have made their appearance in Europe and Asia. These states may be put in two categories:

a) States produced by the victory of the revolution in these countries, as in the case of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China.

b) States produced by the expansionism of the Soviet bureaucracy, the occupation of these countries

and their structural assimilation with the Soviet Union by military-bureaucratic means, supported in certain instances by a limited mobilization of the masses: this is the case in the European buffer zone and in the case of the People's Republic of North Korea (where, incidentally, the mobilization of the masses was on a larger scale).

To these countries it is necessary to add: a) the democratic state of Vietnam, produced by a revolutionary wave in Vietnam similar to that in China but which still continues the anti-imperialist war and the civil war in order to gain control of the entire national territory; b) Albania, where there has also been a strong revolutionary movement of the masses.

The appearance of these states represents a fundamental modification of the world situation, extending the global area withdrawn from the domination of capitalism from one-sixth to one-third on the geographical plane, and from one-twelfth to one-third as regards the world population.

25. The victory of the revolution in Yugoslavia and in China — the first revolutionary victories since 1917 — dealt a mortal blow to the direct hold of the Soviet bureaucracy upon the Communist Parties of these two countries and inaugurated the world crisis of Stalinism. In this way has been confirmed the prediction of Leon Trotsky to the effect that « the disintegration of the Comintern (i.e., of the apparatus of subordinating the CPs to the Kremlin) which has no *direct* support in the GPU, will precede the downfall of the Bonapartist clique and of the Thermidorian bureaucracy as a whole. » The blow dealt to Stalinism by the victory of the revolution in Yugoslavia and in China, although these revolutions were led by parties issuing from the Comintern, expresses itself in the fact that this victory resulted from their « breach of discipline » toward the Kremlin. Threatened with being overwhelmed by the revolutionary wave of the masses and faced with no alternative other than being crushed politically and physically by reaction, the Yugoslav CP, and later the Chinese CP, went beyond the orders of the Kremlin and marched to the conquest of power. From this they gained a genuine material independence in relation to the Soviet bureaucracy, and this has created the objective base for a political and ideological differentiation. The system of rigid subordination of the Communist Parties to the political directives of the Kremlin and of the automatic and servile repetition of each successive manifestation of Stalinist revisionism of Marxist-Leninist theory has thus been breached.

26. Neither in the case of Yugoslavia nor that of China, however, did the victorious CPs decide on their own initiative upon a public political break

with the policy of Stalinism. The explanation for this is to be found in

a) the Stalinist origin and traditions of these leaderships and of the majority of their cadres, who sought, for the most part, to excuse within their narrow circles the « errors » of Moscow and to hide them from their own party members and from the masses;

b) the objective support which these parties received after the revolutionary victory through their diplomatic, political, military, and economic alliance with the Soviet Union in the face of the *de facto* imperialist blockade; even though this Kremlin support was considered as insufficient or very onerous, it was worth more in their eyes than the abandonment of all aid;

c) the opportunist character of these leaderships who see no pole of attraction other than the Kremlin or imperialism, and who underestimate or ignore the upsurge of the world revolution and the international working-class movement.

27. In the case of Yugoslavia it was the Kremlin itself that took the initiative for the break with the CP, conscious that this party represented a mortal danger for the bureaucracy by introducing into its system of parties a Communist Party with an independent base, capable of reacting independently not only in relations between the states (Yugoslav policy in relation to mixed companies, Balkan federation, relations with Italy, etc.) but also as regards the policy of other Communist Parties (the attitude of the JCP toward the Greek partisan movement, toward the policy followed by the French and Italian CPs during the « liberation, » etc.). It preferred to push Yugoslavia into the embraces of imperialism and in this way to open up a dangerous breach in its line of defenses in the Balkans rather than incur the risk of having the Yugoslav example break up the Kremlin's entire grip on the glacis and on the Cominform. Toward this end it utilized every resource in its power: the break of diplomatic relations; the sudden economic blockade disorganizing the Yugoslav economy; provocation of border incidents; attempts at organizing a terrorist movement inside Yugoslavia itself; a permanent campaign of intimidation via press, radio, etc. But it was able originally to indulge in such a counter-revolutionary attitude first because the preparations for the imperialist war were still only in their preliminary stage, and then and above all because Yugoslavia is a small country which cannot basically alter the world relationship of economic and military forces. It was otherwise in the case of the Chinese revolution. The Kremlin could not permit a break of a coalition which represented the keystone of its military defense system and which in effect broke up the imperialist encirclement of

the USSR. That is why in the case of the Chinese CP, the Kremlin, despite apprehensions analogous to those it nursed toward the Yugoslav CP, was obliged to accept a collaboration on a basis of equality and even on the basis of co-leadership with the Chinese CP of the entire Asian Communist movement.

28. Both the Yugoslav state and the Chinese state, born of a victorious revolution resulting from the destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie and of its state, have moved at a rapid tempo toward the complete economic expropriation of that same bourgeoisie. After the first hesitations and compromises, to the extent that this tendency has been manifested more and more, the structure of these states has also been adjusted to its new social base, and the non-capitalist, working-class character of these states has clearly manifested itself. But, even though born of a victorious revolution, the Yugoslav state and the Chinese state bear the stigmata of an opportunist and bureaucratic workers' leadership. In the case of Yugoslavia these features were notably revealed between 1945 and 1948 in a servile imitation of Soviet practices, methods, and institutions, and in the suppression of all workers' democracy within the state and within the party. After an attempt at a genuine democratization of the regime from 1948 to 1950 the opportunist character of the JCP again found expression in the state structure as a result of the latest changes in the Constitution and in the party statutes which, far from guaranteeing workers' democracy, represent an attempt to eliminate the influence of advanced layers of the proletariat on the conduct of public affairs. This is the meaning of the dissolution of the JCP and of the utilization of the People's Front as the sole political instrument of power. In the case of China, the opportunist and bureaucratic character of the Chinese CP has equally left its mark upon the Constitution and upon the evolution of the state in the People's Republic of China. Its desire to collaborate with important fractions of the « national bourgeoisie » led it in the beginning to sabotage and impede revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat in the cities conjointly with the revolutionary uprising of the peasants in North China. The same desire then led it to take entire segments of the old Kuomintang state apparatus and incorporate them into the newly constructed state apparatus. And when, after the Chinese intervention in Korea, the offensive was opened up against the bourgeoisie and a certain mobilization of the masses of the poor took place (mobilization of the peasant masses in the South in order to achieve the agrarian reform; mobilization of the workers in the campaigns « Against Five Ways » and the campaign « Against Three Ways ») (3), the

(3) Campaigns against pillage, corruption, bureaucratism, etc.

Chinese CP did everything possible to limit this mobilization and halt it and prevent it from giving birth to organs of self-administration of the working-class masses in the cities; and it even utilized this same occasion to employ terror against the vanguard revolutionary elements. As in the case of Yugoslavia so in the case of China the new workers' states are not based upon organs of self-administration (soviets, committees), and where such organs formally exist, they are void of their revolutionary content because of the lack of political freedom and freedom of expression for the various workers' currents. That is why in these two cases it is a question of *bureaucratically deformed workers' states*.

29. There is no contradiction between the fact that, on the one hand, the Yugoslav CP and the Chinese CP have been able to lead a revolution victoriously and independently of the Kremlin and have in these instances ceased to be Stalinist parties in the proper meaning of this term; and that, on the other hand, these parties have followed and continue to follow an opportunist orientation which restricts, disorganizes, and places in danger the conquests of the revolution — an opportunist line essentially derived from the Stalinist past of the leaderships of these parties. The Marxist theory of revolutions by no means implies that no revolution could ever triumph, no matter what the circumstances, without a 100 % Marxist leadership. The Yugoslav CP and the Chinese CP freed themselves from the tutelage of the Kremlin, but did so pragmatically, under the pressure of events, of the revolutionary movement of the masses which threatened to overwhelm them. Therein lies their merit, but therein also lies their weakness. What our period demands is not an opportunist leadership which permits itself to be dragged along in order somehow to accomplish the revolution as it were in spite of itself and without a clear vision of the overall tasks of the revolution and means for its accomplishment. Our period requires a revolutionary leadership conscious of its mission in its full scope, conscious of the enormous possibilities inherent in the colossal wave of international revolution, capable of coördinating the international revolutionary forces and of leading them to victory as quickly as possible. In this sense it may be said that the more the revolution progresses and touches advanced industrial countries, the more the existence of such a leadership will become necessary for victory. In the same sense, the experiences in Yugoslavia and China do not invalidate but on the contrary confirm the need for the Fourth International, not only on a world scale but also in these two countries themselves.

30. By the scope of the transformations which

the Chinese revolution has brought about in China itself and throughout the world, the People's Republic of China occupies a special place among the new non-capitalist states which have appeared since World War II. The Chinese revolution and the People's Republic of China are today the principal motor force of the colonial revolution, an essential element of the international revolutionary upsurge. This imposes upon the People's Republic of China special relations with American imperialism; it is upon the People's Republic of China that the U.S. concentrates its principal fire at the present stage. This is precisely the meaning of the Korean war, of the first rank occupied henceforth by Asian affairs in the diplomacy, policy, and military strategy of American imperialism. That is why it is a vital question for the People's Republic of China to assure itself of Soviet aid and alliance so long as the revolution has not triumphed in other advanced industrial countries. At the present stage and for the entire stage to come, it is not the Kremlin which « imposes » an alliance upon China, it is the People's Republic of China which demands guarantees that this alliance be maintained. The more the colonial revolution extends to other Asian countries, the stronger will grow the pressure that the People's Republic of China will be able to exert in this sense upon the Kremlin. But the maintenance and the consolidation of the Sino-Soviet military alliance are by themselves independent of the Kremlin's degree of influence upon the Chinese CP, that is to say, of the extent of the decline of Stalinism in China. The latter is a function of the relationship of forces between the Chinese CP and the Kremlin, fundamentally a function of the progress of the colonial revolution, of the economic reconstruction of China, and of the progress achieved by the proletariat in the rest of the world, including the Soviet Union itself.

31. From this flow the actual stages which have been traversed up to now by the relations between the Chinese CP and the Kremlin:

a) From the victory of Mao up to the American offensive toward the Yalu River: the Chinese CP affirmed its *de facto* independence, including its independence in the ideological field. The stress is placed upon equality between the two allies, and upon Mao's role as the guide of the revolution in all the colonial countries.

b) From the American offensive toward the Yalu up to the death of Stalin: the Chinese CP affirmed the vital character of its alliance with the Kremlin, the decisive aid which it obtains and must obtain from the Soviet Union in military, economic, technical, cultural, and other fields. The stress is placed on the great example and lesson of the Soviet

Union, on the role of Stalin as the guide of the world proletariat, including the Chinese proletariat.

c) Since Stalin's death: Mao's prestige has risen considerably throughout the entire non-capitalist world and among all the Communist Parties. Domestic economic difficulties impel China toward an armistice in Korea. Stress is once again being placed upon equality between the two allies. The Soviet Union's economic aid takes first place in propaganda.

One inescapable part of this entire evolution is inherent in the objective world situation; the other part derives from the opportunist policy of the Chinese CP, the lack of revolutionary audacity on the part of its leadership and its lack of confidence in the dynamism of the revolutionary forces in Asia.

32. Mao's victory has signified only the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution. The tasks of this revolution are only beginning to be solved. After the unification of the country, a unified national market for food products and for manufactured consumers' goods has been created; the conquest of national independence has been by and large achieved; the agrarian reform has been extended and achieved over the entire territory of China. Age-old social relations have been overthrown in the Chinese countryside (relations between peasants and landlords and merchant-usurers, between men and women, between parents and children), and this represents an enormous progress.

In this process the Chinese CP, after being first pushed into action by the peasant masses which overwhelmed it in the North, found itself later obliged itself to mobilize the peasant masses in the South in order to achieve the agrarian reform. This led it to attack for the first time in a massive way the positions and property of the bourgeoisie. But the bourgeoisie preserves to this day 20 % of heavy industry, 60 % of light industry, and the greater part of retail trade; its complete expropriation will be a long and arduous task, above all in the sector of trade, which is nourished by scores of millions of small private peasant enterprises. But holding in its hands the key sectors of the economy, the major part of heavy industry and of the transport system, the banks, foreign trade and wholesale trade, the People's Republic of China can and must begin the planned development of state industry even before the expropriation of the bourgeoisie has been achieved. To the extent that this process has begun and clearly indicates the future dynamic of the evolution, the working-class nature of the state becomes explicit. In the Soviet Union, too, the Left Opposition demanded the launching of large-scale industrialization without the suppression of all the measures of the NEP. But as long as the situation remains as it is, the Chinese CP will be able to limit its appeal to the masses and their

mobilization, as has been the case for the last two years. These appeals to the working masses, while they have not entailed an enormous upsurge of the workers' movement in the cities, have nevertheless obliged the government to modify its policy toward the workers, to ameliorate the workers' position by the new regime of social security, of forms of workers' participation in the administration of the enterprises, and improvements in living standards, thereby creating a more favorable climate for a new rise of the workers' movement. It is in connection with the outbreak of the war, with the aggravation of class contradictions, with the necessity of expropriating the bourgeoisie which will confront the Chinese CP, that such a rise will most likely occur in order to carry through the conquests of the Chinese revolution.

33. The tasks of the Fourth International in Yugoslavia and in China are determined by the particular nature of these states and of the Yugoslav and Chinese Communist Parties. Since workers' states are involved, we are obviously for their defense against any attempts to overthrow them and to alter the social bases created by the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions. Since both the Chinese CP and to a certain extent also the Yugoslav CP are in reality bureaucratic centrist parties, which however still find themselves under the pressure of the revolution in their countries, we do not call upon the proletariat of these countries to constitute new revolutionary parties or to prepare a political revolution in these countries. We are working toward the constitution of a left tendency within the JCP and within the Chinese CP, a tendency which will be able, in connection with the development of the world revolutionary rise, to assure and to lead a new stage forward in the revolution in these two countries. In China our forces will orient themselves particularly toward raising the level of consciousness and of organization of the proletariat and will use every opportunity offered by official government policy in order to prepare and accelerate the entry of the industrial proletariat into the revolution. In Yugoslavia, on the basis of unconditional defense of the conquests of the revolution against imperialism and against the Kremlin, including the conquests of the period from 1948 to 1950, our forces will attempt to constitute an opposition which will seek to replace the present leadership of the party, to break the military and diplomatic alliance of Yugoslavia with the imperialist bloc which is leading the revolution to ruin, to reconstitute officially the JCP, to establish a genuine socialist democracy with freedom of expression for all currents of working-class political opinion, to reorient it theoretically and politically toward revolutionary Marxism and toward the international revolutionary movement. Without a

doubt, the evolution of the situation in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, and the approach of the revolutionary rise in that country and the beginning of its bursting out in the buffer-zone countries, will greatly favor such an orientation.

34. Unlike the new states of China, Yugoslavia and Vietnam, the non-capitalist states of the buffer zone in Eastern Europe were not the product of a revolutionary rise of the masses in these countries that swept beyond the policy and the organizational control of the Kremlin and obliged the Communist Parties of these countries to go forward on the road of revolution, independently of Moscow's orders and contrary to them. They are, on the contrary, the product of Soviet expansionism, of the tight hold which the Kremlin has succeeded in *maintaining* over the Communist Parties and over the masses of these countries, owing either to the absence or too limited character of the revolutionary rise which took place there at the end of World War II. The weakening of the bourgeoisie of these countries as a result of the war permitted the Soviet bureaucracy to assimilate these countries structurally without being obliged to mobilize the masses on a large scale, without being menaced by a mass movement sweeping over their heads. Wherever the bourgeoisie still remained too strong to be eliminated in this cold way, as in Finland and Austria, the attempts at structural assimilation miscarried and these countries returned to the capitalist orbit. From this basic difference between the origin of the non-capitalist states of the buffer zone and the origin of the People's Republic of China and of Yugoslavia flow important differences both as regards the reciprocal relations between these Communist Parties and the Kremlin, and between the CPs and the masses.

35. The attitude taken and the aims pursued by the Soviet bureaucracy in the buffer countries have passed through three phases:

a) From 1944 to 1947: The basic aim was that of immediate economic pillage of the buffer zone. Toward this end the Soviet bureaucracy utilized the existing capitalist relations of production, by introducing reparation treaties, the seizure of former German property, the creation of Soviet stock companies, of mixed companies, etc. Economic reforms remained limited to agrarian reform and to the nationalization of basic industries. In general, coalition governments with the bourgeoisie and with the petty-bourgeois parties were maintained, governments in which the Communist Parties, however, made sure of the commanding levers (army, police, justice, etc.).

b) From 1948 to 1950: Faced with the launching of the Marshall Plan and imperialism's attempt at the economic disintegration of the buffer zone, the bureaucracy replied by eliminating the bour-

geois parties from power, generalizing the nationalizations, projecting through two-year and three-year reconstruction plans the basis for overall planning of the economy, by beginning to develop peasant coöperatives, and by transforming the structure of the state.

c) From 1951 on: Five- and six-year plans developed the industry of the buffer zone, integrating and tying it more and more closely with that of the Soviet Union; collectivization of agriculture has been pursued at rates varying from country to country. The arms programme imposed considerable sacrifices upon the economy and upon the workers. The direct grip of the Soviet Union upon these countries, the « Russification » of the respective CPs became accentuated, indicating that social and economic contradictions were tending to become reflected inside these parties. To consolidate its hold upon these CPs has become task No. 1 and the most difficult task for the Soviet bureaucracy in the buffer countries.

36. The evolution of the workers' movement and of the masses' moods in the buffer zone differs from country to country. The essential criteria for judging this evolution are, on the one side, the extent to which the post-1948 industrialization has effectively overthrown the previously existing backward economic, cultural, and technological conditions, and, on the other side, the extent to which the CPs in the respective countries have been able to gain or preserve the confidence of important layers of the proletariat.

As regards Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Slovakia, and, in part, Hungary, industrialization is taking place at a relatively higher rate than in the Soviet Union itself, and in these countries has in tendency effects analogous to those which are being produced in the Soviet Union with regard to the social modification that they are bringing about there. Even though difficulties with restorationist layers among the peasantry, elements of national oppression introduced into the life of these countries, along with terror, and the still low living level of the masses, are delaying a new workers' rise in these countries, this will finally occur in these countries as the product of the same causes. The Yugoslav CP could have played a leading role in developing this revolutionary rise; today its capitulationist course plays instead the role of a brake.

As regards East Germany, Poland, western Czechoslovakia, and in part Hungary, industrialization — while swiftly developing the productive forces — has not basically modified the weight, the technical skills, and the culture of the working class which had already attained a relatively high level there. In these countries, during the first stage, the workers' resistance against the relative or absolute

decline of living standards, against the dictatorship and the arbitrariness of the Stalinist bureaucracy in formation, has not ceased to sharpen and is becoming an increasingly greater obstacle to the Soviet bureaucracy's carrying out its project. In Hungary and partly in Poland this resistance has been able to be limited because of the relative stability of the CP leadership. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, where this resistance is combined with violent shocks within the leading apparatus, it is resulting in a very grave and prolonged crisis, marking the inception of the revolutionary rise (strikes and workers' demonstrations May to June, 1953). In these countries, as in the Soviet Union or even at a still faster pace, the struggle for the conquest of socialist democracy is maturing.

37. It is still too early to predict the precise organizational form which the revolutionary rise will assume in each of the buffer-zone countries. Two variants are possible:

a) The development of autonomous mass actions transmitting themselves to the native Communist Parties where there are developing leftist currents capable of giving leadership to the upsurge. This variant is the more probable for those CPs that have preserved a broad enough workers' base and possess old traditions: Hungary, Bulgaria, partially Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

b) The development of independent mass movements finding their coördination outside the legally existing organizations, through the appearance of new political currents or the revival of Social Democratic organizations. This variant is the more probable for those countries where the CP has only a feeble tradition or a narrow mass base: Albania, Rumania, Poland, and in part East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

A combination of these two organizational forms cannot be excluded, either. We must be prepared for these two possible organizational forms of the future upsurge so as always to be within the real movement of the masses when it will burst forth. It is naturally necessary carefully to distinguish genuine working-class resistance movements, no matter what confused forms they may take on initially, from restorationist movements instigated by the remnants of former possessing classes and by imperialism and led by them, movements which it is necessary to combat. Also, the more the outbreak of the revolutionary upsurge is delayed, and the young generation which has known no form of political organization other than the CP will awaken to political life, the more the CP will tend to become the natural forum in which the leadership of the new revolutionary upsurge will develop. That is why our forces will seek to carry out their tasks, which

are in general similar to those we have in the Soviet Union and whose solution demands the construction of Bolshevik-Leninist parties, through an entrust tactic toward the CPs, while remaining prepared to join quickly any other mass organization which might appear at the beginning of the upsurge. Our basic task within the buffer zone is to assure a Bolshevik leadership to this upsurge and to prevent its falling under the domination of reformist, semi-restorationist forces. This upsurge has to lead to the constitution of genuinely independent Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and similar Socialist Republics, free to associate themselves voluntarily among themselves in a Balkan-Danubian Federation of Socialist Republics.

38. The general dynamic of the decline of Stalinism in the buffer-zone countries may be clearly outlined as follows:

a) In all these countries structural assimilation has not been able to be effected except through the turning over of political and economic power, in large measure, to the native Communist Parties. These parties thereby acquired a relatively independent base even in cases where, because of lack of mass support, this power remains precarious and depends upon support of the Kremlin.

b) In all these countries the national CP leadership has sought — first against the Kremlin, and since the death of Stalin perhaps partially with the Kremlin's encouragement — to avoid the most disastrous aspects of Stalinist policy in the Soviet Union, above all, forced collectivization.

c) In all these countries, after a transitional period of retreat, passivity, and confusion, the working class appears stronger and more active than before to fight for socialist democracy.

d) In all these countries the objective factors (the war devastations, the low level of the productive forces, etc.) and the subjective factors (absence of workers' organization, the onerous past of a fascist or military dictatorship, lack of revolutionary perspectives, intensification of national sentiments, etc.) which checked the upsurge in 1944 and aided its strict control by the Kremlin, are beginning to disappear and are only partially compensated for by the elements of demoralization produced by the dictatorship, national oppression, the relative reduction of living standards in the entire last period, etc.

39. In all these countries the changes occurring in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death have had considerable repercussions. These have affected simultaneously the internal regime of these parties, their ties with the Kremlin, and their ties with the masses.

Special economic conditions — the monetary reform in Czechoslovakia, the increase of norms in

East Germany — have caused the resistance of the masses to the bureaucratic dictatorship to culminate in an open revolt of the proletariat in these countries. This revolt, which is nothing other than the beginning of the political revolution by which the masses will overthrow the Stalinist dictatorship, brings the most striking confirmation of the predictions of our movement on this question. It also confirms — by the example of the S.E.D., which on June 17th 1953 was split from top to bottom by the pressure of the revolutionary uprising of the masses, and a part of which showed itself disposed to capitulate to the workers — the heterogeneous character of the bureaucracy and the effects of disintegration produced in it by such action of the masses.

This revolt has doubtless checked the application of the « new course » on the political plane, and in certain cases such as in Germany has been replaced by a regression in this field. But even in these cases the « new course » has been generally applied on the economic plane, and further strengthened in East Germany by the concessions that the Soviet bureaucracy made after June 17th (giving up reparations, turning over the SAG to the national Stalinist authorities).

This « new course, » the most complete example of which has been represented by the reorientation of the Hungarian government, includes these noteworthy features:

a) An improvement in economic conditions for all strata of the population; a slowing down in the development of heavy industry; a slowing down in agrarian collectivization; improvement in supplying the people with industrial goods; softening of the repressive legislation on « violations of labor discipline, » etc.

b) A softening of the atmosphere of extreme tension in the mass organizations; less rigid language, less « prefabricated » discussions, greater possibilities for the lower cadres to get a hearing for their concerns, etc.

This new course, very likely ordered by the Kremlin, is designed as a means of strengthening the grip of the Stalinist Parties on the buffer countries by making it more flexible, less rigid. But, through the social and political forces it will liberate, through the differentiation it will help bring about in the CPs and the youth organizations it will facilitate even more than in the USSR, the rise of the proletariat toward the political revolution.

It goes without saying that the accentuation of the revolutionary rise and its extension into Western Europe and into the USSR, before or during the war, will play a decisive role in the emancipation of the proletariat of the buffer zone from the bureaucratic straitjacket imprisoning it.

40. The programme of political revolution on the order of the day in all the buffer countries includes the following noteworthy points:

1. Freedom for working-class prisoners.
2. Abolition of repressive anti-labor legislation.
3. Democratization of the workers' parties and organizations.
4. Legalization of all workers' parties and organizations.
5. Election and democratic functioning of mass committees.
6. Independence of the trade unions in relation to the government.
7. Democratic elaboration of the economic plan by the masses, for the masses.
8. Effective right of self-determination for peoples.

### III

#### THE RISE AND DECLINE OF STALINISM IN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD

41. The Communist parties were created above all under the impetus produced by the October Revolution within the Social Democratic parties and, subordinately, within other formations of the pre-1914 workers' movement. The victory of the Soviet bureaucracy in the USSR enabled it to exploit the prestige of the October Revolution among the world proletarian vanguard. That is the primary cause for the victory of Stalinism in the CPs. The inherent weaknesses of these parties facilitated this process. The lack of a left-wing organized on a clearcut program inside the pre-1914 Social Democracy resulted in the political and theoretical weakness of most of the CP leaderships in the early years of the Communist International. This led, on the one hand, to the crushing political preponderance of the Bolshevik Party inside the International and, on the other, to the lack of preparation of other party leaderships seriously to cope with the controversial issues beginning with 1923. Once the Bolshevik Party had been bureaucratized, Stalin's faction met with little serious organized opposition in transplanting bureaucratic centralism into the Communist International. The process of Stalinization of the Communist Parties was accentuated by the ebb of the workers' movement in the period from 1923 to 1943, the year when Stalin proceeded to dissolve the CI.

42. The CI and the Communist Parties were converted into instruments of Kremlin diplomacy for a bureaucratic defense of the Soviet Union. They abandoned the struggle for the world revolution and sought to exert pressure upon various national bourgeoisies so as to obtain from them a diplomatic orientation in conformity with the

Kremlin's views. These transformations of the CP objectives provoked swings from adventurism to opportunism, and led certain Communist Parties to take directly counter-revolutionary actions at certain periods (notably in Spain during the People's Front days).

The Stalinist policy resulted in numerous defeats of the working class, including the Nazi victory in Germany, fruit of the policies of both the German Communist Party and the German Social Democratic Party. Each of these defeats accentuated the ebb of the world revolution and reënforced the grip of the Soviet bureaucracy upon the USSR as well as upon the vanguard which remained attached to the Russian Revolution.

The bureaucratic regime within the CI and within the CPs entailed a theoretical decline. The CI became less and less a centre for the elaboration of an international political orientation. The CP leaderships were selected and changed from above, depending upon their aptitude in following orders from the Kremlin through all the multiple turns and zigzags. The CPs functioned under the aegis of empiricism, monolithism and historical falsification. Thus came about a selection in reverse of leaderships, which eliminated the most independent and the most politically capable elements. This regime, in fact, suppressed any possibility of collective political work by the national leaderships, transforming them instead into mere transmission belts for the Kremlin's orders.

43. Originally constituted in order to become the national sections of a world revolutionary party, the Communist Parties, under Stalinist leadership, became instead degenerated workers' parties. Their bureaucratic leaderships depended upon the Kremlin, above all because they lived politically upon exploiting the prestige of the October Revolution and of the Soviet Union among the masses. Nevertheless, unlike the CP of the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Stalinist Parties did not express the interests of a special social stratum with enormous material resources at its disposal. Because of this fact the dual nature of these parties is not identical with the dual nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. By their rank and file, which in contradistinction to the Social Democratic Parties, was generally composed of the most exploited and the most militant sectors of the working class, they were obliged to reflect, to a certain extent and however inadequately, the interests of the proletariat. By their leadership they were subjected to strict control by the Kremlin which sought to maintain the *status quo* of the revolution « in a single country. » precisely at the expense of the revolution in other countries.

By their bondage to Soviet diplomacy, the Communist Parties were led at various periods to practise an opportunist policy very close in its effects to that of the Social Democracy. Even in those periods the Communist Parties could never go so far as to fuse with the Socialist Parties because they were the instruments, not of their own national bourgeoisie, but of the Kremlin. All doubts on this score were dissipated by the decisive test of World War II: in their overwhelming majority the Communist Parties (the leadership as well as the rank and file) remained faithful to the policy of the Kremlin bureaucracy, notably during the period of the Soviet-German Pact.

44. In the pre-war period the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries experienced varied developments: some, like the French CP, have seen their influence over the masses grow; others, like the British CP, never experienced a genuine upsurge. But during this period all the numerous crises which shook the Communist Parties were surmounted by Stalinism in a way which strengthened its grip upon them.

The main reason for it was that during this period of ebb of the revolution, every great mass struggle ended in defeat, and what became detached from the Communist Parties was either a very small revolutionary vanguard on the programme of Trotskyism, or currents renouncing revolutionary struggle, while the Communist Parties retained militant worker cadres attached to the Soviet Union in an overall way without distinguishing between the state and its leadership.

Each turn was regarded by these militants as a mere tactical manoeuvre dictated by the need to save the first workers' state at all costs. It should however be noted that the role played by Stalinism in the Spanish Civil War, an openly counter-revolutionary role, while it did not turn against Stalinism the Communist militants who had come to fight in the International Brigades, did, nevertheless, for the first time, sow doubts among them, as was revealed much later — after the break with Yugoslavia.

As a consequence, almost everywhere, the Stalinist Parties remained face to face with the Social Democratic Parties as organizations revolutionary in appearance and numerically strongest, and it was toward them that the newly politicalized militant elements turned during each new workers' upsurge. This was the case especially during World War II, in the course of which the Communist Parties became strengthened thanks to their activity inside the Resistance Movements and thanks to the prestige of the Soviet victories.

But it was during this same war period that for the first time a Communist Party, the Yugoslav CP, ceased to act in accordance with the strict require-

ments of the Kremlin's policy. During the war, because of both the acuteness of the struggle against the armies of occupation and the tensions within Yugoslav society which prevented the CP from practising class collaboration in the name of the National Front, the CP was led to build a new army, mass organs of power, and to seize power at the head of the insurgent masses. For several years the Yugoslav leadership tried to adjust this situation to the Kremlin's demands, but finally the conflict erupted in 1948, demonstrating the profound incompatibility between the Soviet bureaucracy, the product of the ebb of the revolution, and a powerful revolutionary movement.

It was likewise after the end of the war that the Chinese CP, confronted with a mighty uprising which posed before it the alternative of either putting itself at its head or of disappearing from the political scene, engaged in a mortal combat with Chiang Kai-shek and conquered power through a struggle of Chinese Red Armies backed by a giant peasant uprising.

In the course of the war the Kremlin's relations with the Communist Parties were loosened. The leadership of the CI was isolated from many parties. It was this moment that was chosen by Stalin to dissolve the CI. In this same period, under pressure of the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge (France, Greece,...), differences within the CP leaderships having a mass base began to manifest themselves. Other leaderships went beyond the required limits of opportunism and were called to order by Moscow (the United States, Holland...). The unfolding post-war situation no longer permitted the Kremlin to re-establish the rigid control over the Communist parties which existed prior to the war. The formation of the Cominform was less intended to attain this than to take Yugoslavia and the buffer zone firmly in hand.

45. With the victory of the Chinese revolution over the Kuomintang regime, the period of the revolutionary upsurge, which began in 1943 with the downfall of fascism in Italy, entered a new stage, basically marked by a relationship of international forces favorable to the revolution and evolving on a global scale more and more favorably. The revolutionary wave is spreading from country to country, from continent to continent. It has recently reached the Soviet Union itself and the buffer zone.

The Communist Parties of the capitalist countries consequently find themselves placed in conditions absolutely different from those of the pre-war days.

In those countries where the Communist Parties are in the minority in the working class, the revolutionary upsurge has generally manifested itself through an influx of the masses into the majority parties, isolating the Communist Parties still fur-

ther, at the same time that leftist currents, such as Bevanism, are beginning to appear within these majority parties.

In countries where the working class has not yet formed its own mass parties, as is the case for the Latin-American countries, among others, the Communist Parties as a rule represented the strongest tendency in the existing political movement of the class. Their Stalinist degeneration, especially their treachery during and immediately after the war, has caused a permanent crisis in these parties, which is becoming accentuated with the rise of the mass movement in Latin America and their inability to offer it a revolutionary outcome. The crisis in these parties can lead the major part of the communist cadres to come close to the Fourth International and even join its ranks. This on condition that the Trotskyist organizations fulfill their task of revolutionary leadership of the masses and adopt a dynamic and flexible attitude toward the communist militants by seeking a common basis in action which would facilitate their transition to Trotskyism.

As for the mass Communist Parties, their relations with Moscow are being subjected to conditions drastically different from the past: the very power of the mass movement in their own countries, developing in the direction of revolutionary struggles, asserts itself increasingly. Relations with Moscow become loosened (during the war there were even prolonged disruptions in certain cases). Finally, it is in place to add, since the recent developments in the USSR, there has been an uncertainty on the part of the CP leaderships about the policy of the Kremlin and — on the part of the rank and file—there are possibilities of a critical attitude toward the regime in the Soviet Union and in the « People's Democracies. »

This international situation and its repercussions on the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries thus open up two ways for the decline of Stalinism in the workers' movement under its control:

In countries where the CPs are a minority in the workers' movement, the tendencies around which the masses tend to polarize themselves (whether it be the revolutionary party as in Bolivia or centrist tendencies as in England or Japan) have increasing chances of definitively eliminating Stalinist influence over the workers' movement provided they acquire a correct revolutionary leadership and orientation. These tendencies serve in effect as the pole of attraction for all the healthy workers' forces, causing the Stalinist influence to crumble, and subsequently promoting internal crises and even splits under the pressure of isolation. But an erroneous policy or acts of treachery by the centrist leaderships can at a later stage revive the chances of the CPs even in these countries.

In countries where the CPs are a majority in the working class, they can, in certain exceptional conditions (advanced disintegration of the possessing classes) and under the pressure of very powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses, be led to project a revolutionary orientation counter to the Kremlin's directives, without abandoning the political and theoretical baggage inherited from Stalinism. They will do this all the more so because the masses, who are still seeking, as they will continue to seek for a whole period to come, to make use of those parties to satisfy their aspirations, have acquired a more critical attitude toward their leaderships than in the past and are no longer prepared to follow no matter what turn of these parties. Under these conditions, the disintegration of Stalinism in these parties must not be understood in the next immediate stage as an organizational disintegration of these parties or as a public break with the Kremlin but as a gradual internal transformation, accompanied by a political differentiation within their midst. It is even possible that such a process of Stalinist disintegration may be accompanied in some Communist mass parties by a certain consolidation or an organizational strengthening, to the extent that, under the pressure of circumstances, they modify their policies to conform closer to the interests of the masses. This perspective—namely not an organizational disintegration of the mass Communist Parties, but rather a disintegration, molecular for an entire period, of the Stalinist ideas inside these parties, as well as of the bureaucratic relations which extend from the Kremlin down to the ranks of these parties — is essential for determining the forms of intervention by our movement in this process in order to make it evolve in a direction favorable to revolutionary Marxism.

46. The evolution of future relations between the Kremlin and the leaderships of the mass Communist Parties, and between these parties and the masses, depends on several factors:

In the first place on the scope and rate of the revolutionary upsurge the world over, notably in the industrialized countries of Western Europe.

On the reawakening of the proletarian masses in the USSR itself and its consequences upon the regime of Soviet society.

On how the war unfolds between imperialism and the anti-imperialist camp.

On the capacity to intervene evinced by a revolutionary leadership, so as to place itself at the head of the mass currents, notably those which appear either inside the mass Communist Parties or inside the mass Socialist Parties.

It is impossible to foresee exactly the action and interaction of these basic factors. In any case it is possible to indicate that the greater the scope of the revolutionary upsurge, and the closer it impin-

ges upon industrially advanced countries, then the more the political initiative will slip out of the Kremlin's hands, while centrist tendencies will become accentuated inside the mass Communist Parties affected by this upsurge. In the same way, the more that the revolutionary upsurge passes under a consistent revolutionary leadership, and the greater its tendency to have direct repercussions in the Soviet Union itself, then the more able will this leadership be to deal a mortal blow to Stalinism in its very heart, even before the majority of the communist militants in these countries have freed themselves from the Kremlin's control and influence.

This entire dynamic is neither unswerving nor uniform. It must be understood as a complex dialectical process with many contradictions and partial swings backward. It does not exclude but on the contrary implies: a) the possibility for the mass Communist Parties to carry out temporary turns to the right within given conditions, as long as mass pressure has not reached its culminating point; b) the possibility of expulsions or break-aways of numerically restricted groups of militants and cadres; c) the possibility, during the war, of open counter-revolutionary actions by the Kremlin against mass movements, especially those that will be still isolated.

But it is important to understand the *general direction* of the evolution in which these variants will occupy a less and less important place, in which the mass revolutionary movements will more and more succeed in liberating themselves from the Kremlin's control, whatever may be their initial form or their initial leadership.

This process of disintegration of Stalinism by no means signifies that for the mass Communist Parties there will take place a gradual transformation of these organizations into revolutionary Marxist parties. Crises and great transformations will be necessary and inevitable for revolutionary Marxist parties under the banner of the Fourth International to emerge from this. But these transformations which will mark the complete end of Stalinism will come as the culminating points of a process which at present begins by stages in the course of which the Communist Parties, compelled to seek to strengthen their ties with the masses, begin to shake off, often in scarcely perceptible ways, the rigid ties of Stalinist obedience.

#### IV

#### THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

47. The Fourth International issued from the Left Opposition of the S.U. Communist Party and from the Bolshevik-Leninist fraction of the Third International. It originated in the defense against Stalinist revisionism of Lenin's programme, of

Leninist strategy and tactics, of the principal lessons of October and of the revolutionary defeats in Europe and Asia. The Fourth International, and the Soviet Left Opposition and the International Left Opposition which preceded it, were in a large measure born from the struggle against the theory of « socialism in one country, » against the theory of the « bloc of the four classes, » against the conceptions of building socialism at a « tortoise pace » or « in giant strides, » against the opportunist tactics of unprincipled alliances with the reformist bureaucracy, with the peasant parties, with the national bourgeoisie in the colonies, and against the ultra-left tactic of « social-fascism. » This principled origin of the Trotskyist movement represents its great strength. For the first time in the history of the workers' movement, an international organization was constituted exclusively on the basis of agreement of the cadres with a precise programme, strategy, and tactics. But at the same time in this strength lay a sure danger of great weakness because of its being cut off from the workers' movement: that of the transformation of the Trotskyist organization into a discussion club and into an academic sect of Marxist critics of Stalinist policy. The founders of the Fourth International, especially Leon Trotsky, were to such a degree conscious of this danger that as early as 1933 they concentrated all their efforts upon rooting the Trotskyist nuclei in the mass movement, upon reestablishing ties with this movement wherever they had been broken, and upon selecting a new generation of Trotskyist workers' cadres. In some countries, such as the United States, this task had already made great progress prior to World War II. In Europe, in Asia, in the greater part of the Latin American countries, the blows dealt to our movement by Stalinist terror and by imperialist and fascist persecutions, by the lack of continuity of our leaderships and our principal cadres, but above all by the effects of the world-wide ebb of the workers' movement, prevented the solution of this task prior to and during the Second World War. It is only in the course of the new revolutionary upsurge, beginning with 1943, that the international movement became fully conscious of this new stage into which the Trotskyist organizations had to enter, the stage of the practical application of the Transitional Programme. It is beginning with the Third World Congress and with the Tenth Plenum of the IEC that the majority of the Trotskyist organizations acquired a concrete conception of the manner in which they must root themselves within the mass movement of their country and conquer leadership therein.

48. The origin of the Fourth International in a factional struggle inside the Third International against the Stalinist fraction of the international

communist movement has given rise to deviations in the Trotskyist movement which considered the struggle against the deviations and crimes of Stalinism as their main function. In reality the role of the Fourth International was and remains quite different. It was not by accident that at the very inception of the Trotskyist movement is to be found the struggle for the theory of the Permanent Revolution which is the most conscious expression of the social dynamic of our epoch. The Fourth International opposes all other workers' leaderships which represent only special, selfish, bureaucratically or nationally narrow interests, whether they are reformist, centrist, Stalinist, or of any other variety. The Fourth International opposes any attempt to limit the action of the workers to the defense of positions already conquered, whether these be bourgeois democracy, the Soviet state or the Yugoslav state. It represents the interests as a whole of the international proletariat and its historic goals, the world-wide realization of the socialist revolution, the world-wide construction of the communist society. It is because the socialist revolution is distinguished from every other revolution by the high degree of consciousness it requires from the vanguard of the class which carries it out, that this goal cannot be definitively achieved without the building of a workers' leadership that has assimilated the programme of the Fourth International. The Fourth International does not conceive of winning over the workers' vanguard and the masses to its programme and to its organization by opposing itself to the actual movement of the masses, but by integrating itself into it, by fusing itself with it, and by aiding through its political and practical intervention its advance and the selection of new leading cadres within its ranks.

49. The particular conditions in which the Fourth International was born — in contrast to the First, the Second, and the Third Internationals, it was born not in a period of rise but in a period of ebb of the working-class movement — determined in the last analysis the slow rate of growth of its organizations and their great weakness at the beginning of the upsurge in 1943. From this fact, as much as from the still limited character of this upsurge, above all in the countries of Western Europe, has flowed the impossibility for the Fourth International to become a leading force of this upsurge in most of the countries of the world. This in its turn has facilitated the manoeuvres of the Soviet bureaucracy to control, check, and stop this upsurge. But it is precisely during this same stage that in many important countries more solid Trotskyist leaderships and cadres have been selected. For this reason the Fourth International enters the next stage of the upsurge and especially will enter the Third World War with a solidity

infinitely superior to that of 1939 and with far more serious and tangible chances of asserting itself and of rallying round its programme a genuine revolutionary leadership of the masses in many countries.

50. The rise of Stalinism was inaugurated by a ferocious struggle against the Left Opposition in the Soviet Union and against the International Left Opposition because these incarnated, as against the conservative interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, the genuine interests of the international and the Soviet proletariat. Despite the attempts of the state apparatus, the most powerful in the world, to crush them, the handful of conscious revolutionaries who at this period formed the Trotskyist movement not only survived but also transmitted intact to the younger generations in most of the countries of the world the entire Leninist programmatic heritage as against the falsifications of the Kremlin. The decline of Stalinism opens up, in varying degrees, favorable conditions for an upsurge of the Trotskyist movement in the entire world. In all countries where the decline of Stalinism is the direct product of the power of the revolutionary upsurge, Trotskyism, Trotskyist ideas, and the Trotskyist programme are experiencing a striking confirmation, and it depends, at bottom, upon the tactical organizational flexibility of our organizations whether they profit to the full from this confirmation. In the USSR itself and in the buffer-zone countries, the existing stage, preliminary to or the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge and characterized by a process of differentiation, of uncertainty, of sharp turns, and even panic among the Stalinist leaders, is very favorable to the reappearance of our ideas and our organization within the working-class movement. Upon the capacity of the International to utilize the slightest fissures in the apparatus for the introduction of our ideas will depend whether this reappearance will take place in a conscious and organized form or whether it will begin by assuming more confused and more complicated forms. As for the countries which will be drawn into the revolutionary upsurge at the next stage, immediately on the eve or in the course of the war, the International has been specially armed to utilize to the maximum the opportunities offered for increasing the influence of our organizations and assuring their breaking through. The disorder and confusion which reign in the leading Stalinist circles, arising both from political problems they are unable to solve and from the latest events in the Soviet Union, will aid us greatly in this task. The significance of our intervention in the world crisis which is shaking Stalinism can be specified as follows: to regain the maximum of the cadres and honest revolutionary militants working for the communist cause in the ranks of the CPs that the crisis of Stalinism is shaking and will shake more and

more; to assure the new revolutionary leadership of the proletariat; to assure the proletarian victory with the least possible expense in regard to the defense of the already existing conquests of the revolution as well as the duration and convulsions of the revolutionary epoch. If we learn how to com-

bine intransigent principled firmness with an extreme tactical flexibility with regard to the integration of our forces in the real mass movement, we shall make the decline and downfall of Stalinism coincide with the triumph of the Fourth International and of the world revolution.

## II

# *Decline and Fall of Stalinism*

## RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS

### PREAMBLE

The theses, « Rise and Decline of Stalinism, » adopted by the Fourth World Congress of the Fourth International, applied to the analysis of the dynamics of Soviet society the general conclusions that the Fourth International had drawn from the reevaluation of the world situation carried out at its Third World Congress.

The dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy, the political expropriation and atomization of the proletariat of the USSR, were the result of the worldwide retreat of the revolutionary forces before those of reaction. They resulted, furthermore, from the relationship of economic and social forces, highly unfavorable to the proletariat, within the USSR itself.

The fundamental change in the international situation and in the internal situation within the USSR, characterized on the one hand by the worldwide upsurge of the revolutionary forces since 1943 and especially since the victory of the Chinese revolution, and on the other hand by the spectacular successes of planification which made the USSR the second industrial power in the world, destroyed the objective bases for the full sway and power of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The evolution of the international correlation of forces in favor of the anticapitalist social strata was paralleled by an evolution of the correlation of forces inside the USSR in favor of the proletariat and at the cost of the bureaucracy. This evolution steadily increased the pressure of the masses on the bureaucratic dictatorship, obliging it to make important concessions to the masses, first only in the economic field, then also, and more and more, in the political field.

We thus considered the « new course » of the Kremlin not as a movement of self-reform by the bureaucracy, but as a movement of self-defense by it. While promoting and even hastening the awakening of the movement of the masses by its

objective consequences, especially by the divisions that it created from the top to the bottom of the bureaucratic ladder, the « new course » was not, we considered, a substitute for, but rather a preparatory phase of, the political revolution of the masses against the bureaucracy.

The more and more dramatic events that have followed one another in the USSR itself, in the « People's Democracies, » and in the CPs of the capitalist countries, since the Fourth World Congress, have confirmed the correctness of this analysis, which rendered our movement the only tendency in the international workers' movement capable of foreseeing and correctly interpreting the evolution of the world crisis of Stalinism.

The rehabilitation of Tito, the spectacular decisions of the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, the sensational revelations of the Khrushchev report, the outburst of « speeded-up democratization » in several « Peoples' Democracies, » the « critical » evolution of the Communist Parties of Italy, Great Britain, the USA, etc., the Poznan revolt, the political revolution in Poland and Hungary — these are so many stages in the steady decline of Stalinism and the beginning of its fall, they are so many leaps forward in a process that the theses « Rise and Decline of Stalinism » had fully analyzed.

The Fifth World Congress of the Fourth International — faced with the final phase of this process which has plainly begun in a whole sector still dominated only yesterday by the Soviet bureaucracy — is above all concerned with defining the precise conditions for the fall of Stalinism, the conditions for an upsurge and victory of the revolutionary proletariat on the ruins of the crumbling dictatorship.

That is why the present theses do not take up again either the historical expositions or the structural analyses and definitions of the theses « Rise and Decline of Stalinism, » of which they are neither a substitute nor a corrective, but a natural continuation and thus an integral part.

I — THE DECLINE AND FALL OF STALINISM  
IN THE USSR

1. — Since 1953 Soviet industry has grown at a rhythm far surpassing that of the growth of the most advanced capitalist countries. In many fields (fuels; petroleum, partially; machine construction; automation; industrial use of nuclear energy), the Soviet economy has succeeded in overcoming the backwardnesses and unevennesses of the end of the Stalin era, and achieving progress that surpasses everything that it had known in the past. The first partial reconversion of heavy industry, carried out in 1953 in favor of certain durable consumer goods (watches, bicycles, television sets, sewing machines, washing machines, etc.) permitted surpassing in a few years in this field too, formerly so neglected, the production of all capitalist countries except the USA, and perceptibly raising the living standards of the working masses.

At the same time the Soviet economy continues to suffer from two disproportions which represent the principal inheritance from the Stalin era: on one hand, the disproportion between heavy industry and light industry, and, on the other, the disproportion between industry and agriculture. These disproportions are the main cause of the fact that, despite the unquestionable successes in raising the living standards of the masses during the last years, consumption still remains very much below that in capitalist countries having an industrial proletariat proportionately comparable to that of the USSR. This is particularly true concerning high-grade food products (meat, dairy products, imported fruits), durable consumer goods (household articles, scooters, radios, automobiles, etc.), and the quality of semi-durable consumer goods (clothing and shoes). The crisis in housing continues to be more than ever the almost universal grounds for discontent among the working population.

The backwardness in agriculture compared to the general boom in the economy is the main worry of the present leaders of the bureaucracy. They tried to do away with it either by by-passing the kolkhoz peasantry (the so-called « virgin land » policy), or by stimulating the private interests of the peasantry (e. g. upward adjustment of the price of potatoes), or by threatening them with suppressing the last vestiges of private exploitation (attacks against private market-gardens and livestock). But in the absence of a correct and coherent overall policy, the fragmentary and often contradictory results of these different efforts did not permit the agricultural crisis as such to be solved.

The malpractices of excessive bureaucratic centralization continue to weigh upon the Soviet economy, despite the first timid measures of administrative decentralization in industry. They are sum-

marized in the officially admitted percentage of productive workers in the whole of Soviet manpower, which is not over 35 %.

The sum total of these contradictions and disproportions represents a strong brake on the development of the productive forces in the Soviet Union. The replacement of bureaucratic management by democratic workers' management, the preparation, adoption, and execution of the plan under the control of the masses, would permit a considerable increase in the productivity of labor, reducing overhead and waste, and guarantee a higher standard of living for the working class and the laboring peasants, without slowing down the rhythm at which the economy is advancing.

2. — With the improvement in the masses' living standards, which was particularly considerable in 1953 and 1954, the economic and social demands of the different social strata, far from diminishing, were manifested in a more and more clear and open fashion. They went beyond the stage of immediate demands — better food-supplies; better quality of industrial products; better workers' housing; higher prices for purchases by the State; more freedom of trade; cheaper industrial products for the peasants — to reach the stage of demands expressing the social logic of the different classes or strata composing Soviet society. Thus the policy of concessions under mass pressure, temporarily braked after the fall of Malenkov, started advancing again during the preparation, the holding, and the aftermath of the XXth Congress.

Two general currents, fundamentally opposed to each other, are showing themselves and having a parallel development in Soviet society; they are beginning to state their demands:

a) The current of the most active and conscious part of the working class, which tends more and more to raise the question of the *administration of the plants*. These workers obtained important concessions at the XXth Congress (raising of low salaries, equalization of pensions, etc.). Workers skilfully seized on the « struggle against the personality cult » to fight the principle of « single command » (i. e., the arbitrary omnipotence of the manager) within the plant. They also obtained the recognition in principle that the Labor Code — the severest in the world! — must be revised. The attempts to introduce a reform into the salary system which — on the pretext of a struggle against the excesses of Stakhanovism and against the system of graduated bonuses — in reality reduced the overall pay of the most skilled workers, were successfully combated. The proletarian current will take its inspiration from the example of the Polish and Hungarian trade-unions to demand a return of the unions to their genuine historical function: the

defense of the specific interests of the workers — if needs be, against the administration and the bureaucratically degenerated State.

b) The current of the most conscious representatives of the most privileged layers of the bureaucracy (managers of trusts and factories, chief engineers, army generals, etc.), who are seeking to obtain *additional legal guarantees* for their privileges, as these are more and more brought in question by the pressure of the masses and their beginning to take action. This current had scored points especially during the year 1955, at the Moscow industrial conference (the demand and obtention of a model status for managers; increase in the prerogatives of supervisory personnel within the plants), but workers' pressure aiming at revising the Labor Code threatens to destroy part of these advantages. The bureaucracy demanded and obtained at the XXth Congress the extension of the bonus system in favor of the administrative personnel. It is asking for a liberalization of the Penal Code in economic matters and is obtaining particularly the right for each industrial enterprise to sell certain production goods, which broadens (and legalizes) the grey market in these goods and introduces a disintegrating factor into planning.

As for the peasantry, it has scarcely had an opportunity to formulate in an articulate way any long-range social demands. It can be supposed, however, that above all it obstinately intends to hang on to its little bits of private land, on which a considerable part of its effort is concentrated and from which it derives a disproportionately high percentage of its income. The fact that it has just received from Khrushchev the right to sell freely the products of these little plots constitutes an important concession in its favor, and will induce it to increase the production of vegetables and stock-raising products.

Thus the continuance of the « new course » is inexorably preparing the big show-down between the proletariat and the more privileged layers of the bureaucracy, a show-down which will have as its main stake the administration of the plants and which will inevitably raise all the questions of the structure and control of the economy and of the workers' state.

3. — Since the period of preparation for the XXth Congress, it had become plain that a revolt was rumbling on the intellectual workers' front in the USSR. The virulent and well-justified criticism to which, one after another, the cinema, the theatre, literary, artistic, architectural, scientific, and philosphic productions were subjected, revealed both the lamentable failure of Jdanovism and the passionate desire of a new generation of artists, writers, and savants to free themselves from « directives » that were ignorant, and at variance with the genuine

exigencies of their work. The Soviet intellectual youth demanded freedom of criticism, thought, and creation, and it demanded it so loudly that certain serious concessions had to be made to it.

But to grant artists and savants a freedom of criticism in politics and economics, not enjoyed by citizens and above all by workers, is to make of artistic creation and scientific research an *inevitable instrument of social criticism*. The broad extent of this criticism, even from artists who were liegemen of the bureaucracy (Ehrenburg!), surprised and worried the bureaucratic tops — whence their efforts to check the current and even turn it backward, to return to a more « sincere » « socialist realism, » to tolerate only those critics who « respect the correct general line of the party. » The ups-and-downs of Soviet history-writing — clinging to most of the Stalinist legend up to the eve of the XXth Congress, then seeming to break free, only to fall back under the ferule of bureaucratic control, whether it be exercised by a Molotov or by even more narrow-minded functionaries — clearly characterize the zigzags of a bureaucracy faced with the demand-for freedom of criticism by the intellectuals.

But despite the desperate resistance of this bureaucracy, despite the steps backward, the delays, and even the reactions shown in this or that field, the battle for freedom of thought in the USSR won at the XXth Congress tremendous victories whose effects cannot be wiped out. Filtering inexorably through all the cracks and crevices henceforth opened up in the shaking dictatorship, the spirit of criticism, the spirit of rebellion, will penetrate into the political field and will strike the spark of the political revolution.

4. — The XXth Congress marked a high point in the crisis which has been shaking the Bonapartist tops of the Soviet bureaucracy since Stalin's death, and which is itself the reflection of the basic change in the relationship of forces between the proletariat and the bureaucracy. Under the pressure of the masses and of a discontent that was beginning to take on a political aspect, the leading nucleus of the bureaucracy was torn into various tendencies: a tendency in favor of major concessions to the masses (Malenkov-Mikoyan?); a tendency for stiffening the dictatorship (Kaganovitch-Molotov?); a « centrist » tendency (Khrushchev-Bulganin). Faced by an open attempt of the « liberals » to capitalize on the hatred of the masses toward Stalin by openly attacking for the first time the authority of the defunct dictator, Khrushchev tried to neutralize this manoeuvre by himself launching a much more violent attack against Stalin in his secret report. Thus, having tried in vain to make Beria shoulder all its collective crimes, the bureaucracy made its own chief the main scapegoat, thus winning a short

respite before having to face a political opposition.

This colossal manoeuvre, of really historic scope, showed from the beginning the marks of the haste and even panic that engendered it. At no moment were the leaders of the bureaucracy able to control, or even to foresee, the forces that they were thus setting loose. While they perhaps delayed the appearance of an anti-Stalinist oppositional tendency within the CP of the USSR, and perhaps temporarily won back some sympathy in certain intellectual circles and lower layers of the bureaucracy, they at the same time set going a real snowballing movement which will end up by crushing them.

By destroying in so thorough a fashion the authority of Stalin, the incarnation of all bureaucratic autocracy, they definitively undermined the authority and spirit of bureaucratic command at every level. By cynically revealing the monstrous crimes of Stalin, with which they had nevertheless been associated, they definitively destroyed the blind obedience of Communist militants toward their leadership, while covering themselves with discredit. By explaining the thus revealed horrors by an inverted « personality cult, » they satisfied nobody, and opened the way to a critical Marxist analysis of Soviet society and its bureaucratic degeneration.

The XXth Congress thus raised to the pitch of paroxysm the crisis of Stalinism in several countries, especially in the « People's Democracies » where the masses were on the threshold of revolt. By unleashing a movement which speeded up the outbreak of the political revolution, it temporarily transferred the centre of gravity of the struggle between the proletariat and the bureaucracy to outside the borders of the USSR. Thrown into consternation by the breadth of the revolutionary force thus set free, the bureaucracy vainly tried to take a step backward and to check destalinization (Summer 1956). These backward steps ended by exasperating the masses even more, especially in Poland and Hungary, and finally faced the Kremlin with the necessity of repressing the mass revolutionary movements in these countries by force. Through the Soviet soldiers in contact with this powerful revolutionary movement, the wave of the political revolution will flow back from the « glacis » into the USSR itself, thus signing the death-verdict for the bureaucracy at bay.

The first repercussions of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, furthermore, were the exacerbation of the fraction struggle in the very centre of the Kremlin leadership. Threatened by a temporary bloc made against him by the Malenkov and the Molotov-Kaganovitch tendencies, outvoted in the Political Bureau (Presidium), Khrushchev was able to stay in power only by making a direct appeal to

the Central Committee over the heads of the Political Bureau, and by eliminating his adversaries from the « collective leadership. » By using classic Stalinist methods (calumnies, amalgams, falsification of history) for this purpose, he diminished his credit still further among the more and more critical circles of the bureaucracy's lower layers and of the proletariat. By involving a part of the party cadres more directly in the solution of this dispute, he contributed, in his own way, to the politicization of the masses, and prepared the following stage during which those opposed to him may well carry an appeal against him to the Congress and to the party rank and file.

5. — Thus the objective and subjective preconditions for the revolution are rapidly ripening in the Soviet Union. After having lost the aureole of omniscience, the Kremlin has now lost that of omnipotence. Having abandoned the mantle of autocracy, the bureaucracy is now losing the mask of enlightened liberalism. With an unheard-of rapidity, history is forcing Stalin's heirs to throw down all their cards and to face empty-handed, so to speak, the assault of the masses.

The more that popular pressure grows, the more the divergences at the top will tend to be accentuated. The neo-Stalinist tendency will see in the concessions already granted the cause of the drive of the masses and will try to put a stop to « liberalization, » bringing into question even the concessions made since 1953. The « liberal » tendency, on the contrary, will understand that the drive from below will continue to grow if the dictatorship does not recognize, at least partially, the people's anxieties, and will prepare a new wave of « destalinization », perhaps even more sensational than that of the XXth Congress. Both, however, are trying only to preserve and defend the privileges of the bureaucracy as a whole. Both will be led more and more to appeal to the army, the only effective tool of repression remaining after the dismantling of the police, to arbitrate their conflicts.

The temporary elimination of Malenkov and of Molotov-Kaganovitch, far from putting an end to this faction struggle, will make it still more violent. Under present conditions, where the relationship of forces is evolving in a way that is unfavorable for the bureaucracy in the USSR, and where the antagonistic currents in society have a tendency to be indirectly reflected within the leading clique itself, it is impossible that the bureaucracy's Bonapartist tops accept once more the iron reign of a super-arbitrator. While the leading staff continues to tear at each other and to discredit itself collectively in the eyes of the masses by its repeated and rapid turnabouts, the rôle of arbitrator will more and more pass over into the hands of the army

leaders, while among the lower and middle cadres of the party, the trade-unions, and especially the youth, there will be produced the first crystallizations of semi-proletarian tendencies aiming at the reestablishment of soviet democracy. It is only at the moment when the masses enter directly into action that the great social currents will find their own political expression in mutually opposed political groupings.

This growing tension between the masses and the bureaucracy, between the different currents within the bureaucracy, and between the worries of the army soldiers and the function of repression assigned to them (Hungary!) — all these are drawing near a violent explosion. Let a group within the bureaucratic leadership be led to appeal to the masses; let the masses go into the streets to settle an economic, social, or political question which is close to their hearts; let vanguard currents within the youth, the working class, or even the army, begin spontaneously to formulate a programme of political demands, or let there be an interaction or combination among these different factors — and an open collision between the forces that want to keep the basic institutions of the dictatorship (single party with bureaucratic structure; trade-unions at the service of the state; omnipotence of the managers; formalistic character of representative institutions; great differences in income) and the masses who want to undertake a democratic administration of the state and the economy will be on the order of the day. The transformation of the *pressure* of the masses into *direct action* of the masses will in this way signalize the beginning of the political revolution in the USSR.

## II — DECLINE AND FALL OF STALINISM IN THE « PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES »

6. — The economic, social, and political development of the « People's Democracies » has not in recent years been parallel to that of the USSR. Whereas in the Soviet Union production, productivity, real wages, and the living standards of the population have in the last eight years increased in a regular though uneven way, the development of the economy in the countries of the Soviet « glacis » has been much more contradictory. This is owing above all to the special forms of exploitation that the bureaucracy had introduced into these countries (reparations, Soviet corporations, mixed companies, trade treaties with one-sided preferential tariffs, etc.), an exploitation that has weighed heavily upon the economy of the « People's Democracies » and partly neutralized their unquestionable advances in industrialization. Though the crudest forms of this exploitation began to be suppressed after the 17 June

1953 revolt in Berlin, the after-effects of this policy have been kept up till today, especially in the matter of trade policy.

The attempt to apply to each of the countries called « People's Democracies » the Stalinist schema of industrialization (absolute priority of heavy industry, plus autarky) was to have the most unfortunate consequences, especially in countries like East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which had formerly been deeply integrated in the world market, and partially remained so until the Korean War and the imperialist « blockade. » The attempts at coördination of the « glacis » economies as a whole, or even the development of a joint plan, were tardy, timid, and marked by the idea of « completing » the more or less autarkic national economies and not by a spirit of joint planning in the common interest of the peoples of the « glacis. »

The higher living standards to which the workers were accustomed, especially the Germans and Czechs and partially the Poles and Hungarians; the even fiercer attachment of the peasants to small property, whose tradition was more ancient; the existence of urban middle classes that were more numerous and had more solid political and social traditions than in Russia; lastly the power of the Catholic church, which served in practically all these countries as the main rallying point for the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois oppositions to the regime of « democracy » — all these factors have from the beginning given a greater social instability to the societies of the « People's Democracies » compared to the USSR.

If there is added to the foregoing the fact that it is scarcely seven or eight years since the opposition parties were eliminated, that the workers keep up a trade-union tradition that leads them to oppose any excessive raise in work-norms by passive resistance, slowdowns, or even outright strikes, that peasant property and private enterprise remain predominant in the agriculture of the whole « glacis, » then it is understandable that bureaucratic planning had to face up to much more dangerous tensions than in the USSR, and that it even broke down at times when faced with those difficulties that it had itself partly brought about.

Thus industrial production followed a jerky rhythm, some years being marked by stagnation or even recession in certain sectors. The real income of workers even went down at certain periods (Poland 1951-1952, Hungary and East Germany 1952-1953, Czechoslovakia 1953), and in numerous cases just stagnated. Poland and Hungary had in 1955 a standard of living scarcely superior to 1949, and doubtless inferior to 1938, at least for the workers. Czechoslovakia has raised its standard of living in the course of recent years, but it scarcely

exceeds that of 1947 and 1936. East Germany, also in great progress since 1949, remains below the level of 1936, and especially below that of West Germany. If in Rumania and Bulgaria the pre-war level has been largely surpassed, that has been brought about partly at the cost of difficulties in food supplies, difficulties which are furthermore common to all these countries, once the granary of Europe, demonstrating the complete bankruptcy of Stalinist agricultural policy.

7. — Based on objective conditions very different from those in the Soviet Union, the relationships between the toiling masses and the Stalinist parties in power, as well as the relationships between the masses and the state, are far more differentiated and far more contradictory than in the USSR. Thus, though the CP of the USSR can scarcely be considered any longer a workers' party in the sociological meaning of the term (it is to a large extent composed of bureaucrats, as is confirmed by the statistics published on the occasion of its XIXth and XXth Congresses), this is not the case with the CPs of the different countries of the « glacis, » in which the majority of the advanced workers continue to be active (especially Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and to a lesser degree until 1956, Poland and Hungary). The trade-unions of these countries are still of a contradictory nature, the bureaucracy considering them just extensions of their own arms, the workers often keeping up the hope — which proved justified, especially in East Germany on 17 June 1953, at Poznan, and in Hungary — of being able once more to use them for their own ends.

For all these reasons, tendency struggles can be launched more easily in these parties than in the CP of the USSR, and above all these tendency struggles can have a much wider echo among the rank-and-file and the most advanced layers of the working class. Since their objective living conditions are much worse than those of the Soviet working class, these tendency struggles become a preparatory stage of mass action. These overall objective conditions, as well as the relatively much greater weakness of the state and party bureaucratic apparatus, considerably reduce the time-lapse between the outbreak of these tendency struggles — under the pressure of all the social contradictions — and the beginning of the political revolution of the masses.

Furthermore, the isolation of the bureaucratic apparatus from society as a whole is much greater in the « People's Democracies » than in the Soviet Union. The apparatus installed from abroad finds itself faced with the still living autonomous class forces; it has not yet been able to surround itself with a broad layer of labor aristocrats; it has infinitely more limited material means at its disposal;

it has been crippled by the 1948-1953 series of purges. That is why such an apparatus, terrified by fear of a popular opposition, is without real means of defense apart from open repression, and hangs desperately on to « friendship with the Soviet Union » (i. e. subordination to the Kremlin) and to the « principle of the monolithic party, » unable to tolerate the slightest fissure without risking loss of power.

This is the explanation of the paradoxical fact that the *first impulse* toward « destalinization » came from the Soviet Union, where the position of the bureaucracy is relatively more solid, whereas the *most revolutionary effects* of this « destalinization » were felt in the « People's Democracies, » where it was the immediate starting-point for the political revolution.

Lastly there must be taken into account the increased violence with which the *national question* is showing itself in the countries of the « glacis. » The leaders of the Stalinist parties there appear generally as Quislings imposed by a foreign power. The opposition within the CPs capitalizes on national feeling. The struggle for the « national road toward socialism » thus takes on there a highly progressive and revolutionary value, contrary to that in the CPs of the West, where it generally covers up a turn toward codified rightist opportunism. Gomulka in Poland, Nagy in Hungary, tomorrow perhaps Harnstedt or Ackermann in East Germany, by becoming in the eyes of the masses symbols of a struggle for national emancipation, are creating favorable conditions for a renewal of popularity for the CP (through its « national » tendency) and permitting the political revolution under oppositional communist leadership to mobilize national feeling in its favor. This has occurred especially in a classical form in Poland.

8. — The revolt of the Yugoslav CP against the Kremlin in 1948, which was the first stage of the international crisis of Stalinism and the remote origin of « destalinization, » has continued to influence the relations between the « glacis » countries and the USSR, as well as the internal evolution in these different countries. During this last period, however, this influence has also revealed its profoundly contradictory nature, itself an expression of the contradictory nature of the Yugoslav CP — a centrist party that stopped on an opportunist and pragmatic line halfway between Stalinism and revolutionary Marxism.

In the process of « destalinization » started by the Soviet bureaucracy as a movement of self-defense under the pressure of the masses, the CP leadership was obliged sooner or later to bring up again the case of the Yugoslav CP. Khrushchev's spectacular trip to Belgrade; the spectacular rehabilitation of Tito; the absurd explanation of the Soviet-Yugoslav

crisis by reference to the « machinations of the traitor Beria » — these were the first sledge-hammer blows that the new leadership of the bureaucracy had to give to Stalin's authority, and, on the rebound, to its own authority and to any bureaucratic authority within the communist movement. The Yugoslav communists themselves insisted that the genuine responsibilities for the break be sought not in Beria but in Stalin and in the whole political system in effect in the USSR during the Stalin era. They once more played a highly progressive role in the international communist movement, during the whole crucial period of preparation for the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR.

Simultaneously the rehabilitation of the « renegade Tito » — suddenly treated with infinitely more consideration than the lackeys Chervenkov, Rakosi, Bierut, Ulbricht, and C<sup>o</sup> — brought about, even before the XXth Congress, a profound crisis in the mutual relations among the CPs and the workers' states such as they had been conceived and set up in the Stalin era. The idea of a basic equality among all the communist parties and all the workers' states, the idea that the petty-bourgeois nationalist concept of the « leading role of the Soviet Union within the socialist camp » must be urgently revised, the idea that it was fatal in other workers' states to imitate the excesses and errors that the Soviet bureaucracy had committed in the USSR itself — made their way quickly through the CPs of the « glacis, » aiding the rapid development of « national » and « liberal » oppositions. The effects of the Khrushchev Report combined with those of Tito's rehabilitation — the two turns being furthermore inseparably linked up with each other — these tendencies played a highly progressive, and even objectively revolutionary, role within the respective CPs.

But as soon as these divergences at the top started more and more violent movements in the ranks and the masses themselves began to intervene in the political struggle, the leadership of the Yugoslav CP itself began to be afraid of the extent of popular reactions, and, from being the motor, it became the brake, of « destalinization, » trying to limit it to the replacement of one leading staff by another (Bulgaria), or even by a simple admission of the « errors committed » by the leadership in power (Rumania). The moment of this transformation of the role of the Yugoslav CP in the preparation of the political revolution in the « glacis » can be located between the first and second trip of Tito to the USSR.

It was not only subjectively but also objectively that the JCP became an obstacle on the path to the full and complete unfolding of the revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe. While the Yugoslav

experiment of worker's administration of the plants remains a progressive stimulant in all cases where a closed bureaucratic regime is maintained, the absence of adequate political democracy in the Yugoslav state and CP deeply disappointed the left oppositions in the CPs of the «glacis» who were seeking a total democratization of the workers' movement, especially in the Polish CP. Unquestionably the absence of a living and victorious example of a democratic workers' state delayed the ripening of the revolution and especially in the case of Hungary contributed to preventing a rapid revolutionary solution of the crisis created by the popular rising of 23 October. The scope and audacity of the revolution also frightened the leadership of the Yugoslav CP and produced its hesitant attitude during the decisive days in Budapest.

When, on the contrary, the Soviet bureaucracy started a big movement of pulling back from «destalinization» after the Hungarian events, and when it tried to condemn all the more or less independent currents in the CPs of Eastern Europe, the JCP, considering itself (and with good grounds) to be aimed at, felt obliged to specify and accentuate once more its opposition to Stalinism and the Soviet bureaucracy. The violent offensive launched against police terrorism making its reappearance in Hungary, Albania, Rumania, etc.; the defense, at first hesitant (Tito's speech at Pula), then clearer and more courageous (Kardelj's speech before the Yugoslav National Assembly), of the Hungarian revolution against Soviet intervention; the unconditional support given to the Polish revolution; the slogan « All power to the workers' councils » launched by the JCP for Hungary, even though after the event—these have great significance in this direction, and permit the positions taken by the JCP once again to play the role of an ideological motor in the differentiation within the CPs.

The progressive role played by the resistance of the Yugoslav CP to the Stalinist ukases is nowise brought into question again by the preceding analysis. This role already belongs to history. But history has also demonstrated by the Yugoslav example that a pragmatic opportunist policy which piles up passing «successes» on a day-by-day basis, can abruptly become a historically negative factor when the revolutionary upsurge of the masses requires decisions of another sort of audacity and in conformity with principles. That was demonstrated a first time at the moment of the Korean war. It was shown a second time during the crucial weeks of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions.

9. The political revolution in Poland dips its roots not only into the overall objective conditions of the bureaucratic dictatorship and into the

element of national oppression that the Kremlin introduced into this country, but also into the serious revolutionary traditions of the Polish workers' movement, that have shown themselves uninterruptedly, so to speak, for half a century. By rapidly breaking the iron yoke of Stalinist ideas and dogmas that were never wholly assimilated by the Polish CP—dissolved for this reason by Stalin in 1938—the political revolution in Poland linked itself again to a tradition which had no equal save that of Bolshevism. Hence the exceptionally high level of consciousness of the old and new generation of workers in Poland, which enabled the political revolution, right from its first stage, to surpass the best writings and actions of the JCP, as far as the latter had surpassed Stalinism properly speaking.

Having received its first stimulus from the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, and aided by a crisis in the leadership coinciding with that XXth Congress (Bierut's death), the awakening of communist consciousness, nurtured by the exceptionally grave economic errors committed by the Stalinist staff in power, led rapidly to a struggle of tendencies for the leadership of the party, parallel to which there developed a struggle for the return of Gomulka to that leadership.

Freedom of thought and of criticism then burst out violently within workers' organizations, encouraging public manifestations of workers' discontent. If the pressure of the masses explains « democratization, » « democratization » prepared the ground for the transformation of pressure into direct action by the masses. It is thus that there occurred the Poznan strike, the proletariat's answer to a senseless economic and social policy that was violating the workers' most immediate interests.

Poznan raised straight away the question of the struggle for the leadership of the Party. The repression and above all the calumny used against the strikers unleashed a storm of popular opposition. While a Stalinist tendency considered the strike a product of limited « democratization, » and, with the help of the Kremlin, tried to limit the « excesses » of political liberty within the workers' movement, a left opposition crystalized, determined to remake contact and unity with the working class by resolutely taking the lead in a movement of democratization of all social life. The VIIth Plenum of the CC of the Polish CP (August 1956) adopted important reforms imposed under the pressure of this opposition, but Kremlin pressure sufficed to impose on the Polish CP a paritary leadership that paralyzed in practice the application of the line of the VIIth Plenum.

From August to October 1956, from the VIIth to the VIIIth Plenum of the CC, the tendency struggle became general throughout all workers' organiza-

tions and took on a more and more tumultuous and violent form, transforming it into a fraction struggle in the course of which each fraction tried to mobilize support in the proletariat. The Stalinist right appealed to the worst anti-semitic and chauvinist instincts and launched demands of pure demagoguery; the liberal left appealed to the workers' class consciousness and desire for emancipation. It began to mobilize them against the bureaucracy.

The mass movement then attained a new level for long unknown. Spontaneously the factory workers began to demand workers' administration of the plants. Worker and student youth put itself at the head of the movement of political democratization and a return to Lenin on the theoretical plane. When Gomulka joined the left fraction at the beginning of October, its victory seemed certain. As a last resource the Stalinist fraction called the Kremlin to its aid; the brutal intervention of the Stalinist delegation at the VIIIth Plenum brought about a general mobilization of the proletariat, which occupied the factories, armed itself, and set up councils. After four days of revolutionary fever, the opposition took over the leadership of the party. The political revolution in Poland had won a first decisive stage.

By its manifold connections with the proletariat in which it had deeply rooted itself during the six months of violent political struggle; by the clarity of its criticism of Stalinism, which came quite close to revolutionary Marxism; by its programme of mobilizing the workers taking over the leadership of the economy — the left tendency, which associated itself with the centrist fraction of Gomulka in overthrowing the Stalinist leadership of the Polish CP, can be considered, especially in its advanced wing, the youth, as a nucleus for the now forming revolutionary Marxist leadership of the Polish proletariat. The alliance of this tendency with Gomulka remains unstable, subject to the contradictory influences exercised on the centrist fraction by the pressure of the masses on the one hand, drawing it each time closer to the left, and by the pressure of the Polish bureaucratic apparatus and the Soviet bureaucracy on the other, periodically pulling it away. The relationship of social forces and especially the audacity and correct tactics of the Left will definitively decide this evolution. The workers' discontent (Lodj), and the way the students hold on to the liberties won in October threaten to break it up. The relationship of social forces and above all the Left's audacity and correct tactic will definitively determine developments. The degree to which the left tendency remains faithful to its programme, applies it in practice, and binds itself ever more closely to the proletariat, will determine its capacity to fulfil completely the

role of Leninist guide to the Polish working class.

10. The political revolution in Hungary burst out in far more unfavorable conditions than those that permitted the Polish revolution to win its first stage. Among these unfavorable conditions must be listed:

(a) The much more limited Marxist tradition of the workers' movement, the traditional weakness and internal divisions of the communist movement.

(b) The more police-ridden and odious character of the Stalinist dictatorship (the Rajk trial).

(c) The lack of an alternative leadership resulting from the lack of a broadly organized tendency in the whole party and the workers' movement.

This fact led a group of intellectuals and students, the « Petöfi Circle, » who were not all communists, to play the role of guide in the democratization, the Nagy-Rakosi (Gerö) tendency struggle being no longer reflected in the leading organisms of the party.

(d) The fact that the « liberal » elements, having once risen to power in 1953, had been driven out of it after the fall of Malenkov, which brought about a purge from the party of many left elements and a hardening of the Stalinist elements.

(e) The lack of an alarm signal of the Poznan sort, which delayed the formation of a broad Nagy fraction and allowed the Stalinist elements to refuse till the last minute any substantial concession to the masses (delays in Rakosi's resignation, interventions against the Petöfi Circle, etc.).

(f) The truly criminal provocations of which the Stalinists made themselves guilty when faced with a mass movement that was powerful but still peaceful and not breaking out of the framework of « people's democracy »: Gerö's 22 October speech, the 23 October shootings, the call for the intervention of Soviet troops.

These different factors explain why the rise of the mass movement — which, from the XXth Congress of the Soviet CP up to the fall of Rakosi and even up to the victory of the first stage of the revolution in Poland, had developed in parallel with the Polish upsurge — abruptly took a more violent turn and, beginning with 23 October 1956, overflowed into an insurrectional general strike against the bureaucratic dictatorship.

This more spontaneous character of the political revolution in Hungary gave a classic proletarian form to its means of struggle and organization: street demonstrations and factory occupations; the going over of the army to the side of the people; general arming of the workers; formation of workers', soldiers', and students' councils all over the country.

There were thus assembled all the *objective* elements for a rapid and brilliant revolutionary vic-

tory, capable of raising the whole world revolutionary movement to a higher level. It was essentially the danger of that victory, and not the counter-revolutionary danger, that incited the Kremlin — after hesitations and repeated reversals of policy — to engage in military intervention against the Hungarian revolution, which threatened to extend to the whole « glacis » and to the USSR itself.

But the essentially spontaneous character of the 23 October insurrection and the lack of a revolutionary leadership capable of quickly coördinating the proletarian forces and guiding them rapidly toward the constitution of a democratic and independent republic based on the councils, permitted free manifestations of all currents in the population, the reappearance of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois parties, and even a beginning of counter-revolutionary activity, which provided the Kremlin's intervention with a semblance of justification and an alibi seized on the wing.

The revolutionary people in arms, who had risen to wrench the factories and the power from the bureaucrats, would never have tolerated that they should be restored to their old capitalist masters and landlords. It was strong enough to prevent any victory of the counter-revolution. But the less it had at its disposal a revolutionary leadership at the level of its tasks, the more prolonged became a transitional period of confusion during which the reaction could organize and show itself. The longer the bureaucracy delayed withdrawing its troops from Hungary, and the more it intervened directly against the revolution, the more exacerbated national feelings were to become and to move into the foreground of the masses' concerns. Nagy and his friends, anxious above all to take the leadership of the movement in hand again, could only adapt themselves to this evolution of popular feelings, and enter into open collision with even the most « liberal » tendencies of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Soviet military interventions against the Hungarian revolution were crimes that struck an enormous blow against the Soviet Union and the international communist movement. They were a bad setback for the Hungarian Communist Party itself, now totally cut off from the proletariat of its country. They were unable, however, to break the magnificent combativity of the Hungarian workers. These lost only the first round of the political revolution, which will arise again, invincible, from the blood-letting imposed by the Kremlin. Already the Kadar regime is forced to keep part of the conquests of 23 October. Encouraged by a fierce passive resistance and an unremitting mass pressure, the revolution will again take up its march forward, and will reestablish, with

full and complete proletarian democracy, the honor of communism in Hungary.

11. The XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, the Khrushchev Report, and the political revolution in Poland and Hungary, have had a profound influence on the CPs of all the workers' states—including that of China, where there was shown a certain delay in « destalinization, » explicable above all by the backward state of the country and the enormous objective economic difficulties that the leadership of the Chinese CP must face. But the pressure of the current of « destalinization » was sufficiently strong to impose important decisions on the Congress of the Chinese CP, especially in favor of the right to tendencies, the right of minorities to defend their ideas within the Communist Party even after majority decisions, and even the need of tolerating several « democratic » parties in a workers' state. These ideas, even if they are not put into practice in China, will help stir things up inside numerous Communist Parties, especially in Asia.

Subsequently, the contradictory pressures of social forces, revolutionary and conservative, on the international scale and even inside China, seem to have produced serious divergences within the leadership of the Chinese CP. While for one wing of this leadership the public support given to the repression of the Hungarian revolution seems to have been accompanied by an analysis of bureaucratic phenomena the public support given to the repression of the Hungarian revolution seems to have been accompanied by an analysis of bureaucratic phenomena going farther along the road of « destalinization » than any Kremlin tendency has done to date (oral report of Mao Tse-tung about the « rectification » movement and about the « contradictions » within the people), another wing, momentarily victorious, seems to have succeeded in backing up very fast (differences between Mao's speech and its publicly printed text, waves of repression, etc.). The social difficulties being met with in China itself, the strike waves, the peasant resistance to agrarian collectivization, the student rebellions, have doubtless convinced the majority of the leaders of the bureaucracy that any « Gomulkiist » course would within a short time provoke a mass uprising.

Stirrings have appeared even in the countries where the bureaucratic dictatorship was not immediately confronted by a mass movement (Harich group in East Germany, intellectuals' and students' movement in Czechoslovakia, purge in Bulgaria, etc.). The bureaucratic leaders have to make concessions, especially economic ones, to the masses, and have had to promise likewise democratic political reforms. Though the Hungarian events will inevitably delay the outbreak of mass movements in

these countries, by stimulating them to a greater conformism with the Stalinist apparatus as a whole, their long-range repercussions will render the inevitable explosions against the bureaucracy all the more violent and radical.

One of the most spectacular results of the Hungarian revolution was the Soviet declaration of 30 October. This statement attempted to establish relations between the « People's Democracies » and the USSR on a new basis, thus implicitly recognizing the element of national oppression that the Kremlin had introduced into the mutual contacts among workers' states.

Though the brutal intervention of the Kremlin in the Hungarian revolution opposes a scathing denial to the bureaucracy's protestations of good faith, its 30 October declaration will nevertheless be invoked against it every time that a tendency in a CP of the « Peoples' Democracies » will try to free itself effectively from Kremlin tutelage. It will thus become, without the bureaucracy's realizing it, a new time-bomb which will blow to bits the relationships of subordination among the communist parties and workers' states.

The immediate repercussions of the Hungarian revolution can stimulate a momentarily predominant fraction in the Kremlin to « harden » again its attitude toward the countries of the « glacis. » But the pressure of the masses cannot fail to continue to grow in these countries. The fermentation of national independence and the autonomy of the CPs toward the Soviet CP cannot fail to « break up » a large part of the youth and of the communist militants themselves. The process of the transformation of relations among workers' states, of relations of national oppression and economic exploitation, into relations of equality and fraternal collaboration, is irreversible. The more the bureaucracy grasps the importance of this process, the more it is obliged to substitute a policy of effective economic aid to the « glacis » countries for its old policy of exploitation, in order to try at least to establish an alliance, however fragile, with the leading bureaucratic groups in those countries. Any attempt to go back to the old relationship of flagrant subordination and economic exploitation of the « glacis » runs the risk of provoking uprisings there in a short time — what the Kremlin is trying at any price to avoid.

12. The theses on « The Rise and Decline of Stalinism » had characterized the period opened by Stalin's death and the acute crisis of the Soviet bureaucracy as a period in which there would rapidly ripen conditions favorable for the reconstitution of the Soviet section of the Fourth International. The experience of the Polish and Hungarian revolution has completely confirmed this prog-

nosis. Spontaneously, on the basis of their own experience and relinking up with the living Leninist tradition in the history of world communism, nuclei of left communists there reached programmatic positions close to those of the Fourth International. The formation of such nuclei is inevitable in the USSR as well, if it has not already occurred. By helping these nuclei to clarify completely their analysis of the bureaucratic dictatorship and their programme for the political revolution, by pointing out to them the way to the maintenance of living contacts with the masses and their integration in the broad currents of more or less centrist communist opposition that exist or are being formed in all the countries under the domination of the Kremlin, the Fourth International will try within the shortest possible time to achieve the constitution of genuine sections, of authentic Trotskyist organizations, in these countries. This will be the best guarantee that the new revolutionary leadership of the proletariat be rapidly forged in the fire of the revolution, and that there be reduced to a minimum the dangers of confusion and of the temporary taking over by counter-revolutionary forces in the course of mass uprisings.

### III — THE PROGRAMME OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL FOR THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION

The development of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, the rapid ripening of both the objective conditions for a political revolution in the USSR itself, the appearance of oppositional currents in the Stalinist parties of the other « People's Democracies, » as well as the whole international discussion started by the present crisis of the bureaucratic dictatorship, make the formulation by the Fourth International of a more detailed and precise programme for that revolution an urgent necessity. It is not a question of immediate or transitional demands that might be able to lead to the first mass actions against the bureaucratic dictatorship. Such demands, following in general the line of the demands incorporated in the *Transitional Programme* for the USSR, must be worked up by the revolutionary Marxists of the Soviet Union and of the « People's Democracies » on the basis of the concrete conditions existing in those countries. The programme sketched out below is the one that revolutionary Marxists present to already awakened and politically active masses, on the eve of, during, and on the morrow of, the outbreak of the political revolution. It is the programme for the building of soviet democracy in the state and the economy, a crucial problem of the political revolution, around which the discussion among advanced

workers is concentrated, as the Polish and Hungarian examples have proved.

Such a programme can no longer be based merely on generalization of the experience of the democratic workers' state of the first years after the October revolution. It must at the same time base itself on the numerous experiences that the working class movement has accumulated since then: that of the degeneration of the Soviet bureaucratic state; that of the Third International and of the Communist Parties; that of the Spanish revolution; those, whether positive or negative, of the Yugoslav, Chinese, Polish, and Hungarian revolutions; those of the so-called « People's Democracies, » as well as the demands put forth by the proletarian vanguard and the revolutionary youth in struggle against the bureaucratic dictatorship, for the establishment of a true soviet power (in particular in the days of 16-17 June 1953 in East Berlin and throughout the whole of the DDR; at the end of May 1953 in Czechoslovakia; the revolts at Vorkuta and other forced labor camps in the USSR since the second half of 1953; those of the June 1956 strike at Poznan, etc.).

13. The organization of the workers' state must be reviewed in the light of classic Leninist theory on the subject, that is, the theory of soviet democracy conceived as the broadening and not the limiting of democratic rights and freedoms of which the whole of the toiling masses may partake, as compared to those they enjoy even in the most democratic bourgeois states. The dictatorship of the proletariat and soviet democracy are synonymous in that the granting of unlimited political freedom to the toiling masses can and must be accompanied by the limiting or even the denial of political freedom to all representatives of the hostile classes, to all those who aim at the overthrowing of the workers' state based on the suppression of the private ownership of the major means of production.

Practically speaking, the real exercise of power by the soviets, the freely elected councils of the manual and intellectual workers of the towns and country—organisms that are both legislative and executive and for this reason represent a higher form of democratic organization—is possible only if the following guarantees exist:

(a) The freedom to organize all parties that place themselves within the limits of Soviet legality and the framework of the Constitution of the workers' state.

(b) Genuine freedom of press and assembly, i.e., the right for each tendency supported by a legally established minimum of manual and intellectual workers, or by a decision of the soviets, to dispose of meeting halls, broadcasting time on the radio

and television, paper and printing presses proportional to existing available supplies.

(c) The election and periodical reëlection of the members of the central legislative organisms and of the principal central, provincial, and local functionaries, by secret ballot and with multiple candidates or lists, representing the various soviet parties; and the recall of those elected when those who elected them so wish.

(d) The limitation of the salaries of all functionaries in the administration, especially the state administration, to those of a skilled worker.

(e) The election and periodical reëlection of judges by secret ballot, thereby guaranteeing their complete independence with regard to the organisms of state administration. Open trial with full hearings, and with the defense's rights guaranteed in each case, and on the basis of written law.

(f) The disbanding of all permanent secret organisms of internal security. These must be replaced by public workers' militias that function, when necessary, with the help of auxiliary organisms constantly under the public control of the soviets.

(g) The generalized arming of workers and the setting up of arsenals of automatic arms in the plants and working-class quarters.

The Leninist principle held by the Fourth International is that, if violence is necessary in the relations between the proletariat and its class enemy, it must be eliminated from the relations which, within the working class, bring into conflict different tendencies in the labor movement, and from those among various currents, tendencies, or fractions within the revolutionary party. The dictatorship of the proletariat means the use of violence against the class enemy, according to the resistance of the enemy. Soviet democracy means the refusal to use violence within the workers' movement, and the use of only persuasion and experience by the revolutionary party in its relations with the working class and the other toiling strata of society.

Since in practice the boundaries between the toiling classes and their enemy are not sharply drawn, and since various objective conditions can lead the class enemy to seek support among the most conservative currents within the toiling classes, the revolutionary vanguard may sometimes be called upon to make a painful choice: either to accept the development of a dangerous situation within the workers' state, or, in order to overcome this danger, to use methods that may seriously undermine the workers' trust in this vanguard and in the state. Without wanting to emit absolute truths or dogmas, the Fourth International declares that, on the basis of past experience, it is absolutely clear that a workers' state must always face *two*

*dangers* as long as the world victory of socialism is not ensured: the return of a capitalist counter-revolution, and the development of bureaucratic degeneration. The weaker the state, the stronger the pressure exerted by the enemy, the more the trust and the political initiative of the great majority of the workers are lacking, then the more any coercion used against sections of the working class drains their confidence in the state and opens the gates to bureaucratic degeneration. That is why it is the duty of the revolutionary party to submit itself to the democratic verdict of the soviets, even when they make serious mistakes that the working masses by experience will recognize and right sooner or later. It is only in this spirit that the principle, ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS, as the basis of organization of the workers' state, acquires its full meaning.

In developing the programme of the political revolution for the reëstablishment of workers' democracy in the workers' states, the Fourth International unshakably maintains the principle of the defense of all workers' states against imperialism. It will fight against every effort by imperialism to exploit the political revolution in its own counter-revolutionary interests. These efforts will become more accentuated as the political revolution goes forward. This renders that much the more urgent our task of permanent explanation of our traditional position on this matter to the masses and the communist cadres.

14. The bureaucratic degeneration of the USSR has proved that the roots of the power of the bureaucratic apparatus lie in its more or less arbitrary disposal of the state production machine. The relations among the state apparatus, the apparatus directing the economy, and the revolutionary party, are for this reason decisive in guaranteeing the increase in soviet socialist democracy. These relations must be governed by the following principles:

(a) A fundamental differentiation between the workers' state and the revolutionary party, one being quite distinct from and in no way subordinated to the other. This means in particular that under no condition can any state organism — and even less so any security organism — intervene in the discussions or the struggles of tendencies inside the party. This also means that no state organism elected by the masses (or the soviet) may be modified in its composition by a party decision.

(b) The election and democratic control over party leaders by the members of the party, by the strict observance of all rules of democratic centralism: congresses and conferences at fixed periods; the election of local, regional, and national leaders by secret ballot; the right to organize tendencies and even to print internal tendency bulletins; as

complete information and discussion as possible in the rank and file before important differences are settled by the central organisms; no sanctions against members without the agreement of the rank-and-file organisms to which they belong; etc.

(c) Democratic control of the state apparatus and that of the economy, respectively organized in local soviets and factory committees. The election and revocability of the principal members of this apparatus by these organisms. The active participation of the different existing political tendencies in the choice of leaders and of alternative action programmes.

(d) The lack of material privileges in connection with leadership activities, there being no exception other than in the case of technicians not belonging to the party; such cases must be subjected to the close control of the soviet rank-and-file organisms.

(e) The principle of maximum information on and publicity for all controversial issues within the party, the state organisms, or those of the economy. This is an indispensable condition if the proletariat is to direct the state effectively and acquire in the shortest possible time the necessary experience to govern with the maximum efficiency.

15. The organization of the socialist economy, during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, is the touchstone for either the extension of socialist democracy in the workers' state—until such a time as democracy itself withers away as the last form of state—or towards the various bureaucratic deformations of the state and the appearance of fresh social inequalities that can lead to a monstrous bureaucratic degeneration.

As Marxists, we know that the bureaucratic degeneration of the state can be only a transitional phase in the history of the struggle for world socialism, a phase rendered *possible* by the lack of a sufficient material basis in any workers' state (or group of workers' states) and by its (or their) isolation. But, while recognizing this basic cause of degeneration, Marxists nowise accept a mechanistic and automatic determinism, i.e., the inevitability of an extreme degeneration of the Soviet type. They recognize only that the poorer the material basis of the workers' state, the greater the risk of bureaucratic deformations of the Soviet Union that cost the Soviet and international proletariat *avoidable* slaughters, defeats, and sacrifices, they understand that it is an imperative necessity that the revolutionary vanguard oppose insofar as possible, as a subjective factor, the play of spontaneous objective forces determined by need, pressure of a hostile milieu, lack of culture and skills, etc.

In this respect it is essential to understand the necessity of a *division of economic functions and powers* so as to ensure a severe limitation of bureau-

cratic arbitrariness, and at the same time producing the best guarantees for the most harmonious possible development of the productive forces. This sharing out of powers should be schematically established according to the following plan:

(a) Central decisions (in a national Congress of the soviets or workers' councils) to be taken after democratic discussion of alternative plans, insofar as the main lines of distribution of the national product (investments policy, rate of progress, price-and-wage policy) are concerned. The Fourth International rejects as antidemocratic and anti-communist the anarcho-syndicalist myth of the complete autonomy of enterprises, that can end only in the competitive fight for a market, more or less free or more or less monopolized, with all the injustices that this brings about (the appropriation by the workers of the more modern factories of part of the product created by the workers of more backward enterprises, etc.), with the danger of dislocation of the planned economy.

(b) The running of enterprises by the workers' committees, within the framework of the general plan elaborated by the elected representatives of the whole of the proletariat. These councils must control and, if necessary, modify the plan during its execution, and they must defend the specific interests of the *producers* (working and wage norms in their concrete application, dismissal and hiring, organization of work, etc.). They must elect the director and at the same time become the great management school in which a growing number of workers will each in turn become familiar with the exercise of administrative functions.

(c) The trade unions' role of control must be mainly to defend the interests of the workers as *consumers and citizens* with given cultural needs, against the workers' councils (mainly representing the production point of view) and the central organisms of planifications. The unions must discuss general work and wage norms and their application to the various branches of industry and the factories within the framework of collective fixed-term contracts; they must watch over all forms of workers' social insurance, without playing an administrative part (this belongs to the state, i.e., to the local organisms of self-administration); they must try to reduce working hours, increase the possibilities of paid holidays and the participation of the workers in all aspects of cultural life, etc. They must be based, like the party, on the strict rule of voluntary membership, contrary to the workers' councils and the soviets in which every wage-earner of the enterprise or locality automatically has the right to vote.

The effective guarantee of the right to *strike* is at the same time an effective and not merely formal

guarantee of this division of economic powers.

By insisting on the importance of the dividing up of economic powers, the Fourth International also affirms that, however ideal any organizational structure may be, it remains but a framework void of content as long as *political working-class democracy* and effective participation in the political life of the country by an ever-increasing number of workers are not flourishing. In a planned economy, the decision as to how the national income is to be shared out in major proportions is a capital factor that sets up a more or less rigid framework to all administering organisms from which they cannot dissociate themselves without disrupting the whole system of planification. So long as the majority of the working class does not participate in taking this decision, either directly or indirectly (through its freely elected representatives) and does not itself — in full knowledge of the facts — establish the limits of the sacrifices it is willing to make in order to develop the productive forces, it is not possible to speak concretely of a genuine and fully developed soviet democracy. So long as different workers' currents are not allowed to present general or partial alternative plans for the choice of the workers themselves, this participation will remain more fictive than real.

16. Socialism is a form of social organization based on abundance. When the proletariat conquers power in any given country, including the most highly developed ones, the existing productive forces are not sufficient to ensure this abundance for all citizens, and even less to all the citizens of the globe. The period of transition between capitalism and socialism is therefore in any case a period during which the proletariat cannot be satisfied merely by a new and more equitable distribution of the *already existing wealth* of the earth. The proletariat will have to ensure a *considerable increase* in the current production of wealth, and in the stock of means of production that are at the disposal of society, in order to attain its goal: the organization of a society that ensures the full and complete satisfaction of the needs of one and all, without calculating this satisfaction according to the work that each has contributed in exchange.

In the light of this thesis one might suppose that there exists only a quantitative difference between the problems of developing production posed in a workers' state or a group of such states which have scarcely started industrialization, and for workers' states created in countries where capitalism had already ensured an important development of modern industry. This, however, is not the case: there are qualitative differences between these two types of countries, insofar as the problems set by the de-

velopment of a socialized industry are concerned:

(a) From the social point of view, in the first group of countries industrialization—even when it can avail itself of the help of an international socialist economy—develops in a *hostile* milieu (the majority of the population composed of small peasant producers). In the second group of countries, the workers' state can count on the *support of the majority* if not 2/3rds of the population for its economic policy.

(b) From the economic point of view, industrialization in the first group of countries must correspond to combined aims: the specific interests of the workers, the raising of their level of living and culture, etc., and the need to differentiate the peasantry (from which must be detached a stratum of poor peasants that can be freely integrated in a socialized economy, and a stratum of middle peasants that can be neutralized against the primitive accumulation of the rich peasants). In the second group of countries, the development of the economy can be fundamentally oriented towards the satisfaction of the growing needs of the mass of producers, while reserving an important segment of the national product, during a long transitional period, to help the less industrialized workers' states.

The Fourth International affirms not only the principle that it is impossible for a workers' state to impose on the workers a margin of sacrifices above that which they freely accept; it also affirms that any attempt systematically to increase the rate of accumulation over a long period of time has negative repercussions on the productivity of labor and on the self-discipline of the producers, and thus creates enormous losses and waste that to a great extent cancel the advantages thought to be gained by such an accumulation. Only a planification that establishes harmonious proportions in the development of the different sectors of the economy—industry, agriculture, and transport—and of the different branches of industry itself, pays off in the long run. The basis of such a system must be an increase in production together with a more or less equivalent raising of the standard of living of the producers. The easier it is for the producers to measure this parallel progress, the more conscious and enthusiastic their creative participation in a harmonious development will become. The requirements of such a harmonious development of all branches of the economy rule out from the start any policy of forced collectivization in agriculture, which is the source of stagnation if not of falling off in agricultural production, and of serious disruption in the cities' food supplies.

These requirements, on the other hand, are compatible with the creation of agricultural producers' coöperatives in all strata of the peasantry

that are socially and economically ready to accept such a means of production, on condition that such coöperatives bring them concrete material advantages.

Without excluding the necessity, which might arise even in the future, for a workers' state isolated on a given continent to start building up a socialist economy on its own, all experience has shown that international division of labor and mutual aid among workers' states on a basis of equality, constitute a factor that aids and stimulates the upsurge of the economy, a factor that is in any case indispensable to catching up with and surpassing the level of productivity reached in the most advanced capitalist countries, this being the only criterion of the final victory of a socialized economy over a capitalist economy. The idea of achieving the construction of an autarkic socialist economy in one country or in a small group of countries must be rejected as a reactionary myth.

17. Soviet democracy, goal of the political revolution in the degenerated workers' states and of the social revolution in the capitalist countries, is inconceivable without the free development of artistic creation, scientific work, and all the cultural activities of mankind. Such a development is more and more proving to be an indispensable condition for the full and complete exploitation of the tremendous reserves of the technical and productive creative forces that the revolution puts at the disposal of the new society. Such a free development does not mean that the party and the revolutionary vanguard refrain from expressing their own views with regard to the numerous controversies that may arise in theoretical fields. It means:

(a) that the revolutionary party engages in militant action through propaganda and persuasion in favor of the theses of Marxism and of dialectic and historical materialism; that it demands the widest possibility for teaching all these without the state's imposing the adoption or the exclusive presentation of these theses on the body of teachers or on the youth;

(b) that no scientific, artistic or cultural tendency that is not considered to be progressive, or the most progressive, by the revolutionary vanguard, can be repressed or sanctioned administratively or hindered in its productive and creative efforts;

(c) that the state does not give its official approval either in the form of material advantages or by distribution of hierarchic posts to any tendency in the fields of science, the arts, or cultural activities — fields which are the ripest for the integral application of the principle of self-administration;

(d) that the party establish clear distinctions between the choice of the social, economic, or cultural aims that have priority (for example the priority

of the solution of the housing problem over that of the needs of urbanist aesthetics and the need to defend on a theoretical level (that of planification, in the long run) the correct principles that appertain to these aims, even if it is not possible to implement them immediately.

Soviet democracy is equally inconceivable without a radical elimination of all the obstacles that today prevent a majority of citizens from enjoying the material and cultural gifts of civilization. It must guarantee completely free education at all levels, selection being made strictly according to individual capacity; it must guarantee every citizen the right to free medical care without social discrimination. It must ensure the full and autonomous participation of youth in political life. It must completely apply the principle of « equal pay for equal work, » give maximum encouragement to the emancipation of women from thousands of years of submission, and at the same time permit professional selection according to the physical peculiarities of women. It must revise the marriage laws in the spirit of the October Revolution, as well as the right to divorce and voluntary maternity (free distribution of the means of contraception, and the right to abortion), children's rights, the self-administration of schools, all of which must bring about the absolute equality of men and women, and a complete absence of coercion by one person over another.

18. The Soviet bureaucracy usurped power under the banner of « socialism in one country »; it is under the banner of true proletarian internationalism based on strict equality between all nations, that the political revolution against the bureaucracy will triumph. The bureaucracy has poisoned the relations among the various workers' states, as well as those among the various nationalities inside the USSR, by its brutal Great-Russian chauvinism and its narrow petty-bourgeois prejudices.

The Fourth International condemns the Stalinist conception of the subordination of the interests of the world proletariat to those of the Kremlin bureaucracy as a criterion of proletarian internationalism. It also rejects the centrist, anti-Leninist thesis according to which the chauvinism of a great oppressing nation should be condemned in the same way as the nationalism of the small nationalities. While raising the banner of international solidarity everywhere, it makes a clear distinction between Great-Russian (and Great-Han) chauvinism, which are unconditionally reactionary, and the nationalism of small nations oppressed by the bureaucracy, which is often only a deformation of the just revolt of the masses against the national oppression they suffered, and that can in no way modify the objectively progressive nature of their struggle for emancipation.

That is why the Fourth International defends the slogan of the independent and sovereign Soviet Socialist Republics of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, while at the same time advocating the confederation of all these workers' states on a strict basis of equality, in one or several democratic federations of workers' states.

A democratic workers' state will educate the workers and youth in a spirit of complete respect for the cultural personality of all peoples, for whom it will ensure an unlimited development. It will untiringly combat any manifestation of chauvinism, national or racial hatred, antisemitism, etc. It will try to increase whenever possible the solidarity, interest, and conscious participation of the workers of the workers' states in the struggles of every country throughout the world.

Any nationalistic tendency toward the subordination of the interests of the international revolution to the defense of the workers' state, however important and progressive be this state, is always a clear sign of bureaucratic deformation.

19. The Fourth International conceives the problem of the Workers' International in the same spirit as the revolutionary party. An International which includes one or several parties that hold power in workers' states can no more « dictate » policy to the citizens or the governments of these states than can the party to the workers organized in soviets. It can only bring weight to the conviction and prestige of the arguments it submits to the decision of the workers—and even this only insofar as experience has proved to the workers that it has systematically defended the collective interests of the proletariat against particular or nationalist deformations of these interests.

Conceived in this spirit, a revolutionary International, far from being outdated or losing importance due to the conquest of power by the proletariat in one or several countries, remains an absolutely indispensable instrument for resolving the tasks set by the building of world communism:

(a) Leaving aside the indispensable diplomatic manoeuvres that one or several workers' states may be obliged to make, the International coördinates the struggle of all the revolutionary parties, including those that have already conquered power, in order to achieve the victory of the world revolution in the shortest possible time.

(b) After the victory of the revolution, the International will make every effort to coördinate and encourage the best possible international economic planification, thus preceding the practical possibilities of federation or confederation of workers' states.

(c) The International will be an instrument for the coördinating and encouraging of all the activities of the revolutionary vanguard in the workers' states, in the process of permanent revolution, until world communism is brought about. This is all the more important since in these fields complete theoretical generalization has to be accomplished, and this cannot be done on the basis of fragmentary national experiences.

Given the disastrous experience many communist militants had with the Komintern, then with the Kominform, during the Stalinist era, these militants have become wary about the very idea of an International based on democratic centralism. This wariness is in no way justified, and to give in to this tendency is to abandon an essential element of revolutionary Marxism. It is not through the degeneration of the Communist International that the world crisis of Communism began. It was in a party, the Russian party, that the bureaucracy first destroyed democracy, thus departing from the Leninist road. The stronger the International, and the more it is out of reach of the predominating influence of one section or of a small group of sections, the easier becomes the struggle against the danger of bureaucratization in a party or a workers' state, by the transfer of the full weight of the healthiest sectors of the international workers' movement towards the country most in danger.

For this very reason any idea of « polycentric » international organization or of purely « bilateral » relations between CPs must be rejected. Far from guaranteeing a healthy evolution to the workers' movement, the aim of such opportunistic formulas is to protect the national bureaucracy from the influence of the international revolution.

#### IV. — THE DECLINE AND FALL OF STALINISM IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

20. The crisis of the Communist Parties, that originated in the contradiction between the revolutionary aspirations of the militants therein and the function of instruments of Soviet foreign policy that the bureaucracy wanted to force upon them, has in the past few years been accentuated by two factors. On the one hand the progress of the revolutionary upsurge throughout the world has brought several parties face to face with pre-revolutionary (or revolutionary) situations, and caused the militants therein to express their dissatisfaction with the leadership's opportunist policy. In some cases, as in Algeria, the pressure of the workers or revolutionary movement of the masses has been such that it has forced the Stalinist leadership to make an important move to the left, away from a position that had originally placed it on the counter-revolutionary side.

On the other hand, the outbreak of the crisis of bureaucracy in the USSR itself and in the « People's Democracies » has acted as a powerful stimulus to the development of the crisis in the Communist Parties of all capitalist countries. This crisis exploded immediately after Stalin's death; it was greatly accentuated by the spectacular rehabilitation of Tito; it reached a first breaking-point with the XXth Congress in the USSR, only to reach very rapidly a second breaking-point and a real paroxysm with the Polish and Hungarian revolutions. It is not an exaggeration to say that the CPs today are divided into two currents, and that some of them (the Polish, Yugoslav, Norwegian, and American, and partly the Italian, Belgian, and Swedish Communist Parties, with strong opposition in Great Britain, Austria, Brazil, etc.) condemn the first Soviet intervention in Hungary and regret if not condemn the second, identifying themselves with the Polish Revolution; while others (the Soviet, Czech, East German, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and French Communist Parties) servilely identify themselves with the Kremlin's policy. The Chinese CP, followed by the majority of the Asian CPs, seems to occupy a half-way place between the two tendencies, which is gradually evolving towards an arbiter's position in the international Communist movement, while associating its efforts with those of the Kremlin in order to limit the disintegrating effects of « destalinization » on the international Stalinist movement.

The origins of this spectacular development are evident: in the Polish and Hungarian revolutions there was a *convergence* of the two currents that are today feeding the Stalinist crisis, the objective revolutionary current and the subjective current of « destalinization. » Furthermore, in Hungary, for the first time since the Spanish civil war, the Soviet bureaucracy was forced to play an openly counter-revolutionary part—that is, itself to repress a revolutionary upsurge of the masses on a broad scale (the 1953 experience in Germany was far more limited). Though in certain parts of the world, the Hungarian events coincided with an objective situation that was not favorable to a mass revolutionary upsurge, this was not the case for the colonial and semi-colonial countries for which these events served as a direct lesson and an encouragement in their own struggles. Thus the « orthodox » Stalinist position became even more untenable in these countries.

21. The general characteristics of crisis in the CPs, which apply in varying degrees to the CPs of all capitalist countries, can be thus summarized:

(a) Since Stalin's death and especially since Khrushchev's revelations, the very basis of Stalinist thought, i.e., of faith in the infallibility of the

leader, of the Soviet government and the leaders of the Soviet CP, has received a mortal blow. All the fundamental questions of communism are once more brought into discussion. Henceforth, when on an important issue the actions of the Soviet government seem to come into conflict with the interests of a fraction or the whole of the world proletariat, the validity of such actions will be openly brought into question by an ever-increasing number of Communist militants.

(b) This loss of faith which was the basis of obedience is causing a real revolt against the rigid system of the bureaucratic CP leadership, against the absence of freedom of discussion, against the tyranny of the machine and the anti-democratic way in which it maintains its control at the head of the CP. More and more voices are being raised to demand a genuine and not formal application of democratic centralism (genuine discussions in the public organs of the parties before congresses; the periodical meeting of congresses; the election of leaders by secret ballot; the right to tendencies within the party or, at least, the right—as already established in the new statutes of the Chinese CP—of minorities to keep their opinions even after their defeat in congresses, etc.).

(c) Since, except for a few cases, the Stalinist leaders are not giving way to the democratic pressure of the rank and file or only partially doing so (in order to maintain their leadership in the party), the rank-and-file vanguard is forming more or less open or secret tendencies, according to the more or less bureaucratic atmosphere of their own party, so as to force democratization and the revision of political activity on given platforms that are being on many sides elaborated, and compared, as open or secret discussion develops within the party.

(d) Inevitably these currents and opposition groups must revise on the basis of the experience revealed by the Khrushchev report their relations with the USSR, and analyze Soviet society and the Soviet state (or even more generally, as in the Yugoslav and Polish CPs, all the problems raised by the transition period from capitalism to socialism). The « Russian question » (such as was discussed in the international Trotskyist movement over a whole period) is now breaking out in an entire wing of the CPs.

(e) These opposition currents that are coming up against the satisfied conservatism and the ignorance of the bureaucratic apparatus in office soon find that they have to extend their platforms not only to the problems of the USSR but also to all the problems of communist doctrine: relations with the social-democracy, analysis of contemporary capitalism, position towards the colonial revolution, workers' councils, roads to socialism, International, etc., etc.

22. Experience has proved that according to the position they adopt towards these various problems of immediate interest and of doctrine, the opposition currents that crystallize within the Communist Parties may be classified in two categories: a right-wing and a left-wing opposition current.

The right-wing opposition current is the logical consequence of the rightist opportunism of important CPs for long periods of their life (and even recently following the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR) but an opportunism that loses, in its relations with the capitalist world, its main brake — that provided by the unconditional subordination of the Stalinist parties to the Soviet bureaucracy. Such currents (Hervé in France, Giolitti in Italy, the Gates tendency in the American CP, etc.) take as good coin Khrushchev's words on new roads to socialism, the conquest of power by peaceful and parliamentary means in capitalist countries, including the largest and most powerful among them, on closer contacts with the social-democrats. They are rapidly undergoing an evolution toward « social-democratization » to such a point that they question the legitimacy of the colonial revolution from the point of view of « peace » or, in a even more vulgar way, the « nation » (that of the imperialist bourgeoisie!) of the country where they happen to be.

The left-wing opposition current, on the other hand, rises up against the contradictions of the Khrushchev interpretations of the Stalinist phenomenon and the fundamentally opportunistic character (periodically associated with a childish sectarianism) of their own CP's policy. It reproaches the CP leadership with its incapacity to take advantage of many favorable opportunities to encourage or lead to victory the mass movement, or really to root itself in the native workers' movement of its country. It wants, not « peaceful coexistence » with the country's imperialist bourgeoisie, but a more forceful and efficient struggle against it. The « Marty » current in the French CP, the oppositional groups in the Austrian and Brazilian CPs, various oppositional groups in the Italian CP, are all typical of this tendency.

As long as these currents express themselves inside the CP or fight for the right to express themselves openly, the various sections of the Fourth International that practise a policy of *sui generis* entrism in the CPs, and those sympathizers who are either led by these sections or work in collaboration with them, will defend the right of speech and of democratic representation in the organisms of leadership of *all* tendencies inside the CP. After decades of bureaucratic strangulation, the critical state of mind of rank-and-file Communist militants needs a long period of reflection, discussion, and

confrontation of various ideas before it can again find the capacity to discover its own orientation in political life. The left-wing current has nothing to fear from a free confrontation of different tendencies, which will facilitate the crystallization of a true revolutionary vanguard in these countries. Moreover, it is impossible to assert as main demand the right to organise tendencies and to deny this right to a tendency with which one does not politically agree. For all these reasons, the Trotskyists will be in the vanguard of the struggle for inner democracy in the CPs for *all* members, without exception, while at the same time calling on the most advanced elements to form a left-wing oppositional current.

23. In the *mass Communist Parties* of the Western European countries (France and Italy), the « destalinization » problems that are under discussion are exasperated by the flagrant incapacity of the bureaucratic leadership of these parties to take advantage of the numerous pre-revolutionary and revolutionary situations favoring the development of the party. At the same time, however, within the general conjuncture that exists in these countries, the even greater bankruptcy of the social-democracy (Algerian war, Suez adventure in France, collaboration with the Christian-Democracy in Italy) has enabled the Communist Parties of these countries to continue to canalize the majority, and above all the most combative section, of the proletariat. In Italy, however, the more leftish line of Nenni's party offers a serious competition to the CP. For this reason, the most healthy and left currents will tend to stay within the CP, the expelled groups that tend towards « right-wing communism » rapidly degenerating to form right-wing centrist or even left social-democratic formations. The evolution of the Hungarian and Polish revolutions, and the attempts made by the Polish and Yugoslav CPs to influence ideologically other CPs, have a similar effect. This does not mean that our sections must, as a matter of principle, disdain to work within these formations, especially if they have a certain numerical importance and influence in sectors of the working class; but this work continues to be subordinated to the general *sui generis* entrism tactic that, more than ever before, is proving to be the only efficient tactic for the building of a revolutionary party in these countries.

The same thing cannot be said of the *small Stalinist sects* of Western Europe (German, British, Belgian, Dutch, Swiss, Austrian, Scandinavian CPs, etc.) where the Stalinist crisis is fed not only by the general repercussions of « destalinization » and the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, but by the catastrophic decline in the influence of the CP over the masses, its almost complete isolation from

the organized workers' movement, its incapacity — in spite of the periodic alternation of sectarian and right-wing opportunistic tactics — to operate a « rapprochement with the social-democratic rank-and-file. » The right-wing communist tendencies of these parties are particularly inclined to capitulate, and usually go so far as to propose nothing less than the complete dissolution of the CP. The left-wing communist tendencies, insofar as they are not paralyzed by a complete sectarianism towards the mass movement, soon evolve tactics near to those of our movement. While proposing that these elements continue their struggle within the CP for the triumph of a Leninist line, we must offer them, as an alternative to the right-wing policy, the prospect of working within the social-democratic organizations and the trade-unions on a revolutionary platform, within the framework of the sections of the Fourth International. The object of this work is not that they should adapt themselves to the opportunism of the reformist leaders, but to reduce in the shortest possible time the influence of the latter on the most combative layers of the workers, and to aid the creation later of new mass revolutionary parties. From such a platform (to which the positive results already obtained by different sections in this work give weight) the communist oppositional elements can be won over by our movement.

In the CPs of the *semi-colonial and colonial countries*, the crisis of Stalinism is more particularly nourished by the right-wing opportunistic policy that the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR forced on the leaders of these parties: direct and servile subordination to the interests of the colonial bourgeoisie allied to the Soviet bureaucracy, or « neutralized » by it. In the general atmosphere of « destalinization, » such a policy can end in the developing of powerful left-wing currents within these parties. The pressure of the revolutionary movement of the masses, however, can in practice bring the leadership of these parties, or a part thereof, to sketch out a turn towards a revolutionary orientation and to suppress before its birth the development of an autonomous left-wing current within the party.

Whatever be the forms taken in the next phase of the crisis of Stalinism within the various CPs of the capitalist countries, the revolutionary movement that is developing in the « People's Democracies » and in the USSR already foreshadows its final issue: the disappearance of Stalinism as an ideological current of the international communist movement, the return of part of the cadres and the CP militants of today to social-democracy (or similar centrist or right-wing formations), and the regrouping of the healthiest part of the great majority of convinced communist militants in new

revolutionary parties that will emerge from the crisis.

#### V. — THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN THE USSR AND THE « PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES » AS A PHASE OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

24. The political revolution in the USSR and the so-called « People's Democracies » is in itself a process of the permanent revolution. Unleashed by the accumulation of grievances that the working masses hold against the bureaucracy, it develops, according to its own logic, from a popular revolution in which all the layers of the nation participate, towards a more and more rapid social differentiation that can end only in the victory of the most proletarian and conscious current: that which brings about socialist democracy by advocating and achieving the concentration of all power in the hands of the democratically elected workers' and poor peasants' councils. The permanent character of the revolution does not stop at the conquest of power by the workers' councils. On the contrary this opens up a revolutionary period of exceptional fertility in which, thanks to the spirit of audacity and creative initiative pushed to their highest pitch of expression under the spur of the revolution, all aspects of social life will be submitted to a merciless criticism and revision, in order to produce everywhere the highest forms of direct democracy, equality, and solidarity that are compatible with the material framework of society. The rapid broadening of this framework, due to a prodigious development of the productive forces, which will at last be freed of bureaucratic tutelage, and to the international extension of the revolution, will itself then become the object of the permanent revolution of which this precise stage will seek more and more consciously the following colossal objective: the triumph of soviet democracy throughout all the workers' states, for one third of mankind and over one quarter of the globe.

25. But the political revolution in the bureaucratically degenerated or deformed workers' states is not only a process of permanent revolution according to its own dynamics. It also represents an integral part of the world dynamics of the permanent revolution, of the world socialist revolution. It is in fact inconceivable that the victory of the political revolution in several of the existing workers' states can fail to return to the fundamental forms of proletarian internationalism. Far from having particular interests to defend that will force them to continue their efforts to keep under a tutelary control the international workers' movement, they will aid and stimulate insofar as

possible the emancipation movements of the workers in the capitalist states and of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples.

Also, both objectively and subjectively, the international working-class movement will receive from the reestablishment of soviet democracy in the USSR a stimulus comparable only to that of the October socialist revolution. The effect of bourgeois propaganda and of its social-democratic servants against communism, exclusively aimed at the bureaucracy's crimes, would disappear. The increase in the standard of living of the workers in the Soviet Union and in the « People's Democracies » which will rapidly become possible would increase the power of attraction of these states on the inhabitants of the capitalist world. The imperialist bourgeoisie of the last capitalist powers would soon become isolated in a world that is fundamentally its enemy, and the majority of the workers all over the world would soon join the side of the workers' states and of the colonial revolution. The internal reinforcement of the working-class movement in the greater part of these countries

would no doubt place on the order of the day the conquest of power within a short time.

The concrete march of the world revolution throughout the world after the Second World War has made of the Chinese and colonial revolutions the principal motor of the world revolution. In reaching the USSR and the countries dominated by the Soviet bureaucracy, the revolutionary wave makes of the political revolution against this bureaucracy the second powerful motor of the world revolution. In these countries the revolution finds itself faced with millions of qualified and highly cultivated workers who are today capable of resolving the problems set by the socialist reorganization of mankind, with the same consciousness as the German or French workers could have done so on the morrow of the First World War. The concrete prospect of the victory of the political revolution in the USSR is that of the direct exercise of power by the proletariat in the second most powerful industrial country in the world. It can be only a prelude to the final victory of the world revolution.

### III

## *Prospects and Dynamics of the Political Revolution against the Bureaucracy*

REPORT PRESENTED BY COMRADE ERNEST GERMAIN

Since Stalin's death, the domination of the Soviet bureaucracy over the Soviet Union, over the « Peoples' Democracies, » and over the Communist Parties of the whole world, has been deeply shaken.

The sensational suppression of the Stalin cult at the XXth Congress of the Soviet C.P. produced great agitation in the Communist Parties of the whole world. All the fundamental points of Communist policy began to be reexamined in a critical way by an ever greater number of the militants of these parties. The result is the formation of groups, tendencies, sometimes even organized fractions, in most of the C.P.s. all things unknown in the previous 30 years. The servile subordination of the fate of the international working class to the Kremlin's diplomatic manoeuvres is being questioned — at the very moment when critical communists within the U.S.S.R. are beginning to question the grounds of these manoeuvres from the point of view of interests of the Soviet state itself.

The struggles for economic demands, the strikes, the workers' uprisings which occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and partly also in the U.S.S.R., have dramatically stressed « destalinisation. » They have confirmed the Trotskyist opinion that all manoeuvres on the part of the leaders are only a pale reflection of the pressure, the indignation, and the spirit of revolt ripening in the popular

masses. The Hungarian revolution showed beyond all doubt that a political revolution is building up, and that it is absolutely necessary for the overthrow of the power of the bureaucratic clique.

This tumultuous development which has been taking place for the last four years did not catch us unawares. We were armed to understand it, for we had predicted it. Without exaggeration, but also without false modesty, we can state that we were the only tendency of the international workers' movement that accurately foresaw these events, at least in their main lines, and that prepared itself to face the historical tasks which might arise from these developments.

To analyze their meanings and laws, we have had to raise some of the most difficult problems of Marxist theory. Once more it has become clear that each step forward of the international revolution also gives rise to a progress of revolutionary thought. The assimilation of this progress by the whole revolutionary party is, in turn, necessary to the victory of the revolution.

#### **POLITICAL REVOLUTION OR SOCIAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION**

The traditional Trotskyist analysis of the U.S.S.R. as a degenerate workers' state confined the possible outcome of the historical evolution of the first workers' state to the following alternative: either restoration of capitalism or

reestablishment of soviet democracy guaranteeing the building of socialism. Either social counter-revolution, or political revolution.

The two terms of this alternative were conceived in close connection with the development of the relationship of forces on the world scale. Either international revolution would undergo another series of international defeats, fascism would slowly spread to a large part of the world, Trotsky wrote in 1935, and then the workers' state would be irremediably lost; we should see the victory of the social counter-revolution. Or else new advances of the revolution would reverse the predominant reactionary tendency of the years 1923-1939 and then political revolution would have a good chance of winning in the U.S.S.R.

Two terms of an alternative do not mean two possibilities of *simultaneous* solutions. When Trotsky formulated this perspective for the first time in a precise way, that is, after Hitler's victory in 1933, he was obliged to place a question mark over the future dynamics of the relationship of forces on the world scale. Would revolution advance again, or would it go on being defeated everywhere in the world? No one could seriously answer this question in 1935. But, towards the end of the Second World War, with the victory of the Yugoslav revolution, the victory of the Chinese revolution, and the spread of the colonial revolution, with the enormous progress of the Soviet economy, it became clear that the relationship of forces was turning in favor of Revolution on the world scale.

Under these conditions, to hang on to an alternative prospect, at least for short- or medium-term forecasts, meant to substitute vulgar eclecticism for Marxist dialectics. To repeat in 1953 what had been true in 1933, i.e. that the U.S.S.R. could experience either the reestablishment of capitalism or political revolution, was to change Trotskyist theory from an instrument of analysis of reality into a collection of ritual formulae. It meant refusing to settle a question which had already been settled for a whole historical period at Stalingrad, Belgrade, Peking, Dien-Bien-Phu, and on the Yalu, where capitalism had been dealt such powerful blows that its reestablishment in a short time in the U.S.S.R. was no longer a possibility.

A double change in the relationship of forces has favored the evolution towards political revolution in the U.S.S.R. It has done so objectively and subjectively.

Trotsky had always foreseen that the preservation of the production relations born of the October Revolution would finally create objective conditions which would facilitate the overthrow of the bureaucratic dictatorship. In his theses « The Fourth International and the U.S.S.R., » he wrote at the end of 1933:

« Though squandering an enormous part of the national income in an unproductive way, the bureaucracy has an interest in the economic and cultural upsurge of the country; the higher the national income, the richer the funds from which it draws its privileges. But on the social bases of the Soviet state, the economic and cultural rise of the toiling masses will undermine the bases of bureaucratic domination itself. »

This is what has actually happened. Above all, it is the numerical strength and the specific weight of the proletariat in Soviet society, its high level of skills and its superior culture, the rise in its living conditions, its progressive liberation from the worst slavery of poverty, the widening of its political horizon, its needs growing faster than the amount of goods accorded to it by the bureaucracy—it is above all this overall result of the economic and cultural progress of the U.S.S.R. which tolls the knell of bureaucratic dictatorship.

But the change in the relationship of forces on the world scale creates the subjective conditions for the political revolution. In *The Revolution Betrayed*, analyzing the reasons for the apparent stability of the Stalinist dictatorship, Trotsky wrote:

« If in contrast to the peasants the workers have almost never come out on the road of open struggle, thus condemning the protesting villages to confusion and impotence, this is not only because of the repressions. The workers fear lest, in throwing out the bureaucracy, they will open the way for the capitalist restoration. [...] The workers are realists. Without deceiving themselves with regard to the ruling caste — at least with regard to its lower tiers which stand near to them — they see in it the watchman for the time being of a certain part of their own conquests. They will inevitably drive out the dishonest, impudent and unreliable watchman as soon as they see another possibility. For this it is necessary that in the West or the East another revolutionary dawn arise. » (U.S. edition, pp. 285-286.)

The revolutionary opening has come about in the East. Capitalism has been terribly weakened on the world scale. Because of this, the fear of restoration of capitalism has very much diminished in the U.S.S.R. The working class has giving up its passive attitude. It no longer « tolerates » the dishonest watchman. On the contrary, it hounds him more and more, waging war on the field of factories and on that of principles, forcing him to put aside his insolence, and preparing to overthrow his power.

### THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE BUREAUCRACY

The question of our revolutionary prospects in the U.S.S.R. and in the glaci is closely linked to that of our specific analysis of the bureaucracy. In the proletarian movement, if we leave out those who consider the bureaucracy a new class, there exist two false conceptions of the nature of the bureaucracy.

The first, the *subjective* conception, is most often developed by Stalinists or former Stalinists. For them, the bureaucracy is the result of psychological and moral phenomena, instead of social phenomena. It is a question of habits, manners, and customs: to prefer to sit in an office rather than move around where work is actually being done; to use a rough commanding tone with workers; to be « aloof from the aspirations of the people »; to show « scorn for manual work, » etc... etc... The « theoreticians » of the Chinese Communist Party have prepared for us a whole catalogue of the sins which might be the basis of « bureaucratism. »

The opposite of this subjective conception is the *objective* deviation, of which the most typical representatives are the Brandlerites, some Communist currents in Eastern Europe such as the Gomulists, and also Deutscher, at least in his first works. They say: Russia was a backward country; the proletariat was weak, lacking skills and culture. It was thus unable to manage industrialization. So it inevitably had to be managed by a bureaucracy.

But, as industrialization involved a considerable increase in the rate of investment, it also involved a very severe lowering of the standard of living. The workers did not want to accept this lowering of the standard of living. It therefore had to be forced upon them. Hence the objective necessity of the bureaucratic dictatorship, which disappears with the historical conditions which gave birth to it.

The Trotskyist, the Marxist, analysis of the phenomena of the bureaucracy is opposed to these two equally wrong conceptions.

Bureaucratism, in the form of habits of work and undemocratic customs, is an endemic phenomenon in mass organizations, where it is normally corrected by the free play of elections and of the democratic control of the rank and file. It becomes a serious evil only when *social advantages* are grafted on to personal shortcomings, in other words when we pass from the plane of psychology to that of sociology. In the capitalist regime, the development of bourgeois parliamentary democracy and of a reformist mass movement transforms persons with bureaucratic tendencies into members and profiteers of the bourgeois state apparatus

off which they live. In the workers' state, the ebb of the revolution and the defeat of the revolutionary opposition allowed the bureaucracy to seize the state and the economy, from which were derived enormous privileges. This is how parasitic bureaucratic castes are born, linked to particular social systems, from which they suck away part of the wealth.

We know, as Lenin did, that the complete disappearance of all functionaryism and all bureaucracy, i.e. the carrying out of all the functions of leadership by all producers in turn is impossible in the first days after the revolution in any country in the world, and certainly in a poor country. Thus we know that there was already a certain bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. in 1918 and that there will be one in any country after the victory of the proletarian revolution. We also know that the poorer a country is, and the weaker and more backward its proletariat, the greater is the risk that this bureaucracy become powerful and accumulate new privileges.

But what separates us from the «objectivists» is that, like Lenin, who passionately defended this point of view during the last years of his life, like Trotsky, and like the best Soviet Bolsheviks, we are convinced that this ebb is not inevitable, and that the growth of bureaucratic degeneration can be stopped by *well-advised action on the part of the subjective factor*. Neither the national nor international relationship of forces is unalterable. After the defeat of 1923, there were possibilities of victory in China in 1927, in Germany in the beginning of the '30s, in Spain and in France in 1936. If the bureaucracy was triumphant, it is in large measure because the Bolshevik Party, instead of being aware of this danger right from the beginning, underestimated it; because it had itself become bureaucratic, and part of its cadres reacted too late, when they were already a minority in their own house, when the party, tool of the proletariat, had already become a tool of the bureaucracy.

This Trotskyist answer to the problem of the bureaucratic degeneration of the U.S.S.R. and of the Communist International corresponds exactly to the state of mind of the whole critical and oppositional mass appearing today in the C.P.s, including the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. All are asking the question: «How was this possible?» All are trying to find the link between the overall objective conditions unfavorable to the growth of soviet democracy in the U.S.S.R. and the particularly malignant, even catastrophic, form taken by the development of the bureaucracy. Only our Trotskyist conception of bureaucracy can explain this process to them, including in the analysis the great gains of the new economic and social basis of the first workers' state.

#### CURRENTS IN SOCIETY, TENDENCIES IN THE PARTY, DIVISIONS IN THE BUREAUCRACY

Our traditional conception of the Soviet bureaucracy enables us to answer also two questions of analysis which have been continually brought up by international working-class opinion since Stalin's death:

a) Are the divisions which have appeared in the Kremlin group explained essentially by a struggle for power, or are they a reflection of what is happening in the whole of Soviet society?

b) To what extent can the bureaucracy as a caste resist the final onset of the masses?

We know that, traditionally, in regimes based on a single party, all the social contradictions tend to be reflected inside this party. We said it in the past about the Bolshevik Party during the '20s. We say it today for the C.P. of the Soviet Union. In this sense, it is absolutely clear that the different tendencies which are already formed, or are in course of being formed, in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R., are not without relation to the great currents which are already beginning to manifest themselves in Soviet society.

But what relations does this mean? We distinguish two

phenomena. When the different fractions appeared in the Bolshevik Party, we defined the Left-Opposition fraction as the one which consciously expressed the interests of the proletariat. As for the rightist, Bukharinist, fraction, it was *under the pressure of the peasantry* in its way of stating tactical problems, and especially of solving them. But never did Trotsky describe Bukharin as the representative of a peasant current, or as an agent of the petty-bourgeoisie; or as a bourgeois politician. His being a communist, i.e. a militant of a revolutionary party of the proletariat, was never questioned.

It is the same distinction which we use as a starting point to explain the divisions which appeared in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. after Stalin's death. If we judge by a great number of the positions they took, especially in the economic and ideological field, it seems unquestionable that the Molotov-Kaganovitch group can be considered as the most conscious and direct representative of the most privileged strata of the bureaucracy, above all of the trust and factory directors. As for the other groups and intermediate groups, they have, to different degrees, undergone the pressure of the proletariat and of the peasantry, in the sense that they have been obliged to raise problems whose solutions the masses were more and more insistently demanding and that they have, to different degrees, undergone the pressure of the masses and have put forward certain reforms in the sense of these solutions.

But we have never said and we shall never say that either Malenkov, Mikoyan, or Khrushchev represents, even indirectly, a proletarian tendency in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. All of them are politicians of the bureaucracy who are trying, each in his own way and with his own character, to protect the interests, the power, and the privileges of the bureaucratic caste as such.

Because of their past, their complicity in many of Stalin's crimes, a complicity well known to the masses, and because of their very functions in society at present, all the members of the Presidium are identified in the eyes of the masses with an ever more hated power: the dictatorship of the «bonzes,» the bureaucrats, the bureaucracy. *It is excluded that any one of them should play the part which Tito, Gomulka, or Nagy played, that of popular and centrist leaders of one wing of the bureaucracy, channeling for their own benefit the masses' hostility against the bureaucracy as a whole.* All of them have more or less tried to do so: Beria, by declaring himself against police despotism and backing out of the «affair of the doctors»; Malenkov, by promising a forced-draught development of light industry; Mikoyan, by launching the decisive attack against the Stalin cult; Khrushchev, by promising abundance of bread, butter, and meat. None of them will succeed.

But for us, bureaucracy is not a new class; it is a caste which has its roots deep in the proletariat. If we examine the social composition of the C.P. of the U.S.S.R., we notice that one third of its members are still factory workers. Even if they are Stakhanovists or foremen, they are, because of their way of life, closer to the workers than to the big shots who roll around in automobiles and give their sons a thousand rubles a week for spending-money.

The trade-union cadres in the factories, the secretaries of the factory cells of the C.P., even leaders of districts, small towns, and sometimes even provincial cities, especially the Komsomols, can thus become true transmission belts of the proletarian currents which are crystalizing in society. And from their ranks there may appear future Nagys and Gomulkas, perhaps even future Bolshevik leaders. This dialectical and dual nature of the tendencies appearing in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. in their relations to the proletariat, reflect the dual nature of Stalinism and of the bureaucracy itself, which have never definitively cut the umbilical cord which bound them to the proletariat.

It is by starting out from these same premises that we can solve the problem of the possible resistance of the bu-

reocracy to the revolutionary onset of the masses. Trotsky had already solved this problem in advance. He wrote in 1933:

« The social roots of the bureaucracy, as we know, are to be found in the proletariat, if not in its active support, at least in the fact that it tolerates it. If the proletariat become active again, the Stalinist apparatus will find itself hanging in mid-air. If it tries to oppose it, repressive police measures will have to be taken, rather than civil-war measures. At any rate, it will not be an uprising against the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the removal of a malignant tumor from this dictatorship.

« There can be no real civil war between the Stalinist bureaucracy and the proletariat in uprising, but only between the proletariat and the active forces of counter-revolution. »

These predictions have been completely confirmed by the experience of the 16th and 17th of June 1953 in Eastern Germany and by the experience of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions. In all cases, before the Soviet military forces intervened, the « native » bureaucracy collapsed without seriously resisting the masses' action. Only small nuclei of the secret police defended themselves. The rest of the bureaucracy divided: on the one hand, those who went over bag and baggage to the camp of the political revolution (in hundreds of factories and dozens of towns, strikes and demonstrations were led by official trade-union, party, or youth leaders); and on the other, those who went into hiding or ran away (in the physical meaning of the word) from the revolution.

As in the U.S.S.R. no foreign army will be able to intervene, the problem will be solved by the behavior of the Soviet army itself. We shall examine this problem in a few moments. But we can already predict that Trotsky's analysis will probably be verified in the most striking way at the moment of the outbreak of the political revolution in the U.S.S.R. As there will also be confirmed the fact that real civil war can break out only between the proletariat and the counter-revolution. The Hungarian revolution was about to confirm this prediction when the criminal intervention of the Russian army changed the givens of the problem.

### THE ROLE OF THE ARMY

If we try to sum up what has been happening in the upper regions of the bureaucracy since Stalin's death, we can distinguish two different processes:

a) The falling apart of the « solid nucleus » of « Stalin's faithful lieutenants » into different groups fighting each other more and more violently, and successively eliminating series of leaders from the Presidium, each group quickly breaking down in face of the impossibility of reconciling its desire to maintain the privileges of the bureaucracy with the necessity of making concessions to the masses.

b) The swift rise of the importance of the army, personified by the rise of Marshal Zhukov, today a member of the Presidium and actually N° 2 or N° 3 man in the « collective leadership. » (1)

We have already explained the first process as the indirect reflection, through the prism of the bureaucracy, of the fundamental currents which run through the whole Soviet society in ferment. In this connection, we must stress a very characteristic phenomenon. In Stalin's time, the secretary-general alone made decisions. After his death, a small group of lieutenants (Malenkov, Molotov, Beria) really held the reins of power. After the fall of Beria, power passed into the hands of a Presidium, composed of a dozen persons. When Khrushchev was voted into minority within this Presidium, he appealed over its head to the C.C., composed of

more than one hundred persons. To give more authority to its decision, he was obliged to go and explain the matter to the workers, in the factories, and to the rank and file of the party. Tomorrow, a leader of a group within the C.C., if he is put in a minority within this organism, may be tempted to appeal over its head to the members of the party, to the workers in the factories. It will be a decisive event, a turning point in the post-Stalinist history of the U.S.S.R.

What does the rise of the army mean? Under Stalin, the real power of the secretary-general was exercised through the omnipotence of the secret police, which controlled all the spheres of Soviet society, beginning with the party, the government, and the army. The death of Stalin, the execution of Beria, the reestablishment of control over the secret police by the party, destroyed this system of power. Outside the operation of bureaucratic centralism, of the nomination of officials, the bureaucracy no longer has any instrument of power over the people other than the army. All the information that we have confirms the fact that the army, and more precisely the Moscow garrison, played a key role in the elimination of Beria, then in Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov on one side, and over Molotov-Kaganovitch on the other.

Does this mean that there is danger of a military dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.? Without wishing a priori to exclude the possibility of short intermediate phases in the process towards the victory of the political revolution, we think that the eventuality of military dictatorship is impossible as a stable form of government by the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Soviet army is today the true mirror of Soviet society. It is no longer a mainly peasant army. It has become an army of mechanics and drivers, reflecting the enormous technical and cultural progress of the workers' state. It is true that it includes a caste of extremely privileged and arrogant officers. Probably we shall soon see a Zhukov group appear in the Presidium, striving to represent the interests of this caste. But the great reckoning which is building up in Soviet society between the proletarian current and that of the most privileged strata of the bureaucracy will take place also in the army. The ideas of equality will penetrate there; the officers' caste has already been obliged to make concessions, especially by abolishing the separate officers' messes. Many signs suggest that the decisive phase before the political revolution will be that in which revolutionary ideas will penetrate the army and make it unable to play its part as a shield of the bureaucracy's privileges and power.

### THE POLARIZATION OF FORCES IN SOVIET SOCIETY

Beginning with 1953, we have been saying that three parallel currents are being polarized in Soviet society:

- a) the current of the privileged strata of the bureaucracy;
- b) the current of the peasantry, the least articulate of the three;
- c) the current of the proletariat.

We had added that these three currents would have not only an indirect expression, by the echo of their demands in the speeches and writings of authors and political leaders, but also a direct expression, on the level of openly stated demands and of action, first economic, then even political. The social aims which these three currents strive to reach are, in short, the following:

- a) the most privileged strata of the bureaucracy seek to enlarge the legal bases which guarantee their privileges; they seek to transform usurped powers into vested rights (especially in the factories);
- b) the peasants strive to defend their private bits of land and the rights to the total profits which they yield;
- c) the workers demand better living conditions, and more rights in the economy and in the state (basically they aim at the management of the factories).

In the very last discussion, preparing the great reform

(1) This report was presented before the « Zhukov affair » broke out. The passage in this report concerning the army precisely casts light on this affair. [Ed. Note]

introduced by Khrushchev in the management of the economy, these three currents appeared clearly:

a) As at the Moscow economic conference in 1955, the factory directors, taking advantage of the principle of « decentralization, » again insisted that their rights and those of the foremen be increased, especially the right to fire and punish workers. Khrushchev mentioned these demands in his report to the Supreme Soviet. The ideological reflection of this pressure of the most privileged bureaucrats is the new theory which appeared in the « Economic » section of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., a theory according to which the means of production in the U.S.S.R. should also be considered as merchandise! It is well known that the directors' illegal selling of certain pieces of equipment directly from one factory to another, without the authorization of the Plan, was confirmed as their right.

b) The peasants relieved from Khrushchev a quite sensational concession: starting from 1958, they will pay no taxes on the products of their private bits of land. This great « principled Bolshevik » has thus moved, in a few years' time, from the struggle for « agrovilles, » for the statification of the kolkhozes, and for strict limitation of private bits of land, to a policy of concessions to the powerful instinct of private appropriation which remains more predominant than ever in the kolkhozian peasantry.

c) The workers have increased their pressure in favor of an increase in real wages, against a revision of the wage system which would end up by reducing the over-all wage for the most skilled workers. They demand more equality and protest against the bureaucratic abuses of power. The strikes which broke out in the Donbas in October 1956 and which spread to Leningrad, the slow-down strikes which paralyzed the Ordjonikidze factories in Moscow as well as other large factories, had essentially the same aims.

The incident reported by the daily newspaper *Trud* and picked up by Deutscher is very significant. A worker on the Red Square in Moscow went up to a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet who was leaving the Kremlin. He took him by the lapel of his jacket and said: « That is good cloth. A worker could not buy cloth like that. » This anecdote shows exactly how much the relationship of forces has changed in favor of the proletariat since Stalin. But the worker, after having made this gesture, just disappeared into the crowd. That shows how far there still is to go.

### THE LESSONS OF HUNGARY

What will be the concrete form of the proletariat's political revolution against the Soviet bureaucracy? Without going into fruitless speculations, we can bring out a few specific characteristics of the experiences of Hungary, Poland, and Eastern Germany.

First of all, the political revolution will have the *dynamics of permanent revolution*. All the strata of the population are mobilized against the dictatorship of the bureaucracy. In the beginning of the revolution, all these strata will participate in the movement. It is in the very course of the revolution that the proletariat and its conscious vanguard will conquer leadership and will bring the revolution to the victory of soviet democracy.

The relationship of forces between the classes will decide whether this victory can be won without an armed struggle against the organized forces of the counter-revolution (in Eastern Europe and China). In the U.S.S.R., this hypothesis is excluded because of the complete disappearance of those forces. This means that to forecast that from the very beginning of the revolution the forces will be divided into two clearly distinct camps, on the one side that of the Bolshevik-Leninists, and on the other that of the Stalinists, the confusionists, and the counter-revolutionaries, is absolutely contrary to reality. To have such an idea of the political revolution is to deny in practice the enormous discredit

and confusion that the Stalinist dictatorship has sown concerning the most elementary ideas of Leninism.

The duration and the rapid outcome of this process of permanent revolution will depend above all on the *organization* and the *leadership* of the proletarian vanguard. The working class itself will quickly find its own form of organization, that of workers' councils. The examples of Hungary and Poland have proved this beyond all doubt. This is the general precondition of soviet democracy, which is thus reestablished. But it is not enough that these councils should exist: they must also quickly aim towards *the exercise of all political power*. The mere existence of the councils is not a guarantee of the rapid victory of the political revolution. It can be combined, during a transitional period, with political compromise, the re-creation of petty-bourgeois parties, the attempt to give life again to bourgeois parliamentarism, etc... Only the presence in the councils of a conscious revolutionary leadership will make them become the centre around which the whole class will gather, reestablishing its revolutionary democratic power on the ruins of bureaucratic absolutism, and crushing any counter-revolutionary attempt.

The national question will play an important part in the political revolution. Here there is a very important difference between the countries of the « Soviet glacis » and the U.S.S.R. itself. In the countries of the glacis, » the national question, the feeling of oppression and exploitation undergone at the hands of the Kremlin, are a powerful stimulus to the revolution, increasing the desire of the masses for revolt and revenge. At a later stage, the national question could feed the prejudices of the more backward strata and of petty-bourgeois groups. But a clear and bold attitude on this question can channelize national feelings for the benefit of a workers' solution to the revolution, as is shown by the Yugoslav and Polish examples, even under the centrist leaderships of Tito and Gomulka.

It is not the same thing in the U.S.S.R. The national feeling, the feeling that the U.S.S.R. has become the second world power, is more a prop for the bureaucratic dictatorship. The sentiment of national oppression, felt by certain oppressed nationalities in Europe (Ukrainians, Balts, and to a certain extent the Caucasian nationalities), will introduce a dissociating and centrifugal element into the popular movement of which the bureaucracy is already taking advantage (e.g., stationing troops on other nationalities' territory). Finally, the Asian nationalities have in part a completely different attitude toward the bureaucracy from that of the European nationalities, because of the enormous progress accomplished in their territories, even during the Stalinist period. This fact is also skillfully exploited by the bureaucracy (mobilization of the authors of surrounding regions against the most oppositional authors of Moscow). For all these reasons, the national question threatens to slow down the outbreak of the political revolution and hinder its quick outcome in the victory of soviet democracy in the U.S.S.R.

But it must be made clear that these are not absolute obstacles. In any case, the faster the proletariat can regroup and go into action, the faster its vanguard can get organized and fight for the Bolshevik-Leninist programme, and the more all the transitional phases of inevitable confusion and compromise can be shortened, then the more quickly the revolution will appear in its purest aspect: that of the struggle for the *power of the workers' councils*.

### THE PROGRAMME OF THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION

It is for this reason that the programme of the political revolution, which will be discussed with passion by the communist vanguard, both workers and intellectuals, beginning in the period of preparation of the revolution, takes on a decisive importance, and must be carefully prepared by this Congress. The theses which have been placed before

you strive to achieve this preparation in the light of all the experiences of these last decades. We shall particularly stress two points.

Our theses state that soviet democracy cannot be achieved without the *right* for the masses to organize different soviet parties. It is on this point that Trotsky, and ourselves still more clearly, go one step further than the fundamental documents of the Third International and the Left Opposition. We believe that this step is justified by the Soviet experience. If the proletariat does not have the right to organize different parties, the tendency struggle inside the class party itself is inevitably stifled, for sooner or later this struggle threatens to end up by splitting the party. It is only if the revolutionary party honestly accepts the rule: all power to the workers' councils, if it acts within the framework of these councils as an organized vanguard fighting for the triumph of its ideas without repressing the minority or, if such be the case, the majority of the workers who do not accept these ideas, only then does the idea of the *dictatorship of the proletariat* take on its true meaning, in opposition to the theories and still more the bureaucratic adventurist practices of the Stalinists. Any other solution ends up in *bureaucratic arbitrariness*, in which the party takes the place of the class, the Central Committee takes the place of the party, and the secretary-general of the Central Committee takes that of the Central Committee.

Our theses stress the real difficulties and contradictions, which live on into the transitional period, between the different economic functions of the workers' state: the administration of the economy and the distribution of the national income; the advancement of socialist accumulation and the increase of the masses' standard of living, etc. To guarantee the most progressive solution of these contradictions, they stand for a sharing out and autonomy of various powers: the sharing of power by the workers' councils administering the factories, the trade unions defending the workers' interests as consumers, and the soviets (territorial workers' councils) exercising the democratic political power of the proletariat; mutual autonomy of the soviets, the trade unions, and the party.

This solution is simultaneously opposed to the bureaucratic centralization of the Stalinists, and to the « Yugoslav decentralization » which maintains bureaucracy at the central level, but at the same time re-introduces into the economy, by the way of factory autonomy, the phenomena of waste that result from competition. For instance, the Yugoslav factories hide technical improvements, new ways of organizing work, even patents, from each other, to win this « socialist competition » of a new type.

### NEO-CENTRISM

With the collapse of the Stalin cult, there also collapsed a whole way of political thinking, purely pragmatist and opportunist, among the leaders of the Communist Parties, purely schematic and mythological among the rank and file: the *Vozjd*, the leader (or the Central Committee of the C.P. of the U.S.S.R.), is always right... In the void left by the disappearance of these reflexes of obedience, and with the lack of truly revolutionary Marxist criteria of analysis, there are appearing all sorts of theories, of shadings of thoughts which lie between Stalinism and Marxism. The two most important varieties are the following:

a) *The semi-reformism* of the rightist opposition tendencies: Giolitti and Reale in Italy, Hervé-Lecœur in France, some oppositionals in Great Britain, some elements of Harich's ideas in East Germany, some « revisionists » of the Polish C.P., the Gates tendency in the American C.P., etc. Taking their inspiration from some of the ideas launched by Khrushchev at the XXth Congress (parliamentary road to socialism, etc.), these people are drawing near the Social-Democracy and throwing overboard essential elements of Leninist thought.

b) *The neo-centrism* of the former Stalinists who, under the pressure of the masses and of events, go farther and farther in the Marxist analysis of the phenomena of bureaucracy and of soviet democracy, including the real nature of Stalinism. Thus Gomulka stands for the right to strike; Mao also stressed it in his first report on the movement for rectification. Mao even analyzes the sources of bureaucratism, in the contradiction between the « manual workers » (producers) and the « intellectual workers » (administrators). All this goes much further than Khrushchev's scanty « theoretical » notions on the « personality cult. »

True, in most cases, these centrists' actions are not in conformity with their words. As representatives of a tendency of the bureaucracy, they are equally incapable of continuing the road all the way to Bolshevism. The numerical and cultural weakness of the Yugoslav proletariat, the real danger of counter-revolutionary uprisings in China, constitute additional subjective obstacles on the road to a victory of soviet democracy in these countries. Nevertheless, the importance of this « neo-centrism » is enormous, because it keeps up a ferment in the minds of all the Communist Party militants in the world (including those in the U.S.S.R.), and because it creates possibilities for a revolutionary vanguard to use it as a starting platform in its struggle for a return to Lenin.

*The experience of the Polish revolution since October 1956* enables us to draw up an objective balance-sheet of the meaning of this neo-centrism. The revolution had achieved four great conquests: national independence; the workers' councils in the factories; the end of forced collectivization of agriculture; a certain freedom of the press and especially of speech in the workers' movement. The first and third of these conquests still exist and will probably not be abolished without a civil war. But the second and fourth are always being questioned and run the risk of being lost if the revolution continues to mark time as it has unquestionably been doing for a certain time.

Caught between the revolutionary pressure of the left and the conservative pressure of the Stalinist right, Gomulka and his centrist group are striving to consolidate the position by avoiding any new concession either to one side or the other. But each blow which they deal to the left strengthens not their own group but the right: this is the most important lesson of the IXth Plenum of the C.C. of the United Workers' Party of Poland. What warps this process is the perfect organization of the right, led by the Soviet embassy, and the lack of organization of the left, whose leaders are disoriented and demoralized. A revival of the left with the slogan « All power to the councils, » opening the way to a concrete programme of economic and political reorganization, would, however, enable the real relationship of forces to find expression, and would give a new start to the revolution, which is far from being defeated.

### THE RETURN TO LENIN

Stalin's epigones have incautiously launched the struggle against the « personality cult » with the keynote of the « return to Lenin. » In so doing, they have lit the fire which will destroy them! Khrushchev strives to spread the story that the present leaders all sincerely believed in Stalin as long as he lived. But Communist militants and the mass of the workers' vanguard are discovering, and will discover more and more, that this is not true.

The Czechoslovakian Stalinist leader « on the cultural front, » Vladimir Dostal, gave the following answer in the organ of the Czechoslovakian Writers' Association, *Literární Noviny*, to the objection by the Polish writer Jan Kott that Soviet literature had lived in the midst of lies, since it said nothing of the crimes of the Stalinist period:

« I can imagine that the tragic conflict between duty and conscience has tortured many writers. But I consider it a

natural and temporary surrender to historical necessity that they finally decided to keep silent and to wait, for by acting against the government, they would have weakened their own country in years of a growing threat of war... On one side, there was the fate of the country and of the revolution; on the other a few [!] human lives, the honor of a few, and the purity of principles. Between the two, there was no other course. »

This is what a Stalinist leader says in Czechoslovakia, the country where the C.P. has remained the most « Stalinist » in all Europe! But the new generation of Communists, which is rising with the keynote of the « return to Lenin » will answer the bureaucrats that in Lenin's mind *the defense of principles can never be opposed to the interests of the Revolution!*

It will denounce those who have trampled these principles underfoot, not for the interests of the Revolution, to which

they have done great injury, but for the interests of a caste of ravenous and blood-thirsty upstarts.

Drawing their inspiration from Lenin's faithfulness to principles, it will rediscover in the Oppositionals, and above all in the Left Oppositionals and in the Trotskyists, those who, without yielding to fear or temptation, have upheld the banner of communism, keeping it clean and unstained. It will build a granite monument to these thousands of nameless heroes who have, by their apparently hopeless resistance in the past, assured the perpetuity and the magnificent worldwide revival of Leninism which we are witnessing today. It will come to the conclusion that the Fourth International, heir to these traditions, is capable of reestablishing them fully in the entire world communist movement. And by overthrowing the dictatorship of the bureaucracy, by reestablishing soviet democracy, under the banner of Lenin, it will clear the way to the victory of the World October.

# ACTIVITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL

REPORT PRESENTED BY COMRADE MICHEL PABLO

(Excerpts)

At the time of the Fourth Congress, the International was in full crisis, provoked by the split that had been carried out by the organizations that rallied to the « Open Letter, » and by the new split provoked right at the time of the Congress by the Cochran-Collins-Mestre tendency. Many among you perhaps remember in what an atmosphere of struggle for the survival of the International we held the Fourth World Congress.

This crisis in our ranks occurred at a time when the objective conditions were changing in favor of renewal in the communist vanguard, and in the last analysis in favor of Trotskyism and the Fourth International. Our own crisis, far from being a sign of the decline of our movement, was in reality a sign of new times in which our movement was from then on to take its place. It is explicable that certain tendencies found it hard to reorient themselves in this new situation; the fundamental abrupt turns in the situation reacted on our own movement, including by the phenomena of crises and even of abandonment. But what definitively counts is to see on what basis the movement regrouped and progresses. The way in which we liquidated the crisis of 1953-54, the fact that we not only maintained the International, but caused it really to progress and root itself better in the class, shows that the crisis, however painful it may have been, was not a demonstration of a decline of our movement. It had its roots in the new situation, to which in any case we had to face up. We were, furthermore, able to overcome it in a positive way thanks to favorable objective conditions. We did not just mark time. Since the Fourth World Congress, we have not only maintained and consolidated the then positions of the International, positions brought under destructive attack by the « orthodoxes » and the liquidators but we have made progress, and serious progress too.

The reports which the comrade delegates from the sections will give during this session will prove it in a more concrete manner than I could do myself. I shall limit this report to three main questions.

- 1) The activity of the leadership of the International.
- 2) The problems raised by the activity of our essentially independent sections.
- 3) The problems raised by our entrust work.

The activity of the leadership of our International has been considerably broadened since the Fourth World Congress. It has been shown in several sectors, but I shall mention only the most important ones. The leadership of the International — in which I include the International Executive Committee, the Latin-American Bureau, and the International Secretariat — has contributed politically, financially, and by the personal participation of its members, in reënforcing the activity of certain of our sections, in reconstructing certain others, and even in building new organizations of our International.

Among the most important successes of the International in these two last sectors, I shall mention: the rebuilding of our movement in Britain: the work done toward the Eastern European countries, on which we shall have certain details later on in our discussions; and the building of a Trotskyist organization also in Japan.

The activity of the leadership of our International has

been considerably increased in the field of publications. First of all, we consolidated the publication of our central theoretical organ, *Quatrième Internationale*, as a quarterly publication, with numbers of sometimes 100 or more pages. A similar effort was made by the Latin-American Bureau with the publication of the *Revista Marxista Latinoamericana*; the L.A.B. will, furthermore, present its own report immediately after this one. We have in addition achieved the publication of a theoretical organ in German, *Die Internationale*, with which you are acquainted, and a theoretical organ in English, *Workers International Review*. We published the first volume of the *Ecrits de Léon Trotsky*, and have started the preparation of the second volume. We have also published in French *Les Bolchéviks contre Staline*. We have in addition published, or republished, several pamphlets in order to have propaganda material adequate to « destalinization. » The L.A.B. has for its part made a parallel effort in Spanish. Only all these achievements, however important they may be, especially in comparison with our means and our past activity, are greatly inferior to the needs of the moment, the needs which arise from the new situation in which our movement is placed.

It is necessary to carry out a much more important programme of publications, both centrally and country by country, in order to renew and enrich our propaganda material and to answer new needs. In the field of central publications which the L.S. took on, we are already late with the publication of the subsequent volumes of Leon Trotsky's *Ecrits* and with our project of printing in a pamphlet the duplicated courses which have been given in the international schools of our International. Furthermore we are late in a general way concerning the need to publish the main works of Leon Trotsky in different languages. These works, which are more needed than ever, are in many cases out-of-print, and the question arises of considering, if needs be by the means of our own movement, the replacement of this absolutely indispensable stock of basic literature of our movement.

As for the theoretical publications of the International, though the progress of *Quatrième Internationale* and of the Latin-American review can be considered relatively satisfying, a big effort remains to be made to stabilize and improve the German organ, and especially the English organ. These are questions that must be studied and solved at this very Congress. In any case the question of a theoretical press, that appears regularly, that is widely distributed, and that above all consolidates and improves a very high theoretical and political level, is the principal weapon of our movement in the ideological battle already opened by « destalinization » for the reorientation of the international communist vanguard. We must not forget, comrades, that even now the main strength of our movement is the strength of its ideas, its theoretical and political superiority. In general the question of our press must concern all our sections, in order to succeed in publishing organs of a high political and theoretical level, and simultaneously — especially concerning political propaganda organs — expressing a sharpened knowledge of the problems and needs of the masses we are addressing. This furthermore will be the reflection of our real progress in integration in the mass movement.

I might further emphasize this question of the press by casting light on it from another angle. Our movement must not present itself to the masses as being essentially a movement of criticism of Stalinism, but as a movement which gives positive answers to the overall questions now raised by the working class and its vanguard. It is from our movement that whole strata of the toiling population are awaiting an answer to a series of questions in various countries. These are not only exclusively economic and political questions, but broader questions. Questions of social and cultural interest. The youth of the new generation, who have gone through and are still going through a terrible crisis, can be drawn to our movement, to the communist movement, only if the communist movement renews its themes, adapting them to the needs and aspirations of the youth of today.

The masses of women in the world, too, who have nowhere found the solution of their own problems, of their problems as women, which are not only economic problems such as equality of pay, but are much broader problems, of their relations with the other sex, on all planes, of questions which touch on the whole of the social and cultural position of women in present-day society, on their rights and freedoms on the sexual plane, on the plane of marriage, on the plane of children, on the plane of their relations with the men of this society. To these concrete questions, which worry more than you may think great masses of women who have nowhere obtained their real emancipation, it is necessary that the communist movement give an answer. It is not, of course, with the answer they found in the petty-bourgeois ideology developed under Stalinism and by the Communist Parties that women are going to be satisfied. The answer that they are seeking to these questions, very vital, very important for them, as the social category of women with their own problems toward which the men of this society always show the greatest lack of understanding, even when it concerns revolutionaries and communists — it is our movement which must give it. These questions must find a place in our press, extending it to a sector that touches on the social and cultural problems that concern broad masses of present-day humanity.

Stalinism has contributed nothing to these questions, for 30 years now. It has even gone back on the achievements attained in the first years of the Third International in this field. These questions have now become acute, let us make no mistake about it. Our movement can become a pole of attraction for broad masses if it is able to give an answer to these questions as well, to give new life to the themes of communism and renew the drawing-power of communism for a humanity which is more awakened than ever and is awaiting an urgent solution to a whole gamut of aspirations and needs, more broadly than at any other moment in its history.

We must examine the concrete means that will be able to give, not a complete solution, but the beginning of a solution, to these questions. We need a new press, a communist press tuned to the mid-XXth century. It is our movement that must begin to provide this new communist press of our times, of our period.

The importance of the question I am touching on lies, I think, in the fact that we must understand that we no longer are and must no longer be just a movement of opposition, but step firmly into our new role as the communist leadership of humanity.

The International Executive Committee has functioned in a more or less satisfactory way, at the regular tempo of two plenary sessions a year. It must however be regretted that the means of our movement have not enabled I.E.C. members from outside Europe to be present at these meetings. To fill up this grave lack, measures must be taken to make it possible, at least at one session per year, for the non-European

members to be present, both from Latin America and from the Far East. As for the International Secretariat, it has met in plenary sessions at least four times a year. That is, naturally, not enough. Practical measures must also be considered so that meetings can be guaranteed at least once every two months. Unquestionably the weakest point in the functioning of the International leadership lies in the functioning of the Bureau of the I.S., on which lies the weight of the daily practical work of the International. With the increase in the activities of the International, there would have been necessary in reality a parallel increase in the stable nucleus that resides at the seat of the I.S. But we have in fact seen the contrary evolution. The weight of the activity of our sections in a series of countries has absorbed almost the entire activity of the I.S. members who have taken over a leading role in their sections, including now Comrade Walter.

As for the present composition of the I.S., I think that it is quite representative of our movement. It could be still more so if it included other comrades, especially from the Far East. In the present composition of the I.S. there are represented the principal European sections of the International and Latin American comrades. The majority of these comrades are not only leaders of the International, but also comrades who undertake real responsibilities in the mass movement. This is a very healthy development as far as the composition of the I.S. is concerned, for our goal has always been to have the International led by the principal leaders of the sections of the International.

I seize this opportunity to recall what I already said at the Fourth World Congress: our International is absolutely democratic. The doors to the leadership of the International are wide open to the sections. There exists absolutely no obstacle to the International's being led by those who lead the sections, the essential forces of the International. I already said at the Fourth World Congress, and I repeat it: if we have reached the point that we have, we are here because that was the unanimous, democratically expressed, will of this movement. It is necessary, it is salutary, to consider that the leadership of the International is not the business of a few men, of any individual whatsoever, but that it is the most important, the most primordial business of those who lead the essential forces of the International.

I go on to the second part of the report, to the problems concerning the activity of our essentially independent sections. I shall leave it to the Ceylonese comrades to tell us about the current situation in their country and the problems and tasks which they have to face. It is in any case desirable, in my opinion, that the prospect of the Ceylonese revolution should have an adequate place in the document on the colonial revolution which will come out of this World Congress. I shall confine myself more especially to questions of our work in two countries: in India and in Bolivia. I shall begin with the question of Bolivia.

In Bolivia, the situation has evolved rapidly in these last months in the direction of a break between the political right wing of the M.N.R. and the left wing, represented by the strength of the trade unions and by the workers organized in the C.O.B. The political right wing, urged on by imperialism, and profiting by the pusillanimity, the cowardice, of the left wing, has since the last elections adopted an offensive attitude that aims at breaking up the conquests of the revolution, and of applying the stabilization plan of imperialism. The Bolivian example also confirms the impossibility of a so-called third way, of « a middle of the road, » between the solution of pro-imperialist capitalist reaction and the working-class solution. Siles, encouraged by imperialism, has now decided to push his offensive through to the end, even at the risk of giving place to a fascizing extreme-right. The essential forces of the Bolivian revolution, represented by the mining proletariat and the armed

peasants, are nevertheless still intact. What is important is that these forces are beginning to understand that they are now being betrayed also by the representatives of the C.O.B. and the « worker » ex-ministers, Lechin & C°. They are stirring and resisting. They are unquestionably looking for a new leadership in a way such as they never have in the past, from the beginning of the revolution up until now.

Once more, thanks to this development which is simultaneously critical and also more promising than ever for our movement, our section once more has a full opportunity to play its part. In reality, through the evolution of the situation, our section has become — it is this that we must understand and that the Bolivian comrades must understand — the key to the present situation in Bolivia. We must now prepare our party to play its role to the full. Its situation has been considerably improved of late. We have been able to observe it even here by the successes obtained at the time of the Miners' Congress and later at the time of the Congress of the C.O.B. Its influence as well as its prestige with the masses have again increased. These masses, betrayed by the trade-union bureaucracy of Lechin & C°, opportunist and lacking in perspectives, is turning toward the P.O.R. They await from it an answer to all problems, they expect from it a leadership — that is the fact of capital importance which we must take as our starting-point to define at present our line and the scope of our efforts in Bolivia.

This time the masses must not be disappointed, and, if our party does not at present play its role, it too will contribute, objectively, to the victory of the counter-revolution in Bolivia. It is necessary that our section show itself to be at the level of events, for the greatest hopes are now placed on Bolivia. Our organization is at present the only immediate alternative leadership for the masses, and it is on its intervention that more than ever the fate of the Revolution literally depends. It must struggle to include in its ranks the leading revolutionary elements in the workers' and peasants' milieu who are leaving the old leaderships, by integrating the economic demands of the masses — against the high cost of living, against inflation and unemployment, against the denationalization of the mines, against the sabotage of the agrarian reform, against the plan of stabilization of imperialism and reaction — in a positive political programme giving an answer to these questions and brightened by the perspective of a Workers' and Peasants' Government in Bolivia, which will be based on the workers' and peasants' organizations and their militias. In face of the complete discomfiture of the bureaucratic leadership of the C.O.B. and of the « labor » wing of the M.N.R., it is necessary, in my opinion, that the slogan of the C.O.B.'s breaking with the government, and of all power to the C.O.B., be combined more than ever with propaganda for the Workers' and Peasants' Government.

If the discomfiture of the C.O.B. leadership continues and ends up in a sort of paralysis and falling away of this organization, we must be ready to take up the struggle of the disappointed masses under the more direct slogan of the struggle for the Workers' and Peasants' Government. This is a concrete question which we must discuss from the viewpoint of the completely concrete present conjuncture in Bolivia.

What seems to me essential in Bolivia is that the party, with all its strength, must carry out an immense labor of organization of the workers' and peasants' vanguard which has just seen itself betrayed by those whom it still recently considered to be its leaders, i.e., by the leadership of the C.O.B., and by the leadership of the « labor » wing of the M.N.R.

The party absolutely must extend its organizational base by trying to enroll in its ranks not only ordinary workers and peasants, but a series of leading revolutionary militants in workers' and peasants' circles that are abandoning the old

leaderships. In this immense effort of our organization in Bolivia, the regular publication of our central and local press is a task that must be carried out at any cost. The Bolivian question is a question that concerns the whole International, and it is absolutely necessary that at the end of this Congress we have a more specific resolution on the Bolivian question, a resolution adopted in the name of the Congress of the International. We must further discuss practical measures that can insure the maximum help from the entire International to our Bolivian section.

I pass on now to the question of India. India is an immense country in which, unquestionably and independently of the evaluation we may make of the immediate situation and of its evolution in the near future, there is smouldering a formidable revolutionary explosion. The possibilities for the revolutionary Marxist movement are unquestionably very great. Nevertheless, we must admit that in the question of forming a stable organization of the Fourth International with a definite orientation of work, up until now there has been failure. The reasons therefor are many, and I do not propose to go into all the details. I shall stress more especially this point: that the creation of a Trotskyist organization that is a section of the Fourth International must this time go hand-in-hand with the definition of a concrete tactic for the building of the mass revolutionary party in India. Without wanting to raise this opinion into a thesis of the International or into anything else, I have the opinion that the Trotskyists in India must combine independent work with a serious entrist work, in the Communist Party and, in certain places, in the Socialist Parties where those parties still hold mass positions. This opinion is based on a series of considerations concerning — despite everything that has gone on in that country — the chances of the Stalinists, which obviously must be discussed together with the Indian and the Ceylonese comrades.

The independent work of the section should be demonstrated above all by the publication of a regular organ, distributed as widely as possible throughout the country.

Obviously all that is first of all subordinated to the possibility of regrouping the Indian comrades on the basis of a reunified organization, an organization of the Fourth International. We must discuss the question practically with the Ceylonese comrades, and set as one of the tasks of the International in the coming period the reconstruction of the section of the Fourth International in India.

I now go on to the third and last part of my report, which concerns the problems raised by the development of our entrist work.

It is now clear that the turn carried out by the Third World Congress has proved to be fundamental for our integration in the real mass movement. This work was a success, a salutary success, which permitted, as the discussion will show, the stabilization and the progress of all the sections that engaged in it, and which has qualitatively transformed our movement. That is to say, we have not only numerically increased our membership, but changed it qualitatively by the fact that the great majority of our members are not isolated in their class but occupy a place in the mass movement.

This new physiognomy of our movement, which in the past it had in only limited cases, is now the general feature of our movement, with all the fortunate and salutary consequences for the very life of our International. After a first stage of integration, we have now pretty much everywhere reached the point of how to set going in the Socialist Parties and Communist Parties a broader left current, a current stimulated by our nuclei who work in these movements, and partly led by these nuclei. In this new stage of entrist work several new problems have appeared which have not yet found satisfactory solutions. Among these questions I shall raise the following: the question of the

press, of recruitment, and the more general one of the development of the tactic. There is, furthermore, an interdependence among these questions which in reality can be summed up as that of the development of the perspectives of our tactic in mass organizations.

For this last question of the development of the entrism tactic, I personally think, on the basis of experience, on the basis of the problems that have arisen for us, that it should tend more or less everywhere to become a tactic of « sui generis entrism, » in the way in which we already carry it out in the Communist Parties, i.e., a tactic which combines independent activity with entrism activity properly so called, our independent activity continuing to be aimed essentially at aiding our entrism activity. Our independent activity will be demonstrated above all by the publication, everywhere that it is possible, of a 100 % Trotskyist press, undertaken by an independent nucleus which will represent, to the developed elements of the country, the section of the Fourth International.

This is, I believe, the common conclusion which the majority of our sections engaged in entrism work are now reaching. In any case, I shall return to this question, and we can discuss it fully in this Congress.

I come back to the question of the press. What did we need for entrism work, properly so called, either in the Communist Parties or in the Socialist Parties? We needed above all an interior organ to be the expression of the left tendency of the party expressing itself in a language suitable to that milieu and representing the political alternative to the policy of the leadership of the party. I believe that that is valid for the press we need in both the Socialist and Communist Parties.

Naturally, in addition to this internal press in either the Socialist or Communist Parties, we now feel the need pretty much everywhere of insuring the publication of an external 100 % Trotskyist press that represents both the ideas and the organization, however limited it may be, of the Fourth International. Around these organs we can polarize in all countries a series of elements who have reached a higher point of understanding. For the Socialist Parties, such an organ must be rather a theoretical review. For the Communist Parties, it should rather be a newspaper combining a theoretical character with a more concrete political character.

# TOWARD THE WORLD OCTOBER

## *Manifesto of the Fifth World Congress of the Fourth International*

### TO THE WORKERS AND PEOPLES OF THE ENTIRE WORLD

Comrades :

The structural crisis which has been shaking the capitalist world for the last 40 years is reaching its final phase. Undermined by its economic contradictions, dogged by the colonial revolution which is indefatigably continuing its onward march, faced by the growing power of the workers' states, capitalism has lost all hope of reconquering the globe. Hanging on to the last solid positions it occupies, in North America and in Western Europe, it yet does not propose to abdicate without a struggle to the rising waves of the revolutionary forces. On the contrary, it never ceases preparations for waging a last decisive battle, throwing into the scales the enormous technical and military potential of the United States. Hence arises the danger that still threatens humanity, the danger of a nuclear world war whose consequences for the survival of the human race would be incalculable.

#### ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE GOLDEN AGE

Never has capitalism better shown its fundamentally reactionary role in the world of today. Never has it given such proof that all human progress urgently requires its destruction.

For ten years now human science and technics have progressed with giant strides. Automation, the multiplicity of new industrial techniques, the productive use of nuclear energy, and even tomorrow the productive use of solar energy, would enable humanity within a relatively short time to bring true its age-old dream of abundance. Rid once and for all of material worries, man would set out to conquer space and the last secrets of life, would put an end to bad weather and disease, make deserts flower, and guarantee to all inhabitants of the planet an existence which would at last be at the level of human greatness.

In the opinion of scientists, there are no longer any insurmountable barriers blocking us from these wonderful goals. The material means and the techniques are no longer wanting. What is lacking is the rational organization of society which must eliminate the conflicts among social groups. What is lacking is the rational distribution of the resources already at the disposal of humanity for the purpose of well-being

and progress and not for the purpose of destruction and waste.

Such is the basic paradox of our epoch : at the moment when immense wealth is being used in the production of devices for the suicide of humanity, at the moment when equally colossal wealth is being used to conquer space, one and a half billion human beings cannot satisfy their hunger, can scarcely cover their nakedness, live in dwellings unworthy of human habitation, and remain prey to illness, destitution, and ignorance. At the moment when man is getting ready to become the master of the universe, thousands of human beings, even in advanced capitalist countries, have not yet solved the problem of decent housing.

In order that the acquisitions of science and technics may be put at the service of all humanity, it is necessary to abolish the absurd economic system which subordinates production to profit, and the consumption of broad masses to the income that the masters of the trusts and monopolies feel like granting to them. It is necessary to abolish the exploitation of man by man, and the system of international exchanges based on market relations. It is necessary to place the means of production in the hands of the community, insure the control of the producers over the plants, draw up the inventory of the real needs of two and a half billion consumers, and work up a **world-wide plan of economic development and well-being** which, while improving the living standards of the workers of advanced countries, will in the shortest possible time enable the inhabitants of colonial and semi-colonial countries at last to live at the level of the XXth century.

Such world-wide planning of the economy is today the most burning task for humanity, else the evolution of the next decades will accentuate the monstrous tendency for the rich countries to become richer and the poor countries to become relatively poorer. This planning is not utopian; it does not demand heavy sacrifices from the workers of the West. On the contrary : if we take as a starting-point only the wealth annually wasted on armament goals, that is, on destruction, we reach the fantastic sum of one hundred billion dollars **a year** which could be integrally devoted to the industrialization and modernization of the

countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, without the workers of industrially advanced countries having to give up the slightest bit of their present standard of living.

And even this hypothesis is based only on the mere **maintenance** of the wealth at present produced by capitalism. But in reality the example of the Soviet Union shows year after year that even a slightly rational organization would enable industrially advanced countries to **double**, at least, the rhythm of their economic progress, thus aiding a new and substantial rise of the standard of living in the West, while still freeing new resources for an economic and cultural upsurge in the countries which imperialism has until now kept chained to an almost mediaeval economy.

The reign of universal abundance and peace is now within the direct reach of humanity. There is only one serious obstacle: the survival of capitalism. To sweep capitalism off the face of the earth has become a task of public safety for humanity; if this task is not solved, capitalism threatens to mobilize the infinite resources of science and technics for the purpose of frightful destruction.

#### **CAPITALISM MUST BE DISARMED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!**

Sensing that the relationship of forces has definitely turned against it, American imperialism has rushed into an arms race whose outcome can only be war unless the workers of the entire world and the workers of the United States succeed in time in disarming the masters of Wall Street and the Pentagon by taking power.

The economic and technical advances achieved by the Soviet Union, far from damping the warlike ardor of Yankee imperialism, only drive it to the pitch of paroxysm. In the present decisive stage of the death-agony of capitalism, imperialism has in fact the choice only between giving up without a fight or making a last desperate struggle in order to push back the deadline. Each new decisive progress of the revolution, each major economic crisis that threatens itself, each sensational technical advance of the U.S.S.R. drives imperialism to lean over the edge of the abyss, according to the expression of Foster Dulles, the theoretician and leader of imperialism's war policy.

For several years it seemed that imperialism was somewhat slowing down its drive toward war. The economic conjuncture was favorable for profits. The colonial revolution for a certain period was being canalized by leaderships inclined to conclude compromises with Washington. The Kremlin was exposed to contradictory internal forces within Soviet society. We thus witnessed the Geneva conference and the interminable negotiations of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London.

But it needed only a new advance of the colonial

revolution in the Middle East and a sensational bound forward of Soviet technique and armament for the fictitious nature of this « truce » to become clear as day. Partial agreements on this or that aspect of the armament race remain, of course, possible. But genuine disarmament would mean imperialism's signing its own death warrant.

**Rather than delude the world's peoples with optimistic prognoses, the Fourth International solemnly warns them of the dangers threatening humanity. If the international proletariat does not disarm imperialism, especially American imperialism, in time, it will hurl humanity into a nuclear war rather than give up to the Revolution without a fight.**

To defend the mendacious policy of « peaceful coexistence, » some people state that, since a nuclear world war threatens to destroy all civilization, and since any new advance of the revolution threatens to drive imperialism to launch its war, it is better to slow down the advance of the revolution! In this way they excuse the treacherous behavior of the Kremlin and the Communist Parties toward revolutionary movements such as the Algerian revolution. But in reality these supporters of « passive resistance » do not carry through their thinking to its conclusion. The latest events have shown that not only the advance of the Revolution, but also bounds forward of the Soviet economy, technics, or science can « provoke » imperialism. The logic of capitulation to atomic blackmail would therefore require not only stopping the colonial revolution but even stopping the progress of the Soviet economy!

No force in the world, however, is capable today of stopping either of these fundamental tendencies of our time. The task laid on humanity is not to capitulate to Washington's atomic blackmail but to disarm as quickly as possible the nuclear war-makers. The movements which are at present developing around this matter in Great Britain, Norway, Iceland, and elsewhere indicate that the international proletariat, after a moment of stupefaction, is understanding better and better the life-and-death question posed to humanity.

**The Fourth International calls the workers and all the peoples of the world to concerted action against the madness of the nuclear arms race. Let a world conference assemble the representatives of all workers' organizations—political, trade-union, and cooperative—with the aim of drawing up a plan of concerted action against A and H bombs! Let May Day be proclaimed throughout the entire world as a day of common struggle against nuclear arms! Let the voice of the international proletariat ring out powerfully, in thousands of mass-meetings, demonstrations, and strikes, throughout the world:**

**An immediate end to nuclear tests!**

**Immediate prohibition of nuclear arms under the**

**control of workers' organizations and destruction of the stock-piles of these arms!**

**No farther along the road leading the madmen in power toward the abyss of nuclear war!**

At the same time the Fourth International warns the workers and peoples of all countries that there is definitely only one effective means of disarming imperialism: **that is to wrench its wealth and power from it, to overthrow its states and to build workers' states in the great countries of the world.**

### **FOR THE VICTORY OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION!**

The main force that has changed the global relationship of forces among the classes was the Chinese revolution and the tremendous wave of the colonial revolution throughout the world. Inspired by the elementary thirst for freedom and human dignity of masses wakened from a sleep of centuries, fed by an ineffable poverty contrasting with the comfort and luxury insured by the imperialist countries to part of their own inhabitants, encouraged by the successive defeats suffered by imperialism in China, Korea, and Vietnam, the colonial revolution today is setting aflame all the Arab countries from Pakistan to Casablanca, is producing a powerful upsurge of the mass movement in many countries of Latin America (Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, Cuba...), is undermining the apparent stability of Nehru's bourgeois regime in India and Sukarno's in Indonesia, and is beginning to infiltrate through thousands of cracks in the imperialist edifice set up in Central Africa.

The social structure of colonial and semi-colonial countries, the extreme numerical weakness of the proletariat, the betrayal of the colonial revolution by the big metropolitan workers' parties, the Kremlin's opportunist policy of unreserved support accorded to the colonial bourgeoisie to whom the Communist Parties are called on to subordinate themselves in a servile way—all these phenomena, during a first stage of the revolution, help to keep in command bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leaderships, who manoeuvre between the masses on the one hand and imperialism on the other, indiscriminatingly seeking diplomatic support from the side of Washington or of the Kremlin.

American imperialism, realizing the disastrous consequences for its regime of an even slightly durable alliance between the colonial bourgeoisies and the Kremlin on the world scale, has tried to buy their sympathy by promising them financial aid and supporting them to a certain extent against European imperialisms. The attitude of the American imperialists at the time of the Suez crisis, when they acted with the colonial bourgeoisies and the bloc of workers' states against Paris and London, marked the culminating point of this manoeuvre.

But this manoeuvre runs up against a series of objective obstacles. Where the imperialism against which the masses are rising is precisely American imperialism itself, it has only a limited field of application (for example the support given at present to the right wing of the M.N.R. in Bolivia). By its own social nature and in spite of financial reserves infinitely more extensive than those of the U.S.S.R., American imperialism is incapable of stimulating the genuine industrialization of the colonial countries. Its own wealth, which makes it an exporting country of both agricultural and manufactured products, prevents it from furthering the growth of market production of numerous colonial and semi-colonial countries (for example, of cotton in Egypt). Lastly the very logic of the colonial revolution will cause it to go beyond its present stage of vacillating or treacherous bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leaderships. The more the mass movement broadens, the more plebeian staffs, of workers' if not of Marxist inspiration, will struggle with the old leaderships for the control of the colonial revolution. The creation of independent workers' parties, arising from the nationalist or trade-union movement, is on the order of the day in all these countries. This will rapidly eliminate the manoeuvres of Yankee imperialism.

Of all the manifestations of the colonial revolution produced in the course of these last years since Dien-Bien-Phu, it is the heroic revolutionary uprising of the Algerian people which represents at the present time the most direct threat to world imperialism. Bringing more and more into question the unstable compromises concluded between French imperialism and the Moroccan and Tunisian bourgeoisies, undermining the stability of the economy, the finances, and the state in metropolitan France itself, uncovering the flank of Central Africa to a new extension of the revolution, destroying French imperialism's last hope of « grandeur » based on the oil-bearing sands of the Sahara, the Algerian revolution deserves the respect and admiration of all workers throughout the world for the spirit of sacrifice and unparalleled abnegation of the masses engaged in it, for the audacity and unshakable will to victory of its combatants. Faced with the deep unrest that the outbreak of the Algerian revolution produced in France, faced with refusal of orders and the first mutinies by young recruits in the French army, the French workers' movement could have both given serious help to the Algerian revolution and profited by this unique opportunity to strike a decisive blow against its own N° 1 enemy, French big capital. Instead of so acting, the mass organizations of the French workers' movement covered themselves with shame by their cowardice, their hypocrisy, their passivity, if not their open betrayal, toward the Algerian revolution.

The reformist leadership of Guy Mollet, casting its campaign promises to the winds and capitulating before the riots of the colonialists in Algiers, boasts of

its having organized the counter-revolutionary repression in Algeria. It has on its conscience massacres that have attained the scope of genocide, terror and tortures that are the equal of Hitler's, the establishment of a concentration-camp regime that the so-called « special powers » law has already transferred to France. As for the Communist Party, ready not so long ago to mobilize its militants against the « American » general Ridgway or against the « German » general Speidel, it has not seen a way to organize a single class action, a single strike, a single demonstration of any breadth, in order to impose the withdrawal of French troops and imperialism from Algeria. It cannot, to justify itself, invoke the chauvinist wave that has spread over France, for it has fed it if not launched it, in complicity with the S.F.I.O. Neither can it invoke the relative passivity of the workers, for which it is itself responsible because of its past crimes. And yet the much weaker French C.P. of 1925, under infinitely more unfavorable conditions, carried out a campaign of a different dynamism against the war in Morocco.

It fell to the French section of the Fourth International, to be the only workers' organization in the country proudly to raise the banner of Lenin, the banner of the common struggle of the French workers and the Algerian people for the defeat of French imperialism. By so doing, it saved the honor of the working class in face of the blood-bath of which the Versailles masters of the Palais-Bourbon had rendered themselves guilty.

In Latin America, the Bolivian revolution has entered its decisive stage. Without a social base of any importance whatever, the reactionary government of Siles, fully backed by Yankee imperialism and encouraged by the cowardice of the official leadership of the Left, the Lechins and other « worker » ex-ministers, is preparing to take away from the masses all the gains of the revolution of April 1952 and to instal a sanguinary military dictatorship.

But the fighting spirit of the heroic Bolivian masses, the miners of Catavi and Siglo XX, the peasants, their organizations and their militias, is as high as ever. Guided by the P.O.R. (Bolivian section of the Fourth International), they will soon find the way to force the calling of a special congress of the C.O.B. which will decide on the formation of a genuine Workers' and Peasants' Government, freeing the masses of the country from the economic nightmare in which they are now living and from the threat of dictatorship.

Any victory in Bolivia will echo throughout all Latin America, through which a revolutionary fever is again running, in face of the extraordinary instability of the weak bourgeois governments and the economic chaos which they maintain. From Argentina to Colombia and even to Cuba, the Latin American masses will salute the successes of the Bolivian revolution and

will be able to follow tumultuously on the same victorious path!

**Long live the victory of the colonial revolution!**  
**Full and entire independence for all peoples!**  
**Withdrawal of the imperialist occupation troops from all colonial and semi-colonial countries!**  
**Glory to the heroic Algerian revolution!**  
**For the defeat of French imperialism, common enemy of the French proletariat, of the Algerian people, and of all the oppressed peoples of the French Union!**

#### **FOR A NEW ASSAULT ON THE WESTERN CITADELS OF CAPITAL**

Thanks to the betrayal of the reformist and Stalinist leaderships, who called on the workers to rebuild the dilapidated capitalist economy and states at the end of World War II, when the seizure of power was within their grasp, capitalism has succeeded in passing through a new period of prosperity in most of the countries of Western Europe. True, no structural problem has been solved. Southern Italy is not industrialized; Spain remains bent under the burden of starvation wages and semi-feudal land ownership; the decay of the British economy becomes ever more explicit; France has not succeeded in modernizing its conversion industries or in bringing its finances into balance; Germany has not succeeded in recovering its unity. Nevertheless, during these last years, capitalist industry has unquestionably experienced a remarkable boom and real wages have undergone a modest increase in most countries.

But since it is under the capitalist system that this prosperity has been reached, it has been characterized by all the phenomena which traditionally go along with it. The capacity of production has been developed much more than the capacity of consumption of the broad masses. Rapid fortunes have been made thanks to speculation and shady deals, while millions of wage-earners, especially women and the young, earn less than the strict living minimum while working more intensely than ever. There is a glut of luxury building, while millions of families suffer from a housing crisis, the origin of demoralization and personal catastrophes. In the general race after profits, the conjuncture has grown hotter, inflation has begun to show itself, the dollar deficit has reappeared in Europe, the imbalance in international exchanges is becoming more accentuated. There have thus been assembled all the elements of a new recession, which has already begun in several countries.

In the United States, where prosperity is maintained essentially thanks to the enormous military expenditures, regional fluctuations have created in that country, the most prosperous in the world, tragic social situations and ever more accentuated economic imbalances.

The textile industry has for years been in decline. The recession in the auto industry has lasted two years, creating a mass of unemployed in the most industrialized regions. These unemployed are being added to by workers discharged from the aviation plants as a result of the revision of the arms programmes. Industrialization in the South, far from solving the race question in a harmonious way, has exacerbated the tension between the Negro masses, demanding more and more insistently their emancipation and real equality in rights, and the « hard kernel » of white-supremacists who hang on to their privileges at any price. This has given birth to a political crisis of an exceptional gravity for the equilibrium of the American bourgeois government, a crisis which is only the reflection inside the United States of the advances achieved by the colonial revolution on the world scale.

This means that, despite prosperity both in Western Europe and in the United States, the workers' movement was again in a position to deliver very hard if not decisive blows against its class adversary. This means that the moments of crisis were not lacking, moments by which the workers' movement could have profited to present boldly to the world's peoples, as an alternate solution to the waste of capitalist disorder and exploitation, **the reorganization of society on a socialist basis.** If these occasions were not exploited, the fault thereof lies not with « objective conditions » but with the impotence and cowardice of the traditional « Socialist » and « Communist » leaderships, more than ever terrified by the idea that they must at some given point go outside the sacrosanct framework of bourgeois democracy.

Today, on the threshold of a new recession whose scope will be determined in the final analysis by the importance of a new wave of military expenditures which will undermine even further the stability of the currencies, the Fourth International calls on the workers of all advanced capitalist countries to raise themselves to the height of the socialist opportunities opened by the death-agony of capitalism.

**Do not let the employers close down plants built by your labor and pains. Do not let the plague of unemployment spread. Nationalization of the banks and all basic industries and their administration under workers' control! Automatic expropriation by the state of all businesses closed down by their owners! Establishment of overall plans for economic development, worked out under the control of the trade unions! Against the «Europe» of the trusts, and for the Socialist United States of Europe, which will develop a joint economic plan and offer integration on a socialist basis to the countries of « People's Democracy » and to the U.S.S.R.! Reduction of the working week to 40 hours in all countries where it is at present 48 or 44 hours, and to 35 hours where it is at present 40 hours, with no correspond-**

**ing decrease in wages! Application of any automation technique under workers' control and within the framework of an overall economic plan guaranteeing full employment!**

#### FOR THE REESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET DEMOCRACY IN THE U.S.S.R.

At the moment when the death-agony of capitalism is entering its decisive stage, that of the Soviet bureaucracy is beginning. The same forces that are shaking the world foundations of Capital are blowing up the monolithic dictatorship of the Kremlin. The rise of the colonial revolution and the remarkable advances in Soviet technics and economy are undermining the objective and subjective bases of that dictatorship, viz, the relative weakness of the proletariat and its fear of a reestablishment of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. Assured of the world victory of socialism, confident of the future, and proud of its incomparable industrial accomplishments, the Soviet working class is raising its head again, is condemning police oppression, growing social inequality, the exorbitant privileges of the bureaucrats and the mediocrity of daily life, in crying contradiction with the enormous advances in the country's economy.

This growing pressure of the masses had already made itself felt before Stalin's death. That event accentuated the tendency. Seized by panic in face of the rising waves of popular discontent, Stalin's successors threw out ballast, granting successively economic and political concessions to the masses, disowned the Stalin cult, admitted, even though in a mealy-mouthed way, most of the crimes of the hated dictator, and promised to return to the path of Lenin. Far from having calmed the grumbling voices, the Kremlin's concessions, as well as new successes achieved by Soviet society, have spurred and will still further spur the appetite and the aspirations of the people.

In the countries of «People's Democracy,» to all these reasons explaining the growing pressure of the masses on the bureaucratic leaderships in office, there is added their feeling of being the victims of national oppression and of seeing their country exploited by the Kremlin. The strength of these feelings and the intolerable economic situation of the workers caused the great workers' revolts of East Berlin and Poznan. Combining with a current of political opposition inside the Communist movement against the bureaucratic dictatorship, they led to the Polish and Hungarian revolutions.

In Poland, the movement of the masses, victorious over Stalinist resistance thanks to an alliance with the liberal wing of the bureaucracy, has temporarily stopped halfway to victory. In Hungary, faced with the fierce resistance of the Stalinist apparatus, mobilizing the Soviet army to its aid, the revolution rapidly

took a classic turn, opposing almost the entire population to the hated instruments of the bureaucratic dictatorship. Scarcely had the revolution been launched than the Hungarian proletarians, repeating the traditions of all proletarian revolutions, built their soviets, their workers' councils, demanding all power in the country. Faced with this example, which threatened to set aflame its whole «glacis,» and even the U.S.S.R. itself, the Soviet bureaucracy struck back pitilessly. But it could not break the heroic resistance of a working class which the workers of all countries, including Communist workers, felt solidarity. The effects of the political revolution in the European «People's Democracies» and in the U.S.S.R. are already being felt also in China and even in Yugoslavia.

With its inevitable ups and downs, undergoing stoppages and even temporary retreats, the political revolution against the Soviet bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. itself and in the «People's Democracies» is already one of the driving forces of the world revolution. It will spread in close interaction with the latter, spurred by the reconstruction of a new Bolshevik-Leninist vanguard, a reconstruction which the international revolutionary movement must help with all its strength. Putting itself boldly, at the head of the masses, the Bolshevik-Leninists of the U.S.S.R. and of Eastern Europe will avoid the intermediate stages of confusion and reduce to a minimum the needless costs of the political revolution, as well as the temporary profits that the counter-revolution may be able, here and there, to derive from it.

**Long live the Hungarian revolution, which will arise again, invincible, until the power belongs to the democratic committees of the toiling people!**

**Down with the bloody counter-revolutionary intervention of the Kremlin in Hungary!**

**Long live the Polish October which will end by winning out over all the hesitations, retreats, and betrayals of the Gomulkiist centrists!**

**Long live the political revolution in the U.S.S.R., which will reestablish soviet democracy there, reorganize the planned economy, freeing it from the bureaucratic grip, stimulate the creative enthusiasm of the proletarians and the intellectuals, and make of the U.S.S.R. the invincible bastion of socialism in the world!**

**Long live the power of the soviets, the power of the councils of workers and poor peasants, without which the regeneration of the workers' states is impossible.**

**Long live soviet democracy, which will mark for all humanity an enormous stride forward compared to the most advanced forms of bourgeois democracy!**

**Long live the alliance of all workers' states on a basis of equality!**

### **COMRADE WORKERS, COMRADE COMMUNISTS!**

The Fifth World Congress of the Fourth International met on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. The Fourth International speaks to you as the legitimate heir of the ideas of that revolution, of the ideas of the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Trotsky, of the ideas of the early Communist International. Today, when the Kremlin leaders are themselves admitting the crimes of Stalin, they implicitly recognize that the indefatigable struggle carried on by the Old Bolsheviks in the U.S.S.R., by the Russian and International Left Opposition, by the world Trotskyist movement, against the degeneration of the workers' state, was fully justified.

It is in this bureaucratic degeneration, in the presence at the head of the workers' state of a powerful privileged caste, that it is necessary to seek the secret of all the failures and all the defeats undergone by the international workers' movement during the last 30 years. If today the Communist Parties are in crisis, in full retreat if not in decomposition in many a country in the West, it is not due to a strengthening of capitalism, whose death-agony is completely visible to everyone. It is due to the fact of the false, criminal, treacherous policy imposed on the Communist Parties by the Kremlin. This policy has not contributed to the defense of the Soviet Union. It has on the contrary contributed to arousing against it an alliance of countries several of which might today have been workers' states.

**When the Kremlin leaders say that they want to return to the path of Lenin, hold them to it! Demand a total and opposite revision of the Stalinist policy of these last years. Demand that freedom of discussion and freedom for tendencies be reestablished within the Communist Parties. Demand the reconstitution of a communist International within which, on a basis of strict equality, all communist parties would work out together the joint line that would lead to the world triumph of communism!**

By formulating these demands, you would once more run up against the resistance, the obstruction if not the repression, of your bureaucratic leaders. You will soon see that, though they have thrown out ballast, they are still prepared to fight hard for their positions and privileges.

**Organize against them, for the straightening out of the Communist movement, a left opposition on a national and international scale. Study the writings of Lenin, of the Old Bolsheviks, of Trotsky and the international Trotskyist movement: you will there find the only revolutionary Marxist explanation of the crimes of Stalin and the mistakes of your parties. Make contact with the sections of the Fourth International. They are patiently and tenaciously preparing the construction of a new leadership of the**

**international proletariat within which you have an essential place to fill.**

What made possible the victory of October will tomorrow make possible the victory of the world-wide October : a revolution pushed to its logical extreme ; the power of councils of workers and poor peasants ; a party at the unselfish service of the proletariat, armed by all the teachings of that science of society and revolution, revolutionary Marxism.

Met together in this World Congress which reflects the considerable strengthening of their movement, the 100 delegates and observers from the revolutionary organizations of nearly 30 nations, represent a cohort of vanguard militants who are already in action, each in his own country and all together on the world scale, as educators, coördinators, unifiers, and driving forces of the real movement of the masses in which they are definitively integrated. With them, around them, the most conscious proletarians will build the world

Bolshevik party which will insure the victory of the world-wide October.

**Long live the immortal October Revolution, which opened for humanity the era of victorious communism !**

**Long live the programme of Lenin and Trotsky, the shining guide of the international proletariat !**

**Down with the Stalinist bureaucracy, which stained with mud and blood that banner dear to the workers, and led astray an important part of the international proletariat !**

**Long live the Fourth International, which saved the honor of communism and which will tomorrow reassemble all honest communists in the final combat for the defeat of capitalism, for the victory of the world socialist revolution !**

**THE FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE  
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL**

[*Note:* The foregoing Manifesto is also published separately as a pamphlet, and can be obtained from the addresses on the inside of the cover.]

## *Some publications of the Fourth International*

### OTHER THEORETICAL ORGANS

*Quatrième Internationale* (French)

*Die Internationale* (German)

*Revista Marxista Latinoamericana* (Spanish)

*De Internationale* (Dutch)

### RECENT BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

Léon Trotsky : *Ecrits, 1928-1940*, tome I

Léon Trotsky : *Les Bolcheviks contre Staline*

Michel Pablo : *Dictature du prolétariat, démocratie, socialisme*

Michel Pablo : *La Guerre qui vient (Capitalisme ou Socialisme)*

*Orders to* : Service des Éditions de la IV<sup>e</sup>, 64, Rue de Richelieu, Paris

## *Public Organs of Some of the Sections of the Fourth International*

France : *La Vérité des Travailleurs*

Italy : *Bandiera Rossa*

Ceylon : *The Samasamajist*

Argentina : *Voz Proletaria*

Greece : *Workers' Struggle*

Brazil : *Frente Operaio*

Japan : *Fourth International*

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PIERRE FRANK  
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